east side of the St. John's, puts the Penobscot and the Kennebec in each other's places, and is, in all other respects, as rude as can well be imagined. Yet this is the authority which is relied upon in part, to prove that due north means more west than north, and that the framers of the Treaty did not know their own meaning, when they defined the boundary as a north line.

The map of De Lisle is not worthy of any more consideration than that of Coronelli. But it may be advisable to dwell upon that of Evans for the sake of the singular blunder into which the Commissioners have fallen respecting it. They claim that the description of the southern boundary of Quebec already given from the Proclamation of 1763, was founded upon the map of Evans published in 1755. But very unluckily, the map published by Lewis Evans at that time was a map of the middle British Colonies only. It was not until 1776, or thirteen years after the proclamation, that Governor Pownall's addition to it, containing New England, and the bordering parts of Canada, saw the light. Hence it follows that the framers of the proclamation must have had some other guide to go by than this map, and that, if the public is to "find in the description of the country contained in the public documents promulgated immediately after the Peace of 1763 a mere echo of the information produced by the explorations of Governor Pownall," it is probably of a novel species of echo that the Commissioners treat, which is heard before the sound that occasions it.

The truth is, that Mitchell's Map, and Mitchell's Map only, is the important one in the whole of this controversy. And that not solely because it was a map undertaken by direction of the Lords of Trade, and derived from official papers in their office, and was, therefore, more likely to be accurate than any other map of the same date, but because there is abundant evidence on record to prove that it was the guide of the negotiators of the Treaty of 1783. It is altogether likely that this map was the guide of the British Government in drawing up the proclamation instead of that of Pownall, which has been shown to have had a much later origin. Neither is Pownall's Map itself at all deserving of comparison with it in point of accuracy or fulness. The great reason why it has been dragged into the discussion appears to be, that along the interior there appears very vaguely laid down a line called the "height of the land." And as this line, thus vague, may be made to correspond to the "axis of maximum elevation," in quest of which the Commissioners were sent, they very quietly sct it down as the same. They go on to say, that this ridge was familiarly known to Governor Pownall and the British ninety years ago, notwithstanding that in another part of the same Report, they claim great credit to themselves for having just found it now, and notwithstanding that Governor Pownall himself declared, that of the nature and course of this Highland," that is, of the Highland between the Kennebec and the Chaudière eastward, he was totally uninformed.

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Your Committee will pass at once to another argument of the Commissioners, drawn from a minute inspection of the instructions given by the Congress of the Confederation to their Ministers who negotiated the Treaty on the part of the United States. It appears by them that the Congress directed them first of all to press their claim of boundary beyond the St. Croix River and quite up to to the St. John's on the east, and to take that river as the line, from its source to its mouth. This was done under the impression that the Charter of Massachusetts, given in 1691, which was the source of authority respecting the boundaries of that province, justified the pretension, But when this claim was decided utterly inadmissible by Great Britain, the American negotiators were directed to fall back upon the exact lines that could be clearly maintained by reference to the Charter, and to make the St. Croix one of those lines; and to these terms the British Ministers finally assented.

The exact use which Her Majesty's Commissioners make of these facts is this: they argue that the British refusal to make the St. John's the Boundary in the first instance is utterly inconsistent with the supposition of assent afterwards, to any such north line towards the Highlands as the Americans claim, because it implies the absurd idea that the British Ministry would have been willing to concede at last a greater and more valuable territory under a boundary, avowedly reduced, than they originally refused to yield, and the very proposition of which they declared to be utterly inadmissible. When the American negotiators, therefore, decided upon receding from the claim as far as the St. John's, they could not be supposed to intend to substitute as less inadmis

N

sible a new claim, that proves, in fact, to be still larger in extent than the rejected one.

Your Committee will admit at once that there is something very plausible in this argument. But, upon examination, they are confident it will turn out to be only plausible and not sound. In the first place, it is not true that the territory which would have been gained by making the St. John's, from its mouth to its source, the boundary line, either was, at the time of making the Treaty, or is even now regarded by the British, of less value than that claimed under the terms of that Treaty. No further proof of this can be needed than the refusal of the British Government to listen to Mr. Forsyth, when he offered, a short time since, to compromise the dispute by adopting this very same line of the St. John's as the Boundary. If such is the estimate now placed upon the land near the coast in preference to the interior, how much greater must it have been sixty years since, when wild and unexplored lands generally bore a far smaller relative value to the sea-board than now. In the next place, it does not appear that value was regarded nearly so much in the course of the negotiation as the strict proof of legal title. When convinced that they could not establish their claim to go to the St. John's, the Americans determined upon planting themselves in a position from which they could not be driven. That position was taken upon the Massachusetts' Charter of 1691, modified by the tacit assent to the Proclamation of 1763, given in the manner and for reasons already shown. That position was admitted to be sound by the British negotiators, for they, in their turn, retreated from the claims they successively presented, to go westward to the Kennebec and then to the Penobscot as the Boundary, and both Parties united upon a description of it, which had been found by examination to have prevailed before that time in the authorized public papers emanating from the British Government itself.

