In proposing to take an observation of our exact position, and in regard to our situation, under the terms and import of our Legislative Resolves, and under all the circumstances in which we are necessarily placed, at the present period, the Committee would remark that they have been guided by the public documents that have emanated from the Governments of the United States and of this State, so far as they have extended; it so happening that there has been no Report, such as was formerly usual from the Standing Committee upon this subject, for the last two years. The active duties in which the State has been necessarily engaged during that interval, may naturally account for the omission; and the Committee may be permitted to allude to it, as an apology, if one is to be offered, for the more extended range which the present Report has taken, in regard more particularly to the transactions and events of the last three or four years, which have been so pregnant with momentous concerns and consequences.

The last Legislature, it has been noticed, invoked the General Government for protection and for the settlement of this question shortly by negotiation or by arms; and unless a distinct and satisfactory proposition for the immediate adjustment of the question should be made or accepted by the British Government during the session of Congress, which expired last year, it solicited the General Government to take military possession of the Disputed Territory.

In view of these Resolves, the Committee would remark, first, that the appropriation made by Congress in 1839, making extraordinary provision for military force, and for a special embassy to England, had already expired, at the passage of those Resolves. Instead of adopting this last course, which appeared to be recommended by Congress, and which might have been the means of at least preventing the long delays required by interchanges across the Atlantic, (without making any remark, for which there might well be room, on the instructions to Mr. Stevenson, of March 6, 1839,) it seems that the ordinary sluggish course of negotiation was resumed, and it was to be carried on thenceforward at Washington.

Soon after the close of the session of the Legislature in 1839, and the termination of that matter, a proposition was made by the British Government to our own for establishing a Commission of Exploration and Survey, but one so loaded with such limitations and qualifications as to cause its rejection by the President at once. Subsequently, in the course of the next summer, a Counter-project was submitted to the British Government, which included a provision for the certain and final adjustment of the limits in dispute; and it was kept by that Government for some time under consideration. It seems no reply had been received by the President at the commencement of the session of Congress in December (1839). In the mean time the British Government instituted the Special Commission, which has been referred to, for the exploration of the territory. It appeared by a subsequent official communication from Lord Palmerston to Mr. Fox, laid before Parliament in June, 1840, "that the British Government then concurred with the United States in the opinion, that the next measure to be taken by the two Governments should contain, in its details, arrangements which should necessarily lead to some final settlement." At the same time the British Government signified its willingness to assent to the principle of arbitration.

The note from Mr. Fox to Mr. Forsyth, conveying this concurrence and assent, dated June 22, 1840, according to his instructions, purported to state officially, "that Her Majesty's Government consent to the two principles which form the main foundation of the American Counter-Draft, namely: first, that the Commission to be appointed shall be so constituted as necessarily to lead to a final settlement of the question of Boundary at issue between the two countries; and secondly, that in order to secure such a result, the Convention, by which the Commission is to be created, shall contain a provision for arbitration upon points as to which the British and American Commissioners may not be able to agree." But it was further added, that there were "many matters of detail in the American Counter-Draft, which Her Majesty's Government cannot adopt."

The last President's annual message, at the opening of the late session of Congress, announced the arrival of the answer of that Government, accompanied by additional propositions of its own, some of which were assented to,

and others not. Such as were deemed correct in principle, and consistent with a due regard to the just rights of the United States and of the State of Maine, were concurred in; and the reasons for dissenting from the residue, together with an additional suggestion on our part, communicated by the Secretary of State to the British Minister at Washington, through whom the recent reply had been received. The matter was again referred by that Minister to his Government for its further decision, for want of instructions upon some of the points, and that Government having for some time had the subject under advisement, the President expressed his confident expectation of a speedy and satisfactory termination.

