demeanor, involving moral turpitude, in addition to any other penalty shall be added a revocation of his license. Section 3 provides that if any practitioner shall commit the crime of abortion, or aid therein (provided this section shall not apply to any abor tion produced by any regular practicing physicians to save the mother's life), he shall be adjudged guilty of a felony and punished by imprisonment in the penitentiary for from one to five years, and his license shall be revoked. Section 4 provides that any practitioner whose license is thus revoked may appeal, but shall not practice pending the appeal, and that if he does so practice, or attempt to offer to do so, he shall be punished in the same manner and to the same extent as if he had never had any license to practice. Section 5 provides that after one year from the date of the revocation of his license for these causes a practitioner may ask for and receive a new license, fi he shall satisfy the board that he is qualified, has reformed and is worthy.

KEEPING REGISTRY OF BIRTHS AND DEATHS WITHOUT PAY.

Sections 2582 and 2583 of the Kentucky statutes of 1899 make it the duty of all physicians, surgeons and midwives to keep a registry of all births and deaths which they have professionally attended, and to report them to the county clerk. In the case of Commonwealth vs. McConnell, where there was an indictment for non-compliance with these requirements, it was urged that the statute was unconstitutional, because it required physicians to perform a service without compensation, and that the Legislature had no power so to do. But the Court of Appeals of Kentucky does not think the statute unconstitutional on that ground an affirms that the Legislature has authority to require said duties.

MASSACHUSETTS-PRACTICE OF DENTISTRY BY

PHYSICIAN.

Chapter 219 of the Acts of Massachusetts of 1903, entitled, “An act relative to the practice of dentistry," amends Section. 29 of Chapter 76 of the revised laws so that it reads: The provisions of Sections 24 to 28, inclusive, shall not apply to a physician registered under the provisions of this chapter "and in actual practice as a physician, in cases where he deems immediate treatment necessary for the relief of his patients," etc., the amendment consisting of the insertion of the words inclosed in quotation marks.-Exchange

MICHIGAN-PROHIBITS EXHIBITIONS OF THE DE-
FORMED ETC.

No. 10 of the Public Acts of Michigan of 1903 provides, under penalty, that it shall be unlawful for any physician or other person to expose or keep on exhibition any human monstrossity, or any diseased or deformed human bodies, or parts or representation thereof, which would be indecent in the case of a living person, except as used for scientific purposes before members of the medical profession or medical classes.

MASSACHUSETTS-FORBIDS FURNISHING LIQUOR AT

HOSPITALS.

Chapter 410 of the Acts of Massachusetts of 1903 provides that whoever gives, sells or delivers spiritous or intoxicating liquor to a patient of the Massachusetts Hospital for dipsomaniacs and inebrites, or of any of the state hospitals for the insane, or to a patient under the control of any of said hospitals, except under the direction of a physician of the hospital, and whoever has in his possession within the precincts of any of said hospitals, any such liquor, with intent to convey or deliver it to any patient thereof, except under direction as aforesaid, shall be punished by a fine of not more than $50 or by imprisonment for not more than two months.

MICHIGAN-PROVISION FOR PREVENTION OF RABIES.

No. 118 of the Public Acts of Michigan of 1903 provides that whenever it shall be proved to the satisfaction of the local board of health that any indigent person within its jurisdiction has been bitten by a rabid dog, or other rabid animal, or in any other manner has been infected with the virus of rabies, said board shall make the necessary arrangements and send said person to the Pasteur Institute at the University of Michigan. The necessary expenses thus incurred shall be a charge on the township, city or incorporated village in which the expense was authorized. Before their payment or allowance all bills for such expenses shall be audited by the local board of health.

RIGHT OF WAY FOR PHYSICIANS.

The City Council of Kansas City, Mo., has passed an ordirance giving the right of way through funeral and other processions of ambulances, hospital corps and physicians' private carriages.

THE MEDICO-LEGAL BULLETIN is issued on the first of each month, in the interests of the medical profession from a Medico-Legal standpoint, and will spare no endeavor to furnish valuable news and information relative to legislative enactments and judicial decisions affecting the profession. Communications on these subjects are solicited from all interested. Reprints of contributed original articles will be furnished, without charge, to authors making request.

$1.00 Per Annum

SUBSCRIPTION RATES

Single Copies 15c

ADVERTISING RATES FURNISHED UPON APPLICATION. Non-ethical advertisements will not be received, the publishers reserving the right to reject and discontinue any advertisement at any time.

