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793.94/2968: Telegram

The Minister in China (Johnson) to the Secretary of State

PEIPING, December 1, 1931-noon. [Received December 1-6: 15 a. m.]

1027. Department's 123, November 27, 1 p. m., to Nanking. Following from Minister:

"November 30, 3 p. m. Your November 29, 11 a. m.; my November 28, midnight. Inform Military Attaché at Chinchow that I understand new instructions have been sent today to British Military Attaché. You should also inform him that I understand that Paris proposal upon which other military observers are working is as follows:

A. Observers to concert together with a view to possibility of establishing between Chinese and Japanese troops a neutral zone or any similar arrangement for avoiding a clash between them.

B. Observers should concert methods of establishing liaison with commanders of Japanese and Chinese with a view to making necessary arrangements.

I understand British instructions contemplate the making of arrangements for a regular concerted organization of observers with liaison between different nationalities and collation of reporters and with sufficient observers held in readiness to proceed to the localities which may be indicated as danger points.

British observer has been instructed to concert with his colleagues at Chinchow with a view to the accomplishment of the above proposals. You are authorized to proceed along similar lines but should keep the Legation and the Department currently informed of all arrangements."

For the Minister:

PERKINS

793.94/2970: Telegram

The Ambassador in Japan (Forbes) to the Secretary of State

[Paraphrase]

TOKYO, December 1, 1931-4 p. m. [Received December 1-9:50 a. m.]

246. My 241, November 29, 6 p. m. As to my last interview with Baron Shidehara, I am not able to think of anything further of importance to add, except to remark that his tone was much calmer than the first time and he explained in detail the causes of existing embarrassment which he did not intimate in the earlier interview. He still is being criticized quite sharply by the military and is undergoing attacks by the press. He informed me that an Army representative

had called upon him and had expressed to him the fear that the Chinese would be so encouraged by the announced Japanese agreement not to occupy Chinchow that any hope of an accord would be upset. Speaking of the Foreign Office spokesman's critical statement as given out, Shidehara said this was contrary to his way of handling public questions, for he endeavored to make all of his utterances conciliatory in tone. The night of November 28, after the Associated Press messages were published, I issued to the Japanese public a statement as follows:

28

"In the absence of exact information the Embassy is unable to make any statement on the alleged interview with the Secretary of State. It is hoped that the situation will be viewed calmly by the public until the receipt of official reports, which it is hoped will clear up any misunderstanding."

29

My statement was printed on the front pages of the Japanese newspapers and had a good effect. After I had shown the substance of your 248 20 to Shidehara the following day, he inquired whether I could not make to the press a further statement, which I did as follows: 30

"The American Embassy has received advices from the State Department in Washington that the interview purporting to have come from Secretary Stimson is utterly at variance with his attitude. The Secretary of State has never held or expressed in public or private an attitude towards the Japanese Government such as that indicated in the press report but on the contrary has used his influence to restrain any expression by the American press which in his words 'might be embarrassing to a solution of the Manchurian controversy'. He has publicly denied that the words as quoted were his.["]

It is agreed by the newspapers here, despite some further repercussions, that the episode is ended unless it should cause the nullifying of the accord which it is hoped is now in process of adjustment.

FORBES

793.94/2975: Telegram

The Chargé in France (Shaw) to the Secretary of State

[Paraphrase]

PARIS, December 1, 1931-4 p. m. [Received December 1-12:40 p. m.]

824. From Ambassador Dawes: I have just had a call from Matsudaira with whom I have discussed one of the few remaining points of difference, namely, the manner in which the League's declaration and

28 Quotation not paraphrased.

"Of November 28, 2 p. m., Foreign Relations, Japan, 1931-1941, vol. 1, p. 54. 80 Quotation not paraphrased.

resolution shall cover the question of the protection of Japanese nationals against bandits. I personally appreciate the Council's desire to avoid making a precedent seemingly inconsistent with international law as it exists by justifying inferentially the occasional chasing of bandits outside the Japanese railway zone, but I also realize, with the recollection in mind of the expedition led by Pershing into Mexico in pursuit of the bandit Villa," that the condition in Manchuria is not theoretical but is actual. If the Japanese Government were to announce its agreement in advance to send no detachment to prevent an expected slaughter of Japanese subjects in any particular locality by a Chinese bandit group, probably the Japanese Government would fall.

The Council, in continuing to deal with the situation in Manchuria, rather than to throw overboard the attempt to secure a peaceful settlement prior to this time, has already overlooked expeditions of this nature in its desire to avert a war. The Council has, however, already intimated with reluctance that it will endeavor in the declaration accompanying the resolution to satisfy the Japanese concerning this point by some reference to it. Though some opposition on the Council exists, I believe Briand can achieve this. Matsudaira has agreed with me that if he can accomplish it the present Japanese demand to include the reference to bandits in the resolution itself will be withdrawn and the Japanese will be content with a reference to this matter by Briand in the declaration. Therefore, unless unexpected happenings occur around Chinchow contrary to the Japanese Government's wishes and orders, daylight appears to be in the offing.

