Page Two way to lose votes. Some people obviously think that the tide has turned politically, and perhaps it has. But if the political outlook has changed, the philosophical resistance to planning has not. The ingrained suspicion remains deeply rooted, especially in the business Community. If planning advocates are right in assessing the political situation, it may be feasible for government to plan in the government sector without the cooperation or consent of the business community. It may be extremely difficult, however, to achieve very much in those areas where business and government overlap if business is unwilling to reveal its thinking about the future or to accept governmental guidance. (This is, of course, precisely why some believe that governmental planning must lead sooner or later to governmental compulsion--otherwise, the planning may prove largely ineffective outside the narrowly defined governmental sphere.) Third, my experience is that our electoral process operates in such a way as to discourage long-term thinking. The accent is always on visible results before the next election. I remember, for example, when Congress was asked to approve a Decade of Development for Latin America. Everyone with any knowledge of the Latin American situation realized that it was nonsensical to talk of achieving substantial results in less than 25-40 years. But it was already daring to ask for 10 years of patient endeavor. In practice, neither Congress or the Executive Branch gave it that much. letdown occurred before the program was fairly underway. Except for the space program and, perhaps, the N.I.H. medical research programs (both of which enjoyed special status for a time--in part, I think, because they were science-based and therefore intimidating to laymen), it is difficult to think of any governmental programs in recent years where long-run objectives have not quickly yielded to demands for annual proofs of progress. The What these three points add up to, it seems to me, is that the systemic biases against planning are extremely strong, and any approach to planning which fails to take these biases into account is certain to fail. My own strong view is that the only way to diminish them is by small steps, building on existing patterns and institutions. I see little hope in grand schemes for creating a long-term planning process by "involving" large numbers of citizens in discussions on major social issues or by reforming the educational system or the political parties. My perception of the way our system works is that the public does not define public issues, though it may evoke the effort to define them. Issues are defined politically by leadership groups and ratified or not by the public's response. If we seek to persuade the public to take a long-rang e view of America's problems, the way to begin is by requiring our political leaders to take a longer look ahead. A modest but useful step in this direction would be to impose a requirement on the Executive Branch (and on each committee of the Congress) to include in each budget submission and in each legislative proposal a statement regarding the anticipated economic and social impact of any proposed change in policy during the first, second and fifth years following adoption. Five year projections should accompany 'Page Three the Budget Report and the Economic Report, together with a statement of the assumptions underlying those projections. As part of the oversight responsibility, each committee should be required once each biennium to produce a report dealing with long-range problems, goals and objectives on the matters within its jurisdicition. (I am thinking here mainly in terms of domestic policies. I am not at all sure that it is either practical or useful to impose such a requirement in the area of foreign policy.) These requirements in my opinion would stimulate a useful political dialog on long-term prospects without creating the unreasonable expectations (or fears) that I believe would be generated by some of the more sweeping proposals that have been advanced. On the reforms of existing institutions mentioned in your hearings and enumerated in your letter: 1. I agree that realignment of the Congressional committee structure is desirable but I do not see that it would cure the problem at hand. Moreover, it is far from the easiest reform to implement. 2. While it is difficult to be against additional informationgathering, I suspect that inadequate data is less of a problem than effective presentation and utilization. In any case, datagathering will be improved as demand for the data grows. For this reason, I regard it as a secondary problem. 3. Educational "uplift" and "meaningful public participation" are desirable goals. But if we take that route to planning, we will all be dead before it becomes a reality. 4. For the reasons outlined earlier, I do not think much is to be achieved by urging political parties to engage in long-term goal-setting. 5. Before communication between government and public, there has to be something solid to communicate. 6. Expansion of the Council of Economic Advisers is a possible approach but I am concerned that the result might be to dilute rather than to increase the CEA's effectiveness. 