would make an irrevocable gift almost impossible. No man could confer a boon with grace or enjoy it without misgiving. It has been suggested in the Irish Court of Chancery that if Hunter v. Atkins goes too far in one direction, Cooke v. Lamotte and Hoghton v. Hoghton go too far in the other, and it may finally be established that the true rule lies between these (u). The supposed middle course would however be difficult to define. relation. It is certain that in the absence of any special relation Burden of proof from which influence is presumed, and when it is shown that where no the grantor fully understood the effect of his act, the burden special of proof is on the person impeaching the transaction (b), and he must show affirmatively that pressure or undue influence was employed. Auxiliary Having thus stated the fundamental rules, we may rules and proceed to say something more of doctrines points. (1) The auxiliary rules applied by courts of equity to on special voluntary gifts in general: (2) The like as to the influence presumed from special relations, and the evidence required in order to rebut such presumption: (3) What are the continuing relations between the parties from which influence has been presumed: (4) From what circumstances, apart from any continuing relation, undue influence has been inferred and herein of the doctrine of equity as to sales at an undervalue and catching bargains": (5) The limits of the right of rescission. 1. As to voluntary dispositions in general. (Cp. Dav. Voluntary Conv. 3. pt. 1. Appx. No. 4.) disposi tions A voluntary settlement which deprives the settlor of the generally. immediate control of the property dealt with, though it be made not for the benefit of any particular donee, but for the (a) Kirwan v. Cullen, 4 Ir. Ch. 322, 328. (b) Blackie v. Clark, 15 Beav. 595; Toker v. Toker, 31 Beav. 629, 3 As to power of revocation. Special relations. benefit of the settlor's children or family generally, and free from any suspicion of unfair motive, is not in a much better position than an absolute and immediate gift. It seems indeed doubtful whether the Court does not consider it improvident to make in general indefinite contemplation of marriage the same kind of settlement which in contemplation and consideration of a definitely intended marriage it is thought improvident not to make (a). It is conceived that the ground on which such dispositions are readily set aside at the instance of the settlor's representatives is not the imprudence of the thing alone, but an inference from that, coupled with other circumstances such as the age, sex, and capacity of the settlor— that the effect of the act cannot have been really considered and understood at the time when it was done (b). The absence of a power of revocation has often been insisted upon as a mark of improvidence in a voluntary settlement; and it has been even held to be in itself an almost fatal objection: but the doctrine now settled by the Court of Appeal is that it is not conclusive, but is only to be taken into account as matter of evidence, and is of more or less weight according to the other circumstances of each case (c). It was a rule of Chancery practice that a voluntary settlement could not be set aside at the suit of a defendant. The person impeaching it had to do so by a substantive proceeding in either an original or a cross suit («). Under the new practice he will proceed by counter-claim if sued on the deed. 2. Auxiliary rules as to the influence presumed from special relations. (a) Everitt v. Everitt, 10 Eq. 405; but here some of the usual provisions were omitted. (b) Ib.; Prideaux v. Lonsdale, 1 D. J. S. 433. So common ignorance or mistake of both parties as to the effect of an instrument may some times be inferred on the face of it from its unreasonable or unusual character: see p. 468 supra. (c) Hall v. Hall, 8 Ch. 430, where the former cases are reviewed. (d) Way's tr. 2 D. J. S. 365, 372; Hall v. Hall, 14 Eq. 365, 377. not The principle on which the Court acts in such cases Age, &c. is not affected either by the age or capacity of the person material. conferring the benefit, or by the nature of the benefit conferred (a). "Where a relation of confidence is once established, either some positive act or some complete case of abandonment must be shown in order to determine it :" it will not be considered as determined whilst the influence derived from it can reasonably be supposed to remain (a). tinue. Where the influence has its inception in the legal autho- Influence presumed rity of a parent or guardian, it is presumed to continue for to consome time after the termination of the legal authority, until there is what may be called a complete emancipation, so that a free and unfettered judgment may be formed, independent of any sort of control (b). It is sufficiently obvious that without this extension the rule would be practically meaningless. It