The Chinese announcement which was made public last night, as suggested by me, has pleased Matsudaira. [Dawes.]

SHAW

793.94/2969: Telegram

The Minister in China (Johnson) to the Secretary of State

NANKING, December 1, 1931-5 p. m. [Received December 1-10 a. m.]

My November 24, midnight; and Department's 120, November 25, 4 p. m., to Nanking.

Instructions contained in the Department's 123, November 27, 1 p. m., to Nanking, have been transmitted to American Military Attaché at Chinchow.

I have just seen Koo who tells me that apparently there has been a misunderstanding in regard to the situation at Chinchow on the part 31 See Foreign Relations, 1916, pp. 483-597, passim.

of the Japanese. He states that the Japanese refused to accept the proposal of the Council of the League in regard to military observers and has so notified Briand. He informed me that the Japanese Minister called upon him yesterday and brought up the question of Chinchow, intimating that Japan had accepted tentative suggestion of Dr. Koo contained in my November 24, midnight, as a formal proposal and was demanding that Chinese now evacuate territory up to and inside of Great Wall at Shanhaikwan, Japan undertaking not to send troops into areas thus evacuated but reserving the right to despatch troops into such area or beyond in case of bandit activities or emergency.

[Paraphrase.] The misunderstanding seems to have arisen from the fact that the French Ambassador in Japan communicated to Tokyo the proposal as a formal one on the part of the Chinese. The situation at the moment is that the Council's proposal has been accepted by the Chinese who have instructed their military at Chinchow to work along this line with the foreign military observers. The Japanese have not accepted the Council's proposal, but they state they have accepted the Chinese proposal of November 24. The Japanese Minister informed Koo that if the Chinese refuse to abide by what he calls the November 24 proposal, the Japanese military will be incensed and a dangerous situation may again arise. The foregoing is for your confidential information. [End paraphrase.]

JOHNSON

793.94/2976: Telegram

The Chargé in France (Shaw) to the Secretary of State

[Paraphrase]

PARIS, December 1, 1931-5 p. m. [Received December 1-1: 40 p. m.]

825. From Ambassador Dawes: Referring to Department's No. 609 of November 30.82 The Italian representative called upon me this noon in regard to a delegate of his country joining the commission, and I informed Scialoja in the Under Secretary's words that my Government would naturally not object to an Italian member on the commission, since its appointment is entirely a League of Nations matter. [Dawes.]

32 Not printed.

SHAW

793.94/2987: Telegram

The Chargé in France (Shaw) to the Secretary of State

PARIS, December 1, 1931-6 p. m. [Received December 1-4: 42 p. m.33]

826. From Ambassador Dawes. Following is report from Sweetser: "The Drafting Committee completed this morning for submission to the Twelve tonight the final text of the resolution taking account to the greatest possible degree of changes suggested by both the Chinese and the Japanese. Two points only need be emphasized before this final text is approved and forwarded tonight. First, there is no mention in it of Japan's demand for the right to take police measures against bandits. Second, the number of members of the commission as recommended to the Twelve is five.

The Committee also considered both the policy and the actual text of the declaration to be made by the President. After some discussion it was felt best to recommend dividing this declaration into two parts. The first part would be a somewhat formal statement on certain points either included in or excluded from the resolution. This declaration would at least in substance be explained to the parties in advance and certain sections of it especially that inserted for the Japanese regarding police measures before evacuation and that for the Chinese regarding observers might even be given to the Chinese Government [Chinese and Japanese?] in full for advance transmission to their Governments. Having been thus negotiated and presented before the adoption of the resolution this declaration would have a decidedly formal character.

The second declaration would be very much less formal and would be made after the passage of the resolution. It would cover certain broad aspects involved in this dispute such as the use of force in diplomatic negotiations, the general philosophy of peaceful settlement, and possibly specific relation to the three great documents involved in the Covenant, the Kellogg Pact and Nine-Power Treaty. The text is now in process of being drafted.

Returning to the first declaration, the most important paragraph is that regarding police measures. It is not yet known whether this will be satisfactory to the Japanese either in being relegated to the declaration or in its actual drafting. That drafting as it stands at present and as it has been informally transmitted to the Japanese is as follows:

"There is, however, one point which requires elucidation. In the special conditions prevailing at present in Manchuria the administrative machinery of government is seriously compromised. There are districts in which many bandits and lawless bands endanger the lives and property of the inhabitants some of whom are Japanese subjects. In these circumstances it has been strongly pressed upon the Council that it may prove necessary as an exceptional measure for the Japanese Government during the period before evacuation is completed to take, if such a danger renders it necessary, police measures sufficient to provide directly for the safety of its subjects. In the very exceptional conditions that prevail, the Council could not take upon itself to rule out altogether action of that kind. Nevertheless, and even assuming that such action is confined strictly to police

33 Telegram in five sections,

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