treaty. It seems to me that we should do well in these circumstances to communicate to the United States a statement of all the proceedings of this Council and of all the discussions which have taken place within it. The United States Government will then be fully informed of what we are doing and they will be able to take any action they think right in connection with the subject."

This suggestion has not yet been formally approved by the Council but there is a strong probability that it will be adopted.

Upon the termination of the discussion the Council was adjourned for 15 minutes to enable the President to draft a resolution dealing with the Sino-Japanese conflict but at the end of one-half hour he announced that the question was not yet in a position in which he could put the resolution before the Council and in order to allow further time for consideration adjourned the meeting until 3:30 this afternoon.

The Consulate will submit a report of the day's proceedings in a later report.

GILBERT

793.94/1834: Telegram

The Ambassador in Great Britain (Dawes) to the Secretary of State

[Paraphrase]

LONDON, September 22, 1931-6 p. m. [Received September 22-3:50 p. m.]

376. The Japanese Ambassador here has just called and says that on September 26 he departs for Tokyo aboard the Berengaria to New York. Upon the insistence of his Government Matsudaira has reluctantly agreed to serve as chairman of the Japanese delegation to the Disarmament Conference next February. He states that representatives of the Army and [Navy?] will be in the delegation. In preparation for this assignment he expects to be away from his post here until the convening of the Conference.

The official advices the Ambassador has received pertaining to the trouble in Manchuria are, in his opinion, somewhat disturbing. In comparison with the estimated force of 10,400 men which Japan has in Manchuria he places the strength of the Chinese at over 200,000 and their heavy guns around Mukden alone at about double the amount available to the entire Japanese Army. Matsudaira states that the Japanese Government and that of China, too, in his opinion, are attempting to bring the conflict to an end. As to the concentration of Soviet troops, he is without knowledge, although he is perturbed by such reports in the press.

The action of the Japanese military commander at Mukden was not authorized by the War Office at Tokyo and obviously was without the knowledge of the Japanese Government, according to the understanding of the British Foreign Office. The latter feels that the ill effects of a Chinese boycott upon the industry of Japan will make the Japanese only too anxious to seek a solution compatible with their national dignity.

Answering an inquiry, the Foreign Office considers that any material Soviet assistance to the Chinese is not at all probable.

Matsudaira states it is urgent for him to reach Tokyo at the earliest moment, so he does not plan to stop over in Washington. It would be best for you to send me a cable now in case you wish to see him en route across the United States, so that he could alter his plans.

793.94/1832: Telegram

The Consul at Geneva (Gilbert) to the Secretary of State

DAWES

GENEVA, September 22, 1931-6 p. m. [Received September 22-4: 17 p. m.]

123. Consulate's 120, September 22, 4 p. m. Mr. Wilson was formally handed a resolution presented by the President of the Council and passed by the Council at its session this afternoon, together with a covering letter enclosing also the minutes of the Council meetings held today relating to the appeal from the Chinese Government under article 11 of the Covenant, together with other documents relating to this question. These papers are being forwarded to the Department.36

The resolution referred to above reads:

"My colleagues and I have listened this morning with the closest attention to the statements of the representatives of China and Japan. We take due note of the request of the representative of Japan to adjourn the discussion of the question until the next meeting. I request the Council to authorize me:

First, to address an urgent appeal to the Governments of China and Japan to abstain from any act which might aggravate the situation or prejudice the peaceful settlement of the problem;

Second, to seek in consultation with the representatives of China and Japan, adequate means whereby the two countries may proceed immediately to the withdrawal of their respective troops without compromising the security of life of their nationals or the protection of the property belonging to them.

I ask the Council to decide to forward for information the minutes of all the meetings of the Council together with the documents relating to this question to the Government of the United States of America."

GILBERT

"Despatches No. 2236, September 23, and No. 2237, September 24, not printed.

793.94/1851

The British Embassy to the Department of State

AIDE-MÉMOIRE

The Chinese Government have appealed to the League under Article 11 of the Covenant to intervene in the Mukden affair and the Council were to discuss the question on the morning of the 23rd of September.

His Majesty's Government and the French Government agree in favouring a proposal for the simultaneous withdrawal of troops and the despatch of the British and French Military Attachés from Tokio to Mukden, whither the Military Attachés from Peking have already proceeded. The Military Attachés would act as neutral observers on the spot to verify withdrawal, so that each side might have assurances that the other side were carrying out their part. The proposal for the withdrawal of troops and the despatch of neutral observers would have the object of preparing the ground for direct negotiations; if these failed or proved difficult, either side might then invoke outside intervention.

His Majesty's Government desire to inform the United States Government of the action they are taking and they would be glad to learn whether or not the latter contemplate urging moderation on both sides.

WASHINGTON, September 22, 1931.