That the condition or contingency required by the Legislature of Maine, at the last session, to the execution of its resolutions, has not taken place in terms is quite obvious. How far the State should rest satisfied with the reasons and circumstances assigned for the delay, or is bound to resign itself to this interminable course of procrastination, is not perhaps quite so clear. The State cannot forget its proper position in the Union, nor fail of the obligations it is under to abide the high behests of our supreme national counsels. At the same time it is absolutely impossible to reconcile itself to this system of endless delay, and this continual claim upon the inexhaustible confidence of our General Government in the equal disposition of both parties to bring the subject to a decisive conclusion. The original proposition of our own Government included "a provision looking in terms for a certain and final adjustment of the limits in dispute." And all that we are definitely led to understand that the British Government gives its assent to, from the language of Lord Palmerston, is, that the next measure to be adopted should contain-not in its absolute provisions, but its details-arrangements that should necessarily lead to some final adjustment! This prospect appears to the Committee, from the very form of statement, to be far from promising; and what is more observJable in regard to the plan, it seems to have a reference to some more or less direct principle of determination to which the State has already signified its entire aversion. What may be the effect of the additional stipulation sent out we do not know; nor can the Committee tell us what is to be the alternative. But Maine can feel no assurance of safety or successful progress towards a conclusion in these vague, involved, and distant phrases. It is undoubtedly difficult to say that any course deliberately acceded to by our own Government would be likely to prove a delusion; but there is no certainty yet, nor any security when the subject will be redeemed from the arts and complications of diplomacy. The Committee must say they are not sanguine as to any prospect of a speedy or satisfactory conclusion to the present state of negotiation. All the propositions now pending, as presented to their minds, appear to them to be purely dilatory.

It is impossible, therefore, your Committee confess, to consider the language of the last Resolves as perfectly satisfied; though, that the whole subject is not placed in such a condition as in some measure to elude the operation of those resolutions, according to their literal force and meaning, is more than the Committee can undertake to say; and no less so, perhaps, whether it is in the power of the National Government to bring the business to a point, otherwise than by a positive rupture. The fact may be, that it is not in our power to relieve ourselves; and that we must suffer the mortification of having holden language which we cannot carry out without compromising our constitutional relations. But it is needless to remark, that there is no end to this course of diplomacy so long as it serves the purpose of delay, and to stave off a final determination. The postponement is indefinite, and we cannot but fear it will ever continue so, so long as Great Britain finds her advantage in keeping open a question that can never be decided in her favour, and in the mean time enjoys the value of a possession which she must eventually yield, or employs herself to strengthen a position she is not disposed to surrender, nor entitled to hold. From whatever cause the difficulty arises most, whether from an aversion on her part to come to an issue, or a reluctance and unwillingness on that of our own Government to precipitate one, which can by any means be avoided, it is apparent that the adjournment of it is equally detrimental to the rights and interests of Maine. Your Committee would be among the last to undervalue sincere and well-directed efforts to bring about an adjustment, at once peaceful and rightful, of the controversy; but they

have seen too much cause to be convinced, that such a disposition, however just and creditable, may be abused.

The Committee may perhaps view themselves called upon to consider the effect of the stipulations adopted in 1839, under the authority of the Resolves of that year, or under the further advice and sanction of Major-General Scott, acting under and in behalf of the Government of the United States.

They may observe that nothing was considered to be done by Maine under the conventional agreement entered into and signed by Mr. Forsyth, the Secretary of State, and Mr. Fox, the British Minister, on the 27th of February, 1839. Without questioning the competency of the two parties to enter into such an arrangement between themselves, or the propriety of recommending it to the acceptance of the State of Maine, its obligatory force was not acknowledged by Governor Fairfield, who observed in his communication of it to the Legislature: "To such an arrangement I trust Maine will never consent. She has been sufficiently trammelled hitherto in the exercise of her rights, and will not voluntarily forge new shackles for herself."

The authority of the Governor, as the Committee view it, to bind the State by his signature to any public stipulation, was necessarily limited by the laws and constitution of the State. His authority in this instance was entirely derived from the Resolves of 1839; and your Committee not only do not understand that he did not intend to exceed it; but they do understand, that what he did he intended in strict and faithful execution of the immediate objects of those Resolves. Such was his language in reporting and commu nicating what he had done in virtue of these Resolves to the next Legislature; and such is the understanding of the Committee equally in regard to the import of the act on his part, and the character of the subject. The Resolves have been already recited. All the information the Legislature have of what was done by Governor Fairfield, under the Resolves, is contained in his subsequent communication to the Legislature the following year; and it is subjoined to a simple statement of having received the written assent of the LieutenantGovernor of New Brunswick to the following proposition made to him by Major-General Scott: to wit, "that it is not the intention of the LieutenantGovernor of Her Britannic Majesty's Province of New Brunswick, under the expected renewal of negotiations between the Cabinets of London and Washington, on the subject of the said Disputed Territory, without renewed instruc tions to that effect from his Government, to seek to take military possession of that territory, or to seek by military force to expel the armed civil posse or the troops of Maine." The residue of the correspondence has not been, that your Committee are aware, communicated to the Legislature.

