lord Whitworth received a note from M. Talleyrand, informing him that the first consul wished to converse with him. The first consul received his lordship in his cabinet with tolerable cordiality; and, after talking a few minutes on different subjects, told him, that he felt it necessary, after what had passed between him and M. de Talleyrand, that he should, in the most clear and authentic manner, make known his sentiments to him, in order to their being communicated to his Britannic majesty; and he conceived that would be more effectually done by himseif, than through any medium whatever. He said it was a matter of infinite disappointment to him, that the treaty of Amiens, instead of being followed by conciliation and friendship, the natural effects of peace, had been productive only of increasing jealousy and mistrust; and that this mistrust was now avowed in such a manner as must bring the point to an issue. The first consul then enumerated the several provocations which he pretended to have received from England. He placed in the first line our not evacuating Malta and Alexandria, as we were bound to do by the treaty. In this, he said, that no consideration on earth should make him acquiesce; and, of the two, he had rather see us in possession of the Faubourg St, Antoine, than Malta. He then adverted to the abuse thrown out against him in the English prints; but this, he said, he did not so much regard as that which appeared in the French papers published in London. This he considered as much more mischievous, since it was meant to excite France against him and his government. He complained of the protection given to Georges and others of his description, who, instead of being sent to Canada, as had been repeatedly promised, were permitted to remain in England, handsomely pensioned, and constantly committing all sorts of crimes on the coast of France, as well as in the interior. In confirmation of this, he told lord Whitworth that two men had, within a few days, been apprehended in Normandy, and were then on their way to Paris, who were hired assassins, and employed by the bishop of Arras, by the baron de Rolle, by Georges, and by Dutheil, as would be fully proved in a court of justice, and made known to the world. He acknowledged that the irritation he felt against England increased daily; because every wind (as he expressed it) which blew from England, brought nothing but enmity and hatred against him. The first consul then reverted to Egypt, and told his lordship that if he had felt the smallest inclination to take possession of it by force, he might have done it a month ago, by sending twenty-five thousand men to Aboukir, who would have possessed themselves of the whole country in defiance of the four thousand British in Alexandria. That instead of that garrison being a means of protecting Egypt, it was only furnishing him with a pretence for invading it. This he should not do, whatever might he his desire to have it as a colony, because he did not think it worth the risk of a war, in which he might perhaps be considered as the aggressor, and by which he should lose more than he should gain, since sooner or later Egypt would belong to France, either by by the falling to pieces of the Turkish empire, or by some arrangement with the Porte. As a proof of his desire to maintain peace, he wished to know what he had to gain by going to war with England. A descent was the only means of offence he had, and that he was determined to attempt, by putting himself at the head of the expedition. But how could it be supposed, that, after having gained the height on which he stood, he would risk his life and reputation in such a hazardous at tempt, unless forced to it by necessity, when the chances were that he and the greatest part of the expedition would go to the bottom of the sea. He talked much on this subject, but never affected to diminish the danger. He acknowledged that there were one hundred chances to one against him; but still he was determined to attempt it, if war should be the consequence of the existing discussion, and that such was the disposition of the troops that army after army would be found for the enterprise. He then expatiated much on the natural force of the two countries. France, with an army of four hundred and eighty thousand men, for to that amount it was, he said, to be immediately completed, all ready for the most desperate enter prises; and England, with a fleet that made her mistress of the seas, and which he did not think he should be able to equal in less than ten years. T'wo such countries, by a proper understanding, might govern the world, but by strife might overturn it. He said, that if he had not felt the enmity of the British government on every occasion since the treaty of Amiens, there would have been nothing he would not have done to prove his desire to conciliate-participation in indemnities, as well as in influence on the continent; treaties of commerce; : in short, any thing that could have given satisfaction, and have testifed his friendship. Nothing, how. ever, had been able to conquer the hatred of the British government, and therefore it was then come to a point whether we should have peace or war. To preserve peace, the treaty of Amiens must be ful filled; the abuse in the publicprints, if not totally suppressed, at least kept within bounds, and