(2) Another fource of falfe judgment is flath, which avoids labour, and is attentive to nothing but what may ferve to excuse its inactivity. To avoid the trouble of inquiry it fuppofes and establishes to itfelf perfect resemblances or differences on fome few different or refembling ftrokes, and being regardless of all the reft is hurry'd into a wrong judgment.

3. A third ground is temperament, which fets things in a light exactly favourable to itself. A perfon of a mild and gentle character is for pardoning every thing, one of a fevere and rigid temper would have none pardon'd.

4. Vanity and prefumption. A vain perfon decides and pronounces without examining, or but very flightly, into the merits of the cause. A defire to pafs for univerfally learned, and expert in every branch of science has given him a fuperficial acquaintance with every thing, but a thorough knowledge of nothing.

5. Levity and inconftancy of fpirit. Those who labour under this defect are continually skipping from one object to another, and from one idea to another, judging by chance upon the first appearances, and by being too curious to know every thing, come to know nothing.

6. Prejudice or prevention; this is one of the moft ordinary and fruitful fources of falfe judgment. We know the effects of prejudices in all orders and nations, which are often fuch as will not let a person fee any thing but what tends to fupport an established and favourite opinion. We see multitudes of a bright understanding live and die in oppofite fentiments, as well about things indifferent, as in points of the highest importance.

7. Cuftom. When the mind has been for a long time habituated, and as it were warp'd and bent to a fet of ideas of common and received use, it is with much difficulty that its views are diverted to others perhaps of a contrary fort. Befides, no perfon is willing to have been in an error, and a change of fentiments would coft too dear.

8. Novelty is a fource of error. We are eager after happiness, which not being attainable in our ordinary purfuits, we embrace every thing new which offers, in hopes of finding in it that felicity which is our principal concern.

9. The fenfes and imagination. Thofe ftrong impreffions which are made upon the imagination and outward fenfes, fix the mind upon what flatters and pleafes it. The imagination being captivated brings in fubjection the mind, which judges out of complaifance, without examination. Because a person speaks, writes, reprefents matters after an agreeable, lively, affecting manner, we believe him, and love to wander out of the way in his company.

10. Love. We find, by daily experience, thofe who are beloved by ns have merit in proportion to our love. It is enough if love fhews a person in a favourable light, he is then an excellent fubject, and poffeffed of all the good qualities we can defire. Self-love is a fruitful fource of prejudice and felf deceit. For what reafon do we generally prefer the fcience we have study'd to all others? Self-love is in the fault. We are pleas'd, when we think that the object of our cares

and

and pains beft deferves them; fuch a thought is to us a proof of our difcernment.

11. Hatred. We hate an object because it difpleases us, and refufe attention to it; or if we apply ourselves to confider it, we fet it in the most disadvantageous light, meerly that we may have fome pretence to defpife and condemn it; we open our eyes to its defects, but wink at its excellencies. Perfons whom we hate are faulty in proportion to our hatred; it is enough if this paffion can spy out a weakness in any person to render him difagreeable.

12. The Paffions are a fource of falfe judgment. The paffions fix the mind upon an object, but it is only on the favourable fide while thefe are predominant; if an object difplays itself to the very bottom, it lafts but for a moment, we have scarce a glance before we lose fight of it.

13. The fources of wrong judgment may fometimes be found in external bleffings, as riches, noblenefs, pomp, and fplendor; thefe outward advantages, by dazzling and ravishing the fenfes, fix the mind on thofe glittering appearances, and the mind while under attachment to the furface of things, without inquiring any farther, easily fuffers itfelf to be furprised.

These then are the principal fources of our errors; and the general prefervative against these forts of infirmities of the human mind is a fincere zeal for truth. A view to truth moderates impatience, and animates floth. Is the temperament or humors the cause of our mistakes? let it ferioufly be asked whether a blind inclination, an unreasonable bent, which leads us into fo many follies, be qualify'd to be our guide. Is vanity the fource of error? let us oppofe thereto the fhame which accompanies the wrong decifion of a precipitate judgment. Is it levity or a defultory temper? think how degrading it is for a man to be like a butterfly, perpetually roving from one object to another. Is it prejudice? reflect how common it is for perfons to be deceived in their firft judgments, which ferve as a foundation on which they build others equally falfe. Are our mistakes to be ascribed to custom? To one who is the leaft acquainted with hiftory and travels, and reflects on the advantages and inconveniences of cuftom, it undoubtedly appears to be a great fund of errors. Is it a tafte for antiquity, or for novelties that deceives us? let us confider that to fuffer fancy and the fenfes to carry all before them where reafon ought to rule, is a fhame to reafon and humanity. Is it love, hatred, or any of the paffions? let us reflect how ridiculous we make ourselves in judging by paffion, and fufpend our judgment till that paffion be over. In general, we país a fafe and found judgment, when knowing how to difcern the motives which follicit our fentence, we are fo far mafters of ourselves as not to be fway'd by faint and confus'd notions, but by the clear and well-grounded dictates of the understanding.

