loyalty of the sepoys, with scarcely a single exception, has been untainted. All the offers of a profligate Government and a licentious soldiery were unavailing; but still it was prudent in my gallant friend, not to bring together on the frontier, for an indefinite time and for no specific object, an immense Native force, seeing that within a few miles they would be exposed to the injurious example of a soldiery free from all restraint, and constantly resorting to threats of actual violence towards their leaders. There were, therefore, political reasons for not keeping our troops, as it were, in immediate contact with such an enemy, and there were military reasons equally powerful.

It was, in the first place, impossible, if aggressions were intended, to foresee at what point an invasion would be made. On the left bank of the Sutlej were many states belonging to the Punjaub, and some of the chiefs of those states men of doubtful fidelity. In those dominions on the left bank of the Sutlej are many forts of considerable size and strength. A force controlled by no Government, impelled by the fear of losing its pay, or the hope of extorting more, is not governed by ordinary considerations of prudence like the armies of regular state; and if the army of the Punjaub meditated a sudden irruption into the British territory, it was difficult to see at what point the descent would be made. Between Ferozepore and Roopur there are not fewer than twenty fords available for the passage of troops; nor is it easy to ascertain their exact position, since, from the nature of the river, they are constantly changing. My gallant friend thought, therefore, that true military policy recommended the course he has pursued, not that his whole army should be concentrated on the banks of the Sutlej, but that our territory should be guarded by a sufficient force stationed at Ferozepore and Loodiana. Seeing the superior force of cavalry in the army of the Punjaub, the desperate rashness of a licentious army not governed by the ordinary rules of conduct, it was within the limit of possibility that a dash might be made at Delhi, or some vital part of the Indian empire. My gallant friend, therefore, most wisely and prudently, kept a considerable force at Umballa, seventy-six miles

to the south-east from Loodiana, and a still larger body of troops in the neighbourhood of Delhi. This whole force was assembled by way of precaution against the possible attempts of the Lahore army; and it consisted in the whole of not fewer than thirty regiments of Native infantry, of nine regiments of European infantry, of twelve regiments of Native cavalry, and of three regiments of European cavalry. All this was quite consistent with forbearance on the part of the Governor-General, and with his determination to be seduced by no temptation to aggression on the enemy.

It is quite clear that my gallant friend the Governor-General did take every precaution to ensure the safety of the British dominions in India, in case of sudden and unprovoked attack. In the early part of the year, at the time he was occupied with his functions as Governor-General, and when it was most material that he should perform them in conjunction with his Council at Calcutta: in a minute, dated on the 16th of June, he submitted to the Council his opinion, that our relations with the court of Lahore became so doubtful, that, great as was the inconvenience of separating the Governor-General and his Council, it was desirable, with reference exclusively to Indian interests, that he should proceed to the left bank of the Sutlej, in order that on the spot he might be enabled to give such directions as appeared necessary, and which, if given at the distance of a thousand miles, might be inappropriate. The unanimous opinion of the members of the Council was, that it was for the public interest that the Governor-General should proceed to join the army; and, in conformity with this advice, in the month of October he took his departure for the left bank of the Sutlej. Up to an early period in December, the opinion of my gallant friend (Sir Henry Hardinge) was, that there would be no irruption from the right bank of the Sutlej into the British territory. He felt confident that the Sikhs must be convinced that such an attempt could only end in signal defeat, and therefore that it would not be made. So far as he could reason from experience, he had a right to arrive at this conclusion. In 1843 the army of Lahore left the capital and advanced to the Sutlej; but after remonstrance on our

part it retired again and abandoned the enterprise. In 1844, exactly the same conduct was observed; the Punjaub army, eager for pay, or for booty, if pay could not be obtained, and, instigated by the Government and the chiefs, appeared to contemplate an irruption; but in 1844, as in 1843, the army withdrew to the interior. Accounts, however, reached my gallant friend towards the end of November last, which led him to believe that an invasion of the British territory was seriously menaced.*

*

On the 9th of December, the Governor-General, thinking our relations with the Punjaub very critical, and that it was desirable to take every precaution against any sudden irruption, gave orders that the division of troops at Umballa, consisting of 7,500 men, should move towards the Sutlej. On December 11, the very day on which the Lahore army crossed the Sutlej, the British and Native troops of that division were on their march from Umballa to the frontier. The whole proceedings of the Governor-General and the Commander-in-Chief, subsequently to that day, as well as before it, were characterized by the greatest prudence, skill, and foresight. From Umballa the troops marched to a place called Buseean, where, owing to the prudent precautions of the Governor-General, they found an ample supply of food and stores. It was resolved that a junction should be effected with the Loodiana division, and that it would be better to incur some risk at Loodiana, rather than forego the advantage of a junction with the Loodiana division of the army. Those troops advanced accordingly towards Ferozepore, and learned by the way that the army of Lahore, amounting to not less than

