to preserve the status quo in the Far East and the peace of the world, will pay special attention to the movements of the Japanese fleet which is about to attack China and make a display of force along the coast and the Yangtze, and draw their just conclusions. 793.94/1999: Telegram The Minister in China (Johnson) to the Secretary of State PEIPING, October 7, 1931-2 p. m. [Received October 7-9: 16 a. m.] 719. Following from American Consul General at Nanking: "October 6, 7 p. m. I am informed that a telephone message from Shanghai states that the Japanese Government has sent a peremptory demand to the Chinese Government that the boycott be stopped; that otherwise the Japanese Government will adopt forcible measures. Rumor that Japan will land armed forces tonight in Chapei, Shanghai. I have been informed during the last few days that the Chinese Government would be obliged to regard such a landing as an act of war. I have been informed recently also that if any military measures are taken at Nanking by the Japanese the Chinese will retaliate. One Japanese cruiser here now. The Consulate General has in readiness tentative plans for the evacuation of American citizens on to the destroyer but no warning has been issued as conditions do not yet seem threatening.["] The Legation has received no alarming reports from other sources except anti-Japanese agitations in Yunnan referred to in my 715, October 7, 9 a. m.' Reuter reports from Tokyo, October 6th, speak of Japanese taking "Chinese Government severely to task for its negligence in failing to check anti-Japanese boycott" and of despatching cruiser Tokiwa to Shanghai with bluejackets for protective purposes. Also that all Japanese living in districts along the Yangtze have been ordered to withdraw to Hankow and Shanghai. JOHNSON 793.94/2015: Telegram The Consul at Geneva (Gilbert) to the Secretary of State [Paraphrase] GENEVA, October 7, 1931-1 p. m. [Received October 8-8:50 a. m.] 160. (Section 3.)2 Department's 63, October 3, 5 p. m. (1) Regarding a possible Council meeting on October 14, Drummond said it might not be necessary if things took a favorable turn, 1 Not printed. 'Sections 1 and 2 (telegrams No. 158 and No. 159) not printed; section 4 (telegram No. 161) printed infra. The four sections, dated October 7, were given numbers for convenience of reference. though present indications allowed no definite forecast. He expressed the hope that if the Council meets it might be made stronger through the presence of more Foreign Ministers than attended the final part of the regular session in September when the case between China and Japan came up (see my 141, September 26, 9 a. m., paragraph 4). Drummond thinks Briand at any rate is quite prepared to attend. 3 (2) Regarding the policy of the Council in this matter, Drummond expanded on one point (see my 150, October 1, 9 a. m., for Council's resolution, point 3). The Council has insisted all along on using the term "withdrawal of troops within the railway zone" or some such phrase, but the Chinese have used and tried to have adopted the phrase "reestablishment of the status quo ante" or something of similar purport. Drummond said Sze had urged on him that the expression "status quo ante" be employed, to which he had countered with the suggestion of the term "in accordance with treaty stipulations". Drummond's suggestion had caused Sze to retreat from his position, since his Government, I understand, has taken the stand of not recognizing the "validity" of the treaties concerned and since, as I gather, under those instruments Japan is entitled to more troops in the railway zone and to occupation of more points than is envisaged in Sze's "status quo ante". (3) I wish to add, in connection with the above, that Sze yesterday came to me. First he made some statements respecting the position of the forces in Manchuria, etc., chiefly repetitious of assertions previously made by the Chinese, and then he took occasion to state that it was Chinese policy to demand in turn the taking of three successive steps; namely: (a) reestablishment of the status quo ante; (c) examination of the causes for the difficulty in the general sit uation in Manchuria with a view to a settlement. (4) Regarding China's policy in general, Drummond concurred in the opinion which was expressed in the last two paragraphs of my 150, October 1, 9 a. m., and remarked that, while he was merely giving his personal views, it was his belief that, if Japanese withdrawal within the railway zone were successfully achieved, the League would attempt to follow its usual course by having both parties agree to procedure for the adjustment of other outstanding questions through direct negotiations between the two countries. Judging by the Chinese attitude, this might be made difficult by them, but Drummond felt it was desirable since otherwise the danger might remain thereafter of the Chinese bringing every small question before the League or ap'Aristide Briand, French Minister for Foreign Affairs. pealing to the League at each hitch. Should the Chinese persist in trying to keep the matter on an international plane, Drummond of course cannot foresee the outcome. (5) Drummond expressed concurrence with the opinion expressed in my 141, September 26, 9 a. m., paragraph 7, and agreed that an extremely difficult situation would be caused if Japan should prove recalcitrant in executing the program accepted hitherto. In view of the present situation in the world, Drummond agreed that pressure through economic sanctions would be entirely out of the question, but it had occurred to him that, if worst came to worst, the leading powers might possibly withdraw their mission chiefs from Tokyo. This, he believes, would prove to be a type of pressure which it would be most difficult for the Japanese to resist. Section 4 follows in my 161. GILBERT 793.94/2015: Telegram The Consul at Geneva (Gilbert) to the Secretary of State [Paraphrase] GENEVA, October 7, 1931-3 p. m. [Received October 7-1:35 p. m.] 161. (Section 4.) Department's 64, October 5, 2 p. m. (1) In talking with Drummond I could see he was cheered greatly by the evidence of understanding and cooperation on