is no longer the principal wealth of the country : commerce and luxury have increased the means, the wants, and the mutual relations of almost every individual in society. The elder son no longer engrosses all the wealth of the family and is no longer considered as the prop, the support, and protector of the younger children, for whom provisions are made by complicated conveyances, in trust, under the most voluminous wills and unwieldy settlements. The spirit of trade and speculation which pervades all ranks, from the agricultural and building Leviathar of the house of peers to almost the lowest of his tenantry, as it has created the necessity of converting every security, as far as possible, into a trading capital, either for the purpose of commencing new commercial undertakings or to secure to creditors the payment of debts incurred on the old; add to these the effect of the bankrupt laws which render almost "all assurance little sure" all these have rendered the business of the conveyancer most complicated and intricate. His deeds must provide for all contingencies and embrace all kinds of property. Every thing that is capable of being converted into wealth or gain, above and below ground, is not merely to be passed from hand to hand, but is to be, more frequently, assured to the possession of one in trust for many others, by way of security to creditors or provision for families. In this view of the business of a conveyancer, 'his occupation is as various and complex as the business of the world we live in, and we are not to wonder that his deeds are commensurably long and intricate. And they are the more so, because it is the practice to ascertain every thing by specific covenants, instead of relying upon general warranties, or leaving the parties to seek the aid of a court of equity; and, because, at the same time that it is desirable to settle the property strictly in one respect, it is also an object to give the trustees full and specific powers of disposition over it, as actual proprietors, for the benefit of the celles que trusts.

We are therefore, for our own parts, far from thinking with Mr. Ritson that the recital in deeds was, wholly, introduced for the sake of the fees, though however they may sometimes occasion it to be lengthened too much. In many instances it is true, much recital is unnecessary; but in many others a concise recital of some of the leading facts which mark the relative situation of the parties must not only afford a more easy clue to the understanding of the whole deed and the intention of the parties, but it may also enable the conveyancer to abridge considerably the verbosity of his covenants.

With respect to the other observation, as to the grammatical

inaccuracy of the commencement of modern indentures, it has occurred to ourselves, and doubtless to many others, and we see no reason why it should not be altered. We should indeed be amongst the first to recommend the study of neatness and the total banishment of tautology from every solemn deed: but we know the utility and the sanctity of long established forms; we know the danger of innovation; and we know, that he who attempts it must arrogate to himself no small confidence in his own judgment. Were it

not for this we should see much of the trash of the office of the special pleader the equity draughtsman, and the conveyancer banished from all our precedents. Abating this, it is only ignorance or a superficial view of life and human affairs that will raise an outcry against the length of legal proceedings; and in this opinion we are happy to be confirmed by the authority of one whom few will question for his accuracy of judgment, and none surely for his want of candour in this instance; we mean that of Dr. Johnson, who considers the length of an ordinary conveyance not so much attributable to the interested views or the ignorant and prosing habits of the conveyancer, as to the general infidelity and suspicion of all mankind in worldly concerns.

"If we consider the present state of the world, it will be found that all confidence is lost among mankind; that no man ventures to act where money can be endangered upon the faith of another. It is impossible to see the long scrolls in which every contract is included, with all their appendages of seals and attestation, without wondering at the depravity of those beings who must be restrained from violation of promise by such formal and public evidences, and precluded from equivocation and subterfuge by such punctilious minuteness. Among all the satires to which folly and wickedness have given occasion, none is equally severe with a bond or a settlement."

We shall add the following extract from Mr. Ritson's observations :

[" Bearing date the day next before the day of the date of these presents."]

"A datu includes the day, but a die datus excludes the day. Hath v Ash, 2 Salk. 413."

"Common sense and Lord Coke however tell us that "from the date" and "from the day of the date" mean the same thing; and Lord Mansfield, the case of Pugh v. the Duke of Leeds, Cowp. has decided that in deeds it means either from the day exclusive or inclusive, as the context and the intention

of the parties shall determine, and that the distinction that from is inclusive is a subtlety unworthy the jargon of the schools. In this he has been wisely followed by Lord Ellenborough and the whole court of King's Bench in the case of the King v. Stevens, Smith's Rep. 44 Geo. III.437, where the same doctrine has been extended to indictments, and this plain rule has seen established, "that in all cases the language of all legal proceedings is to be construed by the context and by known usage, as all other words and writings."

We think therefore that the editor should have noticed this, we mean the case of Pugh v. the Duke of Leeds. But he has been very sparing of his labour; he has not even corrected the grammar of these hasty notes, in which we frequently find a change of the tenses in the same sentence, which, though very excusable in the draught of a deed, written in the hurry of business, is scarcely so in a printed book. The editor perhaps was led to this by respect for the eminent character of the author, and was afraid to change or to doubt any thing; but if so, he pays a false tribute to his memory.

