following table shows the number of strikes and strikers and the average number of strikers per strike during each year from 1879 to 1896:

STRIKES, STRIKERS, AND AVERAGE NUMBER OF STRIKERS PER STRIKE, 1879 TO 1896.

From

The number of strikes increased from 32 in 1879 to 139 in 1890. that time until 1895 it remained nearly stationary, when in 1896 it increased to 210. The greatest number of strikes in 1896 occurred during the months of June, August, and October, while the smallest number took place during the winter months.

The causes of strikes during 1896 and the results are shown below:

Nearly 53 per cent of the disturbances during the year 1896 were due

to demands for increased wages, while 12.4 per cent were on account of

reduction of wages, making a total of 65 per cent of the strikes which resulted from wage disputes. Nearly 4 per cent of the strikes related to hours of labor

Of the strikes, 38 per cent were successful and 24 per cent were partly successful, while 38 per cent were failures. If the number of strikers is considered, the results were still more favorable. Seventy per cent of the strikers succeeded, 18 per cent succeeded partly, and but 12 per cent failed. The most successful strikes were those relating to hours of labor.

A comparison of the proportionate results of strikes during a period of years is shown in the following table:

It appears from the above table that during the period the proportion of successful strikes has increased almost steadily from year to year. With regard to the number of strikers, there is a fluctuation in the percentages of success and failure from year to year, but a comparison of results for the last three years shows a decided increase in the proportion of successful strikers.

In the next table the number of strikes, strikers, and working days. lost during 1896 is shown by occupations:

STRIKES, STRIKERS, AND WORKING DAYS LOST, BY OCCUPATIONS, 1896.

In 1896, as in the preceding year, the geatest number of strikes occurred in the mining and quarrying and the textile industries. The unusual number of strikers reported in 1896 is due largely to a single strike which occurred among the straw plaiters in the vicinity of Florence, and in which 40,950 persons took part. This industry, therefore, reports the greatest number of strikers during the year. Next in importance as to number of strikers were the miners and ore diggers, 31,007, and the weavers, spinners, and carders, with 9,706 strikers.

Of the 96,051 persons who participated in strikes during the year, 39,955 were men, 34,264 were women, and 21,832 were children. The large number of women and children is due to the above-mentioned strike of straw plaiters, in which 26,950 women and 11,000 children took part.

There was but one strike reported in the agricultural industry during 1896. This was among about 100 peasants employed in the vineyards near Rome. They struck for higher wages and were partly successful. Two lockouts were reported during the year, in beth of which the employers were successful. In four other cases establishments were closed on account of disputes between employers and the public authorities.

DECISIONS OF COURTS AFFECTING LABOR.

[This subject, begun in Bulletin No. 2, has been continued in successive issues. All material parts of the decisions are reproduced in the words of the courts, indicated when short by quotation marks and when long by being printed solid. In order to save space, immaterial matter, needed simply by way of explanation, is given in the words of the editorial reviser.]

DECISIONS UNDER STATUTORY LAW.

CRIMINAL CONSPIRACY-TRADE UNIONS-People v. Davis et al., Chicago Legal News, Vol. XXX, No. 26, page 212.-The defendants were indicted for criminal conspiracy under section 46 of chapter 38 of the Revised Statutes of Illinois of 1891, and the case was heard in the criminal court of Cook County, Ill., upon a motion to quash the indictment. Section 46 of chapter 38 of the Revised Statutes reads, in so far as it is applicable to this case, as follows:

If any two or more persons conspire or agree together with the fraudulent or malicious intent wrongfully and wickedly to injure the person, character, business or employment or property of another they shall be deemed guilty of a conspiracy, and every such offender, whether as individuals, or as officers of any society or organization, and every person convicted of conspiracy at common law shall be imprisoned in the penitentiary not exceeding five years, or fined not exceeding two thousand dollars, or both.