7. Combining the National Security Council and the Domestic Council is a totally bad idea. Certainly it is true that domestic policy and foreign policy are related, but on that basis one might as sensibly argue that all of the Cabinet departments ought to be combined in one super agency. 8. As indicated above, I support a requirement that each agency's budget submission should contain a long-range component. With regard to proposals for new institutions: Page Four 1. Establishment of a long-range planning body within the Smithsonian Institution seems to me to have very little to recommend it. The efforts of this body would remain outside the governmental process. 2. The suggestion for a Council of National Advisers appointed by the President, the Congress and the Supreme Court fails to take account of Constitutional realities. It would achieve little. 3. I am not sure I understand the proposed function of the Institute for Congress--how it would differ in concept or operation from the Congressional Research Service or the Congressional Budget Office. But in any case if there is an additional function to be performed, I think it might be better to integrate it with one of these two existing institutions. 4. The Humphrey/Javits proposal is an extremely interesting one, and it may have possibilities in the longer run. I would prefer to begin with the more modest steps mentioned earlier in my letter. 5. I would have to see the details of any proposal for a Council of Social Advisers before commenting on its wisdom or practicality. 6. and 7. Neither a National Foundation for the Purposes of Society nor the permanent establishment of a Commission on National Goals seems to me to be a useful suggestion. Despite the discontent many of us feel with our approach to the future, the fact is that there are many private groups which periodically offer advic e on where we ought to be going and how we ought to get there. I do not consider it wise to coopt these efforts or to channel them through a chosen instrument at the national level which would remain, nonetheless, outside the apparatus of government. The contribution of the Eisenhower Commission on National Goals seems to me to have been less than enormous. The unnumbered concept of a "future impact statement" is not too distant from what I have recommended. My concern would be to circumscribe it closely so that the reporting agency would have an obligation to cover a well-defined territory--and not to expand it so that it becomes amorphous and/or difficult to review after the fact so as to determine its value as a policy guide. Since I am submitting these comments after the March 22deadline mentioned in your letter, I do not expect them to be published. However, as I said at the outset, I think this is an important subject, and I wanted to get my views to you and your staff, for whatever value they may have. If I can be of further help, please let me know. Sincerely, Norman I. Gelman FREDERICK D. WILKINSON Assistant Treasurer Board of Trustees Lucy Wilson Benson Michael Burke Edward E. Carlson Lisle C. Carter Michael C. Clement Jewel L. Cooper The Right Rev. John P. Craine, DD. Ronald R. Davenport Coy G. Eklund Charles S. Finch, Jr. Elizabeth L. Fitter I. Owen Funderburg Alfreda M. Garibaldi William A. Hilliard Joyce A. Hughes Richard J. Jacob Nancy Steeger Jennings Lane Kirkland Daniel H. Kruger Clarence G. Littlejohn William Lucy Edward McMahon Bishop Samuel S. Morris, Jr. Edward N. Ney John E. Oxendine John W. Porter John W. Riley, Jr. T. Joseph Semrod HENRY STEEGER The Honorable John Glenn United States Senate Room 1203 Dirksen Senate Office Building 20510 Dear Senator Glenn: The National Urban League is pleased to respond to your letter of March 12, 1976, requesting our comments on the recently held Government Operations Committee symposium on long-term policy development and planning. First, our congratulations to you for recognizing a need for such a symposium. The Urban League has long been concerned that our Govemment has for too long used a "band-aid approach" to national problems and our failure to focus on these problems and the plight of the poor. And our Government has neglected to make optimal use of the talents, knowledge and experience that exists in the private sector of our country. In In response to the three major questions listed in your letter and the comments, the Urban League would concur with those responses. addition, we are concerned about the long-term policy development and planning issues as they relate to the Black community. As you may know, Black America is in a state of crisis. The social and economic gains Blacks made over the past decade have either been wiped out or badly eroded by inflation, recession and unemployment, and portents for the future are not encouraging. We know, on a limited and individual basis there were exceptions to Contributions to the National Urban League are tax deductible Senator John Glenn April 5, 1976 Government should not make the mistake of believing that because of the problems of Blacks and poor did not have high visibility or command public attention that they no longer exist, or have been ameliorated to such an extent they are no longer important. I feel that these points are very relevant to long-term policy development and planning in our country. If my office can be of any further assistance, please do not hesitate to call upon us. |