EDITORIAL NOTES

A case of unusual interest to the medical profession was decided on January 8th, 1901, by the Supreme Court of Minnesota---Heuslin vs. Wheaton, et al. The action was by the appellants against the appellee for damages caused by X-ray burns, the facts in brief being as follows: The plaintiff was under the impression that he had inhaled into his lungs the gold crown of one of his teeth, and for the purpose of locating the substance, called on the defendants for the purpose of receiving medical advice and treatment. The defendants exposed his person to the Xray and took two skiagraphs in an endeavor to locate the substance, which were fruitless. The plaintiff felt no immediate consequences of the treatment, but after a period of time he felt severe pains upon his back and was advised that he had received what is known as an X-ray burn. The usual allegations were made in the plaintiff's complaint, charging unskillfulness, etc. On the trial, the plaintiffs called a certain professor as an expert witness, who testified that he was familiar

with electricity and the use of the X-ray machine. 'The plaintiffs sought to show by this witness that it was negligence to apply the X-ray to the person of the patient with the tube only two inches from the body and the extent or degree the flesh would be affected is determined by the nearnss of the exposure, and also that nearness of the exposure was likely to cause and X-ray burn, when if further removed such would not result: in short, the testimony of the witness, if received, would tend to show unskillfulness and negligence on the part of the defendants. On the objection of the defendants, the lower court excluded the evidence; applying the rule, in Martin vs. Courtney, 75 Minn., 255, so well established; that a physician must be judged by the standards of his own school of medicine and for this reason members of a different school,cannot be introduced as expert witnesses touching upon the skillfulness, etc., of the treatment administered. The Supreme Court, however, decided that this rule does not apply in the case at bar and reverses the decision of the lower court, saying in part as follows: "The application of the X-ray to plaintiff was not for the purpose of treating any disease or ailments from which he suffered, but for the purpose of locating, if possible, a foreign substance thought to be in his lurgs. While it perhaps may in some instances be used as a remedial agent, it was not so employed in this case. The so-called X-ray, discovered by Roentgen, has been recognized and known to scientists, both in and out of the medical profession, for some eight years. During this time the apparatus for the generation of X-rays has been used very generally by electricians, etc., for experimental and demonstrative purposes. It is a scientific and medical appliance, the operation of which is the same in the hands of the college professor or the physician of the allopathic, homeopathic or any other school of medicine. It may be applied by any person possessing the requisite scientific knowledge of its properties, and there would seem to be no reason why its application to the human body may not be explained by any person who understands it The rule in the Courtney case, therefore, has no application to the case at bar. It might apply, if it appeared that the app'ication of the X-rays to plaintiff's person was for medical purposes, and nor for the scientific purpose of discovering the presence of foreign substances in his lungs."

It appears to us, however, that in the above case there was a fixed scientific and medical question, the claim for damages was certainly predicated upon the negligent use of the

X-ray machine as applied to the plaintiff's person. No doubt the scientist could testify to the use and properties of the X-ray, but we do not see how he could qualify as an expert wit ness to testify as such in a case where the only question involved was the skillful or unskillful application of the X-rays to the person of the plaintiff. As is stated in this case, the defendants conceded that some bodies were more susceptible to the influence of X-rays than others and, regardless of the distance of the apparatus from the person of the patient, X-ray burns may or may not result. If the physician, therefore, is to be judged by the standards of his own school, we fail to understand hom a scieinist, not a physician, could be qualified as an expert witness.

Another phase of this question occurs to us in this way: From the report of the case we gather that the application of the X-ray machine to the plaintiff's person was for the purpose of diagnosis and was made by men who held themselves out as practicing physicians and surgeons. Evidently the plaintiff went to the defendant because they were physicians and surgeons and for the purpose of obtaining relief. In other words, the treatment he was to receive was "therapeutic" in its nature, and the skill, etc., used in applying the same should be judged by the standards of the physician's own school.

Some time in the latter part of 1903 our competitors, the Casualty Insurance Company, instigated the announcement that the Fhysicians Defense Companies, a corporation organized for the defense of the medical profession against suits for civil malpractice, had been ordered by different secretaries of state to desist doing business on the ground that they were writing an insurance contract and were not authorized to do such business. The announcements coming more particularly to our notice were made in the states of Maryland and Illinois. The Company, however, entered upon the defense of its rights, and after a vigorous contest before the several state authorities in which the entire proposition was gone over, the insurance commissioner of Maryland, acting upon the advice of his counsel, decided that the contract written by the Physicians Defense Company was not insurance, and said in part: "While we have no statutory definition of insurance in Maryland, * * we learn from the text books and court decisions that in general