mowed down by the fire under which they were advancing. I have made inquiries respecting that regiment, and I find that it has been sixteen years in the East Indies; that in the course of forty years it has served thirty-three years abroad, and only seven in the United Kingdom; that in the course of the sixteen years during which it has served in the East Indies it has been in all parts of India; that its numbers have been recruited twice over since it has been in that country; and that at this moment, of these men who made that attack and suffered that loss, three-fourths had not been seven years in the service. I considered it my duty to examine into the state of this regiment, seeing that word "panic ;" and I believe I have with me a most extraordinary report of their good conduct from this very general officer on a former occasion; and it will convince your Lordships that if the list of killed and wounded had been brought before him on that occasion it would have been impossible for him to apply that word to them. I cannot find the paper now, but it contains the expression of unqualified approbation of the state of this very regiment, by this same general officer, Sir J. Littler, upon the last inspection at Christmas last. I was anxious to read it to your Lordships to show that to the accident of the dreadful fire kept up upon them, and their being mowed down, you ought to attribute what occurred, and not to a deficiency or failure on their part.*

HOUSE OF COMMONS.

Sir R. PEEL rose and spoke as follows:-I am about to propose that one of the highest rewards that can be bestowed upon successful valour shall be conferred by this House. I am about to propose that the thanks of the Commons of this great Empire shall be given to the officers and men, who recently on the banks of the Sutlej, under very trying circumstances, by their discipline, by their fortitude, by their brilliant valour, have sustained the reputation of their country, and proved themselves worthy of the * The reader is referred to the General Order, issued by the Commander-inChief, at page 61.

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service to which they belong. The resolutions with which I shall conclude will not touch upon any matter of purely political concern, but are framed in conformity with established usage-that usage being consonant with reason and justice.

The state of the country and the history of the Punjaub are probably well known to all whom I am addressing, from the relation in which we stood towards it, during our operations in the neighbouring county of Affghanistan. The House is probably well aware that by the ability and energy of an individual (Runjeet Sing) supremacy was established by him in the Punjaub; and that for many years, through that ability and energy, he ruled the destinies of that great country, and kept in subjection and subordination a powerful army. Since his death, which took place in the year 1839, the Government of the Punjaub has presented a series of acts of cruelty, of intrigue, of a rapid succession of governors, in consequence of the murder of the predecessor by the successor; it has exhibited a picture of licentiousness and debauchery so extravagant, that it might be calculated to provoke a smile if it were not for the influence such licentiousness and debauchery must exercise over the welfare of millions. The acts of that government have been mainly directed by that powerful soldiery over which Runjeet Sing established his sway; but which since his death has been in the constant habit of controlling the conduct of the civil authorities, and even of the military commanders, by repeated acts of insubordination, and repeated murders, for the purpose of extorting increased pay. Perhaps the best idea one can give of the anomalous condition of affairs, and of the difficulties of speculating upon any acts that may be committed, or upon any measure that may be resorted to is this-that it is quite clear that the main object of the governors of that country, and of the principal landed proprietors, and chiefs, has been to provoke collision with the British army, not for the purpose of resenting any wrong, or of sustaining the military reputation of the country, but of freeing themselves from subjection to an insubordinate and licentious force, by provoking a conflict with Great Britain, in which that

was,

force should fall a sacrifice. That has been the main object, and the strange principle of public policy, that has for some time guided the decisions and regulated the acts of the rulers of the Punjaub. I well know what was the object of my Friend, Sir Henry Hardinge, in undertaking the government of India. He made great sacrifices from a sense of public duty; my gallant Friend held a prominent place in the Councils of Her Majesty : he I believe, without any reference to party divisions, held in general esteem in this House, as well by his political opponents as by his political friends. He was regarded by the army of this country as its friend, because he was the friend of justice to all ranks of that army. It was proposed to him at a time of life when, perhaps, ambition is a less powerful stimulus than it might have been at an earlier period-it was proposed to him to relinquish his place in the Councils of his Sovereign-to forego the satisfaction he must have felt at what he could not fail to see, that he was an object of general respect and esteem. He separated himself from that family which constituted the chief happiness of his life, for the purpose of performing a public duty he owed to his Sovereign and his country, by taking the arduous and responsible situation of Chief Governor of our Indian possessions. He went out with a high military reputation. Solicitous to establish his fame in connection with our Indian Empire, not by means of conquest, or the exhibition of military skill and valour, but by obtaining for himself a name in the annals of India as the friend of peace, and through the promotion of the social interests and welfare of the inhabitants. It was mainly on account of the military character and high reputation of my gallant Friend that he was enabled to control and keep in check the aspirations of more ardent and impetuous minds bent upon the invasion and conquest of the Punjaub.