60,000 men, had crossed the river, and were prepared to attack the British army. The expectations of the Governor-General were entirely justified by the result. There were in Ferozepore 7,500 men, 35 heavy guns in position, and 24 pieces of field artillery, in addition to the heavy ordnance. The army of Lahore shrunk from the attack of so formidable a post, and Ferozepore was entirely safe,

See the Despatches of Major Broadfoot, page 6 et seq.

according to the anticipations which had been entertained by the Governor-General. The army of Lahore, not venturing to attack Ferozepore, determined to give battle to the British forces on their march from Umballa, and on the 18th of December made a sudden attack on them. On that day the troops had reached Moodkee, after having marched 150 miles by forced marches. The men were suffering severely from want of water, and from exhaustion, and yet such was their discipline and gallantry, that they repelled the whole of the attacking army, though greatly superior to them in number, defeating a force treble their amount, and succeeding in the capture of seventeen of their guns. The army of Lahore, thus repulsed by our forces advancing from Umballa, retired within very formidable entrenchments at Ferozeshah. Those entrenchments, consisting of strong breastworks, were in the form of a parallelogram, of which the opposite faces were a mile, and half a mile in length respectively. In the face of those formidable works, protected by 150 guns of heavy calibre and excellent workmanship, and defended by near 60,000 men, the Gov.-General and the Commander-in-Chief determined to effect a junction with the division of the army which was stationed at Ferozepore. The troops advanced accordingly within three miles of the enemy's position; and manoeuvred on his left flank; but the Commander-in-Chief having given previous notice to Sir J. Littler, made a march to his left, and on the 21st December effected a junction with the Ferozepore division, which thus gave an addition of 7,500 men. At this time there remained but three hours to sunset. It was resolved, however, to attack the position of the enemy. My gallant friend (the Governor-General) offered his services as second in command, services which were cheerfully and promptly accepted by the Commander-in-Chief. Determined not to wait till next morning, the instant they effected their junction with the division under Sir John Littler, the commanders resolved to make an attack upon the entrenched camp. The result, Sir, of that attack proved the valour of our European and Indian forces in a pre-eminent degree, and has entitled them to the warmest acknowledgments of this House, and of the country

T

The night of the 21st December was one of the most memorable in the military annals of the British Empire. The enemy were well defended within strongly fortified entrenchments-their guns were served with the greatest precision, and told on our advancing columns with great effect. The right of the British army was led by the Commander-in-Chief, whilst the left centre was headed by Sir H. Hardinge. Our forces made an attack on the enemy's camp during the three hours which as yet remained of daylight; but they had not sufficient time to complete that victory, which was gloriously achieved on the following day. The British army, however, made good their attack, and occupied a part of the enemy's camp. In the middle of the night the camp took fire, and further conflict was for a time suspended in consequence; but as soon as it had ceased the army of Lahore brought forward their heavy artillery, and poured a most destructive fire upon our troops. The details of those occurrences have been given with admirable clearness in the despatches of both commanders. Perhaps the House will excuse me if I read an extract from a private letter from the Governor-General to a member of his own family. The right hon. Baronet then read as follows:

"The night of the 21st was the most extraordinary of my life. I bivouacked with the men, without food or covering, and our nights are bitter cold. A burning camp in our front, our brave fellows lying down under a heavy cannonade, which continued during the whole night, mixed with the wild cries of the Sikhs, our English hurrah, the tramp of men, and the groans of the dying. In this state with a handful of men, who had carried the batteries the night before, I remained till morning, taking very short intervals of rest by lying down with various regiments in succession, to ascertain their temper, and revive their spirits." My gallant Friend, as you see, spent that eventful night passing from regiment to regiment, cheering the men by his own example of constancy and courage-doing all that human means could do to ensure victory to our arms. "I found," my gallant Friend goes on to say "I found myself again with my old friends of the 29th, 31st, 50th, and 9th, all in good heart"-(regiments with which he had served in the Peninsula)-and with them that regiment which has earned immortal fame in the annals of the British army-Her Majesty's 80th Regiment