EMPLOYEES IN FLAX FACTORIES IN IRELAND, 1835 TO 1895.

EMPLOYEES IN FLAX FACTORIES IN ENGLAND, 1835 TO 1895.

a Including half-timers over 13 years of age.

b Included with those 18 years of age and over.

e Including those 13 years of age and under 18 years.

As to the changes in employment that have taken place in the flax and jute industries, it was found that in Dundee, Scotland, the domestic system under which linen weavers worked in 1833 was gradually abolished by the introduction of the power loom. With the advent of the latter, the male weavers were very largely replaced by women. In the weaving factories, from the very first, the work was done by women, and there was no displacement of men within the factories. In Belfast the power loom made its way more slowly. Men were employed to some extent on these looms as well as women, probably the more readily because the factory system prevailed among the linen weavers before the introduction of the power loom.

Under the hand-loom system, when both men and women worked the loom, there seems to have been no question of difference of payment for the same work. The women did a lighter kind of work than able-bodied men, and were paid the same rate as "old men and boys." Women and girls rarely owned their looms, and their fathers and husbands usually drew their wages under the domestic system. Since then women's wages in the textile industries in Dundee and Belfast have risen much more in proportion than men's wages in the same industries.

Some of the changes in the rates of wages of women as compared with those of men since 1833 may be seen in the following table:

AVERAGE WEEKLY WAGES OF SPINNING-MILL OPERATIVES IN FLAX AND JUTE INDUSTRIES, 1833, 1896, AND 1897.

A comparison of the Dundee returns for 1896 and those of Belfast for 1897 with the returns for 1833 shows a striking improvement of women's over girls' work. The wages of children also show a marked improvement. Children working half time in 1896 and 1897 earned more than when working full time in 1833.

Rates of wages were at their maximum in Dundee and Belfast in 1873, and at their minimum since that period, in 1886. In 1896, in the Dundee spinning mills the rates of wages were 20 per cent, and in Belfast about 10 per cent, above the rates of 1886. Fluctuations in wages were much more frequent in the jute and flax industries in Dundee than in the flax industry in Belfast. In the former since June, 1873, there were over twenty general changes in wages, while in Belfast since 1871 there were only seven general changes.

The following special circumstances with regard to Dundee are noted in the conclusion of this report: An unceasing immigration of women and girls into Dundee, and an emigration of men from that place, resulting in an abnormal disproportion of the sexes over 20 years of age, women being to men in the ratio of 3 to 2; a high proportion of married women earning wages in the mills; an increase in the percentage of married women. In Belfast, although the average earnings were reported to be lower, the social condition of women in the industrial class appeared to be more satisfactory than in Dundee. The percentage of women occupied in Belfast was found to be much lower than in Dundee, and it was not increasing. The disproportion of the sexes was not so great, and was diminishing. There was a greater variety of employment for women, and there were more openings for skilled workmen.

DECISIONS OF COURTS AFFECTING LABOR.

[This subject, begun in Bulletin No. 2, has been continued in successive issues. All material parts of the decisions are reproduced in the words of the courts, indicated when short by quotation marks and when long by being printed solid. In order to save space, immaterial matter, needed simply by way of explanation, is given in the words of the editorial reviser.]

DECISIONS UNDER STATUTORY LAW.

CONSTITUTIONALITY OF STATUTE-EIGHT-HOUR LAW-Holden v. Hardy, sheriff, 18 Supreme Court Reporter, page 383.-This case came before the United States Supreme Court upon writs of error to review two judgments of the supreme court of the State of Utah denying applications of the plaintiff in error, Holden, for his discharge upon two writs of habeas corpus, and remanding him to the custody of the sheriff of Salt Lake County. The United States Supreme Court rendered its decision February 28, 1898, and affirmed the judgments of the State court.

The facts in the first case were substantially as follows: On June 20, 1896, complaint was made to a justice of the peace of Salt Lake City that the petitioner, Holden, had unlawfully employed "one John Anderson to work and labor as a miner in the underground workings of the Old Jordan mine, in Bingham canyon, in the county aforesaid, for the period of 10 hours each day; and said defendant, on the date aforesaid and continuously since said time, has unlawfully required said John Anderson, under and by virtue of said employment, to work and labor in the underground workings of the mine aforesaid for the period of 10 hours each day, and that said employment was not in case of an emergency, or where life or property was in imminent danger, contrary," etc.

Defendant Holden, having been arrested upon a warrant issued upon said complaint, admitted the facts set forth therein, but said he was not guilty, because he is a native-born citizen of the United States, residing in the State of Utah; that the said John Anderson voluntarily engaged his services for the hours per day alleged, and that the facts charged did not constitute a crime, because the act of the State of Utah which creates and defines the supposed offense is repugnant to the Constitution of the United States in these respects:

It deprives the defendant and all employers and employees of the right to make contracts in a lawful way, and for lawful purposes.

It is class legislation, and not equal or uniform in its provisions. It deprives the defendant and employers and employees of the equal protection of the laws, abridges the privileges and immunities of the defendant as a citizen of the United States, and deprives him of his property and liberty without due process of law.