This is believed to be a true history of the course of the negotiation so far as it respects the Boundary Line now in question. The negotiators on neither side relied upon the first claim presented by them. But they adhered in their case, to a practice common in most transactions of the kind, as well as in disputed questions of property in private life; that is, the practice of advancing pretensions as far as they can be carried with any show of justice, in order that each party, as it approaches towards a settlement, may appear disposed to compromise by sacrificing a part of what it claims. Thus it was in the Treaty of 1783. Great Britain first claimed to go westward to the Kennebec; she then claimed to go only as far as the Penobscot. America, on her side claimed to go east to the St. John's. But when these propositions were declined on each side, the consequence was the selection of some intermediate river consistently with the preservation of all ancient rights on both parts. And thus the St. Croix and the due north line from its source, which appeared in former deeds as the boundary line to the eastward of Massachusetts, were transferred into the Second Article of the Treaty, and made the Boundary of the United States. By this result both Parties agreed then to be bound; and the only source of regret that can ever arise from this Article must be, that both Parties have not remained equally willing to abide by the plain meaning which its language conveys.

There was one point, however, which proved to be really very difficult to decide, and that was, inasmuch as the St. Croix proved to have many sources that unite to form the stream known by that name, which of these sources was to be adhered to as the true St. Croix. The question was important, not only because these branches diverged pretty widely from each other, but because the running of the due north line would be varied according as an eastern or western branch should be selected as the source. In order that this and other similar difficulties might be removed, a Convention was made between the two Governments in 1794, in which it was provided that three Commissioners should be appointed, one by each party, and if the third could not be named by agreement between the two thus selected, one was to be chosen by lot out of two names to be proposed by them. These three persons, thus obtained, were to adjudicate the question, which was the true source of the St Croix. Now, it did so happen that in executing the terms of his agreement, an American, the late Egbert Benson, was the person added by lot to Judge Howell and Colonel Barclay, who had been appointed by their respective Governments. There followed long deliberation and much difference of opinion among the

members of the Board thus constituted, the British Commissioner resting upon no slight array of authority on the extreme western source, called the Scoodiac, as the true St. Croix, whilst one of the Americans as resolutely maintained an eastern branch, called the Magaguadavic, to be the true St. Croix. This he did because it was so called in Mitchell's Map, which was proved to have been the guide to the negotiators in the formation of the Treaty. Upon Mr. Benson devolved the responsibility of the decision, and he decided, notwithstanding his American origin, in favour of the English claim as far as the mouth of the Scoodiac Lake. It was not until after this decision, and in consequence of a discovery that it would disturb the titles to grants made under the authority of the respective Governments on the wrong side of the proposed line, that a compromise was agreed upon by which the Cheputnaticook, or the most northerly source, was substituted for the Scoodiac. This compromise was cheerfully assented to by both parties, and a monument was afterwards erected at the source of the Cheputnaticook, from which it was perfectly well understood that the due north line was to take its course.

Your Committee have dwelt upon this, perhaps the best known portion of the history of this difficult and complicated controversy, a little more than they should, had not the decision thus given been made a pretext for a most unfounded accusation on the part of the Commissioners of Survey. It is declared by them, that this decision was so flagrantly partial and unjust to Great Britain, as hardly to deserve that she should even at this late day consent to abide by it. Such is the reward which one of the most remarkable examples upon record of impartiality, deciding against one's own country, is now to receive. There is abundant evidence to show, that Mr. Benson was regarded by the American Agent, even before the decision, as entirely and unfortunately friendly to the British claim; yet this magnanimity of his, which refused to take the slightest advantage of the decision of fortune in his favour, and which inclined to judge the whole case exclusively upon what appeared to him to be its merits, seems not merely to be unlikely to meet with either acknowledgment or reciprocation by the party benefited, but is to be converted into a positive reproach. If such is to be the fate of the most conciliatory act ever committed in the negotiations upon the subject, can it be much wondered at if all traces of such a spirit should vanish? And will it be astonishing if Americans should prefer to be sure to stand well with their own countrymen, rather than run the double risk of confidence withdrawn at home, and ingratitude from abroad?

