the incident. He stated that he would not fail to communicate to the Council any authentic information which he obtained.

The President of the Council, Mr. Lerroux of Spain, noted the statements and said that the Council had heard with satisfaction that the Japanese Government would take the necessary measures to bring about an appeasement of the situation and expressed the hope for a prompt settlement of the question.

No other member of the Council spoke on the subject. It was evidently the intention of the President to attempt to allay apprehension by the public declarations referred to above.

[Paraphrase.] This morning Dr. Sze called on me to say that he was aware of my following in a strategical way the Council's proceedings, so he thought the Chinese position in this matter might be of interest to me.

I was told by Sze that the chief delegates of certain powers had met informally and privately prior to the Council's meeting on Saturday and had more or less decided against having the question brought up before the Council. This attitude Sze attributed to Japanese influence. Certain delegates after the meeting approached him as to whether he intended to present the question, and for reasons to be explained later in this telegram, he would not say what he planned to do. He gave as his excuse that he was receiving messages from Nanking which might control his action. In consequence of his reply, another meeting was held by the same delegates, and following this (in this case apparently as a result), the question was presented to the Council by the Japanese delegate. This Japanese action, incidentally, is interpreted here as a Japanese desire (as they do not know Sze's plans), by taking the initiative, to prevent bringing up the aspect of good faith. However, it resulted in allowing the Chinese delegate to make a move without initiating it in a way which might be interpreted to be tantamount to an appeal to the Council.

I learned from Sze that he was not able and probably would not be able during the present Council session to communicate to it any more authentic information regarding the Mukden situation, since he had been informed from Nanking of the cutting by the Japanese of communications from Mukden to Peiping and Nanking, thereby preventing his getting any information from Mukden. Sze attributed this Japanese cutting of communications as an act to prevent the true facts becoming known before the Council's meetings have concluded. He also revealed to me that instructions from his Government on the position he should take at Geneva had not yet been received; that his action would be governed by these instructions,

but that he would put off this action as long as he could, even if directed to present the question to the League.

After the above statements, it became apparent why Sze had come to see me. The press in Europe has published articles under a Washington date line about the United States considering the relationship of the current situation to the Four-Power Pacific Treaty's provisions. Sze said he felt that action under this treaty or under the Kellogg Pact of 1928 would be better for China than League of Nations action, since the stronger position of Japan in the League would militate against China. According to Sze, Japan can use its position by employing its relations to questions of Europe as trading points. Sze has no wish to fall between two stools, but if there is a possibility that Washington may take the action mentioned above, Sze does wish to avoid an appeal to the League, especially as he feels that possible American action might be prejudiced by prior League action. From the foregoing it will be noted that neither Japan nor China has as yet requested the League Council to act in this matter.

While listening to Sze's statements, naturally I made no comments. If the Department should make any public statements or any statements to the press on the situation, I should appreciate having their substance. It is probable that nothing will happen tomorrow, but at the meeting of the League Assembly, scheduled at present for September 22, the matter may come to a head. [End paraphrase.] GILBERT

793.94/2216

The Vice Consul at Mukden (Lynch) to the Minister in China (Johnson) 27

No. 446 MUKDEN, September 20, 1931. SIR: I have the honor to advise the Legation as stated in my several telegrams of September 19 that at about 1 a. m. on that morning, Japanese troops entered the International Settlement at Mukden and surrounded the Native City. The city itself was invested in the early hours of the morning. Chinese troops were, at the first signs of trouble, ordered to retire without resistance. In so far as Mukden is concerned the transfer took place with no resistance from Chinese troops and with few indications of any desire to fight on the part of the Chinese. A few unfortunate incidents will be noted in this despatch. Since the taking over of Mukden, the Consulate General has been informed that Changchun, Newchwang, Antung and Kwangchengtze were also taken over on the morning of the nineteenth. The

27

Copy transmitted to the Department by the Vice Consul in his despatch No. 36, September 20; received October 19.

International Settlement has been quiet and Americans and other foreigners, although advised to remain at home after dark, have felt fairly safe.

Firing started about eleven o'clock on Friday evening and for some time thereafter it was believed by most people to indicate only the not unusual Japanese sham battle. At about eleven thirty, however, firing from heavier guns was heard from the southeast of Mukden. Shortly after twelve I proceeded to the Japanese Consulate General and was informed by Vice Consul Miura that Chinese troops had blown up two sections of the South Manchuria Railway at Pei Tai Ying near the Chinese north camp, a few miles north of Mukden; they had also opened fire on a detachment of Japanese troops who had defended themselves and called for enforcements. This was the explanation of the firing then heard. Unbelievable as it may sound, I am reasonably certain that the Japanese Consulate General did not know at that time that it was the intention of the military authorities immediately to occupy Chinese territory. They were, of course, intensely worried as to the probable repercussions of the affair but I very much doubt their having prior knowledge of the actual moving of troops. I was, while at the Consulate General, assured as to the entire safety of foreigners.

