advisable to give some account of the manner in which it was applied (a). The general rule established by the cases was that the purchaser was bound to give the fair market price, and to preserve abundant evidence of the price having been adequate, however difficult it might be to ascertain what the true value was. It was applied to reversionary interests of every kind, and the vendor was none the less entitled to the benefit of it if he had acted with full deliberation. The presumption originally thought to arise from transactions of this kind had in fact become transformed into an inflexible rule of law, which, consistently carried out, made it well nigh impossible to deal with reversionary interests at all. The modern cases almost look as if the Court, finding it too late to shake off the doctrine, had sought to call the attention of the legislature to its inconvenience by extreme instances. Sales were set aside after the lapse of such a length of time as 19 years, and even 40 years (b). A sub-purchaser who bought at a considerably advanced price was held by this alone to have notice of the first sale having been at an undervalue (c). In one case where the price paid was 2007., and the true value as estimated by the Court 2381., the sale was set aside on the ground of this undervalue, though the question was only incidentally raised and the plaintiff's case failed on all other points (d). amend the law re sales of Finally Parliament found it necessary to interfere, and Act to by the " Act to amend the law relating to sales of reversions," 31 Vict. c. 4 (7th December, 1867), it was enacted lating to (s. 1) that no purchase (defined by s. 2 to include every reversions, contract, &c., by which a beneficial interest in property 31 Vict. may be acquired), made bona fide and without fraud or unfair dealing of any reversionary interest in real or per (a) A digest of the cases was given in former editions (p. 550, 2nd ed.). (b) St. Alban v. Harding, 27 Beav. 11; Salter v. Bradshaw, 26 Beav. 161. (c) Nesbitt v. Berridge, 32 Beav. 280. (d) Jones v. Ricketts, 31 Beav. 130. c. 4. Limited effect of the Act. General rules of equity senal estate, should after January 1, 1868 (s. 3), be opened or set aside merely on the ground of undervalue. Subject only to a saving of pending suits (s. 3) this Act is retrospective, and this is the more remarkable inasmuch as the right taken away by it from any vendor of a reversion who might otherwise have set aside the sale on the ground of undervalue alone was (as in the case of a sale voidable on any other ground) not a mere right of suit, but an interest which was transmissible by descent or devise (a). The Act is carefully limited to its special object of putting an end to the arbitrary rule of equity which was an impediment to fair and reasonable as well as to unconscionable bargains. It leaves undervalue still a material element in cases in which it is not the sole equitable ground for relief (b). It had already been decided in Croft v. Graham (c) that the repeal of the usury laws (d) did not alter the general as to rules of the Court of Chancery as to dealings with ex"catching bargains pectant heirs. This decision was followed in Miller v. unaffected. Cook (e), and adhered to in Tyler v. Yates (ƒ), and lastly in Earl of Aylesford v. Morris (g) and Beynon v. Cook (h), and in the two latter cases it has been clearly laid down that the rules are in like manner unaffected by the change (a) Gresley v. Mousley, 4 De G. & J. 78, 93. (b) Earl of Aylesford v. Morris, 8 Ch. at p. 490. See also O'Rorke v. Bolingbroke, 2 App. Ca. 814. (c) 2 D. J. S. 155. (d) 17 & 18 Vict. c. 90. But before this complete repeal exceptions had been made from the usury laws in favour of certain bills of exchange, and loans exceeding 101. not secured on land: 3 & 4 Wm. 4, c. 98, s. 7, 2 & 3 Vict. c. 37, s. 1, and comments thereon in Lane v. Horlock, 5 H. L. C. 480. (e) 10 Eq. 641. (f) 11 Eq. 265, 6 Ch. 665. (g) 8 Ch. 484; this may now be regarded as the leading case on the subject. It should be observed that in Tyler v. Yates a principal and Cp. surety made themselves liable for (7) 10 Ch. 389. in the law concerning sales of reversions. And this was confirmed by all the opinions delivered in the recent case of O'Rorke v. Bolingbroke (a) in the House of Lords, though the particular transaction in dispute was upheld. lender. The effect of these rules is not to lay down any proposition of substantive law, but to make an exception from the ordinary rules of evidence by throwing upon the party claiming under a contract the burden of proving, not merely that the essential requisites of a contract, including the other party's consent, existed, but also that such consent was perfectly free. The question Conditions throwing is therefore, what are "the conditions which throw burden of the burden of justifying the righteousness of the proof on bargain upon the party who claims the benefit of it" (b). Now these conditions have never been fixed by any positive authority. We have seen that the Court of Chancery has refused to define fraud, or to limit by any enumeration the standing relations from which influence will be presumed. In like manner there is no definition to be found of what is to be understood by a "catching bargain." This being so we can only observe the conditions which have in fact been generally present in the bargains against which relief has been given in the exercise of this jurisdiction. These are :— 1. A loan in which the borrower is a person having little or no property immediately available, and is trusted in substance on the credit of his expectations. Obs. It is immaterial whether there is or not any actual dealing with the estate in remainder or expression of the contingency on which the fund for payment of the principal advanced substantially depends. Earl of Aylesford v. Morris, 8 Ch. at p. 497. It is also immaterial whether any particular property is looked to for ultimate payment. A general expectation derived from the position in society of the borrower's family, the lender intending to trade on their probable fear of exposure, may have the same effect. Nevill v. Snelling, 15 Ch. D. 679, 702 (Denman, J.). 