The view which the Governor-General took of the policy to be pursued in regard to the Punjaub, was shortly this: he thought the dominions of the British Crown in India were sufficient for every purpose that the interests of the Empire would not be promoted by the addition of the Punjaub to the possessions already

subject to our own rule. He was determined, therefore, to resist any temptation to territorial aggrandisement. His desire was to see a native government established in the Punjaub, capable of maintaining its independence, of restoring subordination in the ranks of a great army, composed of men of high natural courage, of great physical strength, accustomed to discipline, and trained to military habits by European officers of distinguished reputation. His wish was, that a Sikh Government should be established. He deprecated the formation of a Mussulman Government, or the domination of any other than Sikh authorities. At the same time that he was determined to resist the temptations to direct aggression, he refused repeated proposals that were made to him to interfere in the domestic affairs of the Punjaub. Although nothing could have been more easy; although but a word from him would have been necessary to induce the Mussulman inhabitants of the Punjaub to rise against the Sikh authorities, who were conducting themselves in a manner so irreconcilable with sound policy or common sense, he resolved steadily to adhere to the line he had chalked out; to abstain from all interference in the domestic affairs of the Punjaub, and to observe literally every obligation of good faith.

But while that was his view of the policy that ought to be pursued he was not insensible to the danger to which our Indian Empire was constantly exposed from the maintenance on its frontiers of a profligate and debauched Government, controlled by an insubordinate and licentious army. My gallant Friend, therefore, took all precautions. He had to guard a frontier extending on the banks of the Sutlej at least 100 miles. The frontier from Ferozepore to Roopur was at least 100 miles; from Ferozepore to Loodiana about 77 miles. My gallant Friend, cautiously abstaining from the collection of any force on the frontier which could justify aggression, or even remonstrance, on the part of the Lahore Government, took those precautions which would effectually prevent successful attack on their part. At Ferozepore he stationed a force of about 8,000 men, consisting of one European regiment, seven regiments of Native Infantry, two regiments of

Native Cavalry, twenty-four light guns, and had mounted in position at Ferozepore thirty or thirty-five pieces of heavy artillery. He intended this to be the advanced post of the British army on the western side of the frontier.

At a distance of about seventy-six miles to the eastward, higher up the Sutlej, at Loodiana, he collected a force of about 500 men. He thought that these two armies, or two divisions of an army, stationed about seventy-six miles from each other, acting on the flanks of any force from the Punjaub, induced by caprice or by the temerity of their rulers to invade the British territory, would be sufficient to keep it in effectual control. At a distance more in the interior, namely, at Umballa, he stationed another division of 7,500 men at the least. My gallant friend was undoubtedly under the impression that it was highly improbable that any attack would be made by the army of the Punjaub upon the British positions. He knew that no conduct on his part could provoke or justify such an attack; and he felt every assurance that could be felt, so far as justice and reason sanctioned the inference, that the army of the Punjaub would not be mad enough to seek a conflict with the British forces on the the left bank of the Sutlej.

There were good reasons why Sir Henry Hardinge did not keep together for the last two or three years an immense British and Native army on the banks of the Sutlej. Constant efforts were made by the Government and by the military leaders of the army of the Punjaub to corrupt our native troops. The constitution of the army of the Punjaub is purely democratic: the private soldiers elect representatives, five in number from each company, to control their officers, to depose them when they think fit, or to subject them to death when it is deemed expedient. The pay of an infantry soldier of the Punjaub is about twenty-five shillings a month; while the pay of a sepoy in Her Majesty's service is only about fourteen or fifteen shillings a month. Constant exertions were made, by direct and indirect means, aided by community of language and of religion, to shake the fidelity of the Native troops; but I rejoice to say that they were made without success.

The