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Must be for

uncondi

S1714. A negotiable instrument must be made

tional pay payable in money only,' and without any condition

ment of money.

Payee.

Instrument may be in alternative.

Date, seal, &c.

not certain of fulfillment.2

1 See note 5 to last section.

An obligation dependent upon an uncertain contingency is not negotiable (Sackett v. Palmer, 25 Barb., 179; Cook v. Satterlee, 6 Cow., 108; Van Wagner v. Terrett, 27 Barb., 181; Seacord v. Burling, 5 Denio, 444; Robins v. May, 11 Ad. & E., 213; Palmer v. Pratt, 2 Bing., 185; Kingston v. Long, 4 Doug., 9). An obligation payable only out of a particular fund is therefore not negotiable, because payment is dependent upon the state of the fund (see Gallery v. Prindle, 14 Barb., 186; Worden v. Dodge, 4 Denio, 159). A bill payable out of a certain fund, if sufficient, but if not, then payable absolutely, is not the less negotiable (Bull v. Sims, 23 N. Y., 570). And so of an obligation to pay upon an event which must occur at some time, however indefinite that time may be (Prindle v. Caruthers, 15 N. Y., 425; see Sackett v. Palmer, 25 Barb., 179).

S 1715. The person, to whose order a negotiable instrument is made payable, must be ascertainable at the time the instrument is made.

A note payable to "the order of the secretary of the A. Co., for the time being" at a future day, is not nego. tiable (Cowie v. Stirling, 6 El. & Bl., 333; aff'g Storm v. Stirling, 3 id., 832; Yates v. Nash, 8 C. B. [N. S.], 581). But a note payable "to the order of the indorser" is negotiable, because any holder may indorse it (United States v. White, 2 Hill, 59). And so it has been held, where the name of the payee was left blank (Crutchly v. Mann, 5 Taunt., 529).

S1716. A negotiable instrument may give to the payee an option between the payment of the sum specified therein, and the performance of another act;1 but as to the latter, the instrument is not within the provisions of this Title."

'Hodges v. Shuler, 22 N. Y., 114; Hosstatter v. Wilson, 36 Barb., 307.

See Hosstatter v. Wilson, 36 Barb., 307.

S1717. A negotiable instrument may be with or without date; with or without seal; and with or without designation of the time or place of payment.

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Mechanics' & F. Bank v. Schuyler, 7 Cow., 337, a.
It has been held that a seal destroyed the negotiability
of the instrument (Clark v. Farmers' W. Mf'g Co., 15
Wend., 256; Enthoven v. Hoyle, 13 C. B., 373).
But the contrary is now settled in this state (Brain-
erd v. N. Y. & Harlem R. R., 25 N. Y., 496; Bank
of Rome v. Rome, 19 N. Y., 20; see People v. Mead,
24 N. Y., 125; Delafield v. Illinois, 2 Hill, 159).
And the same rule as that now prevailing here pre-
vails in other states (Bain v. Wilson, 10 Ohio St.,
14; Porter v. McCollum, 15 Geo., 529); and in the
Supreme Court of the United States (Gelpcke v.
Dubuque, 1 Wallace [U. S.], 175).

Mechanics' & F. Bank v. Schuyler, 7 Cow., 337, a.
Story on Notes, § 49.

S1718. A negotiable instrument may contain a pledge of collateral security, with authority to dispose thereof.

Arnold v. Rock River Co., 5 Duer, 207.

S1719. A negotiable instrument must not contain any other contract than such as is specified in this article.

An obligation to pay money and to do anything in addi-
tion, is not negotiable (Austin v. Burns, 16 Barb., 643;
Martin v. Chauntry, 2 Str., 1271). It has been said
that an instrument cannot be made negotiable by call-
ing it so on its face (Carruth v. Walker, 8 Cal., 252).
But it may be worthy of consideration whether parties
should not be allowed by express words to bring any
contract within the rules of negotiable paper.

May con pledge, &c

tain a

what it contain.

must not

S 1720. Any date may be inserted by the maker Date. of a negotiable instrument, whether past, present, or future,' and the instrument is not invalidated by his death or incapacity at the time of the nominal date." Brewster v. McCardel, 8 Wend., 478; Pasmore v. North,

13 East, 516.

Story on Notes, § 48.

S1721. There are six classes of negotiable instru- Different

ments, namely:

classes of negotiable

paper.

1. Bills of exchange;

2. Promissory notes;

3. Bank notes;

4. Cheques;

5. Bonds;

6. Certificates of deposit.

Originally, bills of exchange only were negotiable. Promissory notes were of at least doubtful negotiability prior to the statute of 3 & 4 Anne, which was reenacted in this state, while yet a colony. Of course bank notes were included. The negotiability of the other classes mentioned, has been the subject of controversy down to a very recent period, but it is well settled that cheques (Keene v. Beard, 8 C. B. [N. S.], 381; Eyre v. Waller, 5 H. & N., 460), bonds (Brainerd v. N. Y. & Harlem R. R., 25 N. Y., 496; Bank of Rome v. Rome, 19 N. Y., 20; Gelpcke v. Dubuque, 1 Wallace [U. S.], 175), and certificates of deposit (Miller v. Austen, 13 How. [U. S.], 218), are subject to all the rules of negotiable paper.

