the whole, because his reasons for joy preponderate over those for sorrow, his pleasurable, over his painful emotions; or, that on the whole, in the history of the universe, God will derive from it, in the end, more pleasure than pain, and, hence, can not be said to be unhappy.

As our chief object is exposition, we do not stop to examine the sufficiency of the answer, on either supposition, nor to inquire in what sense a being may be happy while suffering mental disquietude and pain. But it will generally be held, we think, that the suffering of God must be regarded as diminishing, in so far, his blessedness.

(2.) Another question is, whether the sufferings of God are voluntary? Mr. Griffin is very decided on this point. He makes the distinction between voluntary and coerced suffering the latter he declares inconsistent with the attributes of God, and the principles of natural religion; the former is possible. The distinction, however, is not very clear; and both Dr. Tyler and another reviewer find it difficult to understand his meaning. Is it intended to assert that the nature of God is, in itself considered, impassible, but that by his own will he can render it capable of suffering? In that case, God, by an act of will, changes his nature. Is it meant, that while his nature is capable of suffering, he inflicts that suffering by an act of volition? It is answered, that this is absurd, for "suffering itself is not a matter of volition; it is a result of circumstances." It is probably meant that the Divine Being, of choice, and not by compulsion, puts himself in such circumstances that he must suffer. Dr. Beecher also adopts this view. He speaks of the voluntary endurance of suffering. We can not, however, avoid inquiring, to what does this voluntariness amount? In the case of our blessed Lord, it means simply that he might have declined to assume human nature, for this was to put himself in circumstances in which he would suffer, but having done that, his suffering was unavoidable. In the case before us, the suffering of God in general, it means that God might have refused to create moral agents. But if he should do this, inasmuch" as he could not keep them from sinning," and as sin necessarily produces, in various ways, suffering and pain to him, the result could not be averted. As soon as God created

moral agents, it was in their power, not in his, to say whether the possibility of suffering should become altered. We do not see that the voluntariness, as characterizing the divine suffering, is of any value, even if true. In the given circumstances, in the problem before us, God must suffer; it is necessary; it can not be avoided. Should it be said that God might dash the rebels to ruin by an act of power, at the moment of their sinning (which Dr. Beecher admits), it would amount to nothing; for in that case infinite pangs would still be inflicted by their rebellion; the anger and wrath put forth in their destruction would cause pain, and the failure of the divine scheme and system would occasion infinite disappointment. Indeed, if, as Dr. Beecher says, the only way to restore tone to the universe, to overcome the policy and power of Satan, to establish his own kingdom, and to vindicate his own character and glory, is for God to give an example of patient and long-continued suffering, we do not see but we must say, that God's suffering is necessary. The revolt of the first created beings, and the power and policy of Satan, have rendered it necessary.

(3.) A third question carries us a little further into the heart of the theme. What is the nature of those emotions or affections which we are accustomed to ascribe to God? and do they involve the possibility of suffering? The question before us is sometimes thus stated: Has God passions? Dr. Emmons has a sermon entitled "Affections essential to Deity," in which, while there are some things hard to be understood, or, at least, accepted, he fully commits himself against the doctrine of Dr. Beecher. Dr. Tyler says; "If by passions be meant affections or emotions, there can be no doubt on the part of those who believe that God possesses a moral character. He loves holiness, and hates iniquity." "But if by passions be meant such feelings as imply weakness and dependence, or fickleness and instability, or the exercise of a malignant disposition, it is certain that God has not passions." Dr. Woodbridge asserts that there are in God "principles equivalent to moral feelings," while he strenuously opposes the idea that God has passions, or that he is capable of suffering. It should be added, with regard to Dr. Emmons, that he admits that God exercises pity, compassion, and the like, but does not suffer from them, because they are

prompted by benevolence; also, that he denies that there is any foundation for certain affections, such as fear, faith, hope, confidence, and the like, in the Divine Being, because he is independent and unlimited; and also that in answer to the objection that "affections are painful, and, therefore, can not belong to God, who is perfectly happy," he says, this is true, when our affections are ungratified; but God's affections are always gratified, and always yield him permanent felicity. He is infinitely above the reach of pain. Dr. Woodbridge concludes that what Dr. Emmons teaches is this; viz., that "these affections are fixed states, or permanent exercises of the divine mind, varying, of course, from the very immutability of their nature, their expressions toward individuals, according to the changes which take place in their character." In this view Dr. W. coincides, and it corresponds also to the statement before quoted from Dr. Tyler.

