Hall v. Hall. Replevin does not lie at common law, nor under the decisions of this state, unless the taking be tortious and unlawful. Marshall v. Davis, 1 Wend., 109. Pangburn v. Patridge, 7 Johns. R., 141. Hopkins v. Hopkins, 10 Johns, R., 373. Button v. Thompson, 14 Johns. R., 86. Daggett v. Robbins, 2 Black., 415. Miller v. Adsit, 16 Wend., 335. Bruen v. Ogden, 6 Halst., 370. Bowen v. Hutchins, 18 Conn. R., 550. 2. The statute, in the forms prescribed for replevin, both for beasts impounded and goods attached, charges the unlawful impounding, and unlawful taking. These allegations are not formal and fictitious, but substantive averments, which may be specifically denied and which require specific proof. Rev. Stat. 141, 143, § 256, 264, and by § 263, the defendant is summoned into court, to answer only to the unlawful taking. 4. But if replevin would lie for the unlawful detention in this case, that detention is not by the defendant, but by the unauthorized act of the pound-keeper, and without the defendant's knowledge, or consent. The relation of principal and agent does not exist between the pound-keeper and the defendant. The latter had no discretion as to the place of impounding, and he has therefore complied with the law. HINMAN, J. The plaintiff's swine, found running at large in the highways in the town of Wallingford, were taken up by the defendant, and impounded under the 97th section of the statute, relating to communities and corporations, p. 184 of the Ed. of 1854. Afterward, while the swine were in pound, the plaintiff tendered to the keeper the statutory fee of twelve cts. for each swine so impounded, and demanded of him their restoration, which was refused by the pound-keeper, without the knowledge or consent of the defendant, whereupon this action was brought. On these facts, which appear by the pleadings, the superior court held the defendant not liable, and we think the decision was correct. In Bowen v. Hutchins, 18 Conn. R., 550, it was held that replevin would Hall v. Hall. not lie against an officer alone for attaching goods, in favor of a claimant, not a party to the attachment, but the suit must be brought against the attaching creditor. The object of that suit was the same as this,-to procure the restoration to the owner, of property which had been taken into the custody of the law; and the defendant here sustains much the same relation to the swine, that the officer did to the property attached. The only difference is, that, in the case of the attachment of property, the attaching creditor is the party to be sued, and the officer is not liable, unless he has made himself so, by some wrongful act in the execution of his process. Here, there is no party back of the defendant to protect him from a suit, but his authority to take, and impound the swine under the statute, is as ample as that of the officer under his process, and so long as he keeps within the authority, under which he acts, there is no justice in subjecting him to damages, for the wrongful act of the pound-keeper. It was said in the argument, that the pound-keeper was the defendant's agent,-that he was selected by the defendant, and therefore the defendant was liable for his acts. But this is not so. The statute provides that the selectmen shall erect, maintain, and keep in repair, a good and sufficient pound, or pounds, &c. Rev. Stat., 181. When there is but one pound in a town, the impounder has no discretion whatever, as to the place where he will confine animals impounded, and at most, he is restricted to the two or more pounds which may happen to be in the town; and to make him liable for the acts of such a public officer, whom he was bound to employ, would obviously be unjust. It is true, undoubtedly, that the plaintiff was entitled to his swine; the pound-keeper having no right to retain them, after all that he could demand. was tendered to him. But we think the remedy should be sought for against the party, who was in the wrong, and not against the defendant, who has done no wrong. We therefore find no error in the judgment complained of. The State v. Randolph. In this opinion the other Judges, STORRS & ELLSWORTH, concurred. Judgment affirmed. THE STATE vs. RANDOLPH. The offence of being a common prostitute, referred to in the fifty-third section of the third chapter of the act concerning prisons, (Rev. Stat. Tit. 4, Ch. 3, § 53,) is not an infamous crime. The record of the conviction of such offence is not admissible on the trial of a cause, for the purpose of impeaching a witness who has testified. The proper enquiry to be made of an impeaching witness considered. THIS was an indictment against the prisoner, Isaac Randolph, for murder. The