But, in what words shall your Committee express their feelings, at the perception of a bare intimation, on the part of Her Majesty's Commissioners, that the plighted faith of the British nation should be broken for the sake of one million of acres of land? Fortunately, very fortunately, for the peace of the two great nations engaged in this controversy, their interests are intrusted to hands which would spurn with contempt so base a proposal, from whatever source it might come. But, although your Committee would never allow themselves to doubt, for an instant, the honour and perfect good faith of Her Majesty's Government, and their inviolable adherence to treaties once solemnly acknowledged and reciprocally executed, they cannot but profoundly regret, that a sentence, such as the one alluded to, should have been permitted to defile a Report printed under its eye. Not because, in their eyes, it implies a sanction to the argument intended to be conveyed. The hour that should induce them to believe in the possibility of such sanction, would be that in which the standard of St. George would betoken to them nothing but disgrace. Neither because the opinions or the reasoning of the Commissioners are likely to carry much weight with them, wherever they are known. Those who are proved to be disingenuous rarely can persuade. The only reason why your Committee regret to see the sentence alluded to in the Report is, that it is calculated to rouse passions in the United States, which they earnestly hope will be kept quieted, and that it may inspire a degree of distrust on the part of the public, in the good intentions of the British nation, which they believe to be wholly unmerited.

In the present examination of the Report of Her Majesty's Officers of Survey, your Committee are aware that it is not practicable within any reasonable limits, to follow into all its details the erroneous positions that it contains: neither is it certain that the effort to do so would be worth making, if it was. There is one branch of the subject, most particularly, which they would avoid

to treat, because it has been, in their opinion, most improperly introduced and insisted upon in the discussion. They refer to all the argument drawn from the supposed admissions upon one side or the other, made, directly or indirectly, by official agents, who have been employed since the date of the Treaty. In the business of hunting up such evidence, the two nations are by no means on an equal footing; for, whilst it is the habit of the United States to throw open to public view all of the official correspondence carried on by their agents, that is not so immediately connected with existing negotiations as to make the publication obviously improper, a very contrary system prevails in Great Britain, of publishing nothing unless upon some urgent call. It, therefore, follows, that, whilst the latter country has the opportunity of discovering every error of inadvertence, or of haste, that may be found in letters originally written as confidential by American public agents, the United States has no such opportunity of examining the British correspondence. And, even supposing that they had, what does the information thus gained amount to? and what effect can it produce upon the true issue? The wonder is, that after all the disclosures that have taken place, so little has been found to oppose to the strong, unanimous, deep-settled, and perpetually-repeated, expressions of unbounded confidence in the soundness of the claim. In the whole history of the dispute, there is no American admission, in the most secret communication with the Government at home, of which foreign nations are not supposed to have any right of cognizance whatsoever, which can compare in force with the letter of Sir Robert Liston, upon the decision of the Commissioners in 1798, or with the proposition for a "variation" of the line of boundary, made by the British negotiators at the Treaty of Ghent. If evidence of this sort were to be relied upon, the debates in the British Parliament upon the subject of the Treaty of 1783 had, immediately after the negotiation, deserve attention, as a disclosure of the opinions prevailing in England at that time. Yet, notwithstanding all this, your Committee would omit to rest upon the ground which such admissions furnish, because they intend to rest upon the higher and only ground which ought to be assumed, and that is, the merits of the question itself. They cannot conceive that the subordinate matters connected with the good or bad management of a dispute of sixty years' standing, should be entitled to overrule, or put aside, the undoubted issue which the general position of two nations most distinctly presents.