restricted to the English papers; and the protection so openly given to his bitterest enemies (alluding to Georges, and persons of that description), must be withdrawn." If war, it was only necessary to say so, and to refuse to fulfil the treaty. He then made the tour of Eu rope, to prove that, in its present state, there was no power with which we could coalesce, for the purpose of making war against France; consequently, it was our interest to gain time, and if we had any point to gain, renew the war when circumstances were more favourable. He said, it was not doing him justice to suppose that he conceived himself above the opinion of his country, or of Europe. He would not risk uniting Europe against him by any violent act of aggression; neither was he so powerful in France as to persuade the nation to go to war, unless on good grounds. He said that he had not chastised the Algerines, from his unwillingness to excite the jealousy of other powers; but hoped that England, Rus sia, and France would one day feel that it was their interest to destroy such a nest of thieves, and and force them to live rather by cultivating their land, than by plunder. Lord Whitworth, in his account of this conference with the first consul, transmitted to the British government, makes this general remark" His purpose was evidently to convince me that on Malta must depend peace or war, and at the same time to impress upon my mind a strong idea of the means he possessed of annoying us at home and abroad." With regard to the mistrust and jealousy, which, he said, constantly prevailed since the conclusion of the treaty of Amiens, his lordship observed, that it must be admitted we had such motives of mistrust against France as could not be alleged against us, and was going to instance the accession of territory and influence gained by France since the treaty, when he was interrupted by Bonaparte, who said, "I suppose you mean Piedmont and Switzerland; ces sont des bagatelles; and it must have been foreseen whilst the negotiation was pending; vous n'avez pas le droit d'en parler à cette heure." His lordship then alleged as a cause of mistrust and jealousy, the impossibility of obtaining justice, or any kind of redress, for any of his majesty's subjects. Bonaparte asked, in what respect? Lord Whitworth replied, that since the signing of the treaty not one British claimant had been satisfied, although every Frenchman of that description in England had been satisfied within one month after that period; and since he had been in Paris, and he could say as much of his predecessors, not one satisfactory answer had been obtained to the innume rable representations which they had been under the necessity of making, in favour of British subjects, and property detained in the several ports of France and elsewhere, without even a shadow of justice. Such an order of things, his lordship added, was not made to inspire confidence, but, on the contrary, must create mistrust. The first consul rejoined-this must be attributed to the natural difficulties attending such suits, when both parties thought themselves right; but he denied that such delays could proceed from any disinclination to do what was just and right. With regard to the pensions which were granted to French and Swiss individuals, his lordship ob served that they were given as a reward for past services during the war, and most certainly not for present ones, and still less for such as had been insinuated, of a nature repugnant to the feelings of every individual in England, and to the universally acknowledged loyalty and honour of the British govern ment. That as for any participation of indemnities, or other accessions which his majesty might have obtained, he could take upon himself to assure the first consul, that his majesty's ambition led him rather to preserve than to acquire. And that, with regard to the most propitious moment for renewing hostilities, his majesty, whose sincere desire it was to continue the blessings of peace to his subjects, would always consider such a measure as the greatest calamity; but that if his majesty were so desirous of peace, it must not be imputed to the difficulty of obtaining allies; and the less so, as those means which it might be necessary to afford such allies, for perhaps inadequate scrvices, would all he concentrated in England, and give a proportionate increase and energy to our own exertions, come a guaranteeing power-the abolition of the Spanish priories, in defiance of the treaty, to which the king of Spain was a party-the declaration of the Portuguese government of their intention to se questrate the property of the Portuguese priory, as forming a part of the Spanish langue, unless the property of the Spanish priories were restored to them-the non election of a grand-master;-these circumstances would have been sufficient, without any other special grounds, to have warranted his majesty in suspending the evacua tion of the island, until some new arrangement could be adjusted for its security and independence. But when it was considered how great ly the dominion, power, and influence of France had of late been extended, his majesty must feel that he had an incontestable right, conformably to the principles on which the treaty of peace was negotiated and concluded, to demand additional securities in any new arrangement