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languages, the Japanese agreed to put their understanding of this point into written form.

Dr. Sze then came before the committee. He began with a prefatory statement that China was not willing to pay out a price for Japan's agreement to withdraw her troops. To do so would be to condone a flagrant violation of the Covenant and the Kellogg Pact. China could not be expected to pay for rights guaranteed by treaty. Briand here explained that the Council had no such idea in mind but had asked this question simply in view of the doubt raised by Japan.

Sze then repeated that China felt herself bound, as with all members of the League, to a scrupulous respect for treaties. In addition she was willing to have arbitration on any doubtful points as promptly as possible under article 13 of the Covenant. He recalled that at Washington the parties, except for China, had agreed to file their treaty agreements. If Japan should bring up a treaty which is out of date or invalid, China thought the proper course was to arbitrate. A general discussion of treaties at this moment might take a long time; no one knew what treaties Japan had in mind. He thereupon read the text of the Washington provisions for registration of all commitments.46

Sze laid stress upon the point that China is bound as regards Manchuria, not only to Japan but to other nations. Under the NinePower Treaty, for instance, she has obligated herself to other states to maintain the Open Door and equal commercial opportunity. If there is any difference of interpretation China was prepared to arbitrate.

If, however, Japan has in mind the 21 demands China is not going to resign them to buy evacuation. Since their day, China has become bound by the Washington Treaty. Sze pointed out that this statement contained nothing new but was simply a reaffirmation of what he had said at Washington.

The question as to treaties, he said, is not one of China respecting her obligations, but Japan. The latter, he claimed, had already violated the Covenant, the Kellogg Pact and the Nine-Power Treaty. Japan had promised 2 months ago to withdraw; she had not done so; she was always pressing new demands; one wondered when she was going to stop. Thereupon, in reply to a question, he gave the history of the 21 demands, saying they had been presented secretly, with a 48-hour ultimatum, signed under military pressure, never ratified, and since repeatedly protested.

Sze took the occasion to inform the Council that he was constantly receiving urgent cables from China. Since Monday the Japanese troops north of the Nonni had greatly increased, with artillery, tanks, aviation and cavalry. Something must be done to stop the bloodshed. If there were difficulties under article 11 he gave notice that he would take the opportunity of the first public meeting to invoke articles 10, 12, 15 and, if necessary, 16. He felt that the time had come to speak plainly; that Japan had not fulfilled any of her agreements as to the withdrawal of troops, withdrawal of bombing planes, not penetrating north of the Nonni, and the like.

"See Foreign Relations, 1922, vol. 1, p. 355.

The next meeting is fixed for 11 o'clock tomorrow morning, with the probability of having before it Japan's written statement of her views of the relation of the evacuation to the negotiation of the accord on the fundamental points. An atmosphere of gravity settled over the Council at the end, with the feeling that there was very little prospect now of settlement by mediation. Those who have been pressing for a public affirmation of principles, as the British and German representatives this morning, and who have, up until now, held back to give Briand full chance of negotiation, are likely now to press their views vigorously."

[Dawes] SHAW

793.94/2763: Telegram

The Chargé in France (Shaw) to the Secretary of State

[Paraphrase]

PARIS, November 18, 1931-2 p. m. [midnight.]

[Received November 19-4:42 a. m.]

765. From Ambassador Dawes: Simon leaves early tomorrow morning to attend a London Cabinet meeting but expects to return shortly to Paris. Late tonight I had a conversation with him on the critical situation. I informed him that Matsudaira considered the Japanese internal situation as beyond the Government's control, and Simon commented that he had a strictly confidential but independent intimation of the possibility of a coup in Japan.

When Yoshizawa went before the Council this afternoon, he did not inform them of the sending to his Government of a second recommendation and of his hope of obtaining authority to present the matter to the League (as had been expected by Matsudaira and as I reported in telegram 762, November 18, 8 p. m.), but Yoshizawa instead reaffirmed in more extravagant fashion all the objectionable old proposals of Japan (for Sweetser's account of the proceedings in this Council meeting, see Embassy's 764, November 18, midnight).

The League now is acting under article 11 of the Covenant. It is anticipated that the League will be asked soon, if not tomorrow, by China to proceed under articles 10, 12, 15, and, if necessary, 16. Parenthetically, Sze has informed me that he will call at 10:30 a. m. tomorrow, and this may be in connection with the above. Should China make such a request, Simon feels the League should proceed under article 15 to the appointment of a commission to report on the general situation and then, if this action is ineffective, should proceed under article 16. He is inclined to think, in other words, that in this situation the League should go to the limit of its powers irrespective of

whether the probabilities favor success or not. It would tend at least to mobilize the world's moral forces in a strong way in condemnation of Japan's procedure, always provided the same attitude is concurrently and independently assumed by the United States Government. Simon inquires whether, in the event of a commission of League members being sent under article 15 to report on the situation, the United States Government would be inclined to appoint either a member or an associate investigator. Simon expressed a wish for a continuing exchange of ideas between the British and American Governments, designed to supplement each other's attitudes in the most effective way, since our treaty interests and relation generally to the situation are the same. [Dawes.]

SHAW

793.94/2892

Memorandum by the Chief of the Division of Far Eastern Affairs (Hornbeck) of a Conversation Between the Secretary of State and the Chinese Chargé (Yen)"

[WASHINGTON,] November 19, 1931.