The editor, in the little he has done, has shewn a taste to which we are avowed enemies. In his preface, as above he speaks of a legi-logical carcer. What new idea is conveyed by the term legi-logics, beyond the plain English of the study of the law, we know not; but we should be greatly surprised if any one should publish an essay on legi-logics as a treatise on the study of the law, and we believe few who read the advertisement would understand it. We wholly object to neo-logical licences; but if a novel term must be used, we recommend nomo-logical, as of a more regular etymology, being compounded of two Greek words, whereas the word legi-logical is formed by the union of a Latin and a Greek word, which constitutes a most barbarous jargon.

We had nearly lost sight of the original object of this account but we shall conclude with saying, that Mr. Ritson's part of it may be of service as a hint to some one for a plan of analysing and commenting upon the usual parts of a deed; which, if well executed, might be very useful. As to the whole book we may add that, as the size and price are but small and it may contain some practical hints for the attorney or the very young conveyancer, it may be useful both as a specimen of a practical common place book and also as a sort of assistant to the office. It does not profess to contain much; and we should not have dwelt upon it so long had it not afforded us an opportunity of attacking an illiberal prejudice, which we shall be happy at all times to repel.

Observations by M. C. on the Succinct View of the Law of Infancy, by R. R.

IT is not my intention to follow the Author of the Succinct View of the Law applicable to Infancy through the whole matter inserted by him in the Law Journal, but merely to confine myself to such parts of it as clash with the positions advanced by ine in tlie Critique on Mr. Watkins's Chapter of Infancy.

I agree with the Author of the Succinct View, that the grand principle which governs all the cases that have been determined in regard to the acts of infants, is to protect their weakness and inexperience from the snares of the world, but I object to the inference which he draws from those cases, "that the deeds of minors, where there is no. appearance or semblance of benefit to them, are void." This certainly is not correct, for then those deeds of infants which are not prejudicial to themselves, and are beneficial to others, would be bad; but indisputably cases of this sort do not come within the reason of the privilege given to infants, which is to protect them from wrong, and cessante ratione cess it et ipsa ler; nor is there one syllable in the cases to warrant the inference that such deeds are bad. On the contrary, there are many express decisions and obiter sayings in their favour. Indeed, their validity is admitted by the Author of the Succinct View himself, (with that disregard to consistency which is observable in many instances) in p. 6, where it is stated "that the transactions of an infant which do not touch his interest, but take effect from an authority which he is in trusted by law to execute, will bind him."

I come now to the consideration of Zouch v. Parsons. In the construction of this case the opinion of the auther of the Succinct View is widely different from mine. He states, "the court held the deeds to be voidable ouly as the transaction appeared to have been for his (the infant's) benefit. The first general question considered in that case was, whether the conveyance was good and bound the infant; now as it was, the unanimous opinion of the judges that he was bound, the Author of the View, in saying that the conveyance was voidable by the infant, must mean that it was binding only during his minority, and that when he came of a_e, he might avoid it, I shall attack this position, and en195. [ ' ]

deavour to shew that the opinion of the court was, that the infant was bound for ever. When cases have been determined on good and indisputable principles, and other cases arise, differing in circumstances from those so determined, yet if the same principles occur, they will govern the new cases to the full extent to which they were applied in the determined cases. Whether the reasons on which the cases were founded that have determined the acts of infants to be good for ever exist in the case of Zouch v. Parsons, it is not my present business to enquire: my object is to shew that it was the opinion of Lord Mansfield and the court, that these reasons did exist." To mention a rule or two," says Lord M." the reasons of which are applicable to the present case."-Why, if they were applicable to it, they will unquestionably govern it to their fullest extent. The first rule he mentions is, "if an infant does a right act which he ought to do, it shall bind him." He then enumerates several instances where the acts of infants are good and binding for ever; as, to make equal partition. Now when he comes to apply the rules laid down to the case under consideration, he observes, "by act of parliament, 7 Anne, the infant was compellable to do it during his minority;" and adds, "there can be no doubt the infant was compellable to do what he has done." It therefore was clearly the opinion of the court that the reasons which governed the cases of equal partition, and which were good for ever against the infant, applied to and governed the case of Zouch. v. Parsons. The reason being, that the act of an infant which he is compellable to do will be good though it is done without compulsion, and in that case he was compellable to do what he did voluntarily, I shall confine myself to this rule; being apprehensive of taking up too much space in the Journal; other rules, however, were equally strong as that I have noticed. I will now state another reason that it was the opinion of the court that the infant was bound for ever. When a term or expression is borrowed, it must, unless qualified, be understood to be meant in the same sense as it was in the place from whence it was taken. Then in what sense had the word bind been used. During the minority of the infant? No, but, in every case, for ever. Besides in what sense is it used in other parts of the judgment delivered by the court: "Miserable must be the condition of minors,' observes Lord M. "excluded from the society and commerce of the world, deprived of necessaries, education, employment and many advantages, if they could do no binding act." Now what is