Section 158 of chapter 38 of the Revised Statutes of 1891, the effect of which was considered by the court in its decision, reads as follows:

If any two or more persons shall combine for the purpose of depriving the owner or possessor of property of its lawful use and management, or of preventing, by threats, suggestions of danger, or any unlawful means, any person from being employed by or obtaining employment from any such owner or possessor of property, on such terms as the parties concerned may agree upon, such persons so offending shall be fined not exceeding $500, or confined in the county jail not exceeding six months.

The decision of the court was rendered February 11, 1898, and the motion to quash the indictment was allowed. The opinion was delivered by Judge Baker, and the following, sufficiently showing the facts in the case, is quoted therefrom:

This is a motion to quash an indictment against four defendants, which is found under and intended to charge a violation of section 46 of the Criminal Code [sec. 46 of chap. 38 of the R. S. of Ill. of 1891]. The first count of the indictment charges that the defendants were members of a certain union, viz, the Hoisting Engineers' Association; that Charles and Dennis were in the employ of the Thomas Elevator Company; that the defendants did, unlawfully, etc., conspire and agree together with the fraudulent and malicious intent to wrongfully and wickedly injure the business of Charles and Dennis by unlawfully, etc.,

demanding of said elevator company the discharge of Charles and Dennis for the reason to be represented to said elevator company by the defendants; that Charles and Dennis were not members of said association, and then to "call off" certain engineers in the employ of said elevator company who were members of said association, if said demand was not complied with "for the purpose then and there of stopping the work of said Thomas Elevator Company, and thus throw said Charles and Dennis out of their employments." It then avers the exe-. cution of said agreement, demand, refusal, "calling off" of the union engineers by defendants, and avers that thereby the work of said ele vator company was stopped, and by reason thereof, said Charles and Dennis discharged from their employment.

The second and third counts are identical with the first, save that the intent alleged in the second is to injure the "employment," in the third the "business and employment" of Charles and Dennis.

It is not alleged that any contract of employment for any period existed either between the elevator company and the union engineers, or between that company and Charles and Dennis.

To constitute an offense under the provisions of section 46, above quoted, there must be the agreement, with the fraudulent or malicious intent, "wrongfully and wickedly" to injure the business or employment, etc., of another. The agreement with the fraudulent or malicious intent to injure is not enough. The agreement must include the purpose to carry into execution the fraudulent and malicious intent to injure "wrongfully and wickedly," that is, by the use of wrongful and wicked means. It may be that an indictment in the words of the statute charging that the defendants did conspire and agree together with the fraudulent and malicious intent wrongfully and wickedly to injure Charles and Dennis in their employment would be sufficient, but in this indictment there is a precise statement of the means agreed upon by the defendants to be used to carry into effect their alleged malicious intent to injure Charles and Dennis in their employment; and hence, if the means so alleged to have been agreed upon are in law wrongful and wicked, the indictment well and sufficiently charges a conspiracy under the statute. And, on the other hand, if the measures so set out in the indictment are not wrongful and wicked, the indictment can not be held well and sufficiently to charge a conspiracy under the statute, for, if the means which the indictment alleges were agreed upon to be used are not wrongful and wicked, in no just sense can the indictment be held to charge a conspiracy and agreement by the defendants with the fraudulent and malicious intent, "wrongfully and wickedly” to injure Charles and Dennis.

The words "wrongfully and wickedly" in the statute are to be understood as meaning the use of things in themselves "wrongful and wicked," independently of combination. We can not say that the means are wrongful and wicked, because of the agreement to use such means to carry out a malicious intent to injure. (The thing prohibited is an agree ment with the malicious intent wrongfully and wickedly to injure Whether such intent exists depends upon the means agreed upon to! be used to carry out the malicious intent to injure. To say that the means agreed upon are wrongful and wicked because of the agreement to use such means to carry out the malicious intent to injure, amounts to saying that the means receive a character of wrongfulness and wickedness from the agreement to use such means in a manner which depends for its own wrongfulness and wickedness upon the means so agreed

upon.