2. Terms prima facie oppressive and extortionate (i.e. (b) Earl of Aylesford v. Morris, 8 such that a man of ordinary sense and judgment cannot be supposed likely to give his free consent to them). Obs. An excessive rate of interest is in itself nothing more than a disproportionately large consideration given by the borrower for the loan and it is not sufficient, standing alone, to invalidate a contract in equity: Webster v. Cook, 2 Ch. 542, where a loan at 60 per cent. per annum was upheld. Stuart, V.-C. disapproved of the case in Tyler v. Yates (11 Eq. at p. 276) but on another point. And see Parker v. Butcher, 3 Eq. 762, 767. 3. A considerable excess in the nominal amount of the sums advanced over the amount actually received by the borrower. Obs. This appears in all the recent cases in which relief has been given deductions being made on every advance, according to the common practice of professed money-lenders, under the name of discount, commission, and the like. The result is that the rate of interest appearing to be taken does not show anything like the terms on which the loan is in truth made: and this may be considered evidence of fraud so far as it argues a desire on the part of the lender to gloze over the real terms of the bargain. Probably however a jury could not be directed so to consider it in a trial where fraud was distinctly in issue; though no doubt such circumstances, or even an exorbitant rate of interest, would be made matter of observation. 4. The absence of any real bargaining between the parties, or of any inquiry by the lender into the exact nature or value of the borrower's expectations. Obs. These circunstances are relied on in Earl of Aylesford v. Morris (8 Ch. at p. 496) as increasing the difficulty of upholding the transaction: cp. Nevill v. Snelling, 15 Ch. D. at pp. 702-3. This again is the usual practice of the money-lenders who do this kind of business. Their terms are calculated to cover the risk of there being no security at all; moreover the borrower often wishes the lender not to make any inquiries which might end in the matter coming to the knowledge of the ancestor or other person from whom the expectations are derived. The concealment of the transaction from the ancestor was held by Lord Brougham in King v. Hamlet, 2 M. & K. 456, to be an indispensable condition of equitable relief; but this opinion is not now accepted (Earl of Aylesford v. Morris, 8 Ch. at p. 491). The decision in King v. Hamlet (affirmed in the House of Lords, but without giving any reasons, 3 Cl. & F. 218) can be supported on the ground that the party seeking relief had himself acted on the contract he impeached so as to make restitution impossible. It seems safe to assert that in any case where these conditions concur, the burden of proof is thrown on the lender to show that the transaction was a fair one: it seems equally unsafe to assert that they must all concur, or that any one of them (except perhaps the first) is indispensable. lender so practice himself. It may then be asked, By what sort of evidence is the Qu. if lender to satisfy the Court that the borrower was not situated imposed on? As there is no reported case in which it can in was considered that the burden of proof lay upon the ever lender, and yet he did so satisfy the Court, it is impossible exonerate to give any certain answer to this question. But it does not take very much reflection to see that it is in fact extremely improbable that in any case where the abovementioned conditions are present any satisfactory evidence. should be forthcoming to justify the lender (a). Practically the question is whether in the opinion of the Court the transaction was a hard bargain (b)—that is, not merely a bargain in which the consideration is inadequate, but an unconscionable bargain where one party takes an unfair advantage of the other (c). An account stated for the purpose of a contract of this description is of no more validity than the contract itself, and a recital of it in the security does not preclude the borrower from re-opening the account even as against purchasers or sub-mortgagees of the original lender who have notice of the general character of the transaction. For such notice is equivalent to notice of all the legal consequences (d). The borrower who seeks relief against a contract of this Terms (a) "No attempt has been made to show by any independent evidence (if such a thing could be conceived possible) that the terms thus imposed on the plaintiff were fair and reasonable," 8 Ch. 496. (b) See the judgment of the M. R. Beynon v. Cook, 10 Ch. 391, n., and Nevill v. Snelling, 15 Ch. D. at p. 703. (c) Per Jessel, M. R. in Middleton v. Brown (C. A.), Feb. 20, 1878; Nevill v. Snelling, 15 Ch. D. 679, (d) Tottenham v. Green, 32 L. J. |