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1915B, 749, Ann. Cas. 1915B, 677. In this case a policy of insurance was effected on the life of a husband for his wife's benefit. Prior to the husband's death, the wife obtained a divorce. She continued however to pay premiums on the policy until the death of her husband. Payment was resisted by the company on the theory that she had no insurable interest after the diyorce. This court held that the wife's interest in the life of her husband was to be tested as of the date of the original contract when "her interest in his life was that of a wife, and clearly insurable, as we have seen. The divorce did not invalidate the pre-existing valid contract of insurance." Marquet v. Insurance Co., supra.
Rather in accord is the previous case of Snyder v. Mystic Circle, 122 Tenn. 248, 122 S. W. 981, 45 L. R. A. (N. S.) 209.
Marquet v. Insurance Co., supra, follows Conn. Mutual L. Ins. Co. v. Schaefer, 94 U. S. 457, 24 L. Ed. 251. This case involved an insurance policy payable to a wife who obtained a divorce. The Supreme Court after a full consideration of the matter said that in their judgment "a life policy, originally valid, does not cease to be so by the cessation of the assured party's interest in the life insured." Conn. Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Schaefer, supra.
And it has been held in many other cases that a divorce did not affect the wife's interest in a policy of insurance issued to her on the life of her husband. Overhiser v. Mutual L. Ins. Co., 63 Ohio St. 77, 57 N. E. 965, as reported in 50 L. R. A. 552, 81 Am. St. Rep. 612, and cases collected in note.
The exact question before us was present in Keckley v. Coshocton Glass Co., supra, and the Supreme Court of Ohio held that, although the connection of the assured with the corporation had ceased before his death, the corporation was nevertheless entitled to collect the full amount of the policy, inasmuch as the policy was valid when issued and had been listed and used as an asset of the concern.
whole of the insurance. See note Ann. Cas. 1913D, p. 610.
In Rison v. Wilkerson, 3 Sneed (35 Tenn.) 566, it appears from the opinion of the court that the policy was assigned "as collateral security for a note of $1,097" to a creditor. The assignment was only made to secure the debt of the policy holder, and as a matter of course the creditor was not entitled to retain more of the proceeds than was sufficient to discharge the indebtedness.
So that Rison v. Wilkerson, supra, Scobey v. Water, 10 Lea (78 Tenn.) 551, and that class of cases are not in point.
Quinn v. Catholic Knights, 99 Tenn. 80, 41 S. W. 343, and Bendet v. Ellis, 120 Tenn. 277, 111 S. W. 795, 18 L. R. A. (N. S.) 114, 127 Am. St. Rep. 1000, obviously have no bearing on the questions before us for determination in this case.
We conclude therefore that the decree of the chancellor was correct. The pleadings in this case are not in very good form, but none of the parties are making any point as to that and the court will not do so. The cause will be remanded to the chancery court of Shelby county for further proceedings and the execution of the chancellor's decree. The appellant will pay the costs of this court.
(140 Tenn. 19) PUTNAM COUNTY v. WHITE COUNTY. (Supreme Court of Tennessee. April 30, 1918.) 1. COUNTIES 2 STATUTE SETTLING BOUNDARY DISPUTE-VALIDITY. Priv. Acts 1915, c. 477, placing within White county a strip of land of about 340 acres claimed by Putnam county, is valid, since the latter county never acquired such land by any act of the Legislature or by possession or dominion thereover, and such strip was in undisputed possession of White county when Const. art. 10, § 4, forbidding reduction of area of a county of less than 500 square miles, became operative.
2. COUNTIES 2-ACTS CREATING-VALID
If act of 1854 (Laws 1853-54, c. 320), establishing Putnam county, included within boundary of such county land nearer than 12 invalid in view of Const. 1834, art. 10, § 4, promiles to the courthouse of an old county, it was
We can see no difference in principle between the case before us and those cases inviding that the line of a new county shall not which the wife, holding a valid policy of insurance on her husband's life, obtained a divorce prior to the maturity of the policy.
Moreover, the manufacturing company in this case is entitled to the full amount of the policy. This is true because a policy of life insurance is not now held to be a mere contract of indemnity, but is a contract to pay the beneficiary a certain sum of money in the event of death. 25 Cyc. 702; 16 Am. & Eng. Enc. of Law (2d Ed.) 843; and see review of cases in Conn. Mutual L. Ins. Co. v. Schaefer, supra, and Keckley v. Coshocton Glass Co., supra.
