that we must not give way from fear. In answer to such an argument I would apply to the people the observation made by a right hon. gentleman (Mr. Plunkett) on the depositaries of power; "we must not be too critical in examining their conduct." We must recollect that we are their re

The second evil is easily ascertained by looking at the history of those towns, which, during the last century, have grown up into importance. Thus, Manchester, which in 1778 had only 23,000 inhabitants, is now supposed to have 110,000. Leeds had, in 1775, 17,117; in 1811, 62,534. Birmingham had, in 1700, 15,032; in 1811, 85,753. Halifax had, in 1761, 41,000; in 1811, 73,000. Sheffield, in which the first brick-house was built in 1696, had, in 1811, 35,840 inhabitants, Now, Sir, it is very evident that these places suffer a serious inconvenience from the want of representatives. It is said, to be sure, that they are represented by the members for the counties in which they are situated. But those members, however well inclined they may be to do their duty to their constituents, are often of different station and habits of life. They have not the knowledge requisite for stating the grievances and the wants of manufacturers. And when we consider how many questions relating to trade, to the poor-laws, to the laws of combination, and of particular taxes, deeply affect the manufacturers, we cannot but allow the justice of their desire to be represented. Even should their grievances not be redressed, it will be a satisfaction to them to have their direct representatives in this House, who can state their complaints in the face of the ministers and of the nation. Sir, when this argument was pressed in 1782, it was victoriously answered, "Where is the petition from Manchester? Where is the petition from Sheffield?" I am aware that the argument now used will be very different. It will be said that the people of these towns are too clamorous;

It has been said by some persons that to give the elective franchise to the large towns, would be to introduce tumults and affrays. Such an argument, one should have thought, was not produced in England, but came from Naples, or from Spain; and indeed it is such as I have often heard from the mouths of the Spanish clergy. But in England experience has taught us that, so far from occasion. ing bloodshed, elections have tended to give a vent to the political animosities of the place, and after a violent canvass and tumultuous poll, the air has been cleared by the storm, and settled into serenity. Perhaps if there had been elections at Manchester, we should not have had to lament the unfortunate events which we all deplore. Sir, on this subject, I may quote the example of Westminster. It is not a year ago that my honourable friend near me (Mr. G. Lamb) excited the most outrageous disapprobation, being supposed to be the organ of an odious coalition. But he has no sooner shown himself attentive to the interests of this city, and a warm friend to the rights of the subject, than his appearance excites every where good humour and applause.-We have been very lately told that education, which ought to be a blessing, has been injurious to the population of the manufac. turing districts. Sir, the fault is not in education; it is in the time and the circumstances which have accompanied it. Had the people received instruction, when they were rich it would have taught them frugality; had they received political rights at the same time they would have learnt the value of legal liberty. But they have received education when they were sinking into poverty, and they have received it without being admitted to poli

tical power; they have eaten of the tree of knowledge, like our first parents, only to be conscious of their nakedness.

I come now to the most difficult part of the subject, namely, the separation which has on some occasions taken place between the opinions of the people, and the declared will of the House of Commons. I am aware of an objection urged by a right hon. gentleman opposite, that those who ask for moderate reform state the evil as broadly as those who ask for the most extensive reform. This fault I would endeavour to avoid. I do not wish to create illusion, and therefore I do not pretend to say that reform would make our government less inclined to war, which, it must be remembered, is the cause of our chief burthens. A fondness for war is not the fault of an oligarchical, but of a popular government. If we look to late events, we shall see that the French war was popular in its commencement; the American war was popular in its commencement. True, these wars would have been sooner discontinued if the voice of the people had been listened to; but then, on the other hand, the long administration of sir Robert Walpole would hardly have passed in peace with a more popular assembly. If we look farther back in our history, we may observe, that when we speak of our Edwards, and of our Henries, we dwell with the greatest delight upon those of our kings who had the greatest disposition for war, and the greatest opportunities of indulging it. If we look to other countries, we may see, that Venice and Genoa, two popular states, sent their fleets round Italy, for the purpose of meeting in destructive contests. If we look farther back, to the great republics of ancient times, we shall see that Athens ruined herself by failing in the subjugation of Sicily, and Rome by succeeding in the conquest of the world. We may, therefore, state that the wars, in which this country has been engaged, would still have been undertaken if the will of the people had been entirely consulted; and this view is confirmed by looking at the large proportion of county members who voted in the great majorities which have sanctioned our two last wars. Indeed, we might almost say, it is impossible that an assembly acting in the face of the people, vulgi stante corona, should continue, by immense majorities of every class of members, to sanction, year after year, a policy which created immediate and

enormous burthens upon the people, entirely against the feelings of that people. Such a system could hardly continue even in the most despotic state; and it is only by carrying the feelings of the people with them, that a free government can lay on greater taxes than an arbitrary king. So firmly persuaded of this truth was Montesquieu, that he has devoted to it a whole book of his immortal work.