After thefe and the like reflections on judgment, our author proceeds to confider the third and laft operation of the mind, which is ratiocination, in two dialogues, one of which relates to ratiocination, the other to the rules by which it ought to be directed. In these difcourfes we learn when and upon what grounds a person ratiocinates

aright,

aright, a point of which multitudes, tho' they reason well enough, are yet ignorant and indeed it belongs only to a Logician to judge of the justnefs and force of an argument.

The last thing to be confider'd is method. All that has been yet faid has been concerning ideas, judgment, and ratiocination, according to the natural order of the operations of the mind. But it is not enough to know how to form ideas, and to compound them into propofitions, to ferve for principles from whence we may draw conclufions. Moft fubjects which we undertake to examine, being of a compounded nature, require a proper arrangement and concatenation of feveral ideas, feveral judgments, feveral ratiocinations, and different kinds of thoughts for the perfect illuftration of the queftion. And that part of logic which furnishes us with lights, reflexions, and the neceffary rules for conducting the mind by the eafieft and shortest way from truth to truth, till we arrive at our defired point, is what in general we call method.

Method is defin'd by our author "a choice of maxims, rules, and "ways of thinking, proper for the difcovery of truth, in order to un"derstand it ourselves, or make it known to others." Clearnefs, brevity and certainty, are the properties of a good method. By the first quality it illustrates a fubject, by its brevity it faves our time, and by certainty attains its end. In the ufe of method for the discovery of truth we fometimes proceed step by step, and as it were by degrees, from fimple and eafy things to more complex, embarafs'd, and more difficult to be comprehended. We fix our attention firft on fubjects of a more fimple nature, and afterwards divert it on fuch as are complex. Not content with examining them fingly and separately, we try to difcover the relation between them, and fo proceed by fure and certain fteps from one difcovery to another, omitting nothing, the knowledge of which might enlighten us in our progrefs. This method is what we call fynthefis.

In the method of analyfis we proceed from things complex to those of a more fimple nature. We make a divifion of the whole in order to examine the parts feparately, that we might the better understand the nature of the whole by an examination of the parts. Here we find examples, in which the author gives us a clear and distinct notion of both these methods. He then enters upon a particular and very inftructive difcourfe on evidence, and the method we ought to purfue in our fearch after truth. The rules he prescribes are indeed excellent, but of no use to us, if we take no care to apply them to what we hear or read, and examine our converfations and writings by them.

The most neceflary and effential part is, to unite the theory with the practice. Nothing is eafier than learning to reafon juftly in the ordinary affairs of life, and in fciences which have nothing very ab. ftrufe, but we foon lofe fight of thofe rules when requir'd to be put in practice. We are blinded by a spirit of party, and enflaved by our paffions to fuch a degree that our weak and feeble reafon, accuftom'd to their yoke, dares not exert itself but about indifferent things. Imprudence talks without knowledge, malice lurks under humour, hared poifons all things, love embellishes them, intereft imitates fome

times

times love, fometimes hatred, and paffion rules the language. Our friends and patrons are modeft, generous, of bright parts, wife, and have reafon and juftice always on their fide. Our enemies are proud, covetous, brutish, and know not what belongs to juftice or reafon. In respect of circumftances, as a person happens to be a friend or an enemy, free or interefted, rich or poor, melancholy or cheerful, at peace, or in trouble, his views and his fpeeches are accordingly dif ferent. We fhould be quite otherwise from what we are, were our speech and our conduct but answerable to our lights.

NB. We have the favour of a packet from 7. W. Hants, containing a foort view of Bp Brown's procedure of the humane understanding, and of his divine analogy, which fhall have a place in our next pamphlet. We expect alfo that fome of our correfpondents will make remarks on the preceding treatise.

Mr URBAN,

THE

HE training up of children to read and spell is a business of fo much importance, and (at the fame time) fo irksome; that an effay to facilitate the work cannot fail of being acceptable to the pubLic: efpecially as the affair is commonly in the hands of those, who are leaft able to discover what is beft, and often unfit to make use of the helps we have by reason of their ill-contrivance.-In confideration hereof I have drawn up fome thoughts on the fubject; which it may not be amifs to publifh in your Mifcellaneous Correfpondence. The out-lines which I have sketch'd of the defign, may poffibly ftir-up fome person of learning to undertake the work, which would be of more use than is generally imagin'd; or, at leaft, it may serve to engage the public-fpirited to propofe fuch amendments of what is here offer'd, as may lay a better foundation, than has ever yet been thought of, for a quick and eafy introduction to good literature.

