only at our mortal peril. But I believe The Limits to Growth position is quite wrong in assuming that man's scientific, technological, economic, and political skills are incapable of mastering these problems. We must change the directions of investment, as we have four times in the past; but we should not seek zero growth.

Therefore, the Nothing Much Has Happened perspective is, in my view, correct in arguing that high growth rates continue to be necessary for the economic, social, and political health of our societies; that we still need to apply intelligently the tools of fiscal and monetary policy; that the high oil price need not be mortal to our continued progress. But I believe that perspective, in both its liberal and conservative (Democrat and Republican) variants, is quite wrong in implying that we can go on managing our economy, and the world economy, in the comfortable way we did from, say, 1948 to 1972. We shall have to plan the sectoral pattern of investment with respect to energy, air, water, R&D, and perhaps in some other fields as well. To do this we shall need attitudes of public-private cooperation, not confrontation.

Thus, the political economy of the Fifth Kondratieff upswing requires neither the cessation of growth nor the end of capitalism. But it does require something more of economists and governments than a simple repetition of the neo-Keynesian tricks for manipulating the level of effective demand. We are in a world where supply, as well as demand, now matters. We can no longer assume they will be balanced by the Unseen Hand, if we get the level of aggregate demand right. We shall have to act to bring them towards balance in the key sectors; and in doing so, we shall find we are returning to relatively full employment and high rates of growth. That is the essence of the Third View.

TESTIMONY OF WILLIAM RUCKELSHAUS, OF RUCKELSHAUS, BEVERIDGE, FAIRBANKS, AND DIAMOND

Mr. RUCKELSHAUS. Mr. Chairman, having just listened to Mr. Rostow recommend that we create a new institution, I am going to recommend that we do, not a great big new one that's going to handle all these problems, but a much more modest effort directed specifically at attempting to give Congress a new tool that it can use for better analysis.

A group of us over the last year, as far as I'm concerned, and 3 years, as far as others are concerned, have been examining the possibility of creating an institute that would provide analysis for a Congress to address some of the comprehensive issues that it has before it.

We have called this embryonic institute, "The Institute for Congress." Many of you here, including Mrs. Rivlin and others, are familiar with the effort. It is not an effort to compete with the existing committees or organizations and institutions that are seeking to provide analysis for Congress such as Mrs. Rivlin or the General Accounting Office, of the Office of Technology Assessment or Congressional Research Service. Instead, it is an effort to bring to Congress, having as its sole client the Congress, an institutions that can provide the best analysis we can muster, to the Congress from which they can judge what path should be chosen to address a given problem.

The reason I think that, at least as far as I am concerned, and I think others believe, that such an institution could perform a valuable service to Congress is because it seeks to address the problem-in part, seeks to address the problem identified by Mr. Linowitz of the erosion of trust in the society.

69-838-76 -9

The original attraction for me for the Institute was because of the frustration that I felt as a part of the executive branch in the Environmental Protection Agency. Some of the analysis which the executive branch would provide for a given problem was not used by Congress, often because of a lack of trust between the executive and the congressional branches; trying to address this problem head-on by convincing the Congress that the analysis of the executive branch provided was good and sound, and should be used, was not always very helpful.

There were also almost no good reasons for the lack of analysis to exist, and therefore, what we sought to do by suggesting the creation of this new institute is to provide a mechanism whereby problems addressed by Congress can be given the best analysis that our society can produce.

If you take, for instance, the problem of the environment, it's fairly easy to identify a goal of clean air or clean water.

Recognizing that one of the cardinal principles that has arisen in the environmental movement, that everything is connected to everything else, defining the goal of clean air and water in terms of what effect it will have on other social problems and other social priorities is much more difficult, and it's that kind of problem that the Institute would seek to address.

I won't go into great detail as to what the precise outlines of our idea is. I would like to provide, Mr. Chairman, to the committee, a synopsis of exactly what we have in mind, a very brief outline of what the Institute would seek to do on a 5-year trial period. The first 3 years would be funded primarily by foundations.