It follows that if a policy is valid when issued, and remains valid until the death of the insured, the beneficiary is entitled to the
approach the courthouse of any old county from which it was taken nearer than 12 miles. 3. COUNTIES 2 BOUNDARY DISPUTE POWER OF LEGISLATURE.
1915, c. 477, placing disputed territory within | 1854 (Acts 1853-54, c. 320); a previous act the former.
A suit by one county to recover disputed territory from an adjoining county may be brought in the courts of the former; it being an apparrent exception to the rule that a municipal corporation such as the former county may only be sued in the county in which it is located. 9. COUNTIES 2-REDUCING AREA-VALIDITY OF STATUTE.
Putnam county, having an area of less than 500 square miles, could not be further reduced by Priv. Acts 1915, c. 656, in view of Const. art. 10, § 4.
Appeal from Chancery Court, Putnam County; A. H. Roberts, Chancellor.
Controversy between Putnam County and White County. From decree rendered both parties appeal. Affirmed and remanded.
O. K. Holladay, E. H. Boyd, and Sam Edward, all of Cookeville, for appellant. L. D. Hill, of Sparta, and J. H. Anderson, of Knoxville, for appellee.
GREEN, J. This litigation involves a controversy over the boundary between Putnam county and White county. It is not necessary to make a detailed statement of the pleadings. The facts in the case were found by the chancellor, and this finding is made a part of the record in lieu of a bill of exceptions.
The decree of the chancellor was not satisfactory to either party, and both have appealed. The constitutionality of two acts of the Legislature is involved, and the case has accordingly come directly to this court. Three strips of land are involved. On one of these strips is located the mining town of Ravenscroft, and we will first consider the controversy over this tract.
From the findings of the chancellor and elsewhere in the record, we ascertain these facts, as to the Ravenscroft land:
Putnam county was finally established by an act of the Legislature passed in the year
having been held invalid. Commissioners were appointed by this act to survey and fix the boundary lines of said county. This commission made a survey, which has been filed in this case, and the lines run and marked within the boundaries of Putnam county. It by them included the Ravenscroft territory was formerly within White county. At the time of the survey and until within recent years, this section was wild, uninclosed, and sparsely populated. The line thus located by these surveyors was less than 12 miles from Sparta, the county seat of White county. Until the year 1902, White county, regardless of this survey, exercised exclusive sovereignty of this territory, the same having been up to that time of small value. In 1902, Putnam county made an official survey of the lines between it and White county, when it was ascertained that this Ravenscroft section, over which White county had been exercising sovereignty, was really, by the original survey, included within the boundary of Putnam county. Upon learning this fact the Putnam county court asserted the claim of Putnam county to this territory, and from that date up until the passage of chapter 477 of the Private Acts of 1915 Putnam county exercised exclusive sovereignty over the said territory, and White county acquiesced therein. Upon the passage of the aforesaid act of 1915, both counties asserted their claims to this territory, and the controversy herein was precipitated, Putnam county opening the litigation by a bill to enjoin the claims of White county.
In the year 1870, when the present Constitution of the state of Tennessee was adopted, neither Putnam county nor White county had an area of as much as 360 square miles, and neither county since the adoption of that Constitution has had an area of as much as 360 square miles.
 Chapter 477 of the Private Acts of 1915 is entitled "An act to change the county line between White and Putnam counties." This statute enacts that the line between said counties be changed so as to place within the boundary of White county what is known as the Ravenscroft strip, consisting of about 340 acres, and to place within the boundary of Putnam county certain other lands indicated, amounting to about 360 acres. The Ravenscroft strip is valuable property, being the site of a coal mine, and having thereon a considerable town. The land transferred by this act from White county to Putnam county is uninhabited and of little value.
The chancellor upheld the validity of this statute, which was attacked by Putnam county, decreed the Ravenscroft land to White county and the 360-acre tract to Putnam, and from his action in this respect, Putnam county has appealed.
We think the chancellor was correct. Put
For other cases see same topic and KEY-NUMBER in all Key-Numbered Digests and Indexes
nam county has never acquired a right to cover the land, such laches did not operate to the land known as Ravenscroft strip.
 Putnam county did not get this territory by the act of 1854, because if said statute undertook to include said territory within the limits of Putnam county, it was unconstitutional.
