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most of its functions had, in effect, been absorbed by an array of planning institutions and activities both within the Executive Office of the President and within the various executive departments and agencies. He felt that, for these reasons, history had "passed by the NRPB approach to federal planning organization" and that "long-range as well as immediate federal planning should be undertaken by that department or agency of the executive branch which has a continuing substantive operating responsibility in the fields most directly associated with the planning."

He might, I suspect, decide differently if he sat down today to review and reflect not only upon

the experience of the NRPB, but upon our experience over the past 15 years with the fragmented planning arrangements that he believed had rendered unwise and unnecessary the resurrection of anything like the NRPB. We are, as I have suggested, faced with a whole new spectrum of problems that simply cannot be divided up and dealt with by the present bewildering variety of federal agencies and offices, each of which is interested, inevitably, in exercising its muscle and extending its turf. Under these conditions, it is not surprising that interagency contact and "coordination" should at times seem to resemble a free-forall in the dark. It was not without some justification

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that a close and keen analyst of the federal bureaucracy such as Donald Schon could remark that "it sometimes appears to an outside observer that the federal government contains many extremely intelligent, highly dedicated, experienced individuals who work long hours over long periods of time canceling out one another."

There is probably no more compelling evidence of the need for a permanent mechanism for longrange analysis and evaluation than the multitude of interdepartmental task forces, committees and commissions that in recent years have appeared and disappeared, flourished and faded, as the crises that led to their creation have come and gone. The President's Domestic Council and the Office of Management and Budget come closest to resembling the kind of permanent mechanism overseeing all areas of agency interest that we require. But both of these institutions are so inescapably occupied with immediate problems and with day-to-day decision-making that they cannot give much time or attention to long-term, interrelated issues.

What we need, in fact, is a mechanism that will produce the kinds of information, analysis and evaluation of issues that will enable us to understand the long-term impact and implications of the decisions we must make.

Last year, the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars in Washington, D.C., brought together in a series of seminars, one of which I chaired, a number of high-level present and former government officials to explore in detail and in depth the need for a long-range planning mech

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anism in the federal government. On the basis of these discussions, a specific proposal was developed that, in my judgment, merits the most serious consideration.

The Woodrow Wilson proposal recommends establishment in the executive branch and in the Congress of an Office of Strategic Policy Assessments. The basic task of the office in the executive branch would be to identify emerging long-term trends and problems, to spell out and evaluate alternative courses of action to deal with these trends and problems, and to assess actions already under way. The staff of this office would be relatively small-between 30 and 50 people-and would reflect a wide range of expertise. Rather than undertake major research efforts of its own, the staff would encourage and oversee appropriate research projects and efforts both within and outside the federal government. It would have the opportunity to review and comment upon such items and matters as the President's budget, federal resource-allocation decisions, major Presidential policy statements, and legislation with important long-term policy implications.

It seems clear that, if this assessment office is to have any real influence upon the major decisions that determine federal policy, it must be located within the Executive Office of the President. Precisely where it might best be located within the executive office is not so clear. The Woodrow Wilson proposal suggests two possibilities: to put the assessment office within the Office of Management and Budget, or to set it up as an independent agency within the executive office. Each of these possibilities has its advantages and disadvantages. Since the Office of Management and Budget does play such a strong and central role in shaping federal policy and programs, it seems in many ways the logical place to locate the assessment office. Most of the matters that OMB must make decisions upon come up as individual, isolated items: and OMB has not the time or resources to do the continuous, cumulative research and analysis that would enable it to weigh these matters in terms of their broader impacts and long-range implications. The presence of an office of long-range analysis and assessment would permit OMB to make its decisions in the light of this larger context. As an arm of such a powerful agency as OMB. the assessment office would, in turn, be assured that its requests and recommendations would be taken very seriously by the federal bureaucracy. It is, on the other hand, possible that an assessment office would remain relatively inaccessible to the public and that, even to the degree that its analyses

and evaluations do become public, their objectivity and integrity might be open to question. The effectiveness of the NRPB was always, to some degree, undermined by the fact that it was never clear whether its recommendations were the result of objective evidence and impartial analysis or of its desire to support the President's programs.

As an independent agency within the Office of the President, the assessment office would not run the risk of becoming simply an obscure and relatively ineffective part of OMB. It would have far greater public visibility, and it would probably have less difficulty in securing general confidence in the integrity and objectivity of its analyses and evaluations. On the other hand, its isolation from the actual decision-making process might very well diminish its impact upon that process as well as its ability to command the support and cooperation of the federal bureaucracy.

The Congress is far less equipped and organized than the executive branch to deal with interrelated and long-range issues. The establishment of an office of long-range analysis to serve the Congress would measurably improve its ability not only to deal with the fundamental issues that face the country, but to function far more effectively as an equal partner with the executive branch in the creation of national policy. The Woodrow Wilson proposal suggests that the charter and staff of the Joint Economic Committee could be suitably broadened and strengthened, or-what it regards as preferable-that the long-range analysis and assessment function be given to the new Office of Technology Assessment. That new office is concerned with the advance assessment of technology, not simply in the narrow sense, but in the broader social and economic implications and impacts. The fact that the board is composed entirely of members of key committees of the House and Senate would mean that the work of the office would be directly linked to the decision-making process in the Congress.

Precisely how these offices of long-range analysis are organized and where they are located are not unimportant matters; their organization and location would very much determine how effective and influential they are. And if they are not to be effective or influential, there is no point in establishing them.

What is most important and urgent is that they be established as competent and continuing institutions whose cumulative efforts will enable us, as a nation, to come to grips with the kinds of problems that will increasingly confront us in a new age of scarcity and interdependence.

REMARKS BY THE HONORABLE PUSSELL E. TRAIN
ADMINISTRATOR, U.S. ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY
PREPARED FOR DELIVERY BEFORE

THE EXPLORERS CLUB "STRATEGY FOR SURVIVAL' DINNER
NOVEMBER 21, 1975, FRIDAY, NEW YORK, NEW YORK

THE FUTURE IS NOW

Yet the

I suspect that, whatever his other virtues, a football coach would not rank very high on anyone's list of people with profound insights to offer into the ills and anxieties of our age. more I reflect upon the questions that concern us here tonight, upon what I call the problems of growth, the more I am reminded of two remarks by some rather well-known figures from the field of football. I speak of the repeated insistence by George Allen, the current coach of the Washington Redskins that "he future is now," and of the late Vince Lombardi's constant emphasis upon the need to get "back to fundamentals." what I have to say tonight is summed up in these two remarks.

I think that much of

The growth of this Nation has, for the most part, proceeded at a pace and along patterns which have been based upon two assumptions:

The first has been that, in a land so rich and wide, we would never run out of room or of resources and that, as a result, we could forever be free and easy with both. The second was that if, for a time, we found ourselves in a tight squeeze, then we

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