The stipulation, therefore, entered into by Governor Fairfield, under the invitation and sanction of General Scott, is, as your Committee understand, perfectly fulfilled; and the Resolve of 1839 is therefore executed, and has been faithfully observed. The mission of General Scott to Maine was accomplished; and Governor Fairfield, having recalled the military, professed his willingness not, without renewed instructions from the Legislature, to reoccupy the field of dispute in the like manner. Here the immediate controversy subsided. Governor Fairfield may be deemed to have indorsed the agreement made for him by General Scott; who thereby undertook to guarantee, so far as he was capable, to the State of Maine, the counter security of the territory against the military operations of Sir John Harvey.

Such was the posture of Governor Fairfield, and the situation of Maine, in relation to the subject, touching the matter of arrangement. Soon afterwards, it would seem, that Sir John Harvey was divested of all further authority over the subject; and any power of a military kind in that quarter appeared to be transferred from him to the Government of Lower Canada. It may be noticed as a circumstance, that this silent operation, or transmutation, took place about the same time that the British Commission of exploration was closing its business, and shifting the highland description, which formed the southern boundary of Quebec or Canada, to the hypothetical maximum axis of elevation south of the St. John. It is not understood, however, that any corresponding change took place in regard to the usurping civil authorities at Madawaska. This alteration first disclosed itself, in that quarter, by the movement of military force from the side of Lower Canada to certain stations within the Disputed Territory; and in reply to a letter of inquiry from Governor Fairfield into the meaning of so apparent and palpable an infringement of the arrangement entered into under the mediation of General Scott, Sir

John Harvey could only answer as before, that these movements were made under an authority superior to his own. It was added, that they were meant for the protection of certain buildings which had been constructed for the better accommodation of Her Majesty's troops on their march between the Lower and Upper Provinces, and of the provisions, stores, and other public property therein deposited; and it was further subjoined by Sir John Harvey that he should communicate a copy of the letter to the authorities in Canada, who, he was assured, would be as scrupulously desirous that the spirit, as well as the letter, of the agreement entered into, should be observed on their part, as he himself was. The remonstrance, however, produced no further effect; and this last December, upon the occasion of a new detachment of troops having arrived at the Madawaska settlement, Sir John Harvey deemed it consistent with the sincerity which had always marked his intercourse with the authorities of Maine, to apprize Governor Fairfield of the fact, and that the movement was made by the orders of the Governor-General of those provinces. It was evident that this movement was unadvised by Sir John Harvey, who could only apologize or account for it by reference to the complaints of certain civil authorities at that settlement, (one of them a supposed magistrate, and the other the pretended "Warden of the Disputed Territory,") which it had no other object than to support. And Sir John Harvey did not hesitate to express to the Governor-General his persuasion, that the movement for this purpose was needless, and that a corresponding armed civil posse to that of Maine would be quite adequate to prevent any unauthorized interference with the inhabitants or authorities of the Madawaska settlements.

The Committee would take leave to observe, that they know of no settlements bearing that name but the original and proper settlement of Madawaska. That is a spot, or settlement, with which the civil authorities of Maine have not interfered, since those who undertook to act under a law of the State, in organizing the place in 1832, were seized, imprisoned, and punished at Fredericton for the offence, excepting the like seizure and imprisonment of Greely for taking the census in 1837. As to what is supposed to have occurred at Fish River, it is stated as having been represented to Governor Fairfield, that it took place when certain of the citizens of this State were assembled at the Fish River settlement to give in their votes at the recent election for President and Vice-President, under a late law of this State authorizing it. The territory contiguous to the mouth of Fish River, on both sides of the St. John, is not considered, in any proper sense, as included in the Madawaska settlement, which is confined to the immediate vicinity of that river, and does not extend up even to the mouth of the Meriumpticock. To the original and proper limit of the old Madawaska settlement, the adverse local possession ought, in the opinion of your Committee, to be reduced; and it ought to be restored, and confined strictly, to its former civil character.

