W. 927; Baird v. State, 51 Tex. Cr. R. 322, but not an entrance in the private parts of 101 S. W. 991; Brown v. State, 57 Tex. Cr. the girl. The girl was impeached by showing R. 269, 122 S. W. 543; King v. State, 57 Tex. that she made statements impairing the truth Cr. R. 363, 123 S. W. 135; Kempner v. State, of her statements before the jury. She de57 Tex. Cr. R. 355, 123 S. W. 131; Felder nied making the statements, and the appelv. State, 59 Tex. Cr. R. 144, 127 S. W. 1055; / lant contradicted her. The facts show that Choate v. State, 59 Tex, Cr. R. 266, 128 S. there were indications of an emission and W. 524; Hart v. State, 67 Tex. Cr. R. 497, some blood on her drawers three or four days 150 S. W. 188; Criner v. State, 71 Tex. Cr. subsequent to this transaction. However, R. 369, 159 S. W. 1059; Stephens v. State, she said nothing about it until her mother 77 Tex. Cr. R. 30, 177 S. W. 92.

made this discovery. Appellant himself tes[2] Appellant made a motion for a con- tified and introduced evidence in corroboratinuance, and he has some very defective tion showing an alibi. He denied the whole and incomplete bills to the admission of transaction, and said that he was not present, certain testimony. None of these matters and that the matter did not occur so far as can be considered in the absence of a state- he was concerned. There is evidence also ment of facts, as has all the time been held that the girl developed gonorrhea four or five by this court in a great number of decisions. days after the alleged transaction. This matHence the judgment must be affirmed. ter was gone into pretty fully before the jury.

Appellant was sustained by his mother to the

effect that she did the washing of the clothes (83 Tex. Cr. R. 394)

of defendant, and that she saw no evidence REESE v. STATE. (No. 5024.)

of disease on his clothes. There was a wom(Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas. May 15, an living in the house with the mother of 1918.)

prosecutrix named Cochran, who, it was de1. RAPE C 16(5)-ASSAULT TO COMMIT RAPE veloped, had syphilis. The contention of ap-FORCE.

pellant was that the pus from this woman In prosecution for assault to commit rape on a girl under 15 years of age, force and con- might have gotten on the child and developed sent are not material issues.

the gonorrhea. A physician testified that 2. RAPE 59(20, 21)-ASSAULT TO COMMIT this could not be; that if the woman had RAPE-AGGRAVATED ASSAULT. In prosecution for assault to commit rape, sible if the pus should have gotten on the

both syphilis and gonorrhea that it was posevidence held not to call for instruction on aggravated assault.

girl's private parts that either disease might 3. RAPE 53(2)-ASSAULT TO COMMIT RAPE have been developed, but the evidence shows -EVIDENCE.

that the woman Cochran did not have gonorEvidence held sufficient to sustain convic- rhea, but only had syphilis. tion of assault to commit rape on a girl in her eighth year.

[1-3] This is a case of assault to commit 4. CRIMINAL LAW Om763, 764(8) - INSTRUC-rape on a girl under 15 years of age; there

, TIONS ON WEIGHT OF EVIDENCE.

fore the questions of force and consent were A charge, if _defendant did “make an as- not material issues. The element of force sault upon said L.

* with the intent * * to ravish

her

* * was not charged in the indictment. Nor do you will find the defendant guilty," was not we think under the circumstances of this on the weight of the evidence as assuming that case that the question of aggravated assault defendant made an assault.

was suggested; therefore the court did not Appeal from District Court, Austin County; err in refusing to charge this phase of the M. C. Jeffrey, Judge.

law. Under quite a number of authorities Miles Reese was convicted of assault to we are of opinion that the judgment should commit rape upon a girl under 15 years of be sustained. See Callison v. State, 37 Tex. . age, and he appeals. Affirmed.

Cr. R. 217, 39 S. W. 300, Bourland v. State, C. Douglas Duncan and Johnson, Matthaei 49 Tex. Cr. R. 197, 93 S. W. 115, Herbert v. & Thompson, all of Bellville, for appellant. State, 49 Tex. Cr. R. 72, 90 S. W. 653, SanE. B. Hendricks, Asst. Atty. Gen., for the ders v. State, 54 Tex. Cr. R. 171, 112 S. W. State.