The court, having heard the evidence, found the defendant guilty as charged in the complaint, imposed a fine of $50 and costs, and ordered that the defendant be imprisoned in the county jail for a term of 57 days, or until such fine and costs be paid.

Thereupon petitioner sued out a writ of habeas corpus from the supreme court of the State, annexing a copy of the proceedings before the justice. of the peace, and praying his discharge. The supreme court denied his application and remanded him to the custody of the sheriff, whereupon he sued out this writ of error, assigning the unconstitutionality of the law.

In the second case the complaint alleged the unlawful employment by Holden of one William Hooley to work and labor in a certain concentrating mill-the same being an institution for the reduction of ores-for the period of 12 hours per day. The proceedings in this case were precisely the same as in the prior case, and it was admitted that there was no distinction in principle between the two cases.

Mr. Justice Brown, after stating the facts, delivered the following opinion of the court:

This case involves the constitutionality of an act of the legislature of Utah, entitled "An act regulating the hours of employment in underground mines and in smelters and ore-reduction works." The following are the material provisions:

"SECTION 1. The period of employment of workingmen in all underground mines or workings shall be 8 hours per day, except in cases of emergency where life or property is in imminent danger.

"SEC. 2. The period of employment of workingmen in smelters and all other institutions for the reduction or refining of ores or metals shall be 8 hours per day, except in cases of emergency where life or property is in imminent danger.

"SEC. 3. Any person, body corporate, agent, manager, or employer, who shall violate any of the provisions of sections one and two of this act shall be guilty of a misdemeanor."

The supreme court of Utah was of opinion that, if authority in the legislature were needed for the enactment of the statute in question, it was found in that part of article 16 of the constitution of the State which declared that "the legislature shall pass laws to provide for the health and safety of employees in factories, smelters, and mines." As the article deals exclusively with the rights of labor, it is here reproduced in full, as exhibiting the authority under which the legislature acted, and as throwing light upon its intention in enacting the statute in question (Laws 1896, p. 219):

"SECTION 1. The rights of labor shall have just protection through laws calculated to promote the industrial welfare of the State.

"SEC. 2. The legislature shall provide by Paw for a board of labor, conciliation, and arbitration, which shall fairly represent the interests of both capital and labor. The board shall perform duties and receive compensation as prescribed by law.

"SEC. 3. The legislature shall prohibit:

"(1) The employment of women, or of children under the age of 14 years, in underground mines.

"(2) The contracting of convict labor.

"(3) The labor of convicts outside prison grounds, except on public works under the direct control of the State.

"(4) The political and commercial control of employees.

"SEC. 4. The exchange of blacklists by railroad companies, or other corporations, associations, or persons is prohibited.

"SEC. 5. The right of action to recover damages for injuries resulting in death shall never be abrogated, and the amount recoverable shall not be subject to any statutory limitation.

"SEC. 6. Eight hours shall constitute a day's work on all works or undertakings carried on or aided by the State, county, or municipal governments; and the legislature shall pass laws to provide for the health and safety of employees in factories, smelters, and mines.

"SEC. 7. The legislature, by appropriate legislation, shall provide for the enforcement of the provisions of this article."

The validity of the statute in question is, however, challenged upon the ground of an alleged violation of the fourteenth amendment to the Constitution of the United States, in that it abridges the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States, deprives both the employer and the laborer of his property without due process of law, and denies to them the equal protection of the laws. As the three questions of abridging their immunities, depriving them of their property, and denying them the protection of the laws, are so connected that the authorities upon each are, to a greater or less extent, pertinent to the others, they may properly be considered together.

Prior to the adoption of the fourteenth amendment, there was a similar provision against deprivation of life, liberty, or property with out due process of law incorporated in the fifth amendment; but as the first eight amendments to the Constitution were obligatory only upon Congress, the decisions of this court under this amendment have but a partial application to the fourteenth amendment, which operates only upon the action of the several States. The fourteenth amendment, which was finally adopted July 28, 1868, largely expanded the power of the Federal courts and Congress, and for the first time authorized the former to declare invalid all laws and judicial decisions of the States abridging the rights of citizens or denying them the benefit of due process of law.

This amendment was first called to the attention of this court in 1872, in an attack upon the constitutionality of a law of the State of Louisiana, passed in 1869, vesting in a slaughterhouse company therein named the sole and exclusive privilege of conducting and carrying on a live stock landing and slaughterhouse business within certain limits specified in the act, and requiring all animals intended for sale and slaughter to be landed at their wharves or landing places. (Slaughterhouse cases, 16 Wall., 36.) While the court in that case recognized the fact that the primary object of this amendment was to secure to the colored race, then recently emancipated, the full enjoyment of their freedom, the further fact that it was not restricted to that purpose was admitted both in the prevailing and dissenting opinions, and the valid ity of the act was sustained as a proper police regulation for the health and comfort of the people. A majority of the cases which have since arisen have turned, not upon a denial to the colored race of rights therein secured to them, but upon alleged discriminations in matters entirely outside of the political relations of the parties aggrieved.

These cases may be divided, generally, into two classes: First, where a State legislature or a State court is alleged to have unjustly discrimi nated in favor of or against a particular individual or class of individ