During that period it would have to prove itself as a useful tool for Congress. The next 2 years of the 5-year period, the funds would primarily come from Congress by contract, and if Congress did not want to use it, did not see it as a useful tool, obviously, it should not remain in existence, because its sole function is to serve the Congress. One of the results might be to address the two problems that Alice Rivlin identified, that is, to seek to put the analysis in a form that would be useful to Congress and not to just dump on an individual Congressman's desk in a very lengthy form that they would not have the time or the inclination to use, but specifically address a problem of how an individual member of the Congress receives information and how they attempt to make judgments on the basis of this information, so that we would tailor what was produced to the individual Member of Congress.

Also, we would hope to get at the problem of the lazy scholars by forcing them to address the real world, and that if we define as a goal clean air and clean water, and the essential questions were not whether that was a proper goal for the society, but, rather, how do we get there, and what methods do we use? Do we continue to use the standard setting enforcement process that we have now adopted or are there other methods of achieving that? And what pace of achievement of those goals should we seek to have and what are the effects of any given choice and those would then be outlined for the decisionmakers of Congress.

So that the fourth point that Mr. Ash made about the need for participation of decisionmakers themselves and the use of the analysis, would be addressed.

We are hopeful that this experiment in the new institution will be met with the spirit in which it is offered to Congress, and that is, as an experiment, and hopeful that it will provide a better analysis for the Congress to make judgments on what the effects of its actions will be in the future, and that it will be a small step forward but nevertheless, a useful one in getting before the legislators of the country the kind of analysis from which they can better judge what actions should be taken.

Mr. Chairman, the Institute is in a crucial stage of its formation and we are seeking now in the next month some significant funding from foundations and we hope that by the end of this year we will be ready to start on our 5-year experiment.

Chairman GLENN. Thank you very much.

Dr. Seamans?

TESTIMONY OF DR. ROBERT C. SEAMANS, JR., ENERGY RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT ADMINISTRATION

Dr. SEAMANS. Thank you, Senator Glenn. I wish to congratulate you on raising the issues contained in your letter and bringing together people from varying points of view to discuss these important subjects.

I am sure you are well aware that these are somewhat intractable issues that have been around for quite sometime, and I was interested, for example, in reviewing the work of the Elliott Committee in this regard. This was a committee, established by the House some 12 years ago, to study the relationship between Science and Technology and our National goals and policies.

It is a very thoughtful report. I would like to quote a couple of sentences which could well have been written today: "The United States has neither a commonly accepted master list of specific national policies nor a table of research and development goals to which references can be made for purposes of comparing policies to goals or research and development issues to broader national ones.

"There are many reasons for the absence of set policies. A cardinal one is the national tradition of not crossing bridges until we come to them. Most of our decisions have of necessity been responses to a series of crises, but were based on insufficient opportunity for orderly weighing and planning."

When I left the space program and returned to MIT for a brief period, I tried to reflect on our experience in the space effort. I agree with Walt Rostow of the importance of science and technology for the future. It is not the only element involved, but it is an important element. At NASA we tried to think through the whole space program to set in proper perspective what we would accomplish and what it might mean in a broader context.

I picked as a title for my report, "Action and Reactions." It is my view that at least with respect to human affairs we tend to follow

1 Available in committee files.

Newton's Law which says that for every action, there is a reaction. In this report I attempted to put down an agenda of national objectives to be achieved through science and technology. I think the result is what most of us would put down without too much thought; but I wanted to see how we were working toward a set of objectives so I tried to make the list all-encompassing. I do not claim they are the ones we ought to follow.

Here is the result:

First. Is the whole matter of understanding, forecasting, and controlling our environment. We are still living in a world where there are tremendous catastrophies, storms, floods, earthquakes, and volcanic eruptions. At the same time, we are not helping matters by pollution, and we may even be threatening the balance of our whole world ecology.

