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Pbilalethes "believes I will find human Actions in general can "not yield a moral Certainty, but an abfolute Uncertainty." If this is to be my Misfortune I cannot help it, I have not yet found it to be the Cafe, tho' I do not pretend to any uncommon degree of Sagacity. But however that be, the Queftion is not about the limits of my Understanding, but about an Attribute of God Omnifcient; it is not about the Uncertainty and Ignorance which Men labour under, but it is, whether the Deity is involved with any degree of the fame Ignorance and Uncertainty. I think he is not, and I have publish'd my Reasons, which Philalethes has not yet answer'd -Men have no original innate Knowledge, their Ideas are all derived from the fenfible properties and modes of Things, beyond the first Impreffions of which made on the Senfes human Conceptions cannot reach. And hence it comes that our Understandings are enlarged by flow degrees; and we, thro' operofe and tedious Application for a number of Years, furnish our Minds with only a small pittance of Knowledge, which is bounded on every fide with Darkness and inextricable Maze. But to affert the fame Imperfection concerning the Divine Understanding is certainly moft wanton, foolish and abfurd; for the Supreme Knowledge is not dependant nor derived, but original and necessary; it requires no foundation (like ours) for Deduction, Inference, and Conclufion,nor is it built on Argument, or a connected series of Ideas and Resemblances of diftant Things; but (in the Words of a great *Author) "God is Omniprefent, who in infinite Space, as it were in his Sensory, fees the "Things themselves intimately, and throughly perceives them, and com"prehends them wholly, by their immediate Prefence to himself; of "which Things the Images only, carried thro' the Organs of Senfe into "our little Senioriums, are there seen and beheld by that which in us "Perceives and Thinks." If moral Truth (which is moral Certainty) were not at all to be attained by Men, it would no lefs be moral Truth for all that, nor could it from thence be demonilrated not to exist; for no Argument can be drawn against the reality of any thing from our Ignorance of it. Our prefcience of human Actions is wholly built on a narrow acquaintance with Men, and a fhort remembrance of their Principles, Difpofitions and Motives; all which is the effect of Application and laborious Reasoning: But (as I have obferv'd) God, the perfect Being, does not arrive this way at Knowledge; all Truth is effentially and inceffantly prefent with him, without Train, intervention of Medium, or fucceffion of Ideas; fo that there is no poffibility of his being mistaken, or at a loss about any thing. And tho' moral Truth (or Certainty) may be utterly hid from Men, or, if prefumed to be known, may nevertheless be concluded from wrong Principles, and confequently erroneous and not the thing which is pretended; yet as the fault or defect in fuch a Cafe lies not in the thing itself, but arifes from the imperfection of human Nature, which is most certainly excluded from the Divine Mind; so abfolute Unertainty is far from being prov'd on fuch Principles, and a relative Uncertainty is the only thing which can be fairly concluded; which makes nothing at all for that Side which Philalethes has efpoufed; and therefore to build Arguments on the Suppontion of an abfolute Uncertainty in human Actions, is plainly begging the Quellion, and deferves no Antwer.