your part in the difficult Manchurian problem. He clearly perceives the important relationship in the political and economic spheres of the Manchurian question to the whole world situation and particularly to the disarmament problem. He strongly feels that at this juncture no steps should be omitted and no word left unsaid which would aid in the achievement of a speedy adjustment. (2) Drummond is very happy that you concur in general with the policy followed in this matter by the League Council, and he is especially grateful for your message which shows such complete understanding of the League's past, present, and future attitude in this dispute. The cooperation shown in this case, he feels convinced, may be of the utmost value in assuring world peace hereafter. (3) In regard to the matter of exchanging information, Drummond notes that such information as you may be able to make available will be transmitted to him. He desires me to state that he will gladly reciprocate. (4) However, in this connection there arise in his mind certain questions regarding which he would like to come to an understanding with you. It is incumbent upon him, from the nature of his position, to act in the interest of all states in the League. Since at present this question has come before the League Council, it has been his task to make known to all League Council members such information as he may obtain from the Japanese or the Chinese or from any Council member (see my 150, October 1, 9 a. m., the Council's resolution, paragraphs 7 and 9). He has circulated such information as a rule to all Council members. Hitherto all messages received from Washington which embodied information or expressions of opinion, with the exception of your formal messages to the Council President (see my [your] 123, September 23, 4 p. m. and 126, September 24, 4 p. m.), came with the understanding that they were solely for his information. Since his receipt of communications from Washington is generally known, Drummond has often been asked at private Council meetings which have taken place and at meetings of the so-called Committee of Five as to what the policy or views of the United States might be. In response to these requests Drummond has thus far given orally a summary of the information received from you. However, he feels that there are many unsatisfactory elements in such a procedure. First, a résumé of this sort may carry implications of his personal interpretation, and this he naturally is anxious to avoid. Moreover, as keeping anything of the sort strictly confidential is relatively impossible, there is the danger always that it may reach the press and that you may perhaps feel your confidence has not been respected entirely by him. Therefore, though he is quite ready to go on with this system, he would welcome any suggestions from you which would permit him to communicate in writing to the Council members and which perhaps would help promote the common action being frankly sought. (5) In view of the above, Drummond suggests that if it is convenient, you indicate in any communications you make to him, which portion you are sending for his personal information, and which portion he may make known textually to the Council or to the Council members. (6) The above chiefly refers to information in regard to the Manchurian situation as envisaged in the latter portion of your 64, as cited. Also there is the question of policy expressions concerning the United States attitude toward the League in this matter, especially as regards the course pursued by the Council; for example, as made known in your 64. Drummond regards such expressions by you at the present time as solely for him. However, he would appreciate having your opinion regarding what use might properly be made of such expressions, and in this connection he asks you to take into consideration the restraining effect upon the Japanese and the good effect in quieting world anxiety if you or he were able to make known the fact that the 'For these telegrams, which were sent to the Minister in Switzerland at Geneva, see pp. 48 and 59. United States and the League entertain similar views on certain of the more vital aspects involved. GILBERT 793.94/2005: Telegram The Vice Consul at Harbin (Dutko) to the Secretary of State HARBIN, October 7, 1931-3 p. m. [Received October 7-2 p. m.] Following message from Hanson by telephone October 7, 8 a. m. : "The number of Chinese killed during the fighting at Nanling and Kuanchengtse totalled 118, wounded 199. The town Chinese police and Chinese Eastern Railway police at Kuanchengtse are unarmed. They are on duty and are under control and jurisdiction of Japanese gendarmes. Each of the Chinese Eastern Railway police has on his coat sleeve badge of white cloth giving, in Chinese, name of his company and in addition little red stamp about one and one quarter inches square which bears Chinese characters signifying Changchun Japanese gendarmes. About 20 Japanese gendarmes at Kuanchengtse are armed, 2 of whom meet each train. Leaving this morning for Kirin and will return evening of the 9th about 6 p. m." Legation informed, Tokyo informed. 793.94/2155 DUTKO Memorandum by the Under Secretary of State (Castle) [WASHINGTON,] October 7, 1931. I asked the Japanese Ambassador to come to the Department to speak with me about the various newspaper reports today from China and the attached telegram from Mr. Peck in Nanking.5 As to the demand on the Chinese that the boycott be stopped, the Ambassador said he thought it might well be true that the Japanese Consul General in Nanking had used very strong language since it was the belief of the Japanese Government that the Chinese Government was inciting the boycott. He said that he could not imagine the Consul General having threatened resort to forcible measures on the part of Japan as Japan had no idea of taking any measures which will bring war with China. He referred again and again to war as unthinkable. As to the landing of Japanese forces in Chapei, the Ambassador said that he had heard nothing of it, but could not believe that any * See telegram No. 719, October 7, 2 p. m., from the Minister in China, p. 128. |