Of the Pure INTELLECT.

The first operation of the pure intellect is a fimple view of the ideas of fenfation, juft as they lie in the imagination, without affirming or de. nying any thing concerning them. This the logicians term fimple apprehenfion.

N. B. This term is borrow'd from fenfation, tho' it expreffes a pure act of the intelle&.

The fecond operation of the pure intellect, is the judgment it paffes upon the ideas of fenfation.

Under judgment we include fome of the chief operations of the intellect upon our ideas.

From fimple apprehenfion, er intuitive contemplation of ideas, the intellect proceeds not only to make its own observations upon them, as. they appear in the imagination, but to invert their order at pleasure: It enlarge, or diminishes; compounds, or divides; unites, or feparates; improves, or debales them. It compares them, to find out their agreements or difagreements, their relations, fimilitudes, and oppofitions; and by forting, tranfpofing, and bringing them together, forms an endJefs variety of compound ideas. It places one idea to itand for all others of the fame fort, and thus makes it univerfal in its fignification. This is called abftra&tion. It conjoins them with the operations of our minds, known by confcioufnefs, in order to make up complex notions. It fubstitutes the idea or conception of one thing for another, on account of a meer imaginary refemblance, without any real likeness, as in metaphor: or on account of a real and kneeon fimilitude, which is kuman analogy. Lafly it fubititutes our conceptions of things human, and dire@ly known, for the reprefentation of immaterial objects, whereof we have no direct ide or conception; and this, not on account of any knew, but an unknown, tho' real fimilitude, or proportion, or correspondency, which is divine analogy.

The term idea is attributed to the alterations and combinations of the intelle&t lefs properly, than it is to the original perceptions of fenfe, when convey'd to the imagination. Thefe are the primary, the other a feardary fet of ideas. All beyond thefe are either actin, conception, or apprehenfion.

The primary ideas of fenfation are independent of the pure intelle&; it can't add one to the number already in the imagination.

The intellect firft operates either upon fome original ideas of fenfation, or upon its own compofitions out of them, or upon complex notions of its own forming; which three take in all the objects of the human understanding.

We have no other than complex notions or conceptions of any thing, exceping only fenfible material objects. Of all immaterial things, and even God hitelf and his attributes, we have no immediate impreffion

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See Mr

I There is no univertal exifting, and all our ideas reprefent particulars. Like on Abftraction. Bp Berkley gives the fame account of Auftraction, as our au thor does, comrary to My Locke and the Schoolmen.

or idea from without. And we may obferve that all our complex notions and conceptions are only a curious piece of intellectual workmanfap; infomuch that our most refin'd and exalted knowledge, when analytically refolv'd, will end in ideas of fenfation, from whence it took its rife.

This opens to the view of the understanding a new and immense field of what goes properly under the name of knowledge and learning in the world: For the intellect is under a neceffity of fupplying the want of immediate and direct ideas of all things beyond fenfible objects, by the belt compofitions it can, which are its notions or conceptions of them.

When the mind pronounces upon any of thofe ideas, or upon any of thele complex notions or conceptions by exprefs affirmation or negation, it becomes a propofition.

The third and higheft operation of the foul is reasoning, or finding cut and inferring the agreements or differences of two things by the application of a common measure or proof. The great inftrument of reaion is fyllogifm.

Of METAPHOR and ANALOGY.

Metapher, in general, is the fubftitution of the idea or conception of one thing, with the term belonging to it, to fland for another thing, on account of an appearing fimilitude only, without any real resemblance, and true correspondency between the things compar'd; as when the Pfalmift defcribes the verdure and fruitfulness of vallies by laughing and finging; which is human metaphor, as being a meer imaginary refemblance between worldly things. When God's power is defcrib'd by a ftrong hand, it is divine metaphor, becaufe us'd to express heavenly things.

Both human and divine metaphor are us'd without any abfolute neceffity, and to exprels things more exactly known before, after another

manr.er.

Analogy, in general, is the fubftitution of the idea or conception of one thing to ftand for and represent another, on account of a true refemblance and correfpondent or aniwerable reality in the nature of the things compared; as when our conception of human wisdom is fubftituted to represent an inconceivable, but fimilar and correfpondent perfection in the divine nature. This I call divine analogy, to diftinguish it from that human analogy, which is us'd to conceive things in this world, as when we conceive the various operations of inftinct in bruter, by analogy with thofe of reafon in men.

Metaphor is altogether arbitrary, and the refult meerly of imagination; it is a figure of fpeech and allufion only, and not a real fimilitude or comparison of things; and therefore is properly of confideration in rhetoric and poetry. There is. for inftance, no real fimilitude or cor. refpondency in the nature of things between a faculty of our foul, in diflinguishing beauties and defects in writing, painting, mufic, and architecture, and the tale of the palate. But analogy is built on a real fimilitude and correfpondency in the very nature of things; which lays a foundation for a parity of reafon, even between things different in nature and kind: As when God is faid to have knowledge, power, and goodnels

Sone logicians define analogy, Alikeness with fome diverfi y.

goodness. This is a neceffary and ufeful method of conception and rea foning; and therefore of confideration in phyfics and metaphyfics.