There remains to be considered only that part of the Report which gives the result of the survey. And, although it clearly appears, from the limited time devoted to that work, as well as from the confessions of the Commissioners, that they did not thoroughly perform all of the duty they were required to perform, your Committee think they performed enough to show the important fact, that the Treaty can be literally executed. It is for this reason, they think, the Report not to be wholly without value. For, casting aside the argumentative portion, as not only worthless in itself, but too disingenuous to aid the cause it has espoused, they consider the description of the natural features of the country as going far to corroborate all the reasoning, hitherto advanced upon the American side, respecting its character. It may be deduced from the Report, that the tendency of the Highland in the country, now in question, is, as it is in the rest of North America, to run in ridges parallel to each other, in a north-easterly and south-westerly direction. It is further admitted, that there are two of these ridges; and that between the two is a basin, through which find their way the tributaries of the St. John and the Restigouche-the St. John flowing through it for some time, until it winds its way south-east into the Bay of Fundy, the other tracing its course to the Bay of Chaleurs. Now the single question that can arise, should it turn out that these are the only ridges or Highlands in the territory, is, whether either corresponds to the terms of the Treaty, so far as that it will serve for a boundary line between the two nations, and if so, which answers the purpose most precisely. It will not do to say as the Report does:

"It will be satisfactory to us if we shall be able to satisfy your Lordship that there are reasonable grounds for thinking that the true line of boundary has been hitherto overlooked, and that, consequently, the line claimed by the State of Maine fails, upon examination, in every essential particular."

Your Commitiee are at a loss to see the necessary connexion between these

two propositions. If the true line of boundary has been overlooked hitherto, that claimed by Maïne fails, because it is not the true one. If, on the other hand, it fails, upon examination, in every essential particular, it must be rejected without any reference whatsoever to any other that may have been discovered. But your Committee utterly deny that the Report proves either proposition separately, or both united. The southerly of the two ridges, which is dignified with the title of "the axis of maximum elevation," and which the Commissioners maintain to be the true line, is not the true line, because it does not correspond to the boundary of the Proclamation of 1763, nor to the Second Article of the Treaty of 1783, nor entirely to the argument of the Commissioners themselves. It may be shaped off as nicely upon a map as artists can draw it, and yet will serve no useful purpose. It strikes the south coast of the Bay des Chaleurs, when the Proclamation distinctly specifies the north coast as the boundary line of Quebec. It divides no sources of rivers but those of tributaries of the Penobscot from tributaries of the St. John, neither of which flow into the St. Lawrence, so that it does not meet the requisition of the Treaty. And it ranges in so westerly a direction, as to be utterly at variance with the general tenor of the Commissioners' argument about the ancient boundary of Nova Scotia, the least bad argument where all are bad. It is utterly inconsistent with all the deeds and commissions issued by Great Britain during the last century, and can never be sustained by any reasoning other than that last species which overlooks right in its reliance upon physical power.

There is one sentence, however, in the Report, which requires from your Committee a most cheerful acknowledgment of its truth, It is that

"The boundary must be determined by applying the words of the Treaty to the natural features of the country itself, and not by applying those words to any map."

Now maps are only of service as they are guides to those natural features which no ingenuity can make men mistake; so far they are of great service. If this southerly range of highland is proved not to correspond with the terms of the Treaty, the next thing to do is to find whether any other highlands exist which do correspond with them. Her Majesty's Commissioners clearly admit that such other highlands do exist on the north of their proposed line, though they deny them to be continuous or regular, and hence maintain that they do not answer the requisition of the Treaty. Upon these points your Committee are ready to join issue. They deny that the Treaty requires any particular, connected, regular "axis of maximum elevation." They deny that the United States has ever pitched upon this or that mountain as any measure of the elevation required. They affirm that the only range of highland required is that which will shed water on its opposite sides, and prevent it from flowing into one mass. They affirm that what does not flow into the St. Lawrence flows in a direction different from that which does flow into that river; and that is enough to mark in characters as clear as light the Boundary of the Treaty. And whatever may be the ultimate termination of the present controversy, there will that Boundary remain until some terrible convulsion of nature overwhelm it, at once to testify to the exactness of the negotiators of the Treaty, and to the manner in which its conditions shall have been fulfilled.

Your Committee have now executed what they deemed to be their duty; although under a full sense how imperfectly they have succeeded in exposing, as they deserved to be exposed, the manifold and wilful errors of the Report. They trust that the American officers who have had charge of the execution of a survey, on the part of the United States, during the past season, will, before long, present results, not only of a different character from those furnished by their predecessors from Great Britain, but in a manner strikingly to contrast with theirs. For if they cannot, if the cause of the Union and of the State of Maine is not strong enough in itself to dispense with all such intrinsic aid as dishonest artifice can afford it, better were it for both at once to cede the whole Disputed Territory to their opponent, than by a successful resort to it, to pollute one single page of their record with such a proof of disgraceful victory.

The Committee have not deemed it proper to include within this Report any reference to negotiations now pending, respecting the proposal of a joint Commission, of the probable result of which they are not informed. They would