the circumstances sanctioned by the established usages of
equity practice in other cases. U. S. v. Coal Dealers' Assn.
of Cal., 85 F., 252.
1-749
76. Injunction.-A combination whose professed object is to ar-
rest the operation of the railroads whose lines extend from
a great city into adjoining States until such roads accede
to certain demands made upon them, whether such demands
are in themselves reasonable or unreasonable, just or unjust,
is an unlawful conspiracy in restraint of trade and com-
merce among the States, within the act of July 2, 1890,
and acts threatened in pursuance thereof may be restrained
by injunction under section 4 of the act. U. S. v. Elliott,
62 F., 801.
1-262
See also INJUNCTIONS, 19, 26, 27, 31.
77. Injunction Order-Persons Not Named in Bill.-Under act of
July 2, 1890, section 5, an injunction order in an action to
enjoin an illegal conspiracy against interstate commerce
may provide that it shall be in force on defendants not
named in the bill, but who are within the terms of the order,
where it also provides that it is operative on all persons
acting in concert with the designated conspirators, though
not named in the writ, after the commission of some act by
them in furtherance of the conspiracy, and service of the
writ on them. U. S. v. Elliott, 64 F., 27.
1-311
78. The authority given by section 5 of the act of July 2, 1890, to
bring in non-residents of the district can not be availed of
in private suits, and the court can acquire no jurisdiction
over them. Greer, Mills & Co. v. Stoller, 77 F., 1. 1-620
See also INJUNCTIONS, 18.
79. Forfeiture of Property. The provision of act of July 2, 1890,
section 6, for forfeiture of "any property owned under any
contract or by any combination, or pursuant to any con-
spiracy (and being the subject thereof) mentioned in this
act, and being in the course of transportation from one
State to another or to a foreign country," does not imply
that only cases in which property shall be found subject to
forfeiture shall be deemed within the scope of the act.
U. S. v. Debs, 64 F., 724.
1-322
80. Seizure of goods in course of transportation pursuant to the
unlawful contract can only be made under the sixth section
of the act of 1890, which authorizes seizures and condemna-
tion by like proceedings to those provided in cases of prop-
erty imported into the United States contrary to law. U. S.
v. Addyston Pipe & Steel Co., 85 F., 271.
1-773
81. There can be no such seizure in a suit in equity brought by the
United States under the act of 1890 to enjoin the carrying
out of a contract or combination in restraint of interstate
commerce.
Ib.
82. Necessary Parties-Jurisdiction of Federal Courts.-Where a
person brings an action under section 7 of the Anti-Trust
Law against the officials of a State to recover damages for
acts done under authority of a State statute which gives
the State an entire monopoly of the traffic in intoxicating
liquors (act S. C., Jan. 2, 1895), the State itself is a neces-
sary party thereto, and consequently the Federal courts
would have no jurisdiction of the action. Lowenstein v.
Evans, 69 F., 908.
1-598
83. A municipal corporation engaged in operating water, lighting,
or similar plants, from which a revenue is derived, is, in re-
lation to such matters, a business corporation, and may
maintain an action under section 7 of the Anti-Trust Act
for "injury to its business" by reason of a combination or
conspiracy in restraint of interstate trade or commerce made
unlawful by such act. City of Atlanta v. Chattanooga
Foundry & Pipe Works, 127 F., 23.
2-299
Affirmed, 203 U. S., 390.
84. Same-Who Liable.-Every member of such an illegal combi-
nation is liable for the injury resulting to the business or
property of a plaintiff by reason of such combination, re-
gardless of any contract relation between the plaintiff and
defendant.
Ib.
85. Does Not Authorize an Action for Damages by Party to the
Trust.-Section 7 of the Anti-Trust Act, giving to any
person injured by any other person or corporation by rea-
son of anything forbidden in the act the right to recover
treble damages, does not authorize an action against an
alleged trust corporation by one who was a party to its
organization and a stockholder therein to recover damages
resulting from the enforcement by defendant of rights given
it by the alleged unlawful agreement. Bishop v. American
Preservers Co., 105 F., 845.