Dr. Yen called and presented to the Secretary his credentials. The conversation turned on the subject of the Manchuria situation. In the course thereof Dr. Yen stated that various Chinese official leaders placed special reliance on the Nine Powers Treaty. He said that W. W. Yen 18 in particular has stressed to him the importance of that Treaty. He inquired what would be the attitude of the American Government if the question of invoking that Treaty were raised.

48

The Secretary of State replied that we had had most if not all of various possibilities in mind; that at the time when the trouble began the Council of the League was in session, China had appealed to the Council, the Council had taken full "jurisdiction", and the American Government had both acted independently and given its moral support to the action taken by the League. For practical purposes there had been and there is going on a conference of the Powers. For that reason there had arisen so far no need for calling a separate and additional conference. Two conferences sitting at the same time to deal with the same question would mean weakness rather than strength. As to what would be our position if the question of invoking the Nine Powers Treaty were raised, it was our consistent practice to keep in mind the saying: "Don't cross a bridge until you come to the river”. He felt that the representatives of the various Powers were very ac

"Accompanying the new Chinese Chargé, Dr. Hawkling Yen, was the First Secretary of the Chinese Legation, Mr. Yu.

"Appointed Chinese Minister to the United States.

587122-46-VOL. III-38

tively struggling with the Manchuria problem at Paris just now and that we should concentrate our attention on their efforts.

S[TANLEY] K. H[ORNBECK]

793.94/2925

The Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs at Nanking to the Chinese

Legation 49

[NANKING,] November 19, 1931. A fierce attack opened yesterday morning by a large Japanese army on General Ma's troops north of Tahsing, Heilungkiang, the Japanese using heavy artillery, tanks and aeroplanes. Towards night General Ma's men retreated northward Angangchi station, ten miles from Tsitsihar, fighting still continuing. The Japanese determination to seize Tsitsihar is announced in handbills dropped from the Japanese planes flying over the provincial capital.

793.94/2781 : Telegram

The Minister in China (Johnson) to the Secretary of State

NANKING, November 19, 1931–9 a. m. [Received 4: 50 p. m.]

I have received the following manifesto from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs with the request that it was [be?] transmitted to the American Government.

"Since the forcible occupation of various places in the North Eastern Provinces, the Japanese military authority [authorities] have been frequently instigating or utilizing bandits, rebels and other undesirable characters to disturb local peace and order as well as organized [to organize] governments [which are] usurping administrative powers under the protection of [or] duress of Japanese troops.

It has been lately reported that, during the recent disturbance in Tientsin created by insurgent rioters who made use of the Japanese Concession as their base of operations, the defunct emperor Pu-yi of the former Manchu Dynasty was kidnapped and escorted by the Japanese from the said concession to Shenyang for the establishment of a bogus government with himself proclaimed as the emperor.

The National Government has already declared to the League of Nations and the governments of friendly powers that the Chinese Government and people will not recognize any illegitimate institution[s] established in subversion of China's administrative integrity in those places of the North Eastern Provinces which remain under the occupation of Japanese troops. In the event that the establish

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'Copy of telegram handed by the Chinese Chargé to Mr. Ransford S. Miller of the Division of Far Eastern Affairs on November 19, 1931.

ment of Pu-yi's bogus government is confirmed, the National Government will regard such a government as a seditionist institution and at the same time as an auxiliary organ of the Japanese Government in disguise, while all the acts of such a government which are necessarily illegal will be repudiated by the National Government and the entire responsibility therefore will be laid on the shoulders of the Japanese Government. Nanking, November 17th, 1931."

JOHNSON

793.94/2775: Telegram

The Minister in China (Johnson) to the Secretary of State

963. Following from Harbin:

PEIPING, November 19, 1931-10 a. m. [Received 10:40 a. m.50]

"November 18, noon. 1. According to all reports, yesterday passed without any serious attacks by Japanese or Chinese troops on the Nonni River front.

2. Ohashi informed me last night that Chinese representatives of General Ma had informed local representatives of Honjo that his written reply to the Japanese ultimatum of November 15th would not be delivered but that he would comply with the Japanese Consulate demands on the condition that the Japanese troops would simultaneously withdraw with the Chinese, that the Heilungkiang Provincial authorities reserve the right to keep troops south of the Chinese Eastern Railway line in the case of bandit activities there and that in case normal traffic would be restored on the Taoang Railway, the troops of General Chang Hai-peng would not be allowed to use the zone. Ohashi reminds me that this is construed by the Japanese side to be a refusal to accept the terms of the ultimatum and added that on November 16th the Japanese War Office gave out in Tokyo a statement to the effect that it was dissatisfied with Ma's attitude and that the threatening attitude of his troops might make it necessary for the Japanese to clear them away from Tsitsihar and vicinity as a matter of safety. Local Chinese officials confirm the failure of Ma to give a written answer to the ultimatum and attentions, that civil administrator Chang 51 (who is suspected of being pro-Japanese) and Ma could not agree until late last night upon the wording of the written reply which Chinese officials state will arrive in Harbin this morning. Japanese side becoming impatient in regard to dilatory talk of Chinese, who are playing for time.

3. During the last few days weather has become very cold and it is expected that in a few days Nonni River and swampy land nearby will freeze over solid. This would facilitate crossing the river and transport on land, but handicap fighting of soldiers of both sides, but more especially the Japanese who can only be supplied via Taonan.

4. Local Commissioner of Foreign Affairs has confirmed to this office the press report that the provincial government for Kirin Prov

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