793.94/1827: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Consul General at Nanking (Peck) WASHINGTON, September 22, 1931—6 p. m.

75. Your 624, September 22, 3 p. m.37 First, the Secretary of State has not made the statement attributed to him; second, the American Government was in no way consulted or informed in advance. You may so inform your interlocutors.

STIMSON

793.94/1820: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Consul at Geneva (Gilbert)

[Paraphrase]

WASHINGTON, September 22, 1931-6 p. m.

58. Your 116, September 20, 4 p. m., final paragraph. The press has been given no statement on this subject other than the following, which was dated September 19:

38

37 Reference is to telegram from the Minister in China, p. 26.

3 Quatation not paraphrased.

"The Department is informed from American official sources that Japanese troops have occupied Mukden, Newchwang, Changchun, Antung and Kowpangtze and have taken over all Government services. The reports state that all foreigners are safe."

Correspondents at Department daily press conferences have raised the question of applying the Kellogg-Briand Pact of 1928 and the Nine-Power (not Four-Power) Treaty of Washington, but a noncommittal attitude has been taken by the Department. See the Department's 119, September 22, 1 p. m., to the Minister in Switzerland for the Department's position thus far.

STIMSON

793.94/1849: Telegram

The Consul at Geneva (Gilbert) to the Secretary of State

GENEVA, September 22, 1931-7 p. m. [Received September 23-12: 10 p. m.]

124. Consulate's number 120, September 22, 4 p. m. The proceedings in the Council this morning with the exception of Lord Cecil's statement at the close, referred to in the Consulate's telegram under reference, were entirely confined to a series of statements on the part of the Chinese and the Japanese delegates on the Council. The Chinese delegate spoke first. The substance of these is as follows:

China. Sze read two telegrams which he had just received from Nanking. These telegrams outlined factual developments in the conflict area, giving towns occupied, etc. He then stated that the total area which had been occupied by the Japanese troops was as extensive as that of Great Britain and Ireland. He said that these messages gave a very gloomy picture but he was afraid that even so it was incomplete, as the Japanese had cut communication between that area and Nanking, and that he believed the situation to be more grave than at the time he despatched his note to the Secretary General (Consulate's 118, September 21, 5 p. m.).

His position was that it had become a question whether application of other articles than article 11 of Paris Covenant might not be required, although this might be prevented by prompt and effective action on the part of Japan. He then brought forward again the steps which he had requested the Council to take in his note to the Secretary General: (1) To prevent the further development of a situation endangering the peace of nations, (2) to reestablish the status quo ante. (3) to determine the reparations due to China.

89

Japan reported. Yoshizawa 9 expressed his intention of replying to the Chinese delegate's statement as soon as he had received instruc

"Kenkichi Yoshizawa, Japanese Ambassador in France and representative on the League of Nations Council.

tions from his Government. In the meantime he wished to offer a few observations in an attempt to clear up the position and to determine the scope of the problem. He stated that in order to understand the situation, it was necessary to consider the nature of region where the incident occurred, and proceeded to lay stress upon the enormous Japanese interests there and rights guaranteed by treaties. He called attention to the great disproportion between the small garrison of soldiers maintained there by Japan and the very large Chinese army in that region. He declined to accept the Chinese affirmation that the incident took place without provocation on the part of Chinese troops and added that, according to official information in his possession, the incident was caused by the destruction by Chinese troops of part of the railway near Mukden, which necessitated the taking up of arms by the small Japanese garrison there. From this it became necessary to occupy important points in certain towns in order to prevent further incidents and to protect the railway and the life and property of Japanese nationals resident in the district. He then stated that this incident was not an isolated event but was rather an explosion due to a tension which had been created by a number of earlier occurrences such as the murder of Captain Nakamura by Chinese soldiers.

Referring to the Chinese demand for reparations, he considered it unjust to make any such claim until the Council had finished discussing the merits of the case. He contended that the settlement of the question of the reestablishment of the status quo ante could not be properly settled except on the spot and by taking into consideration the various factors in each locality.

He assured the Council that the incident was a local one and that immediately after its occurrence the Japanese Government had sent a formal order to the commander of the Japanese forces in Mukden to take the necessary steps to prevent an extension of the troubles. He added that his Government was far from the idea of making war on the Chinese Republic.

He asserted that, according to latest reports he had received, a proposal had been made by the Chinese that a solution should be sought by direct negotiations between the two Governments. He implied that this proposal was welcomed by his Government and added that in his judgment premature intervention would only have the result of needlessly exciting Japanese public opinion and thus impede the pacific settlement of the situation. He expressed the conviction that a pacific settlement could best be achieved by direct negotiations between the two Governments. Finally, in view of the fact that he had not yet received instructions, he requested the Council to postpone the matter until its next meeting.

China. Sze replied by noting that Yoshizawa's views were personal inasmuch as he had admitted that he had not yet received instructions