2-51
Affirming 51 F., 272 (1-49).
86. For an action for recovery under this section brought under
this section against an association of manufacturers of and
dealers in tiles, mantels, and grates, where the party suing
was not a member of the association, and the sales were
made within the State, see Montague v. Lowry, 193 U. S.,
38.
2-327
87. Attorneys' Fees.-The discretion of the trial court under the
Anti-Trust Act, section 7, to allow a reasonable attorney's
fee to the successful plaintiff in an action brought under
that section to recover damages for a violation of the pro-
visions of that act against combinations in restraint of
trade, is not abused by an allowance of $750, although the
verdict was for but $500, where the trial took five days,
and from the proof offered it appeared that from $750 to
$1,000 would be a reasonable sum.
Ib.
88. A recovery of the treble damages authorized by the Sherman
Anti-Trust Act, section 7, in case of injury sustained by
violation of the act, can be had only by direct action, and
not by way of set-off in an action brought for the price of
goods by a company illegally formed in violation of the act,
especially when the State practice does not permit the set-
off of unliquidated damages. Connolly v. Union Sewer
Pipe Co., 184 U. S., 540.
89. A declaration in a suit based on section 7 of the Anti-Trust
Act to recover damages resulting to plaintiff from a viola-
tion of such provision, which alleges in a single count that
defendant entered into a "contract, combination, and con-
spiracy" in restraint of trade, is bad for duplicity. Rice v.
Standard Oil Co., 134 F., 464.
2-633
90. The pendency of a suit in a State court can not be pleaded in
abatement of an action in a circuit court of the United
States to recover treble damages under section 7 of the
Anti-Trust Act, since the State court is without jurisdiction
to enforce the remedy given by said section, and therefore
the same case can not be depending in both courts. Loewe
v. Lawlor, 130 F., 633.
2-563
91. Limitation.-An action under section 7 of the Anti-Trust Act,
providing that "any person who shall be injured in his
business or property by any other person or corporation
by reason of anything forbidden or declared to be unlaw-
fut by this act may sue therefor in any circuit court of
the United States,
* and shall recover threefold
the damages by him sustained," is not an action for a
penalty or forfeiture within Revised Statutes, section 1047,
prescribing a limitation of five years for a "suit or prose-
cution for any penalty or forfeiture, pecuniary or other-
wise, accruing under the laws of the United States," but
one for the enforcement of a civil remedy for a private
injury, compensatory in its purpose and effect, the recovery
permitted in excess of damages actually sustained being
in the nature of exemplary damages, which does not change
the nature of the action, and such action is governed as to
limitation by the statutes of the State in which it is brought.
City of Atlanta v. Chattanooga Foundry & Pipe Co., 101 F.,
900.
2-11
Affirmed, 127 F., 23 (2-299).
Affirmed, 203 U. S., 390.
FOR COMBINATIONS, ETC., PROHIBITED, Sec COMBINATIONS, CON-
SPIRACIES, CONTRACTS, ETC., IN RESTRAINT OF TRADE, II.
FOR COMBINATIONS, ETC., NOT WITHIN THE STATUTE, see Coм-
BINATIONS, CONSPIRACIES, CONTRACTS, ETC., IN RESTRAINT OF
TRADE, III.
FOR ACTIONS, DEFENSES, OR PARTIES, see ACTIONS AND DE-
FENSES; AND PARTIES.
FOR JURISDICTION OF FEDERAL COURTS, see COURTS.
FOR DAMAGES, see ACTIONS AND DEFENSES, 46-68; AND DAM-
AGES.
Act of February 11, 1893.