On Saturday, the nineteenth, the Consulate General notified Americans that while it had little doubt as to their safety, as an elementary precaution, it was recommended that they remain at home after dark. In company with the British Consul General I called on the Japanese Consul General at 5 p. m. to inquire as to what measures were being taken for the protection of the life and property of our nationals in the International Settlement and in the native city. The Japanese Consul General assured us that he had made every effort to impress upon the Commander-in-Chief, S. Honjo, the necessity for such protection and while he could not tell us the exact number of police, troops and gendarmes that would be available for this work, he had every hope that his urgings had had the desired effect. Mr. Hayashi told us in confidence that when the military came in charge they were extremely difficult to deal with. This fact has been obvious from the first. Both Mr. Eastes and I had to be satisfied with Mr. Hayashi's statement with regard to protection. I requested a special military guard for the National City Bank of New York and Mr. Eastes for the Hongkong Bank. It is now the night of September 20 and, although a few shots can be heard from time to time, it is believed that every precaution is being taken for the protection of foreigners.

The two code telegrams sent from this Consulate General early Saturday morning were returned from the Chinese telegraph office and

were sent Japanese lines via Shanghai. No assurance could be obtained as to their getting through in code and there was considerable doubt about telegrams en clair. Another telegram was, however, sent en clair and in order to make assurance doubly sure the Consulate General got indirectly into communication with Consul Langdon at Dairen and requested that he telegraph the bare details to the Legation, the Department and the Embassy at Tokyo. Up to this time this Consulate General does not know how many, if any, of its wires have been received by the Legation. True readings of the code telegrams and readings of the en clair telegrams are therefore enclosed.28

This Consulate General finds it difficult to give credence to the Japanese explanation of the incident. The movement into Chinese territory was too sudden and too concerted to have been caused by an explosion on the South Manchuria Railway line at 10:30 p. m. Officials of the Consulate General have not given this as their own explanation but they confine themselves to saying "We have been informed by the military authorities that, etc. etc." At 5 p. m. on the afternoon of the eighteenth I called at the Japanese Consulate General to ascertain if there were any new developments in the Nakamura affair. I found that it was felt to be progressing very satisfactorily due to the conciliatory attitude recently adopted by the Chinese. To quote a statement made to me that day by an official of the Japanese Consulate General when discussing the possibility of trouble: "The Chinese are very wise to adopt a conciliatory attitude and tell the truth in this matter for Japan holds two sabres, the South Manchuria Railway lines from Dairen to Mukden and from Korea to Mukden. But Japan with this strength in the form of these sabres would be very wrong to use it unless something very bad were done by the Chinese and unless they refused to treat the matter fairly."

The "something very bad" happened but I cannot believe that the Japanese Consulate General had any idea that it was going to happen and I do not believe that the Japanese consular officials give any credence whatsoever to the military authorities' statement that the affair was a matter of Chinese aggression.

Captain Mayer's telegram of 6 p. m. September 20 gives a very clear account of Japanese military activity so far, which he obtained from the Japanese military authorities. There were a few incidents of what is believed to have been unnecessary terrorism. Japanese troops are reliably reported to have seized the Trench Mortar Arsenal,

None found in Department files. 587122-46-VOL. III-9

to have killed the military guards who offered no resistance and to have tossed hand grenades into the workmen's quarters killing twenty men. The old gateman at the Chinese Post Office made a faint gesture of protest when troops took the postmen's bicycles and received a terrible beating with rifle butts for his pains. He was sent to the Hospital. It is understood that Chinese policemen were shot in many instances when a few police boxes endeavored mistakenly to resist the Japanese. This morning Mr. Sugden, the British works manager of the Peking-Mukden Railway shops, endeavored to reach his office in his car driven by a Chinese chauffeur and draped with the British flag. The car was stopped the chauffeur beaten and the British flag torn from the car stamped and spat upon. Mr. Sugden escaped with a torn coat. The British Consul General protested strongly to the Japanese consular authorities and Mr. Hayashi, the Japanese Consul General, immediately called in person on the military authorities. An apology is expected soon. As was stated in my telegram of eight a. m. September 19, a Chinese chauffeur was killed opposite the Mukden Club at about two a. m. The owner of the car died in the morning from wounds received. Stray bullets entered the Mukden Club and in addition damaged the motor cars of several Americans in the Club compound. No foreigners were hurt. A protest was made by this office to the Japanese Consulate General and expressions of extreme regret as well as assurances of future safety for Americans were received. However, when it is considered that a city of some 400,000 people changed from Chinese to Japanese hands literally overnight it must be admitted that there has been remarkably little bloodshed and few untoward incidents. Respectfully yours, ANDREW G. LYNCH

793.94/1816: Telegram

The Minister in Switzerland (Wilson) to the Secretary of State

[Paraphrase]

GENEVA, September 21, 1931-2 p. m. [Received September 21-11:30 a. m.]

148. Relative to armed clash in Manchuria between forces of China and Japan, Sir Eric Drummond 29 could offer no unprejudiced information and he queried of me whether you would furnish him with facts for his own guidance.

Drummond desires to have also your opinion on the involvement of the Kellogg Pact in this matter and the basis for your views.

20 Secretary-General of the League of Nations.

WILSON