But, Sir, there are other questions materially affecting the interests of this country which are not equally decided by a deference for public opinion; amongst them are those questions which regard the expenditure, and are under the eye of this House in its important capacity of guardian of the public purse. In looking at the divisions on this subject, we shall find, that at the periods when those questions were most interesting, and excited the greatest attention, the majorities, instead of being as large as they have been on questions of war, have been singularly small; and on farther examining those majorities we shall find, that, instead of being formed of the fair proportions of county and borough members, they consisted almost entirely of the latter. On the famous motion of Mr. Dunning, in 1780, which was carried by a majority of 18, there appeared in the majority, consisting of 233, the large proportion of 69 county members; in the minority, consisting of 215, only 11 county members. This question, however, it may be said, was carried; but there was another division, of which I will read an account from a letter of sir George Savile, which I have seen quoted in another place: "The most uncourtly question we have had this year was, when after having voted the influence of the Crown increased, &c., we moved to address the king not to prorogue or dissolve us till we had effectually diminished it: we lost it in the proportion of six to five. In this question, the House being divided into classes, showed itself in the following proportions: county members, about three to one, the three being on the side of the minority; English borough members, about four to three, the four being on the side of the majority; the members of a certain long county, which sends a great many, eight or nine to one, at the least; Scotch members, nine or eight to one, at the least; Cinque Ports, about four to one." On referring to what took place two years ago, we shall see that questions of a si

members to parliament, and that a great town or county shall enjoy the right it has forfeited. On these heads I have nothing to add. The third declares, “that it is the duty of the House to consider of further means to detect and prevent corruption in the election of members of parliament." The meaning of this resolu tion is, that some means ought to be devised to give greater facilities in proving corruption in the elections in the smaller boroughs. Perhaps any person, not a candidate or a voter, ought to be allowed to complain of bribery in an election. The farther meaning of the resolution is, that a body appointed by this House ought to be enabled to decide, that a borough has lost by corruption its right of sending members to parliament. Some persons think, that this body ought to be a committee appointed under the Grenville act; and some are of opinion, that a second committee ought to be appointed. It is in order to avoid pledging the House on this subject, that the resolution has been expressed so generally. On this part of the subject, I hope the House will receive the assistance of the member for the county of Montgomery (Mr. Wynn), who, besides his learning, has hereditary claims to authority on this question.

milar nature were then proposed in this House. In the beginning of 1817, there was a great cry for economical reform; in order to meet this cry the ministers proposed a finance committee. I do not blame them for so doing; for I think that the finances of this country are now so complicated, that they cannot be well examined except in a committee. Upon the composition of this committee, it is evident, depended the question whether our expenditure should be rigorouslyexamined, and honestly corrected, or whether the same system of waste and extravagance should be continued and confirmed. If it was to be composed of independent and impartial men, we might expect the most useful results; if of the followers of ministers we could only look to laboured but flimsy apologies of the existing system of profusion. Sir, the proposal of ministers was, that, besides a great majority of ministerial supporters, five official persons should be members of the committee, in order to see all right. A division took place on the question of substituting the name of a country gentleman for that of lord Binning; for ministers there appeared 178, of whom 15 were county members; on the other side were 136, of whom 27 were county members. The consequence was, as might have been expected, that the reports of the finance committee were totally disregarded by the people. On the 28th of February, the same year, a division took place on the reduction of two junior lords of the Admiralty; when, of 208 who voted with government, 16 were county members; of 152 who voted for the reduction, 35 were county members, being more than double. Now, I do not mention these things as proving that county members alone ought to form the House of Commons, but as an index how totally opposite the decisions of this House have been, on some occasions, to those of the people. In support of the same thing I may mention, on the authority of Mr. Fox, that, although the Opposition were the popular party in 1780, yet they gained very few members by the general election. Even the last general election, decided as the voice of the people was, did not take much from the strength of the ministry.