The Constitution of 1834 (article 10, § 4) provided that no line of any new county should approach the courthouse of any old county from which it was taken nearer than 12 miles. As we have heretofore seen, the line run by the commissioners through this controverted section did approach the courthouse of White county nearer than 12 miles. That is to say, the Ravenscroft strip was in less than 12 miles of Sparta.
This section of the Constitution of 1834 was repeatedly construed by this court, and Acts of the Legislature in violation thereof were uniformly held invalid when assailed by the old counties whose territory had been unlawfully detached. Ford v. Farmer, 9 Humph. (28 Tenn.) 152; Gotcher v. Burrows, 9 Humph. (28 Tenn.) 585; Maury County v. Lewis County, 1 Swan (31 Tenn.) 236; Marion County v. Grundy County, 5 Sneed (37 Tenn.) 490; Bridgenor v. Rodgers, 1 Cold. (41 Tenn.) 259.
If the act of 1854 authorized the commissioners to include the Ravenscroft strip within the limits of Putnam county, which is denied, said act was invalid for the reasons stated. If the commissioners erroneously included said strip of territory within Putnam county, their act was likewise invalid, and without authority.
So that Putnam county never acquired this land by reason of any act of the Legislature.  Neither did Putnam county acquire said land in dispute by possession or by acts of dominion thereover. The fact as found is that White county did not recognize any claim of Putnam county to this strip of land, but White county continued to exercise sovereignty over same up until the year 1902, more than 48 years after Putnam county was established.
Nor did Putnam county acquire the Ravenscroft strip by the assertion of dominion from the year 1902 up to the passage of the act of 1915.
 Although White county submitted to this encroachment of Putnam county for about 13 years and was guilty of laches, still under the rule announced by this court in Roane County v. Anderson County, 89 Tenn. 259, 267, 14 S. W. 1079, it was competent for the Legislature to definitely settle the boundary line between the two counties so as to confer the Ravenscroft strip upon White county. This is true because said land was anciently within the domain of White county, and had been unlawfully and without authority of law claimed and controlled by Putnam county. Although the laches of White
defeat its legal right to the territory, but only deprived it of its remedy. The legislative act was available as a defense to the suit of Putnam county.
In Roane County v. Anderson County, supra, under a similar state of facts, this court said of Anderson county:
"Having recovered territory by an act of legislation, it is, as to such territory, seeking no bar a defense to a suit seking to recover terriaffirmative relief. Laches would not operate to tory annexed by an act of legislative power. So that, if Anderson county can show that the territory annexed by this act was anciently within its domain, and has been unlawfully and without authority of law claimed and controlled by Roane, the defense will be effective, for laches has not operated to defeat the legal right, but had deprived it of legal remedy."
The Ravenscroft land has been reassigned to White county by the act of 1915. Putnam county has acquired no possessory right to this territory which it can successfully assert.
It had exercised dominion over these lands tion. White county had only acquiesced in for about 13 years at the time of this litigasuch claims for the same length of time. such claims for the same length of time. ty v. Smith County, 129 Tenn. 394, 164 S. W. 1147, that such laches and acquiescence must exist for a period of 20 years in order to estop a complaining county from recovering its territory over which another county had unlawfully asserted dominion. would certainly not bar a defense.
 We have recently held in Putnam Coun
It is insisted in behalf of Putnam county that its boundaries were recognized by the Constitution of 1870, and that, inasmuch as its area is less than 360 square miles, the Legislature was without power to reduce its territorial limits by the act of 1915. Const. 1870, art. 10, § 4. For this we are referred to McMillan v. Hannah, 106 Tenn. 689, 61 S. W. 1020. In that case the court held the declaration of the Constitution of 1870 that Cheatham was a constitutional county made all lands then actually included within its territorial limits part of the county, regardless of whether they were originally assigned to that county by a valid law or not.
McMillan v. Hannah has somewhat restricted in its scope by Putnam County v. Smith County, supra. Moreover, the former case is not in point here, if it be conceded that chapter 477 of the Acts of 1915 reduced the area of Putnam county. The Constitution of 1870. recognized the county of Cheatham in express language as follows:
quatchie, as now established by legislative en"The counties of Lewis, Cheatham, and Seactment, are hereby declared to be constitutional counties." Const. art. 10, § 4.
There is no express reference to Putnam county in the Constitution of 1870.