* Sir I. Newton, Op. p. 344

A

As to my Inftance of the Man and Precipice, if Philalethes, or a Meffenger comes in to disturb the peaceful Retreat, the Cafe is alter'd, and not mine, but his; for the Confequences of which I am not answerable. The Cafe, as I put it, fuppos'd an eafy, tranquil, difengaegd and joyous Man, with every thing to make Life agreeable and defirous to him; And now behold! Philalethes makes a violent Inamorato and rash Merchant of this fame peaceful Man, kicks his Mistress down Stairs and breaks her Neck, burns his Ship and destroys all his Goods, and then brings him the News that he has neither Mittress nor a Groat in the World. Now where is the Fairnefs of all this? It is neither Sneer nor Invective to tell Philalethes he ought to have used me in a better manner. But what I think is the weakest part of all Philalethes's Letter, is the Notion of God's Juftice ftanding firmer on the fuppofition of Nonprefcience than Prefcience. He allows that if it was more probable that an excess of Happinets would follow from the creation of Agents than otherwife, it was fitter and righter (these are his own Words) that thofe Agents fhould be introduc'd (created) than otherwife; by which he grants, that an excefs of Happinefs (tho' there fhould happen much Mifery) made the creation of Agents fit and right; and if fo, then fuppofing the Deity certainly foreknew that an excess of Happiness would follow Creation, the rectitude of his Conduct is fully preferv'd, on Philalethes's own Principles. But perhaps he will fay, Probability is a better Foundation than Certainty to proceed upon; if fo, let that be fhewn. He fays, if one Person among Millions of Agents fhould be Unhappy in confequence of a series of wicked Actions, fuppofing eternal Prefcience is fuppofing God defign'd this Perfon Unhappiness; which, he fays, is Impious. So that, with this Gentleman, to defign the Fitnefs of Things fhall take place, and a wicked Man fhall receive the punishment due for his Actions, is impiously imputed to the Character of a Juft Being. I confefs this is a manner of Reasoning I have not been used to: I fhould think there is as much Juftice in adminiftring Unhappiness in one Cafe, as Happiness in another. If the Mifery of a wicked and diforderly Perfon be any how connected with the Happiness of a million of righteous and juft Souls, and this be fit and right, Prescience cannot make is unfit and wrong; and if it is unfit and wrong, Nonprefcience cannot make it right and fit; And yet, except Prescience and Nonprefcience can alter the nature of Things, I do not fee what all this Duit and Confufion tends to. The Inftance of a Sword put into a Man's Hand is not at all to the Purpose, except all created Agents may be fuppofed one Agent, and that one the Devil.

Philalethest allows whatever is from God is right. But all things are from God, either originally and immediately, or confequentially, and therefore right; and no matter how much moral Evil is partially wrong, it is univerfally and finally right, as it refpects the entire fyftem of things.

Philalethes fays, the prefent Method of anfwering Things of this nature is with Sneers and Invectives: But how true this Affertion is I leave to the Judgment of the Publick: I can however declare, on my part, that I love Decency and good Manners as much as he does, and I hope I deferve no Reflections from him on that account.

As to the Quetion in his P. S. || if he means by it, that if an eternal Truth be an eternal Truth, what makes it fo? I anfwer, The nature of

* Gent. Mig. Vol. VIII. p. 183.

Ꭰ

1b. p. 190.

Ib.

the

the Thing. But if he makes no diftinétion between an Action and the rutn of that Action, and therefore calls a human Action an eternal Truth, I must beg the favour of a farther Explanation, and also that he will tell me what Truth is effentially, or in the abilract; and what he says shall be impartially confider'd by

Newcastle, Oct. 4. 1738.

Upon Prefcience.

Haac Thompson.

HIC eft maximus Metaphyfice abufus, quo fit ut Ideas, quarum nulià extant Archetypa, & que a nobis pendent, obtrudant Theologi & Metaphyfici Difcipulis fuis pro Rebus ipfis, quas fibi perspectissimas, errore fuo delufi, exiftimant. Verùm aliud agendo, he Distinctiones mera junt aurium Ludibria-Artem rixandi quæ tam diu in Scholis obtinuit, quæque nihil habet præter inanem Acuminis Oftentationem, prorfus effe viro fapiente indignam fequitur. Itaque bie fummi viri exemplo effe poffunt erroris admodum lubrici, qui videtur cum ex infita humano Ingenio Superbiâ, tum ex inveftigandi, & Judicium interea cobibendi Impatientiâ, nafci. Clerk.

To Mr. Urban.

M

R. Thompson fays (Gent. Mag *) I have thrown together a heap of Quotations, or Scraps, gather'd from diftant parts of his Letter; but the Reader will find I have fairly confider'd him, and that there is as much Order in my Remarks as in his Text.