I come now to the resolutions which I shall have the honour to propose: the two first declare, that when a borough is convicted of gross and notorious bribery and corruption, it shall cease to send

The last resolution declares the opinion of the House, that the borough of Grampound ought to be disfranchised. The corruption of that borough was clearly proved before a committee of the whole House in the last session of parliament, and resolutions appear on the Journals to that effect. The question that remains is, whether Grampound ought to be thrown into the hundred. Now, supposing that all the principles I have endeavoured to establish are false, that all the wants of other districts are imaginary, I still think that there is enough in the peculiar situation of the hundred in question to prevent its receiving from parliament the return of the two members which Grampound is unfit to send. The hundred of Powdar in which Grampound it situated, is one of the most fertile of the whole kingdom in members of parliament. contains Tregony, Truro, Lestwithiel, Fowey, and Grampound, besides three out of five voters of the borough of St. Michael. It will scarcely be contended by any one I imagine, that the hundred of Powdar is not sufficiently represented. Why, then, since Cornwall is in no want of representatives, and the hundred in

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which Grampound is situated is already overstocked,-why not, I say, transfer the right of sending two members to a populous town? I know but of one objection, namely, the common one, that the innocent will suffer with the guilty. And the only answer I shall give, will be in the words of Dr. Johnson, in an argument he furnished his friend Mr. Boswell on the subject of a Scotch borough: "The objection," he says, "in which is urged the injustice of making the innocent suffer with the guilty, is an objection not only against society, but against the possibility of society. All societies, great and small, subsist upon this condition, that as the individuals derive advantages from union, so they may likewise suffer inconveniences; that as those who do nothing, and sometimes those who do ill, will have the honours and emoluments of general virtue and general prosperity, so those likewise who do nothing, or perhaps do well, must be involved in the consequences of predominant corruption."

And here, Sir, I might close my case, were it not that a question has been asked by a gentleman, lately a candidate for the city of Exeter, which it is incumbent upon me to answer; and the more so, because I have no doubt that the same feeling has arisen in the breasts of some whom I most deeply love and respect, The question is, why not disfranchise also the unconvicted boroughs ? To this I answer, that I do not by any means maintain that the resolutions I now propose comprise all the amendments that can be made in the frame of this House. Whenever a specific proposition is made, I shall be ready to give it all my attention, and if I can approve of it to adopt it. But I do not, at present, I confess, see any rule by which any unconvicted boroughs can be disfranchised without disfranchising the whole. We then arrive at what is called a 'reform upon a 'principle, or the reconstruction of the entire House of Commons. Now, Sir, I will not dwell upon the arguments which are generally used to repel such a proposition; arguments resting chiefly upon the advantage of admitting men of talent into this House, by means of the close boroughs; and on the danger that an assembly of popular delegates would overthrow the two other branches of the legislature. But I cannot forget that these arguments have been urged not, as some out of doors. endeavour to persuade the people, by bo

roughmongers anxious to defend their own vile interests, but by some of the greatest, the brightest, and the most virtuous men whom this country ever produced. I cannot say, however, that I give entire credit to these arguments, because I think, that in political speculation, the hazard of error is immense, and the result of the best formed scheme often different from that which has been anticipated. But for this very reason I cannot agree to the wholesale plans of reform that are laid before us. We have no experience to guide us in the alterations which are proposed, at least none that is encouraging. There is, indeed, the example of Spain. Spain was formerly in the enjoyment of a free constitution; but in the course of the fifteenth century many of the towns fell into the hands of the nobility, who, instead of influencing the elections of members to cortes (the practice so much reprobated in this House), prevented their sending members at all. The consequence was, that when a struggle took place between the king and cortes, the aristocracy, feeling no common interest with the representative body joined the crown, and destroyed for ever the liberties of their country. There is also the example of the present French constitution; but that is of too recent a date, not to say of too precarious a nature to make a rule for us to go by; we must come back then to our own laws. The constitution of this country is not written down like that of some of our neighbours. I know not where to look for it, except in the division into King, Lords, and Commons, and in the composition of this House, which has long been the supreme body in the state. The composition of this House by representatives of counties, cities, and boroughs, I take to be an intimate part of our constitution. The House was so formed when they passed the Habeas Corpus act, a law which, together with other wise laws, Mr. Cobbett himself desires to preserve, although with strange inconsistency, whilst he cherishes the fruit, he would cut down the tree. This House was constituted on the same prin. ciple of counties, cities, and boroughs, when Montesquieu pronounced it to be the most perfect in the world. Old Sarum existed when Somers and the great men of the Revolution established our government. Rutland sent as many members as Yorkshire when Hampden lost his life. in defence of the constitution. Are we

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