Time and place of payment.

Place of

payment

fied.

ARTICLE II.

INTERPRETATION OF NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS.

SECTION 1722. Time and place of payment.

1723. Place of payment not specified.

1724. Instruments payable to a person or his order, how construed. 1725. Unindorsed note, when negotiable.

1726. Fictitious payee.

1727. Presumption of consideration.

S1722. A negotiable instrument which does not specify the time of payment, is payable immediately. Lake Ontario R. R. v. Mason, 16 N. Y., 451; Cornell v. Moulton, 3 Den., 12; Peets v. Bratt, 6 Barb., 662; Thompson v. Ketcham, 8 Johns., 189; Jones v. Brown, 11 Ohio St., 601.

S1723. A negotiable instrument which does not

not speci- specify a place of payment, is payable wherever it is held at its maturity.

Instru

ments payable to a

person or his order,

how con strued.

See Haldane v. Johnson, 8 Exch., 689.

1724. An instrument, otherwise negotiable in form, payable to a person named, but adding the words, "or to his order," or "or to bearer," or words equivalent thereto, is in the former case payable to the written order of such person, and in the latter case, payable to the bearer.

This section is intended partly to avoid a difficulty in the
general definition of negotiable paper, and partly to
establish the right of the payer to require the indorse-
ment of the payee - a right which is assumed in prac-
tice, but which has not been adjudged.

note, when

S1725. A negotiable instrument, made payable to Unindorsed the order of the maker, or of a fictitious person, if negotiable. issued by the maker for a valid consideration, without indorsement, has the same effect against him and all other persons having notice of the facts, as if payable to the bearer.

1 R. S., 768; modified by making it more explicit, but
not changing the sense.

payee.

S 1726. A negotiable instrument, made payable to Fictitious the order of a person obviously fictitious, is payable to the bearer.

Willets v. Phoenix Bank, 2 Duer, 121.

tion of con

S1727. The signature of every drawer, acceptor Presump and indorser of a negotiable instrument, is presumed sideration. to have been made for a valuable consideration,1 before the maturity of the instrument,' and in the ordinary course of business.3

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Mechanics' Bank v. Livingston, 33 Barb., 458. So held

as to the maker of a note (Tibbetts v. Blood, 21 id.,
650; Hatch v. Trayes, 11 Ad. & El., 702; Bristol v.
Warner, 19 Conn., 7; Clark v. Schneider, 17 Mo.,
295); as to the acceptor of a bill (Vere v. Lewis, 3
T. R., 183; Thurman v. Van Brunt, 19 Barb., 409;
Atlantic Ins. Co. v. Boies, 6 Duer, 583); and as to an
indorser (Case v. Mechanics' B'kg Asso., 4 N. Y.,
166; Pratt v. Adams, 7 Paige, 615; Vallett v.
Parker, 6 Wend., 615; Mills v. Barber, 1 M. & W.,
425).

So held as to indorsers (Pratt v. Adams, 7 Paige, 615;
Pinkerton v. Bailey, 8 Wend., 600; Lewis v. Parker,
4 Ad. & El., 838; Webster v. Lee, 5 Mass., 339);
and as to an acceptor (Robarts v. Bethell, 12 C. B.,
778).

So held as to indorsers (Erwin v. Downs, 15 N. Y., 575).

ARTICLE III.

Indorsement, what

INDORSEMENT.

SECTION 1728. Indorsement, what.
1729. Agreement to indorse.

1730. When may be made on separate paper.
1731. Kinds of indorsement.

1732. General indorsement, what.

1733. Special indorsement, what.

1734. General indorsement, how made special.

1735. Destruction of negotiability by indorser.
1736. Implied warranty of indorser.
1737. Indorser, when liable to payee.
1738, 1739. Indorsement without recourse.
1740. Indorsee privy to contract.

1741. Indorser has rights of guarantor.
1742. Rights of accommodation indorser.
1743. Effect of want of consideration.
1744. Indorsee in due course, what.
1745. Rights of indorsee in due course.
1746. Instrument left blank.

S 1728. One who writes his name upon a negotiable instrument, otherwise than as a maker or acceptor, and delivers it, with his name thereon, to another person, is called an indorser, and his act is called indorsement.

Both the signature and delivery are necessary to constitute an indorsement (Marston v. Allen, 8 M. & W., 494; Brind v. Hampshire, 1 id., 365; Belcher v. Campbell, 8 Q. B., 1; Cox v. Troy, 5 B. & Ald., 474), and both must be made or authorized by the same person. Thus a signature by A., and delivery by B., his executor, constitute no indorsement on the part of either A. or B. (Bromage v. Lloyd, 1 Exch., 31).

This section will oblige those who wish to guaranty the payment of negotiable paper to write the contract upon another instrument. Holders are likely to be misled by the guaranties now sometimes written on bills and notes.

By the common law, an indorsement was essential to pass title to a bill drawn to order (Cunliffe v. Whitehead, 3 Bing. N. C., 828; Prevot v. Abbott, 5 Taunt., 786). But that was because of the general rule prohibiting transfers of things in action. An assignment by mere delivery, without indorsement, transferred the equitable title (Franklin Bank v. Raymond, 3 Wend., 69); and, under the Code of Civil Procedure, the equitable

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