When I think him a great admirer of the Thomifts, he fays, “I do not "know that I am." This Expreflion is evafive, and contains fomething very fingular. He feems a little afham'd of the Sect, yet being a close Imitator of their empty Subtilties, cannot with a good Grace renounce them.

As to the unfteady ufe of his Terms, I muft repeat, that there is a great Confufion through the Synonomy and Oppofition of Action, Activity, Performance and Free Choice; and as the Terms have no establish'd Signification, or scarce any at all, the Propofitions can have no better: "Phyfical Neceffity is not applicable to Activity or Action, but relates "merely to Effects and Immutability; but moral Neceffity properly and "only belongs to Action or Activity." Choice is the caufe of Activity, Activity the caufe of Action; then Choice is call'd Action itself, and requires an active Principle to make it what it is, viz. free Choice. Mag. 1737.p.416. So that free Choice moves conftantly in an Orbit, and returns into itself from one fingle Impulle without decrease of Force, and performs the perpetual Motion. "I exert my Activity in the Performance." Performance feems intended to fill a middle Station betwixt Activity and Action, but Activity and Action are fometimes made the fame, and fometimes Activity is the cause of Action, and Choice is Action itself: So that thefe Terms bear fuch a jumbl'd relation to one another, that 'tis no easy matter to affign to each of them a distinct and limited fenfe.

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"I have not faid a Man does, but a Man may furely know what Road he will take." This is but Shuffling, for by the words, may certainly know, he means, certainly knows, or he means nothing, for he is not Speaking of Chance or Contingency, but of Certainty betwixt the Choice ↑ Vol. VIII. p. 291.

and

and the Act: But if Choice be Action, and Action Effect, (for he ufes them indifferently) Choice is Catholick [as WARD's Pill and Drop] 'tis all in all.

There is not a more common Miftake than to put the liberty of the Will for the liberty or freedom of Action; for which reafon I made the diftinction, and 'twas an Overfight in not quoting Mr. Lock, as I had done a little before; for I fhall always think myfelt fecure in his Authority: And if Mr. Thompson had read his Chapter on trifling Propofitions, he wou'd not have given us fuch as convey nothing to the Understanding. "M. N. mistakes the Question in debate." He hopes not. "It is not "whether God by his Prefcience has determin'd or laid a Neceffity on our Actions, but whether there is really any fuch thing as Divine Pre"fcience of human Actions." This I think no Question at all, with him who hath any Notion of the Divine Attributes, and brings not down the infinite and allfeeing Eye of God to the level of his own; for if God fees not Futurities, Events must make a continual addition to the divine, as well as human Knowledge; which is abfurd. Neither has this part of the Question been the only thing in debate; and the Reader will readily fee whether Mr. Thompson's laft Letter exprefly contradicts not his former, in which are these words, "The Question is, whether God's prefcience "of human Actions is confiftent with human Liberty, or whether Pre"fcience and Activity are compatible Ideas." Mag. July 1737. where he fpeaks largely of Prescience and the freedom of our Actions. I have confider'd the Cafe, as he and others have, and cannot think he affirms contrary Propofitions through any other reafon than the fhortness of his Memory.

"In the Divine Conduct all Things are perfectly right." Who denies it? But he has formerly fuggefted, that fome Divine Acts were neither, good nor bad, and I wonder where he pick'd up this piece of Doctrine.

But fome Circumftances which attend thofe Acts may be indifferent.", He thought he had spoke too far, and now foftens it by fubftituting the. Circumftance for the Act; yet even the indifferency of the Circumftances may be doubted, if we confider them as attending on, or miniftring to the Divine Appointments: But be this as it will, we are not to confound the Act with the Circumftance; fo that the Quotations from Clark and Leibnitz do nothing for him; and if he allows the effential Properties of the Divinity, it must be incongruous (if not worfe) to fuppole him the Author of what is not positively good.