938, and Branch's Ann. P. C. pp. 964, 965,

for enumerated cases. DAVIDSON, P.J. Appellant was convicted [4] The charge given by the court is critiof assault to rape upon a girl under 15 years cized, especially this clause: The facts show that she was between 7 and the evidence, beyond a reasonable doubt, that

"Now, I charge you that if you believe from 8 years of age at the time of the occurrence. the defendant did, as charged in the indictment, The little girl was left at home with her baby on or about the 27th day of October, 1917, in sister by her mother. Appellant came to the the county of Austin and state of Texas, 'unhouse, laid her on the bed, and undertook to Starks, who was then and there under fifteen

lawfully make an assault upon said Laura have intercourse with her. Her testimony is years of age, and was not then and there the to the effect that he pulled down her drawers wife of the defendant (as the term 'assault is

hereinbefore defined), with the intent then and and placed his privates between her legs and there by such assault to ravish and have hurt her a little. There was an emission, carnal knowledge of her, the said Laura Starks,

*

*

of age.

Om For other cases see same topic and KEY-NUMBER in all Key-Numbered Digests and Indexes

203 S.W.–49

with or without her consent, you will find the tion to entertain it. This is complained of, defendant guilty,” etc.

and the appeal is from the entry of this order This is not a charge upon the weight of the dismissing the motion. evidence. It did not assume that the offense

The motion contained meritorious allegahad been committed as a fact and so charge tions, and the record discloses no reason for the jury. The jury was instructed that if the alleged absence of jurisdiction, and no they should find from the evidence that ap- other reason for the failure of the court to pellant made such assault, then in connection hear and determine the motion. If he had with the other phases of the charge the jury done so and entered final judgment on the would be justified in convicting. It did not forfeiture, there would have been no question assume that the assault was committed, but of the right of appeal. Having failed to do left the jury to determine that fact, and if so, and merely dismissed the motion, the they should so find they might convict. We right of appeal is quite doubtful. Article 960, understand this to be a correct charge, and C. C. P., relating to the procedure on forfeited not on the weight of the evidence. A similar bail bonds, provides for an appeal upon the charge was held to be not subject to such ob- rendition of a final judgment. The rule in jections in Sanders v. State, supra.

civil cases obtains; under these, appeals lie The judgment will be affirmed.

from a final judgment. Article 2078, Sayles' Civil Statutes, and annotations thereon. Ex

cept in special cases, appeals from interloc(83 Tex. Cr. R. 307)

utory orders are not entertained. See Sayles' BURGEMEISTER V. STATE. (No. 4939.) Civil Statutes, art. 2079, and cases cited. The

judgment nisi is in the nature of an interloc(Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas. April 24, 1918. Rehearing Denied May 29, 1918.)

utory judgment. See Vernon's C. C. P., title

7, c. 4. After the judgment nisi is entered, CRIMINAL LAW C1023(2) — APPEAL-INTER- citation is necessary as a predicate for final

– LOCUTORY JUDGMENT.

Since, under Vernon's Ann. Code Cr. Proc. judgment. Articles 490, 493, 498, C. C. P. 1916, arts. 488-643, judgment nisi in forfei- It is only when after citation is served and ture of bail bond is in the nature of an inter-final judgment is entered that execution may locutory judgment, and does not become final issue. Article 581. The dismissal of appelin view of articles 490, 493–498, until citation is entered, dismissal of motion to set aside lant's motion left the judgment nisi in statu judgment nisi left such judgment in statu quo, quo. It appears from the motion that no ciand the order was not appealable, in view of tation had issued upon it, and that the state Vernon's Ann. Code Cr. Proc. 1916, art. 960, was making no effort to make it final. The and Vernon's Sayles' Ann. Civ. St. 1914, art. 2078, providing that appeals lie only from final appellant on her sureties had a right, she havjudgments, and accused after forfeiture of bond ing appeared before final judgment and subhaving appeared before final judgment and mitted to trial, to have the forfeiture set submitted to trial, she or her sureties were entitled to have forfeiture set aside on showing aside (article 504, C. C. P.) upon showing legal legal grounds therefor under Vernon's Ann. grounds therefor. The dismissal of her moCode Cr. Proc. 1916, art. 504.

tion would seem to leave this right intact. Appeal from District Court, Bexar County ;

The order made does not adjudicate her W. S. Anderson, Judge.

rights, does not purport to make the judgHedda Burgemeister, having been charged ment final. Neither she nor her sureties can with a felony, gave bond on which forfeiture suffer any injury from execution of the judgwas taken and judgment nisi entered, and ment nisi. No order that this court could she filed motion to set aside such judgment, make would conclude the matter, and we are which motion was dismissed. From the order constrained to believe that we are without dismissing the motion, defendant appeals. jurisdiction to entertain the appeal. .