Spelling-books (to answer the end they are defign'd for, to the best advantage) should be model'd on two principles, and diftinguisht into two parts.- The former part, for initiating, fhould be as fimple and eafy as poffible; and therefore (1) It ought to contain only fuch words as are founded according to the powers of the letters establisht in the primmer; and (2) The feveral lifts of polyfyllables fhould be forted according to the accent.The fecond part, for trainingup to the difficulties and accuracies of the art, fhould confift of fuch words as are founded differently from the powers of the letters as laid

down

For want of this caution how great an embarasment must it be to beginners, when they meet (without any direction for the difference of pronunciation) with fach words as thefe: leaf, heart, bread, fear, leap, fheath, fheathe, &c.'-NB. This is a reigning fault in all spelling-books; and is a grievous plague both to teachers, and learners.

This has been done, to good purpose, by feveral of our late writers: bur, for want of the preceding caution, their books are full of ftumbling-blocks; to be clear'd of which, they fhould have all the words caft out of their feveral lifts, that do not answer to the found of the letters as fettled in the primmer; or (which is the fame thing) in the beginning of their own books, where they give directions for the pronunciation of letters, and fyllables.

down in the primmer. And these fhould be diftinguisht into two lifts: (1) Such, whofe found may be fettled by one observation, in the courfe of the alphabet ||; and (2) Such as require more than one direction, to ascertain their found: which therefore may best be learnt by throwing each of them into a fhort familiar phrase or sentence, fuch as may lead to the pronunciation of them. §

To thefe might be added (befide other curious particulars) an appendix of peculiarities, or fuch words as might be fpelt with more propriety, and to better purpose, than (hitherto) they have been.....To give but one inRance, the better to explain my meaning; it would be of advantage (notwithstanding the authority of cuftom to the contrary) to disburden our language of fome troublesom fuperfluities. But, not to run into the wild fancies, that have (hitherto) misled most of our reformers; the innovations, that may be propos'd, ought to be under proper regulation. The rule (on this occafion) fhould, I think, be, what Mr Lowe has fix'd (in an appendix to his French grammar) that No innovations (for the fake of facilitating the pronunciation, &c.) ought to fet-afide an establisht cuftom; if they occafion ambiguity; render ancient writings obfcure; or efface the original of words.' Without trefpaffing on thefe reftrictions, I am apt to believe (to give but one inftance) it will generally be allow'd, that, if our', in the termination of words deriv'd from the latin, were fpelt -or' (as favor, labor, honor, &c.) fuch fpelling, befide the faving of a letter, would be more agreeable to the found of the word, and more expreffive of the original; and, confequently, preferable.

Upon the whole, I cannot but think, that, upon this plan, a spelling-book might be drawn-up, incomparably better (for ease, and expedition, in learning) than any that we are yet provided-with ; and

even

Thus (for a fpecimen how to remedy the above-mention'd reigning fault of all fpelling-books) the found of ea' being fuppos'd to be as in leaf'; -the lift of words of the fame found (and of no other) ought to be in the former part of the spelling-book; that neither dames, nor their children, may have any doubt, or rub, or puzzle, to encrease their drudgery and, in the · latter part, all the differences of its found may be exhibited in different lift, with the explanative letters at the head of them, to the following effect: ca founds like (a) in heart, swearing, &c. (e) in head, earnest, &c. (ee) in hear, clearly, &c. (i) in leap, comet, chemistry, &c.

Some (in this cafe) for the readier reading of fuch words, have exprest them, in oppofit columns, by fuch letters, as (in their primmer powers) anfwer to their found. Thus against daughter, draught'; they give us 'daw-ter, draft'-But, as that expedient will not always anfwer precifely [as indaughter,' &c.] and is attended with the inconvenience of perplexing the mind about the fpelling of the word; the attention being chiefly engag'd on the explicative (which is the wrong) (pelling: it would feem much better to lead (more directly) to the pronunciation of them, by torming them into fhort phrates or fentences; that may (more agreeably) amufe the child, and draw him alfo into a better acquaintance with the fenfe of the word. Thus we might exhibit the afore-mention'd words as follows: Is it a fon, or a daughter? • Drink a draught of water.' -And, in this manner, the lift of words of like found, and different fpelling, might be made more pleasant, and more inftructive; thus: Now, you may read the book. Don't break the reed. Mr reid told me fo... Yesterday we read the news. Is it white, or red.'

How poorly we are provided for in this refpect, and how preposterous

our