If it be argued that all counties then existing were recognized by that instrument as such counties were then constituted, nevertheless Putnam county could not have been recognized as actually ambracing within its
that time White county was in possession of the territory and exercising undisputed sovereignty with reference thereto.
right of Cheatham county against Dickson county to a disputed strip of territory, was brought in the chancery court of Cheatham county. Putnam County v. Smith County, 129 Tenn. 394, 164 S. W. 1147, was brought
See, also, Union County v. Knox County, 90 Tenn. 541, 18 S. W. 254.
 It is furthermore urged in behalf of Putnam county that the act of 1915 is in violation of section 20, art. 1, of the Constitution in the chancery court of Putnam county. "that no retrospective law, or law impairing the obligations of contracts, shall be made." Since this territory originally belonged 'to White county, and never was assigned to Putnam county by any valid act of the Legislature, nor did Putnam county ever acquire a right thereto otherwise, it is difficult to see how the act of 1915 can be said to have taken away from Putnam anything that at any time belonged to that county.
So under the practice established by these cases and upon the authority thereof, this assignment of error is overruled.
 White county assigns for error the action of the chancellor in holding partially or conditionally invalid chapter 656 of the Private Acts of 1915. This statute purported to settle a dispute as to the boundary line
We therefore conclude that all the assign-between Putnam county and White county, ments of error interposed in behalf of Putnam county to the chancellor's decree must be overruled.
 Under repeated decisions of this court Putnam county may not attack chapter 477 of the Private Acts of 1915 by reason of the fact that that statute undertook to transfer the 360-acre tract from White county to Putnam county. Putnam cannot complain because White county is reduced in area. No one not adversely affected thereby can question the constitutionality of a statute. Noell v. Eastern Power Co., 130 Tenn. 245, 169 S. W. 1169; Palmer v. Express Co., 129 Tenn. 116, 165 S. W. 236; Kelly v. State, 123 Tenn. 516, 132 S. W. 193; Richardson v. Young, 122 Tenn. 524, 125 S. W. 664.
White county has assigned several errors to the action of the chancellor, which we now proceed to consider.
 White county demurred to the original bill filed by Putnam county in the chancery court of Putnam county on the ground that a municipal cerporation such as White county could only be sued in the county in which it was located. Such is the general rule. Peircy v. Johnson City, 130 Tenn. 231, 169 S. W. 765, L. R. A. 1915F, 1029; Nashville v. Webb, 114 Tenn. 432, 85 S. W. 404, 4 Ann. Cas. 1169.
An apparent exception is made to this rule in the case of a suit by one county to recover disputed territory from an adjoining county or to prevent an encroachment under an invalid statute. Such suits have uniformly been brought and entertained in the courts of the complaining county. Maury County v. Lewis County, 1 Swan (31 Tenn.) 236, was brought in the chancery court of Maury county. Marion County v. Grundy County, 5 Sneed (37 Tenn.) 490, was brought in the chancery court of Marion county. Bridgenor v. Rodgers, 1 Cold. (41 Tenn.) 259, which
suit by Bridgenor and by Bledsoe county of the character above indicated, against Sequatchie county, was brought in the chancery court of Bledsoe county. Roane County v. Anderson County, 89 Tenn. 259, 14 S. W. 1079, was brought in the chancery court of Roane county. McMillan v. Hannah, 106 Tenn. 689, 61 S. W. 1020, asserting the 203 S.W.-22
and by its provisions certain territory, known as the Rose, Lowery, and Howell lands, was placed within the boundary of White county.
The chancellor found that there had been no substantial dispute between the two counties in this vicinity as to where the real line was prior to the passage of said act. He found that the territory mentioned and undertaken to be transferred by said chapter 656 had not been claimed by White county, although there had been some doubt about the true location of the line at this point. The chancellor also found in his decree that this territory was not within the prohibited distance from the courthouse at Sparta.
As stated heretofore, the evidence is not before us; this case being submitted on the chancellor's written findings. From the language of the decree and the finding of facts, part of which has been set out, we must infer that this territory, or some of it, had been lawfully included within the limits of Putnam county, and that the effect of said statute was to detach said lands from Putnam county and attach them to White county; White county not having previously claimed the lands. Since the area of Putnam county is less than 500 square miles, a statute undertaking to further reduce said area, under the circumstances detailed, is obviously ineffective for such purpose. Const. 1870, art. 10, § 4; McMillan v. Hannah, supra.
The chancellor decreed that chapter 656 of the Private Acts of 1915, "in so far as it purports to detach any of said territory from Putnam county and attach the same to White county, is utterly void." On the record before us, this is a proper ruling.
