thing approaching a status quo ante can be reached, in that the commission would be exceedingly irritating to the military elements. He does not deny that some kind of a commission might later be necessary if Japan does not fulfill its obligations by withdrawing from an untenable position. On the other hand, he thinks strongly that at the present moment the situation is improving and the very best method of settling the whole matter would be through direct conversations with the Chinese. The Ambassador says that his Government is very grateful to this Government for its sympathetic attitude in the whole matter and hopes that we shall be content to let matters rest for the time being until Japan can prove by actions their good intentions. I told the Ambassador that this was very important, that, so far as we could see, there had been a violation of treaties, possibly without intention, and that neither this Government nor the rest of the world could sit quietly by in a situation as tense as the present, although I personally was only too glad to give the Japanese an opportunity to prove the good faith which I know they have. I pointed out to the Ambassador that the world had for years suspected Japanese intentions in Manchuria and that this made the world attitude more critical than it perhaps would be. For this reason I told him it was clear that the Japanese Government should act as quickly and as openly as possible in the restoration of legal treaty conditions. The Ambassador said that he was sure that his Government fully appreciated this and would so act. He spoke of the despatch of British troops to Shanghai some years ago and our own so-called bombardment of Nanking, but admitted that this was a different situation than the present in that at that time the question was international and that there could be no claim that we were seeking selfish advantages.

69

The Ambassador said that now that Baron Shidehara and Baron Wakatsuki " were in control of the situation, he felt that things would improve perhaps more rapidly than we believe possible, but that it remained very important not to complicate matters by the imposition of some outside body for investigation or anything else. I pointed out to him that possibly another reason for prompt action might be that it was necessary within the range of possibilities-if not probabilities-that the Russians might take the attitude that they were friends of China and would help put out the Japanese; that, if anything of the sort happened, it would infinitely complicate the situation. The Ambassador said that his Government was fully aware of this possibility, but that he thought the evident determination of the Japanese to withdraw its forces from advanced positions had already shown the Russians that there was no intention of annexation of South Man

68 For incidents in 1927, see Foreign Relations, 1927, vol. 1, pp. 56 ff. and 146 ff. CO Japanese Prime Minister.

churia or of interference with Chinese control. I told him that I hoped most sincerely that his belief as to the facts would prove true and that we might see a steady amelioration in the present dangerous situation.

793.94/1903

W. R. CASTLE, JR.

The Secretary of State to the Chinese Chargé (Yung Kwai)

WASHINGTON, September 25, 1931.

SIR: The receipt is acknowledged of your note of September 21, 1931, in regard to events of the past few days in Manchuria.

You have been informed of the steps already taken by this Government in this matter and I assure you that this subject is continuing to receive most careful consideration.

Accept [etc.]

For the Secretary of State:
W. R. CASTLE, JR.

793.94/1872: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Consul General at Nanking (Peck)

WASHINGTON, September 25, 1931–7 p. m.

79. Your 68, September 25, 10 a. m. What the Secretary said, on the afternoon of September 22, to the Japanese Ambassador " in this connection was:

"It would seem that the responsibility for determining the course of events with regard to the liquidating of this situation rests largely upon Japan, for the simple reason that Japanese armed forces have seized and are exercising de facto control in South Manchuria."

You may discreetly inform the inquirer by oral paraphrase.

792.94/2356

STIMSON

Press Release Issued by the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs “

Unofficial

[Translation]

[NANKING,] September 25, 1931. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs issued a formal communiqué yesterday stating:

"The other day, when the Japanese Minister of War interviewed press reporters, he stated that according to the provisions of Sino

"For memorandum of conversation in full, see Foreign Relations, Japan, 19311941, vol. 1, pp. 5-8.

71

Copy transmitted to the Department by the Consul General at Nanking in his despatch No. D-114, October 1; received October 26.

587122-46—VOL. III- -12

Japanese treaties, Japan may send 15 soldiers to each kilometer of the South Manchuria Railway. The total number of soldiers Japan may send would therefore be 16,500 for the whole railway. In fact, only 15,000 Japanese soldiers have been despatched to that railway. Judging from this, Japan intends to misrepresent facts which other nations have not been fully aware of.

"The strength of Japanese troops now in Manchuria has exceeded 50,000 and the Japanese parliament has appropriated 2,200 Yen per month for these troops, excluding emergency expenditures. Considering how many Chinese citizens have been killed, how vast an area has been occupied, how many cities have been taken and how much property seized, can there be any reason to support the statement that the activities of Japanese troops are in accordance with the provisions of existing treaties?

72

73

"What the Japanese Minister of War said might be based on Article 1 of the supplementary treaty of the Russo-Japanese Treaty of 1905. However, none of the Sino-Japanese treaties has ever recognized such a provision. Article 2 of the Supplementary Treaty signed during 1905 concerning Manchuria 3 provides that Japanese Government promises to take the same action if Russia promises to withdraw troops which have been stationed to protect the railway.' Russian troops on the Chinese Eastern Railway had been withdrawn long ago. At present the Railway is protected by Chinese troops only. The stationing of Japanese troops on the South Manchuria Railway has absolutely no foundation in treaties. Whatever excuse Japan may have in the matter, there is no reason why her troops should occupy our territory, kill our people and seize our properties."