See Appeal dismissed.

Ryan v. State, 198 S. W: 582. T. M. Campbell, of Palestine, and Chambers bond was executed she had delivered to the

Appellant suggests that before her appeal & Watson, of San Antonio, for appellant. E. sheriff a sum of money equal to the amount of B. Hendricks, Asst. Atty. Gen., for the State. her bond fixed by the court, and that the sureMORROW, J. The appellant was charged status of the case leaves her without remedy

ties were obtained by the sheriff, and that the with a felony in the district court of the in her desire to recover the money so depositThirty-Seventh judicial district, executed a bond in the sum of $7,500, upon which a for- ed. It is possible that the law would afford feiture was taken and judgment nisi entered some remedy, but we are of opinion that it on the 1st day of February, 1915. On Febru- does not lie in the power of this court to give ary 11, 1918, she filed in the court mentioned it on appeal from an order dismissing the mo

tion. a motion to set aside the judgment nisi. The

The appeal is dismissed. court by his own motion dismissed the application to set aside the judgment nisi, the judge declacing that he was without jurisdic- PRENDERGAST, J., absent.

(33 Tex. Cr. R. 485)

After some further parleying, because it was SMITH V. STATE. (No. 4879.)

so late, Mr. Hildreth induced them to wait (Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas. Feb. 13, over until morning. Appellant then backed 1918. On Motion for Rehearing, the car into Mr. Hildreth's barn, and they May 29, 1918.)

remained there until the next morning. Mr. 1. CRIMINAL LAW 510 – CORROBORATION Hildreth was suspicious of them, and early OF ACCOMPLICE.

The testimony of an accomplice must be the next morning sent for the constable, wlio corroborated.

came to his house and arrested them and 2. CRIMINAL LAW Om 508(7)–COMPETENCY OF took charge of the car. The car was later ACCOMPLICE-PLEA OF GUILTY.

identified as Mr. O'Rourke's and delivered to Under Code Cr. Proc. 1911, art. 788, in a

him. prosecution for theft of an automobile, the trial court properly overruled defendant's ob- Appellant testified that on the night of jection to his accomplice's competency as a June 18th, when he met Hawkins in Dallas, witness, where such accomplice had pleaded Hawkins already had the car, and wanted guilty to stealing the car, but had not been him to take him to the man who he said sentenced. 3. CRIMINAL LAW Ow1169(7) APPEAL

wanted to buy a car, and he went to HilHARMLESS ERROR-EVIDENCE.

dreth's with him; that he had no interest in In such prosecution, testimony of the ac- the car, but Hawkins was to pay him $5 for complice that he first met defendant in the

Hildreth said county jail, that he himself was in jail, and taking him to Hildreth’s. that defendant was there to see about making appellant that night told him Hawkins ownbond for him, not himself confined in jail, was ed the car and had owned it for two months. not error justifying reversal.

Will O'Leary (Tom Hawkins) swore: That 4. LARCENY 55 THEFT WITH ACCOM- appellant met him in Dallas before the night PLICE-SUFFICIENCY OF EVIDENCE.

Evidence held sufficient to show that de- of June 18th, and told him "he knew where fendant and his accomplice actually stole the he could sell one (a car) if we could get it." car, and that defendant was a principal with "He told me we could sell the car at Blue his accomplice, even if the latter himself per- Ridge.” That on the night of June 18th, about sonally did the stealing. 5. CRIMINAL LAW Om 829(1)-INSTRUCTIONS- 17:30 or 8 o'clock, they met again, when the REPETITION.

subject was again referred to, and appellant Special charges embraced in the main told him he would go get some money for charge were properly refused.

gasoline, “and we will go get the car.” That On Motion for Rehearing.

he got $2, and they went and got the car and 6. CRIMINAL LAW Om511(1)-CORROBORATION drove it to Blue Ridge, with the result as OF ACCOMPLICE-SUFFICIENCY OF EVIDENCE. stated. That he did not tell appellant it was

Evidence held sufficient to corroborate de- his car—"he knew it was not my car.” That fendant's accomplice under the statute as con- appellant suggested he take the name of Tom strued.