is said that as a general rule a year should elapse from the termination of the authority before the judgment can be supposed to be wholly emancipated this of course does not exclude actual proof of undue influence at any subsequent time (c). With regard Evidence required to the evidence to be adduced to rebut the presumption in to rebut a transaction between a father and a son who has recently presumpattained majority, the father is bound "to show at all influence. events that the son was really a free agent, that he had Father adequate independent advice. . . that he perfectly understood the nature and extent of the sacrifice he was making, and that he was desirous of making it." tion of and son. "So again, where a solicitor purchases or obtains a benefit from a Solicitor client, a court of equity expects him to be able to show that he has and client. taken no advantage of his professional position; that the client was so dealing with him as to be free from the influence which a solicitor must necessarily possess, and that the solicitor has done as much to (a) Per Turner, L. J. Rhodes v. Bate, 1 Ch. 252, 257, 260; Holman v. Loynes, 4 D. M. G. 270, 283. (b) Archer v. Hudson, 7 Beav. 551, 560; Wright v. Vanderplank, (c) See per Lord Cranworth, 7 PP Fiduciary relations generally. protect his client's interest as he would have done in the case of a client dealing with a stranger" (a). He must give all the reasonable advice against himself that he would have given against a third person (b). And he must not deal with his client on his own account as an undisclosed principal. "From the very nature of things, where the duty exists that he should give his client advice, it should be disinterested advice; he cannot properly give that advice when he is purchasing himself without telling his client that he is purchasing" (c). The result of the decisions has been thus summed up by the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council. “The Court does not hold that an attorney is incapable of purchasing from his client; but watches such a transaction with jealousy, and throws on the attorney the onus of showing that the bargain is, speaking generally, as good as any that could have been obtained by due diligence from any other purchaser" (d). He is not absolutely bound to insist on the intervention of another professional adviser. But if he does not, he must not be surprised at the transaction being disputed, and may have to pay his own costs even if in the result it is upheld. "The broad principle on which the Court acts in cases of this description is that, wherever there exists such a confidence, of whatever character that confidence may be, as enables the person in whom confidence or trust is reposed to exert influence over the person trusting him, the Court will not allow any transaction between the parties to stand unless there has been the fullest and fairest explanation and communication of every particular resting in the breast of the (a) Savery v. King, 5 H. L. C. at (b) Gibson v. Jeyes, 6 Ves. 266, (e) McPherson v. Watt (Sc.), 3 App. Ca. 254, 272. (d) Pisani v. A.-G. for Gibraltar, L. R. 5 P. C. 516, 536, 540. According to Morgan v. Minett, 6 Ch. D. 638, there is a still more stringent rule as to gifts-an absolute rule of law "that while the relation of solicitor and client subsists the solicitor cannot take a gift from his client." Sed qu. one who seeks to establish a contract with the person so trusting him” (a). In other words, every contract entered into by persons standing in such a relation is treated as being uberrimae fidei, and may be vitiated by silence as to matters which one of two independent parties making a similar contract would be in no way bound to communicate to the other; nor does it matter whether the omission is deliberate, or proceeds from mere error of judgment or inadvertence (b). Thus a medical attendant who makes with his patient a contract in any way depending on the length of the patient's life is bound not to keep to himself any knowledge he may have professionally acquired, whether by forming his own opinion or by consulting with other practitioners, as to the probable duration of the life (c). Perhaps the only safe way, and certainly the best, is to avoid such contracts altogether. In Grosvenor v. Sherratt (d), where a mining lease had been granted by a young lady to her brother-in-law (the son of her father's executor) and uncle, at the inducement of the said executor, "in whom she placed the greatest confidence," it was held that it was not enough for the lessees to show that the terms of the lease were fair; they ought to have shown that no better terms could possibly have been obtained; and as they failed to do this, the lease was set aside (e). This comes very near to the case of an agent dealing on his own account with his principal, when " it must be proved that full information has been imparted, and that |