793.94/1901 : Telegram

The Consul at Geneva (Gilbert) to the Secretary of State

GENEVA, September 26, 1931-9 a. m. [Received 4:50 p. m.]

141. The following are certain aspects of the picture respecting the Sino-Japanese question which may be of interest in evaluating the situation in Geneva.

1. In line with a traditional Geneva attitude there is a strong feeling on the part of the small states that this question is a test of League efficacy in dealing with a great power and that a failure in this instance would be setting a precedent which would substantially weaken the League's influence in the future and discredit conciliatory and security measures in general with a concomitant effect on disarmament. This is responsible for much of the agitation in Geneva that "something be done". To prevent a discussion in the Assembly which would have

For text of Russo-Japanese treaty of peace and additional articles, signed at Portsmouth September 5, 1905, see Foreign Relations, 1905, pp. 824 and 827.

73

For text of the supplementary agreement between China and Japan relative to Manchuria, signed at Peking December 22, 1905, see ibid., 1906, pt. 2, p. 997.

had this sentiment as a background, recourse was had to a restriction of Assembly action as reported in Consulate's 138, September 24, 7 p. m. The possibility still remains however that it might be brought into the Assembly under article 11, paragraph 2 of the Covenant or under paragraph 9 of article 15 although the legal status of such action is not entirely clear.

2. While in the Council proceedings discussion for obvious reasons concerns itself with happenings in Manchuria, in the background and in corridor conversations the core of the problem is seen as lying in Tokyo. As to the situation in Tokyo there are two theses both evidently without a basis of definite information:

(a) That Japanese action in Manchuria is the result of considered Japanese policy modified only perhaps by the military party precipitating the issue, and that thus a failure to bring Japan to terms as stated above endangers all future international conciliatory action.

(b) That this is a military coup to which the Japanese Foreign Office is opposed [Paraphrase.] (this being a contention put forward here privately by the Japanese) [End paraphrase.] and that to bring too much pressure on Japan at this juncture might only serve to increase the power of the military party with perhaps disastrous results.

3. It is obvious that in the formal proceedings no opinion on these points can be brought forward by any power in Geneva, if indeed there is sufficient information at the disposal of any power to give an opinion. Thus the present treatment of the problem here is felt by many to be fundamentally unsatisfactory.

4. Of the great powers on the Council only Italy is at the present moment represented by a Minister of State, which results in a hesitancy on the part of most representatives to take a position.

[Paraphrase.] 5. It is being privately intimated by the Japanese that the American position is based upon paragraph 2 (b) above; as much has been said to me by one of them.

6. The action of the Chinese is tacitly based upon 2 (a) above. However, the Chinese are beginning to show their concern over whether, should general action be based tacitly upon 2 (b) or if Japan is being favored for reasons of policy, the Chinese may not be drifting into a position of isolation. When I met Sze in the Secretariat corridor, he also intimated the foregoing to me directly. [End paraphrase.]

7. Should pressure be put on Japan and should she prove recalcitrant, the question is gravely discussed as to what the powers could do impressed by the present world situation. It is felt that military pressure is out of the question and that there would be great reluctance to exert economic pressure which would further dislocate world trade. This anxiety appears also to influence action here.

GILBERT

793.94/1900: Telegram

The Consul at Geneva (Gilbert) to the Secretary of State

GENEVA, September 26, 1931-10 a. m. [Received 3: 50 p. m.]

142. In the Council yesterday afternoon the Chinese and Japanese submitted the replies from their respective Governments to the Council's telegram of September 22 and their representatives made certain additional assertions.

These were characterized by conflicting statements regarding recent happenings in Manchuria bearing on responsibility for the origin of the conflict and on the present location of troops, many of these being repetitions of previous statements.

The Japanese assertions respecting the position of their troops were substantially those reported in Department's [Consulate's] telegram 133, September 23, 8 p. m. and 140, September 25, 3 p. m. with the following additions. Japanese soldiers have now been mostly withdrawn within the railway zone. There still remain some detachments in Mukden and Kirin and "small number of men in a few other places", but it is denied that Japanese troops have been sent north of Changchun or into Chientao or have taken control of Chinese railways between Mukden and Hsinmin or between Ssupingkai and Chengchiatun. Troops will be withdrawn from Kirin as soon as the menace to the South Manchuria Railway is removed.

The Chinese assertions were principally that Japanese forces now occupied important points in Manchuria, that Japanese soldiers examine travelers on Peking-Mukden trains and that press correspondents are subject to interference. Sze also asked the Japanese representative to explain exactly what was meant by a "small number of men in a few other places."

With respect to policy Japanese position was reported that Japan has had no territorial designs in Manchuria but wishes to protect its rights and interests and the measures that have been taken are only to that end. The general commanding the troops has received orders not to extend operations and the number of soldiers now in Manchuria is not in excess of treaty stipulations. It is the intention of the Japanese Government to withdraw the troops as calm is restored and as promptly as possible [to] do so without danger to its nationals. Japan reiterated a desire to find a pacific settlement by direct negotiations between the two Governments. In view of the present amelioration the Japanese Government considers that this plan of direct negotiations shall be taken up again and it believes that the Council should not risk a premature intervention, but having initiated a pacific settlement should respect the wishes of one of the parties as to the method.