Hawkins. He said, "you can't go by your Appeal from Criminal District Court, Dal- name, because they could identify you." las County; C. A. Pippen, Judge.

That they were to split the money, half and Will H. Smith was convicted of theft of an half, they were to get for the car. automobile, and he appeals. Affirmed.

[1, 2] O'Leary (Hawkins) was an John White, of Dallas, for appellant. E. plice, and the judge so told the jury in a B. Hendricks, Asst. Atty. Gen., for the State. proper charge, requiring corroboration. He

had already pleaded guilty to stealing said PRENDERGAST, J. This is an appeal) car, but had not been sentenced. The court from a conviction for the theft of an automo- therefore properly overruled appellant's objecbile with the lowest punishment assessed. tion to his competency as a witness. Article

Briefly summarized, the testimony shows 788, C. C. P.; and cases cited in note 19, p. that Mr. Hildreth, who lived in Blue Ridge, 701, 2 Vernon's Crim. Stats. in Collin county, was in Dallas a short time [3] Appellant has another bill wherein he before June 18th to buy an automobile, and complains of the testimony of said accomthere met appellant and so told him. Mr. plice witness that he first met appellant in O'Rourke's automobile was stolen from Cycle the county jail. This bill is entirely too meaPark in Dallas about 9 or 10 o'clock in the ger. It does not show the surroundings so night of June 18th. Later that night appel as to show error or authorize this court to lant, with Will O'Leary, reached Mr. Hil- hold it error, From the testimony of this dreth's home with Mr. O'Rourke's car. Ap- witness on the subject, if we could look to pellant knocked on Mr. Hildreth's door, called the statement of facts, we gather that the him out of the bed, and told him, “I have witness himself was in jail, confined on some brought you the car." Mr. Hildreth asked charged offense, and that appellant was there him "What car?" and he said, "The car I to see him about making bond for him not was telling you about down at Burleson's," himself confined in jail. At any rate it is the place they had met in Dallas. Appellant not shown to be any such error as to justify then tried to sell him the car. At this time a reversal. appellant introduced said O'Leary to Mr. [4, 5] The evidence was sufficient to show Hildreth under the name of Tom Hawkins. I that appellant himself, together with O'Leary

Om For other cases see same topic and KEY-NUMBER in all Key-Numbered Digests and radoxes

actually stole the car. It also raised the, the price was. They said they wouldn't go to question, and was sufficient to show that he bed, but would drive in my lot, and I said, was a principal with O'Leary even if O'Leary over there if you want to sleep in the car, and

‘Boys, the barn there is vacant, dover (drive) himself personally stole the car. Both of I will look at the car in the morning.' So I these issues were submitted by the court in its suspicioned something, and sent my boyup charge to the jury, to which charge there town to the constable early the next morning,

and he came down there and arrested them. was no objection at all. Appellant requested Mr. Smith was driving the car. Up to that some special charges on the same subject, time I had never met O'Leary; I had met Smith but the court refused to give them, stating prior to that time. When I met Smith in Dalthereon that he did so because they were em- down here that had not been run but a few

las he told me he had a friend that had a car braced in his main charge. The court com- miles, and he would take $275 for it; that was mitted no reversible error in refusing to give my business down here, to buy a car, and I his special charges.

said, “Where is your friend?'” The judgment is affirmed.

On cross-examination he said he didn't

know who drove the car to his house at On Motion for Rehearing.