"The Old and New Teftament are almoft in every bodies hands, "I did not therefore think it neceflary to inform People of what (it is "to be hop'd) they read every day." If his Obfervation is juft, our Clergy fupererogate very much, and do abundance of needlefs Work. To point out Texts of Scripture for Proof and Explication of the Doctrine deliver'd, is convenient for all, and of abfolute neceflity for those who cannot read; and for thofe who can, but have not Judgment or Leifure to make the Application. "And this more efpecially, as the ingenious Gentleman, on the other fide, had borrow'd no Artillery "from that Quarter." Tho' Mr. Thompson may put no great Confidence. in the words of Jesus the Son of Sirack, he will not (it is to be hop'd) reject the fpiritual Authority of the Canonical Books of the Old Teftament: The Artillery is from that Quarter, and if the Texts are drawn 16. D. † b. G. 16, H,

H.

Da

from

from the pure, clean, wholsome Waters of Life, I think he has faid too much, and is not enlighten'd with a more certain Rule or Record than the Divine Oracles, or Holy Scriptures: The Texts are drawn from a pure Fountain, or they are not; utrum horum mavult accipiat. The New Teftament in feveral places fpeaks of God's Foreknowledge, Counsel, and Providence; but as Mr. Thompson (it is to be hop'd) has this Book in his Hand, 'tis needless to inform him; and tho' fome have call'd the Holy Scriptures Death, Duft, and Serpent's Meat, we hope better of him.

"I formerly writ to clear my own Character, which has been abus'd.” This has been the Cafe of others, and for much greater Reason, as he very well knows; And whether he has been apply'd to for Affiftance, or been Auxiliary in the wrangling Caufe of another, which did not in the leaft concern him, is a Question. He has been requested by W. B. to give Satisfaction in this Point, but his Answer (which may be produc'd) is as evasive as that relating to the Thomists. How the Debate began, was carry'd on, and in what a fhameful Difcovery it terminated on the Party for whom he was Advocate or Solicited, he is not ignorant, let him declare what he will in the matter, which fhou'd not have been mention'd by me, but for the Hint he has given.

Philalethes has this Expreffion,G. Mag V.viii.p.191. "Surely God, for cer"tain Reasons, may decline foreseeing our Actions in the Embryo; not that "I infer God has not Prescience, but that he will not foresee our Acti"ons." This is a wild Hypothefis, and a wild Inference, and I wish he had given his Reasons. We are to fuppofe an Agreement in the Divine Attributes, and that none of them are fhorten'd, fufpended, or excluded by another; but that they all accord, and are always infinite. These Enquiries are out of our reach, and beyond the verge of our Faculties; we fee but dimly in Things offer'd to our Senfes; what can we fee then in fpiritual, abftracted Truths, where the Effence and Operations are unknown, and, for any thing we know, the fame? If fo, our Propofitions and Conclufions concerning them must be identical, and can therefore prove nothing. This was the Practice of the School-men, who had Terms without Ideas, and made Diftinctions where they ought not; for Example, fpeaking of the Knowledge of God, they fay he hath a Conditional and Abfolute Knowledge, alfo a Knowledge of fimple Intelligence, and a Knowledge of Vifion. They affected to be obfcure and fubtil, and fpun the Thread of Argument till it broke, or became invifible: And it was a smart Remark when it was faid of a certain Perfon who affected this way of Writing, that one of bis Arguments was enough to puzzle all Pofterity. A Man indeed may aim at Praife through a profound Obfcurity, and gain his Point with fome; but cannot make others believe him able to explain the Mysteries of Religion by the Inftrument of Reafon; neither ought he to be angry if he is not allow'd to give his decisive Stroke in the arduous Speculations of the Divine Effence. We are not to pry with a curious Temerity, but humbly to acquiefce in the belief of the Infinity of his Attributes, which operate with mutual Confent and in perfect Harmony. Thus we fhall fecure ourselves from falfe Apprehenfions of his Nature, which lead to Superftition or Prefumption. I

cannot

*This Panegyric, for fuch it was intended by him that wrote it, may give us a very frong and just Idea of the abfurd Methods by which the Writers of that Age afpired Reputation.