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occurs in the Constitution. It was introduced for the purpose of effectually silencing all attempts at an alliance of Church and State in the National Government.
§ 10. In the very first Article of Amendments to the Constitution, Congress is prohibited from making any law respecting an establishment of religion, or from interfering with its free exercise. Congress is not allowed in any way to intermeddle with the religious institutions of the country.
Our fathers felt extreme dread of every thing in the line of religious establishments of State. They felt that religion was chiefly a matter of personal concern between the individual and his Maker. They were familiar with the history of religious intolerance in those European States where the ecclesiastical power had become superior to the civil. They were well satisfied that the interests of a pure and holy religion demand no alliance with the civil power. Many of the authors of the Constitution were themselves men of strong religious convictions; so that we are not to attribute the clauses on this subject, either in the Constitution or its amendments, as arising from indifference or hostility to the interests of religion.
§ 11. Judge Story says, “It was also obvious, from the numerous and powerful sects existing in the United States, that there would be perpetual temptations to struggles for ascendency in the national councils, if any one might thereby hope to found a permanent and exclusive national establishment of its own; and religious persecutions might thus be introduced to an extent utterly subversive of the true interests and good order of the Republic. The most effectual mode of suppressing the evil, in the view of the people, was to strike down the temptation to its introduction.”
RELATING TO OFFICERS.
ART. I. - INELIGIBILITY.
1. UNITED STATES OFFICERS. - No person holding any office
of trust or profit under the United States shall,
1st. Be appointed an elector of President and Vice
President, 54; nor,
his continuance in office. 22.
President, 54; nor,
pointed to any civil office under the United States,
such time ; nor,
increased during such time. 22.
This clause requires that the electors shall come direct and fresh from the people, untrammeled by existing official relations.
§ 2. The clause forbidding membership of either house to officers under the General Government has been noticed in treating of the eligibility of senators and representatives, and need not be discussed here.
§ 3. Senators and representatives, although not officers of the United States, are excluded from being electors of President and Vice-President. The same reasons, however, why United States officers should not be electors, bear with increased force against members of Congress assuming that trust. (See Executive Department.)
§ 4. The Constitution forbids the appointment of members of Congress to any
civil offices created, or the emoluments whereof have been increased, during the terms for which such members were elected. The object of these provisions is apparent. It is to forbid the
creation of offices with tempting salaries, or the increase of the salaries of offices already in existence, with the design of obtaining those salaries on the part of those who should assist in creating or increasing them. (See appendix to Analysis D.)
FOREIGN PATRONAGE. No person holding any office of profit or trust under the United States shall, without the consent of Congress, accept of any present, emolument, office, or title, of any kind whatcver, from any king, prince, or foreign State. 50.
§ 1. According to the theory of our government, American citizenship confers equality. Democracy abhors titular distinctions. The chief purpose of this clause is to forbid the acceptance of these distinctions and bribes, in whatever form they may be tendered by foreign powers, which, if received by an officer under our government, might seduce him from the faithful discharge of duty to his own country.
§ 2. A private citizen, it will be observed, does not come under this prohibition ; nor does an officer under any
State government. It is, perhaps, to be regretted that this prohibition was not extended farther, so as to include all American citizens. Were a costly present to be made by the Emperor of France or the Queen of England to the President of the United States, he would not be at liberty to accept it on his own account, though he might in behalf of the people, and have it preserved in the archives of the nation, as it might seem rude to decline it.
ART. III.-THE PRESIDENT.
1. The compensation for the services of the President of the
United States shall neither be increased nor diminished
during the period for which he shall have been elected. 2. He shall not receive within that period any other emolu
ment from the United States, or any State. 58. This article will receive attention when we come to the discussion of the Executive Department.
ART. IV.- IMPEACHMENT. 1. The President, Vice-President, and all civil officers of the
United States, shall be removed from office on impeachment for and conviction of treason, bribery, or other
high crimes or misdemeanors. 64, 2. Judgment in cases of impeachment shall not extend fur
1st. To removal from office; and,
honor, trust, or profit under the United States. 3. The party convicted shall nevertheless be liable and subject
to indictment, trial, judgment, and punishment according
to law. 14. The subject of impeachment has been fully presented in the first and second chapters of Part II. of this work. It will be found in Art. IX. of Chap. I., and Art. X., Chap. II.
RIGHTS OF STATES.
ARTICLE I.- REPRESENTATION.
1. Each State shall have at least one representative. 5. 2. No amendment shall be made to the Constitution depriv
ing any State, without its consent, of its equal suffrage
in the Senate. 78. § 1. The first paragraph of this article is one of the clauses of the fifth paragraph of the Constitution, as it is numbered for convenience of reference. Witb the clause with which it stands in connection, it reads thus: “The number of representatives shall not exceed one for every thirty thousand ; but each State shall have at least one representative.” It is not here declared that there shall be one representative for every thirty thousand, but that the proportion shall not exceed that.
§ 2. At the taking of the first census, in 1790, it was ascertained that the State having the least number of inbabitants, Delaware,
contained over fifty-nine thousand. In 1860, the population of that State was a little over a hundred and twelve thousand ; not enough, however, to give it one representative, were it not for this clause, which says that “ each State shall have at least one representative ;' for in 1860 the ratio of representation was fixed at one member for 127,316 inhabitants.
§ 3. The authors of the Constitution foresaw that the population of this country would rapidly increase for ages after their labors were done, and that many new States would be added to the Union. They also saw that it would not do to provide for increasing the number of members in the House of Representatives in proportion to the increase of population; for, in such case, that body would soon become inconveniently large for the purposes of legislative deliberation. Within one hundred years from the adoption of the Constitution, our country will number nearly one hundred millions. Were the House of Representatives, then, to have one member for every thirty thousand, it would have 3,333 members.
§ 4. When the time arrives that the United States shall number two hundred and fifty millions, the House of Representatives will probably be constituted on the basis of not over one member to a million of inhabitants. There will be many States, probably, at that time, which will not contain more than two or three hundred thousand each. Especially will this be true of the younger and the smaller of the older States. But these States must have at least one representative each, or they must be unrepresented in the national councils. Hence the necessity of this provision, that "each State shall have at least one representative."
§ 5. There are several States now in the Union, which, but for this provision of the Constitution, would not be entitled to representation in the House. They have not the necessary number of inhabitants; but they each have one member on account of this clause.
§ 6. The second clause of the article under consideration refers to equality of State representation in the Senate. When, in the Constitutional Convention, the smaller States consented that population might become the basis of representation in the House, it was upon
tbe express condition that there should be equality of repre