Blue Ridge; that appellant told him it was In his motion for rehearing and brief a new Ford, had been run only a few miles, thereon appellant contends, “The evidence is but I know it was an old car, and had not legally sufficient,

aside from

been run lots from the looks of it;" that he that of Willie O'Leary, an accomplice, to didn't know who had possession of the car, warrant à conviction," and that the testi- "only Smith (appellant) drove it back to the mony of the accomplice was not sufficiently. barn, or backed it in the barn, and then corroborated. The state's theory and con- drove out to the pasture the next morning tention was that appellant and O'Leary were to look at the horse I traded him.” After

appellant himself alone failed to sell Hilprincipals in the theft of the automobile. [6] The testimony was somewhat fully dreth the car that night apparently as his

' stated in the original opinion. But it will own, he then and not till then told it was now be more particularly stated with refer- | O'Leary's, and falsely stated O'Leary had

owned it two months. ence to appellant's contentions. The evidence establishes that Mr. O'Rourke's car, O'Leary, he and appellant together, as prin

According to the positive testimony of automobile, was stolen from him at Cycle

He was corroborated Park in the city of Dallas in the night of cipals, stole the car.

in that, immediately after the car was stolJune 18th. On that same night, about 10 or 11 o'clock, appellant and O'Leary together en, they were together in possession of it, and appeared at Mr. Hildreth's home at Blue together at once took it to Mr. Hildreth's,

where appellant himself tried to sell it to Ridge in Collin county, with said car. Blue

Hildreth, whom, in effect, he swore he had Ridge is more than 5 miles beyond McKinney staked out to sell it to, and told him, “I from Dallas, perhaps 40 or 50 or more miles have brought you the car;” and, even as befrom Dalla's. Early the next morning the car tween him and O'Leary, what he said was recovered from appellant and O'Leary at and did showed that he was in control of Mr. Hildreth's by an officer, who at the time the car and not O'Leary, but, in any event, arrested them for the theft of it. The car that they were together in possession, as was identified and restored to Mr. O'Rourke. against the true owner and all others. Mr. Hildreth swore he met appellant first

Appellant in his own testimony flatly in Dallas May 30th at Mr. Burleson’s. Ap- contradicted himself, and was flatly contrapellant himself swore this meeting was three dicted by others. In trying to avoid the or four days before June 18th, the night the fact of his control and possession of the car, car was stolen. He also swore, “We (O’- he first swore O'Leary got him to go with Leary and himself), left Dallas (for Hil- him in the car to Hildreth's, and agreed to dreth's) on the night of the 18th of June,” | pay him $5 therefor. Then later he swore:

. with the car. Hildreth further swore:

"I was to get nothing out of the proceeds of "I saw him (appellant) up about Blue Ridge this car except $5 that Mr. Hildreth was to on the 19th day of June this year. This red- pay me for any trouble. O'Leary was not to headed boy (O'Leary) was with him. Smith pay me anything at all.” introduced the red-headed boy to me as Tom Hawkins; that was at my_house. They came

O'Leary swore he and appellant were to up there in a Ford car. I talked to this de- divide equally what they got for it. Appelfendant at that time.

He drove up lant swore he went with O'Leary to Hilto my house and called me up out of bed and dreth's with the car, but did not try to sell wanted to sell me a Ford car. He says, 'I have brought you the car.' I didn't recognize it-he only introduced O'Leary to Hildreth who he was, and I said, 'What car?' He said, as Tom Hawkins. As shown above, by Hil“The car I was telling you about down at Burle- dreth's evidence, appellant alone at first tried son’s. I said, 'I don't want any car now; I have a new one;' and he said, 'You would buy to sell the car to Hildreth, and pressed him a bargain; said, 'You told me you would buy to buy that night, and that appellant was in it;' and I said, 'You boys come in, and we control of the car as to O'Leary. He drove will fix you a bed, and I will look at the car it to Hildreth's—at least did not deny doing in the morning.' He insisted that I take a look at it, and then I went out and seen it wasn't so—and after he failed to induce Hildreth to

*

*

barn, and next morning he drove the car in- and said: "I am going to go and look for to the pasture to see the horse, etc.

him and get this car.” He took the car and O'Leary, the accomplice, swore he did not went toward town; that he thought appellant steal the car alone, but that he and appel- was the owner of the car. lant, before stealing it, agreed to do so, to It would seem that Crum, the keeper of the sell it to Hildreth, whom appellant had stak- wagon yard, was the mere custodian of the ed out to sell it to, and that they went to car, and that his possession of it was not gether, and together did steal it, and to- such as to bring about a variance under the gether took it to Hildreth's.

facts between the proof and allegation of The evidence was amply sufficient to show ownership. There are many cases cited by that appellant and O'Leary were principals Mr. Branch in his Ann. P. C. under the propin stealing the car, and that O'Leary was osition. At page 1323 he says: sufficiently corroborated under the statute "Property in the mere custody of a servant or and decisions thereunder.

other person is and may be alleged to be in the

possession of the owner, if no special owner The motion is overruled.

had possession."