which it might be necessary to make, with a view to effecting the real objects of that treaty. And these considerations, sufficient as they might be in themselves to justify the line of conduct which his majesty had determined to adopt, had received additional force from the views which had been recently and unreservedly manifested by the French govern ment respecting the Turkish dominions, and the islands in the Adriatic, (and which had been, in a great degree, admitted by the first consul, in his interview with the British am Lord Whitworth concluded his note, on this occasion, to the British government, with the remark that the first consul did not, as M. Talleyrand had done, affect to attribute colonel Sebastiani's mission to commercial motives only, but as one rendered necessary in a military point of view, by the infraction by us of the treaty of Amiens. Lord Hawkesbury, in his instructions to the British ambassador at Paris, consequent upon the receipt of the above intelligence, observes, in the first instance, that nothing approaching to explanation or satisfaction was stated by the first consul, in answer to the just representations and complaints of his majesty, in consequence of the unwarrantable insinuations and charges contained in colonel Sebastiani's report against his majesty's go. vernment, the officer commanding his forces in Egypt, and his army in that quarter; but that, on the other hand, the language of the first consul had tended to strengthen and confirm the suspicions which that publication was peculiarly calculated to excite. The stipulations relative to Malta, he said, had been found incapable of execution, owing to circumstances which it was not in his majesty's power to controul. The refusal of Russia to accede to the arrangement, except on condition that the Maltese langue should be abolish-bassador),-views which were died-the silence of the court of Berlin, with respect to the invitation that had been made to it, in consequence of the treaty, to be rectly repugnant, not only to the spirit, but to the letter of the treaty of Amiens. His majesty, there fore, could not consent that his troops troops should evacuate the island of Malta, until substantial security had been provided for those ob jects which, under existing cireum. stances, might be materially en. dangered by their removal. In a conversation between lord Whitworth and M. Talleyrand, which occurred shortly after the interview of the former with the first consul, lord Whitworth was given to understand that a project was in contemplation, by which the integrity of the Turkish empire would be so effectually secured as to remove every cause of doubt or uneasiness, either with regard to Egypt, or any part of the Turkish dominions. To this it was answered by the English government, that his majesty would consider the communication of such a project as indicating a disposition on the part of France to afford him explanation and satisfaction respecting some of the points which had been the subject of his representations. In a subsequent conversation with the French minister, lord Whitworth begged him to explain himself upon this subject; when his lordship was informed that what had been termed a project was nothing more than what had been expressed in the first consul's message to the legislative body, when he said that there was a French ambassador at Constantinople,who was charged to give every proof of the disposition of France to strengthen, instead of to weaken, that government. Lord Whitworth expressed a doubt whether this, or any other parole security, would be considered as sufficient in such a transaction. Upon which M. Talleyrand repeated the question"What then is the security you require, and which the first consul can give?" His lordship answered, This must be the subject of the negotiation on which we are willing to enter." On another meeting, the French minister wished to convince lord Whitworth, that the first consul, far from wishing to carry matters to extremity, was desirous to discuss fairly, and without passion, a point which he admitted was of importance to both countries. He repeatedly assured his lordship, that, much as the first consul might have the acquisition of Egypt at heart, he would sacrifice his own feelings to the preservation of peace; and henceforth seek to augment his glory, by improving and consoli dating the internal situation of the country, rather than by adding to its possessions. About a week previous to this interview, the ambassador of the French republic at London had received, from the first consul, express orders to require from the British government some explanations respecting the protracted occupation of the island of Malta by the British troops. His note stated, that, by the conditions of the fourth paragraph of the 10th article of the treaty of Amiens, the English troops were to evacuate that island and its dependencies three months after the exchange of the ratifications; that ten months had elapsed, and the English troops were still at Malta: that the French troops, on the contrary, who were to evacuate the Neapolitan and Papal states, had not waited the expiration of the three months which were granted them to withdraw, and had quitted Tarentum, the fortifications of which they had re-established, and where they had collected 100 pieces of cannon. He |