The other assignments of error interposed by White county raise no substantial question for review except upon the division of costs ordered by the chancellor. We think the chancellor was correct in taxing half of the costs to White county, and are not disposed to interfere with this apportionment.
Upon the whole case, we think there is no error in the chancellor's decree, and it will be affirmed in all respects, and this cause remanded to the chancery court of Putnam county for further proceedings in accordance
with said decree. The costs of this court will be divided between the two counties. Upon application of L. D. Hill and Smith, Word & Anderson, to fix their fees for services rendered White county in this court, we find that $500 would be a reasonable fee for the services of L. D. Hill, and $500 would be a reasonable fee for the services of said firm. This in addition to the fees allowed by the chancellor for services below.
(140 Tenn. 67)
TUEC CO. v. MCKNIGHT & MERZ et al.
(Supreme Court of Tennessee. May 15, 1918.) MECHANICS' LIENS 30-FIXTURES VAC
A vacuum cleaner operated by electricity, requiring special wiring, and consisting of certain parts permanently attached to theater and other parts which are loose but can be attached to and detached from the parts attached to the building, as the use of the plant requires, is, under modern conditions, material used in construction and subject to lien.
Certiorari to Court of Civil Appeals.
Suit by the Tuec Company against McKnight & Merz and others. From the judgment of the trial court, there was an appeal to the Court of Civil Appeals, where there was judgment for plaintiff, and defendants bring certiorari. Certiorari denied.
D. W. Herring, of Jackson, for plaintiff. R. F. Spragins, of Jackson, for defendants.
LANSDEN, J The question to be discussed in this opinion is the lienability of a vacuum cleaning plant installed in the Lyric Theater at Jackson, Tenn., by special contract between complainant and the builders. The vacuum cleaning plant consists of certain parts which are permanently attached to the building, and certain other parts which are loose articles, but can be attached to and detached from the parts attached to the building as the use of the plant requires. The plant consists of 50 feet of light weight hose; one 15-inch rug and carpet cleaner; one 15inch hardwood floor cleaner; one tuft tool; one radiator tool; one wall brush; one clothes brush;
stance, that the old idea as to fixtures, which was whether the thing was permanently attached and fixed in and to the freehold, has given way in cases of this kind to the nature of the thing done, the character of the house repaired, or constructed, and for which the materials were furnished, as well as the intention of the parties constructing the building. It is perfectly plain that a vacuum cleaner, under modern conditions, is material used in the construction of the theater. Its main parts are attached to the house, and form a part of the building. Its use is quite necessary to the proper sanitation of the house, and the proper protection of its patrons and in every reasonable sense is material used in the construction of the building. The fact that portions of the plant are loose and removable cannot affect their dienability because they are used in, and are part of, the completed plant. The Court of Civil Appeals so held, and the writ of certiorari is denied. Other questions made in the petition have been considered and overruled.
2. CRIMINAL LAW
Where indictment charged a particular act of rape, and other acts were shown, the state could be required to elect on which offense it sought a conviction.
3. CRIMINAL LAW 678(2) - ELECTION BY STATE-TIME.
Where indictment charges statutory rape, and several offenses are shown by the evidence, the defendant can require the state to elect any time between the close of the state's evidence in chief and the final submission of the case to the jury, and likewise the state can make a voluntary election as soon as its proof
4. CRIMINAL LAW 1186(4)
Acts 1911, c. 32, does not prevent reversal for error in refusing to require the state to elect which offense it would rely on for conviction, since such error touched constitutional
one upholstery tool; one ELECTION BY STATE. duster; 450 handles; one hollow handle; one hose connector; one No. 30 heavy How cleaner, etc. All of these articles were necessary to the completed plant. The plant was operated by electricity which required special wiring for the purpose. It also had exhausts which the company had installed.
Counsel for defendants concedes that there would be a lien for the conduits, pipes, and wiring necessary to prepare the building for the use of the vacuum cleaner, but denies the lienability of the other articles of movable property "which might be used in connection with it."
Error to Circuit Court, McNairy County; S. J. Everett, Judge.
John Vinson was convicted of violating the age of consent law, and he appeals in error. Reversed and remanded.
Shelton & Harbert, of Savannah, for plaintiff in error. Joshua Barton, of Woodbury, and The Assistant Attorney General, for the State.
We consider the question to have been settled in the case of Halley v. Alloway, 10 GREEN, J. The plaintiff in error was inLea, 523. In that case it was said, in sub-dicted for a violation of the age of consent