To return, however; the Committee would not fail to treat the species of arrangement in question, under whatever authority it was entered into, with all the respect to which it is entitled, and to render it all proper regard and observance. Having punctually complied with any obligation that might be deemed to be entered into on the part of Maine, it is of no consequence as to the origin of the agency, which is of no further importance, than that the State should stand clear of any reproach upon her good faith and allegiance. It cannot be pretended that there has been any failure upon her part to fulfil any duty that may have been imposed upon her, in whatever way or manner she may have been committed. The imputation cast upon her at one time, to say the least, without sufficient cause and consideration, of any intention to break through the engagements she was placed under, has been repelled with no less force than truth. But it is obvious, that any obligation of this nature, to be effectual, must be mutual. It is plain that it cannot be violated on one side at will, and preserve all its binding force upon the other. The Committee are not called to make any complaint of any breach of agreement between the authorities of this State and of New Brunswick upon the subject. They much doubt, as they have already signified, the competency of any arrangement between the State and a foreign province, without a constitutional sanction, which has not yet been asked; and they should hesitate no less upon the propriety and expediency of any convention or co-operation between two opposite Governments or communities, situated and related as these are, for

purposes which this State, as they conceive, ought either to take upon herself or to be entitled to call upon the General Government to perform, or to provide for her. As to the policy, as well as the principle, of any different course that has been proposed to her, the Committee can have no doubt at all. If any compact exists, or any is violated, in whatever form it has been made, it must be one between the Governments of Great Britain and the United States; and such, as it is the province of the latter, and not that of this State, to see to the effect of, and look after its observance. We do not hold ourselves entitled to call upon a foreign Government for its performance. Our relations are properly with the Government of the United States, upon a subject of this kind, only. It is their agreements and stipulations in regard to our security upon which we must be understood to rely; and we cannot be deemed to have given our consent to any provisionary arrangement, except under the sanction of our own Government, and its guarantee of our own safety. In short, it must be the essence of any agreement entered into by us, that it should be with, and through, the Government of the United States; although we may well view and hold ourselves as bound to fulfil any proper stipulations that the Government has actually made upon our behalf by its own officers, aud with the consent of our Executive agents and Legislative authorities.

The Committee consider it to have been well observed by the Governor in his official communication to both branches of the Legislature, on commencing the duties of his office, that "whatever arrangements have been assented to, in regard to the jurisdiction of different portions of the territory, pending negotiations, must be regarded merely as temporary in their nature;' as well as "under a protest always that we relinquish no claim, and no right, to the absolute and undisputed ownership and jurisdiction of every inch of our State." It is a matter which must force itself upon the mind of every reflecting friend of the peace of the two countries, as it has done, that these sub-arrangements or understandings, are of too slight and precarious a texture to permit the tranquillity of these neighbouring communities to rest upon them.

The arrangements understood to be assented to on the part of Maine in 1839, by which, on condition that Maine should remain in undisturbed possession of the rest of the territory, it was stipulated that we should not attempt to disturb by arms the Province of New Brunswick in its proper Madawaska possession, was only acquiesced in, as the Governor further remarks in his communication, " by the people, on the ground and the belief that immediate and determined efforts were to be, in good faith, adopted by both General Governments, to bring the matter to a speedy, just and final determination. Indulging such hopes," the Governor also adds, "Maine has certainly yielded much in the matter of temporary arrangements, influenced by the wish to preserve the peace of the country and to remove all obstacles to the progress of negotiations. But she has a right to ask," (he subjoins, with no undue emphasis,) "when she yields so much, that her motives should be appreciated, and her cause become the cause of the whole country, and be pressed with vigour and energy to a final settlement."

Earnest and strong as is the desire of this discreet and determined community to remain at peace with her neighbours on this continent, still she can no longer give any consent to the exercise of provincial authority out of the proper orbit of Madawaska. Neither can this State enter into any temporary partition of its own power with a foreign province, or agree to the exercise of any equal, divided, or concurrent authority, either with New Brunswick or Canada, over any other part of her own exclusive territory. Still less, if it be possible, can she endure to see the portion of which the Provincial Government, whether above or below, still claim to be in possession, (and the only portion to which it ever had any shadow of pretence,) converted into a military depôt, as avowed by Sir John Harvey to Governor Fairfield, in the first place, by the erection of barracks, and the collections of stores, provisions, and other munitions of a hostile character, under the name of public property, for establishing a cordon of military communication between the Upper and the Lower British Provinces. This is bringing upon us in time of peace, (to us the most profound, unless we are aroused or awaken,) all the forms of almost unmasked war. It realizes, in advance of the result of any arbitrary process for the division of our Disputed Territory with Great Britain, the dangerous character of this decided military demonstration within our limits. It advises and admonishes us, moreover, of the rather too