cause was tried at New Haven, before the superior court, October term, 1855. On the trial, Maria Tuttle and Delia Sayres were offered as material witnesses, and testified in behalf of the state. For the purpose of affecting their credibility, the defendant offered in evidence a record of a court holden by a justice of the peace, for the county of New Haven, showing that they were convicted of being common prostitutes, under the fiftythird section of the third chapter of the act concerning prisons. To this evidence, the attorney for the state objected, and the court sustained the objection, and excluded the evidence. The jury having found the prisoner guilty, he moved for a new trial, on the ground of the decision of the judge above stated. 24 363 74 430 Keese, in support of the motion. The enquiry, on an impeachment of the witness, should not be restricted to his character for truth and veracity, (although this is the true and primary enquiry,) but the general standing of the witness in the community is properly a subject for investigation. Hume v. Scott, 3. A. K. Marshall, 1 Hill So. Car. Rep., 251, 8, 9. State v. Boswell, 2 Dev. Law Rep., 209-10. Green. Ev., Vol. 1, § 461, note. People v. Mather, 4 Wend., 257-8. 2. Evidence, therefore, that a female witness has been convicted of being a common prostitute, is admissible for the purpose of affecting her credibility, upon general principles, Commonwealth v. Murphy, 14 Mass. R., 387. 2 Stark. Ev., 369, note (1.) Foster, (state attorney,) against the motion. At common law, the credit of a witness can be impeached, by general evidence only, and not by evidence as to particular facts. 1 Stark. Ev., 181. Sw. Ev., 143. 1 Green., 599, § 461, 601, note. Rosc. Cr. Ev., 76, 181. Philips v. Kingsfield, 1 App., 375. State v. Bruce, 11 Shep., 71. 13 Johns., 504. Morse v. Pinneo, 4 Verm., 281. State v. Smith, 7 Verm., 141. Spears v. Forrest, 15 Verm., 435. U. S. v. Van Sickle, 2 McLean, 219–325. 6 Black. 1. 4 Watts, 380. The provision in the statute (Rev. Stat. Tit. 43, Ch. 3, § 5,) does not reach this case. That simply renders competent such as, by reason of conviction of infamous crime, were incompetent to testify in a court of justice. The provision that the conviction of the witness may be shown in evidence, applies only to that class of crimes, which rendered the witness infamous in law. This is not such a crime. common law, the only felonies were murder, manslaughter, treason, arson, burglary, robbery, rape, sodomy, mayhem, larceny. 1 Hale, 703. 1 Hawk., Ch. 40-52. 1 Greenl. Ev., 492, § 373. At The State v. Randolph. ELLSWORTH, J. By a certain statute law of the state, it is provided, that sturdy beggars, vagabonds, vagrants, nightwalkers, and, among others, drunkards and common prostitutes, may be sentenced to the work-house for a period, not exceeding sixty days. Maria Tuttle and Delia Sayres, being witnesses, and having testified against the prisoner, his counsel offered in evidence a copy of the record of a judgment, by justice Bennet, of their conviction, under the statute, as common prostitutes, and claimed to read it, for the purpose of discrediting their evidence. The court refused the offer, and it is this refusal, which gives rise to the present question. It was faintly contended by the prisoner's counsel, that the offence of the witness was an infamous crime, crimen falsi, at the common law, and so, at the common law, the witness should be excluded entirely from testifying, and as, by our recent statute, no infamous offence would entirely disqualify the witness, the record of his conviction must be received, to go to his credit. It is not perfectly clear, what offences fall within the class of crimen falsi, but a sufficient approximation to a general rule has been established, to perceive, that the offences, mentioned in the statute above recited, do not come within any rule hitherto recognised by our courts. In Green. Ev., vol. 1, § 373, it is said, that persons are infamous, who have been convicted of forgery, perjury, subornation of perjury, suppression of testimony by bribery, or conspiracy to procure the absence of a witness, or to accuse one of a crime or barratry. So far the courts have gone, and from these decisions it may be deduced, that the crimen falsi of the common law not only involves the charge of falsehood, but also is one, which may injuriously affect the administration of justice, by the introduction of falsehood and fraud. In Utley v. Merrick, 11 Met., 302, the court held that a conviction for obtaining goods by false pretences, would not disqualify a witness. In 2 Steph. N. P. 1721, 2, there is an enumeration of many offences, conviction of which, renders a |