THE

METHODIST QUARTERLY REVIEW.

APRIL, 1865.

ART. I.-CHRISTIANITY AND THE WAR POWER.

THE times in which we live naturally suggest inquiries relative to the lawfulness and morality of war. Taught as we are, and rightfully too, that the tendency of Christianity is to produce "peace on earth and good-will toward men," there will arise unbidden the doubtings of a tender conscience, and the fear lest in grasping the "carnal weapon" at the call of his government a man should be doing violence to the principles of that "holy evangel," in whose provisions and precepts he hopes to find "the way of life," and to secure endless felicity. Opinions on this subject greatly vary. With reference thereto, men of equal conscientiousness have assumed antagonistic positions. In the same community, and oftentimes in the same family, from whence will go forth with brave heart the men of stalwart frame to do battle even to the death against armed foemen, there may be found those who, while sympathizing with the objects to be accomplished, will by no means voluntarily enter upon active warfare, nor suffer their resources, except under distraint, to be applied to the support of the Government in its struggle to maintain "by force and arms" its legitimate authority, its national status, or the integrity of its domain. Now, by whatsoever number of such men there may be in any country, by so much is the military arm of the nation weakened. And this weakness consists not merely in the FOURTH SERIES, VOL. XVII.-11

abstraction of that number from military duty, but in the moral influence which such may exert upon the minds of others who go forth to the combat. For, claiming to be actuated wholly by considerations of a moral and religious nature, and being chiefly men of real worth and integrity, sincere and honest in their profession and belief, it cannot but be that with reference to those who are cognizant of their opinions, and have respect for their persons and character, the influence exerted will be calculated to fill the mind with doubt, and by so much unnerve the arm as it would strike the blow for the vindication of national right and honor, even though it may not avail to prevent their going into the service of their country. Every doubt of right is traitor to the accomplishment of an intended purpose. It may, therefore, be subserving a purpose of value—“ operæ pretium”—to our struggling nationality, if we calmly examine the question as to the rightfulness of the claim of a government to declare and wage a war, to use the military force of its people in defense of its rights and honor, or for the suppression of a rebellion against its legitimate authority.

By those who contend against the lawfulness of war, it is alleged that absolute non-resistance is the doctrine of Holy Scripture. And this it is said is the rule for both the nationality and the individual; both for the authorities of a civil government acting in their official capacity, and the individual subjects of those authorities. But we apprehend that this is not a correct presentment of Scripture doctrine. The "non-resistance " of Scripture applies not, as may be shown, to the government, but is strictly personal, applies simply to the individual. It may be at once admitted that "resistance" is forbidden to the individual under certain circumstances and conditions. Thus, for example, it is doubtless prohibited when by such resistance there could not be secured personal safety, or could not be obtained deliverance from impending evils, or could not be prevented a repetition or aggravation of personal injury. Whenever the objects proposed to be accomplished by such resistance as we can offer are beyond the bounds of human probability or possibility of attainment, then resistance being vain may well be conceived to be forbidden. Hence there is no difficulty whatever in accounting for Christ's prohibition of

any attempt on the part of Peter to prevent, by violence, his own arrest by the Jewish authorities; even though we leave out of view the obvious principle to which it may be referred, of our constant duty to submit to the constituted civil authorities, acting in accordance with recognized law, to resist whom it is to resist the ordinance of God. For, humanly speaking, contravention of the purpose of the authorities was in that case improbable, if not impossible, and the result must have been an aggravation of the injury, and perhaps the involving of the entire discipleship in destruction and ruin. True, if Jesus had chosen to use his own supernatural power, and called for the "legions of angels," his arrest might have been prevented; but in that case the swords of his terrestrial adherents would have been unnecessary, wholly useless. In the view now presented there is seen also the force of the reason which Jesus gave for the prohibition: "They that take the sword shall perish by the sword." For it cannot be that Christ intended to say that all who in any circumstances should take up the sword should perish by the sword, since such an interpretation is forbidden by the facts of history, and would imply ignorance or falsehood on the part of Christ. It must be interpreted with reference to the particular case, and is applicable only to similar occurrences. We must understand him simply to mean that they who, in such cases as this, and against the legitimately constituted authorities in the full and untrammeled exercise of the powers accorded them, shall attempt resistance, shall perish by the sword of its power, that such resistance is helpless and vain, and can but result in the destruction of those who enter upon it. Thus this prohibition is defended as well on the principles of religion as upon the ground of common sense and common prudence.

It may be further admitted that resistance is forbidden when such resistance would partake rather of the nature of revenge than of simple self-protection and defense, or the assertion and vindication of legitimate right. As a rule for judicial action and decision the doctrine " an eye for an eye and a tooth for a tooth," may perhaps be admitted. But as a rule for private life and for personal individual action, it is distinctly repudiated by the author of our religion. It was to the abuse of the "public law," in its illegitimate application and indiscriminate

use "by private" parties, that Christ was directing attention when he uttered the injunction, "Resist not (ávтiotîvai, that is, retaliate not upon the) evil" (person). Matt. v, 39, etc. The several illustrations of the doctrine thus enounced show that it was intended only for matters which affected solely the personal feelings and property of the individual. To make this clear, we have only to advert to each of the instances which he proceeds to cite, not one of which seems to be a case which could permanently affect the well-being of the individual, much less his life; and by no fair interpretation can any of them be made to apply to the affairs of a government or a state. His first instance is that of a personal insult and indignity: the "smiting (paríše, a quick smart slap upon) the cheek," in which case, rather than get into a personal brawl in the effort to retaliate or avenge ourselves, we are taught to endure even a repetition of the injury or insult as a matter of but trivial importance and affecting only ourselves. But in proof that such acts are not to be suffered to pass without rebuke, we have the example of Jesus, who, when struck by the officer near him, because of the supposed rudeness of his response to the high priest, answered with sufficient curtness and spirit: "If I have spoken evil, then bear witness of that evil; but if well, why smitest thou me?" John xviii, 22, 23. The same spirit was also manifested by Paul when smitten by command of the high priest, and in this instance there is also inculcated the lesson that expressions of rebuke and severity which may be proper in response to indignity or suffering put upon us by a private individual, are not so proper when that individual is fully understood to be "a ruler of the people." Acts xxii, 2, 3. The second instance is the case of a private lawsuit, the evil which may be done us by a litigious or quarrelsome person. The instance implies at least dispute, and on the one side or other doubt as to how the matter might be determined in a court of law. In such cases the teaching is that it is better to give to the litigious person the benefit of his doubt. The subject of dispute, it is to be noted, "a coat," indicates a matter of comparatively trivial importance, affecting only for the moment the well-being of the injured party. There is further inculcated also a disposition to even do more than is demanded to satisfy the asserted claim, if that be necessary