Such views of course do not involve the possibility of suffering on the part of God. He has, indeed, a heart; he has moral emotions; he has affections; he loves; he hates. But these do not involve any pain or suffering, for their exercises are always in accordance with the will and pleasure of God; never run into passion; are not mixed with any thing like human frailty or imperfection. Dr. Beecher, as we have seen, would not be satisfied with this statement. He insists that God has not only emotions and affections of a fixed moral character, that is, moral states, but also sensibilities, and even passions. These necessarily involve pain and suffering in their exercise; and susceptibility to pleasure, in the very nature of mind, implies corresponding susceptibility to pain. We adjourn indefinitely the discussion of the psychological question thus raised.

It ought to be added that Dr. Beecher carefully maintains that there is no malignity in the divine mind, in any of the exercises or sufferings before mentioned. He says, "All the malignity of the anger of selfish and sinful minds, is, of course, excluded from the anger of God. In its most terrific forms, it is nothing but a pure, holy, benevolent reaction against impurity, selfishness, injustice, cruelty." To the minds of others, it is difficult to interpret some of the passages quoted, literally, as Dr. B. does, without involving the idea of malevolence. To

them jealousy, violent anger, revenge, fury, are inseparable from a malevolent state of heart. They are, in their very nature, malevolent passions. They imply the desire to visit that pain which they occasion upon those who have occasioned it. Each party is entitled to its argument.

II. We will now mention the arguments or reasonings by which the affirmative is sustained.

(1.) We should first call attention to the scriptural statements which favor this view. Dr. B. brings forward a large number of quotations to this effect, of which we can readily apprehend the nature. He devotes one chapter to showing the extent of the scriptural testimony on this point. It is not necessary to quote any of these; but they involve such statements as these: God is a being, not only of infinite holiness and purity, but also of infinite tenderness and sensibility. Sin, from its very nature, comes into collision with the sensibilities of God in multiplied ways. By a collation of passages, we find that God is the subject of grief and suffering in general; of pain, from the apostasy and from the coldness and neglect of his people. He suffers from the absence of those outward signs of affection by which a loving heart would express itself, such as burntofferings and sacrifices. The hypocrisy of outward forms is exceedingly painful, "an abomination" to God. He experiences jealousy, indignation, and grief, from the ingratitude of his people in breaking their covenant. Sin also outrages his feelings of order, beauty, symmetry, and harmonious action, and benevolent efficiency. Injustice is felt as an assault on his life, and his moral sensibilities are outraged by it. Displeasure implies all forms of anger from the lowest to the highest. Here come in those passages in which occur anger, hot anger, sore displeasure, fiery anger, wrath, fury. Ingratitude also produces feelings of grief, disgust, and indignation. God feels sorrow and deep repugnance at giving men up to ruin. God's whole soul revolts, unspeakably, from the pollution of sin; and he is much grieved at the various forms of hatred, cruelty, and the like, which men exhibit. God also sympathises with the sorrows and sufferings of those whom he loves. These suggestions are enough to show how thoroughly Dr. Beecher carries out his principle; and to heighten the idea of the divine suffering, he

enlarges upon the great extent of sin in every generation, its long duration, its continued progress in enormity, and its aggravations. We can scarcely resist the conclusion that if God suffers at all, he must suffer so constantly, and to such a degree, as to destroy absolutely his happiness. This Dr. B. seems almost ready to admit, at least during the continuance of the present system.

Of course, the great question is, how are these passages to be interpreted? Dr. Beecher affirms that they are to be taken literally. They are simply and absolutely true. The figurative exposition of them he denounces as a cunning device of Satan, and lays down principles of interpretation which he holds to be conclusive against them. These principles, however, resolve themselves into what we may call the second argument.

(2.) This is, the analogy of the human mind. This is the only real source of knowledge or understanding for us, we are told, as to the mind of God. God made man in his own image, and all the various faculties and endowments of the human mind find their counterpart in God. "This is the foundation," he says, "of all true and possible knowledge of God." "Without this, language is devoid of meaning, and no revelation and no conception of God is possible." The conclusion is obvious. We are to understand by these expressions, in regard to God, just what we understand in reference to ourselves. As we conceive of God's joy, from our own, so must we of his sorrow. Whatever suffering and pain certain forms of evil would inflict upon us, the same will they inflict upon God.

Here the principle of interpretation, and the nature and extent of the analogy, would be denied by the other side. Such questions as these arise: Is not the analogy carried too far? Is it true, that anthropology is the basis of theology, in this case, and in this sense? Must not other considerations, such as our necessary conceptions of God, control the interpretation of these passages? May not these considerations render it quite obvious, as it has done to the vast majority of the church, that the figurative, or accommodated view of these passages, is the true one? Again: in applying the analogy from man to God, is it not a first principle that we must abstract from his character and nature every thing which has the taint of human imper