Second. There is also the matter of supplying basic resources of food; quite obviously, there is not enough in the world. Fuel, minerals and water offer a similar example. I pointed out that the supply of fuels, minerals and water have failed to keep pace with demand of a rapidly expanding population. Supplies of coal, gas, petroleum and many other minerals are rapidly diminishing.

Third. The whole area of improving the quality of life. This raises issues of health, education, housing and welfare, as well as matters of transportation, the automobile and its problems.

Moreover, we need to improve our communications. We need to encourage economic growth. There is the feeling that the role of the man in the street is changing rapidly as technology advances but he still must have a feeling of being creative or useful. Education and motivation cannot provide this opportunity unless challenging jobs become available in increasing numbers.

And finally there is the whole matter of international development and providing national security. The welfare of the United States is certainly linked to the national development. We cannot live in isolation from the rest of the world. We are tied to the rest of the world for reasons that are economic, cultural, moral, and so forth.

Now, as I say, this is something that any one of us can put together in fairly short order, but what do we do about it? This is what came to me as sort of a startling jolt in connection with my new job in the Energy Research and Development Administration.

We were called upon to put together a comprehensive planning document for the Congress in less than 6 months from the time that our Agency was formed. We went through the normal type processes of going to nonprofit institutions to help. We did computer modeling and by and large I think this approach, among others, was helpful We noted, for example, that the United States was relying principally on wood in 1850. In 1910, 60 years later, it was coal, and now 60 year later, it's oil and gas. All of this is pretty close to the 50-year cycl that Walt Rostow just mentioned.

We noted that we do not have another 60 years to move into som other forms of energy. We noted that we certainly must do our bes to conserve. We must obviously make more use of our coal, our nu clear, our solar, geothermal, our fusion processes, looking ahead i time.

But I submit that all of this is for nought unless we have ways to organize, to give real focus and depth and to make the hard decisions. that Dr. Rivlin has pointed out. And this is day-to-day, where there are conflicts between all of the broader objectives.

I was struck in our modeling by the fact that the decisionmaker is not going to be really interested in the results unless he feels comfortable with the methodology used and unless he feels that he understands the assumptions.

It is human nature not to rely on very complicated analyses unless they tend to make sense and just tend to confirm views that we really hold anyway.

One of the items that we noted when we came up with our plan was an editorial in the newspaper that was very antagonistic to our planning because what we attempted to do was to show that there are uncertainties. We do need to have an opportunity for making choices in the future that we cannot make today, but it is impossible to lay out a specific, ironclad plan that the country will follow.

This particular editorial wanted a specific plan and said, "The goverminent can't make up their mind on things. Why can't the government be more like industry, which has to make hard decisions day by day, and announces specifically what they are going to do?"

From my view, this editorial indicated that those who wrote it did not at all understand the planning process, and the problems that we face in this country.

We cannot lay out a blueprint in detail that the country will follow for the next 25 years.

We can lay out our objectives. We can work in specific areas if we put together the right teams: for instance, industry and government and universities. A group like this could guide us and tell us what to do today and tell us where the decision points will probably come in the future.

But beyond that, I think it is a fallacy to think that the planning can be that specific. I think we all abhor the thought that such a plan would somehow be promulgated and that for the rest of our lives we are made slaves to it.

So, these are just a few thoughts, Mr. Chairman, and again I congratulate you on bringing this whole matter into focus, and I think it is extremely important at this time because we face tremendously difficult issues on many, many fronts.

Chairman GLENN. Thank you very much.

Mr. Zarb, there is nothing against you that your last name happens to begin with "Z." I imagine you're going to face this problem for the rest of your life that you are going to be last on an alphabetical list. TESTIMONY OF FRANK ZARB, FEDERAL ENERGY ADMINISTRATION Mr. ZARB. Mr. Chairman, I have come today with more questions than I have answers to and my opening remarks will be very brief.

I must say that I listened very carefully to Mr. Linowitz's comments, and particularly the portion where he talks about the skepticism of the American people with respect to the government's competence to do certain things correctly, soundly and honestly.