And at page 1324: (83 Tex. Cr. R. 282)

"The mere custody of property by an employé

or servant of the general or special owner does THOMAS V. STATE. (No. 4990.)

not operate to take the property out of the (Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas. April possession of such owner."

17, 1918. Rehearing Denied May 29, 1918.) Among the authorities cited by the author, LARCENY O 60 EVIDENCE OWNERSHIP

and which we think support the theory of the -SUFFICIENCY.

state that the proof supported the allegation Evidence held to show that ownership of of ownership made in the indictment, are the stolen automobile was as alleged, and was not following: Thomas v. State, 1 Tex. App. 289; in the keeper of wagon yard where the automobile was temporarily stored, so as to warrant Bailey v. State, 18 Tex. App. 426; Emmerson conviction of larceny.

v. State, 33 Tex, App. 89, 25 S. W. 289; RusAppeal from Criminal District Court, Dal- sell v. State, 55 Tex. Cr. R. 330, 116 s. W. las County; C. A. Pippen, Judge.

573; Livingston v. State, 38 Tex, Cr, R. 535, Cecil Thomas was convicted of theft, and 43 S. W. 1008; Garling v. State, 2 Tex. App. he appeals. Affirmed.

44; Clark v. State, 23 Tex, App. 614, 5 S. W.

178; Odell v. State, 44 Tex Cr. R. 310, 70 John T. Spann, of Dallas, for appellant. S. W. 961; Staha v. State, 69 Tex. Cr. R. 356, E. B. Hendricks, Asst. Atty. Gen., for the 151 S. W. 543; Crouch v. State, 52 Tex. Cr. R. State.

463, 107 S. W. 859. MORROW, J. Appellant was convicted of

The judgment of the lower court is affirmed. theft, and his punishment assessed at two

PRENDERGAST, J., absent. years' confinement in the penitentiary.

The property stolen was an automobile belonging to Jewell Ansley. Ansley drove his

(83 Tex. Cr. R. 384) car to the fair ground at Dallas, and stored BELADO v. STATE. (No. 4960.) it in Crum's wagon yard in the fair ground. There was evidence from which the jury were (Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas. May 15,

1918.) justified in concluding that appellant took the car from the wagon yard without Ansley's CRIMINAL LAW Onw84(6) - JURISDICTION

COUNTY COURTS. consent, and was afterwards found in posses

As the Nueces county court was expressly sion of it. He explained his possession by given jurisdiction of all misdemeanors by Acts claiming that he got it from a man by the 23d Leg. c. 21, and the district court only had name of Savage. Circumstances were suffi- jurisdiction of felonies and offenses involving ofcient to rebut the truth of this statement. Ann. Code Cr. Proc. Supp. 1918, arts. 9742

ficial misconduct, Acts 35th Leg. c. 46 (Vernon's There are no bills complaining of the 9712i), creating a criminal district court, “which charge, or of errors committed on the trial. shall have

all of the criminal jurisdicIn motion for new trial appellant challenges divesting said district court only of jurisdiction

tion now vested in

the district court," the sufficiency of the evidence to show owner. it vests in said criminal district court, and conship. Ansley testified he left his automobile taining no provision conforming the jurisdiction at Crum's wagon yard, gave no one consent of the county or justice court to its jurisdiction, to remove it, and afterwards found it was jurisdiction, under Const. 1876, art. 5, $$ 1, 16,

did not divest such county court of its criminal gone. He said:

as amended September 22, 1891, providing that "I turned the car over to the man at the gate. the Legislature may establish such courts as it He gave his name as J. S. Crum, and I told him may deem necessary and prescribe the jurisdicI would be there until late in the afternoon. tion and organization thereof, and may conform He said, 'All right;' everything was safe."

the jurisdiction of the district and other inferior

courts thereto, and that the county court shall B. D. Crum, the son of J. S. Crum, testified not have criminal jurisdiction in any courts that the man whom he thought he identified where there is a criminal district court, "unless as appellant got the car, and that the witness expressly conferred by law," and that in such had been at the yard about 10 minutes when inferior tribunals in criminal cases shall be to

counties appeals from justices' courts and other the man whom he took to be appellant came the criminal district court, under such regula