92. Immunity of Witnesses.-Act of February 11, 1893 (27 Stat.,
443), providing that no person shall be excused from testi-
fying in a proceeding growing out of an alleged violation
of an act to regulate interstate commerce, approved Feb-
ruary 4, 1887, on the ground that his testimony will tend
to incriminate him, and that no person shall be prosecuted,
etc., on account of anything concerning which he may tes-
tify in such proceedings, applies only to proceedings con-
nected with the act of February 4, 1887, and does not apply
to a prosecution for violation of the act of July 2, 1890,
so as to abrogate in relation there to the Fifth Amendment
to the Constitution, providing that no person shall be com-
pelled in a criminal case to be a witness against himself.
Foot v. Buchanan, 113 F., 156.
2-104
93. The act of February 11, 1893 (27 Stat., 443), which is supple-
mentary to the Interstate Commerce Act, provides that "no
person shall be prosecuted or subjected to any penalty or
forfeiture for or on account of any transaction, matter, or
thing concerning which he may testify or produce evidence,
documentary or otherwise, before said Commission or in
obedience to its subpoena
or in any such case or
proceeding." U. S. v. Armour & Co., 142 F., SOS. 2-951
94. Construction of the Immunity Act.-The immunity act Feb. 11,
1893, c. 27 Stat., 443, which relates to evidence given in
Government investigations, and provides that "no person
shall be prosecuted or subjected to any penalty or forfeiture
for or on account of any transaction, matter or thing con-
cerning which he may testify or produce evidence, *
was enacted to satisfy the demand of the fifth constitutional
amendment, and does so by affording the witness absolute
immunity from future prosecution for any offense arising
out of the transactions to which his testimony relates, and
which might be aided, directly or indirectly, thereby, so as
to leave no ground on which the constitutional privilege may
be invoked. It operates as an act of general amnesty for
all such offenses; but it is not intended to be, and cannot be made, a shield against prosecution for offenses committed after the testimony is given or the evidence furnished, since a person cannot be said to have been a witness against himself in respect to an offense which had not been committed when the testimony was given. U. S. v. Swift, 186 F., 1017. 4-76 95. The immunity statute governing the giving of testimony before the Commissioner of Corporations is the act Feb. 11, 1893, c. 83, 27 Stat., 443, which was expressly made applicable in such cases by the act Feb. 14, 1903, c. 552, § 6, 32 Stat., 827, creating the Department of Commerce and Labor. Ib. 4 63 96. Immunity Not Extended to Persons Called by Defense in Civil Cases. The immunity act of Feb. 25, 1903, c. 755, 32 Stat., 904, as amended by act June 30, 1906, c. 3920, 34 Stat., 798, provides that for the enforcement of the provisions of the act a specified sum was appropriated to employ special counsel to conduct proceedings, suits, and prosecutions thereunder, provided that no person shall be prosecuted or subjected to any penalty or forfeiture for or on account of any transaction, matter, or thing concerning which he might testify in any proceeding, suit, or prosecution under the act, etc. Held that, though the act applies to witnesses, whether called in a criminal or a civil suit, it did not extend immunity to witnesses called by the defense in a civil suit to restrain alleged violations of the act, especially to defendants called by co-defendants, the effect of which would be to render the statute abortive. U. S. v. Standard Sanitary Mfg. Co., 187 F., 236. 4-262
Act of February 19, 1903.
97. Immunity of Witnesses-Anti-Trust Act-Inquisitions.-An inquisition before a grand jury to determine the existence of supposed violations of the Anti-Trust Act was a "proceeding "within act of Congress, February 19, 1903 (ch. 708, 32 Stat., 848), providing that no person shall be prosecuted or subjected to any penalty for or on account of any transaction, matter, or thing concerning which he may testify or produce evidence in any "proceeding" under several statutes mentioned, including such Anti-Trust Act. In re Hale, 139 F., 496.
Act of February 25, 1903.
98. The examination of witnesses before a grand jury concerning an alleged violation of the Anti-Trust Act. is a "proceeding " within the meaning of the proviso to the act of February 25, 1903 (32 Stat., 854-903), that no person shall be prose
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