Now tho' this divine analogy is certainly founded on a real fimilitude and correfpondency between worldly and divine objects, yet the things of this life can bear no fuch exact refemblance or correfpondency to heavenly things, as they do to each other. It is impoffible for us to conceive, what particular degree or proportion of fimilitude and correfpondency the properties of a finite creature bear to the perfections of an infinite creator. But there is a true and real, tho' an incomprehenfible fimilitude and correspondency between them, and fuch as fufficiently ferves all the noble ends of morality and religion in this life. This knowledge by analogy is imperfect, but not delufive; it is real, true and clear as far as it goes. We are fure there must be a real ground for this divine analogy; yet that part of the ground of it which exists in the divine things themielves, is utterly imperceptible to us, we can't tell particularly what it is, nor comprehend wherein exally it confifts. We prove that fuch analogical conceptions are just and true; not only from our being created after the image of God, and in his likeness, but also from the abfolute neceffity of this analogy to our thinking and speaking at all of the divine being, and the objects of another life; as well as from the example of God himfelf in his revelation to mankind.*

Concerning DIVINE ANALOGY.

'Tis a truth which holds univerfally, that we have not the leaft idea, perception, or confcioufnefs of purely fpiritual beings, or of God in particular, as they are in their own nature. In respect of the real nature of immaterial beings, the mind of man is as a fcene or chamber of thick darkness, where the leaft fpark or glimpse of celeftial light, or the glory of God does not directly dart itfelf.

We have three ways of thinking and speaking concerning God and his attributes, as well as all beings purely fpiritual.

1. By the parts and members of a human body, or other things meerly material.'

2. By the paffions and affections of a human foul.

3. By the operations of the mind or intellect.

As to the first of thefe, there can be no real refemblance between matter and spirit, nor between their properties; and therefore here we transfer the words only, and not the ideas; which fhows these words are purely figurative and metaphorical, apply'd voluntarily, and without neceffity to things whereof we had before obtain'd the most exact knowledge we are capable of, by the help of analogy.

2. The fecond way we have of expreffing God's attributes is, by the commendable † paffions and affections of a human foul: After we have remov'd all the natural and moral irregularities of them as carefully as we can, we attribute them to God, not fo fully and exactly as we do the perfections and operations of the pure intellect, but with fome degree of fcruple

• Bp Berk'cy in the Minute Philes pher, combates our author's notion of analogy; but he fuppofes three conftituent parts in man, as well as our author. + 24. is not this notion fomewhat particular?

fcruple and reluctance, as more faint, imperfect, and diftant refemblances of divine perfections, fome way fimilar and anfwerable, but infinite, ineffable, and utterly inconceivable, as they are in themfelves in the divine nature.

Tho' there are in God no paffions, nor any perfections literally the fame even with our most commendable paffions when duly regulated, nor the fame in kind, yet there are perfections which move and incline him to act in all his difpenfations towards mankind, and other intelligent beings, as our paffions properly regulated difpofe us to behave towards ther men; which divine perfections are no lefs real, because they are infinite, and confequently are, literally, and in kind, infinitely different from what they are in us.

'Tis certain that in God these perfections are not attended with any the leaft natural disturbance, or moral irregularity, as the paffions are in us. Nay, hope and fear, which imply fomething future for their objects, can have nothing answerable to them in the divine nature, to which every thing is prefent. But it can't be a thought unworthy of being transferr'd to him, that he really loves a virtuous, and bates a vitious agent, that he is angry at finners, pities their moral infirmities, is pleas'd with their innocence or repentance, and difpleas'd with their tranfgreffions: Tho' all these perfections are in him accompany'd with the utmost ferenity, and never failing tranquillity. Our church afferts God to be without body, parts, or paffions. The two firft can't be apply'd to him even in any the lealt degree of analogy, or resemblance; nor the lat literally, or as the fame in kind, but as a very weak and partial refemblance of what literally and in kind differs infinitely from them.

3. The laft way we have of conceiving and expreffing the divine nature and attributes is, by the perfections and operations of our intellect and will; which being more refin'd and fartheft remov'd from matter, and but accidentally liable to moral corruption (that is, by voluntarily yielding to vitious appetites, and irregular paffions) are the best and moft lively reprefentations we have of the divinity, fuch as wisdom, knowledge, thinking, and will, and the various modifications of them; and accordingly in thefe we familiarly and without fcruple transfer both the word and the conception annex'd to it, to exprefs the divine perfections.

No finite and created being can have any direct and immediate views of that effence and thofe perfections which are infinite. Befides a direct knowledge of them wou'd leave no room for belief or faith, which is the evidence of things not feen, immediately and directly, but, as it were, in a glass, by an obfcure, yet true fign, or resemblance of them. An affent to things in this manner requires the concurrence of the will. This is feeing of them thro' a glass darkly, or, as it shou'd be tranflated, in a glass in an obfcure reprefentation. As by the help of a looking-glafs we fee only the resemblance of a man, but nothing of the fubftance or reality of human nature; fo God in his revelations gives us a view of himself, not directly thro' a Perspective or Telescope, but in the mirrour of this world; which tho' it affords us no direct or immediate

Hh

Βλέπομεν γάρ ἄρτι δ ̓ ἐσόπρα ἐν αινίγματι, τότε δὲ πρόσωπον πρὸς πρόσωπον. 1 Cor. xi. 12. . Can what our author here lays be reconcil'd wan Dr S Care's demonftration of the being of God a priori from the necellary modes of img.entity and eternity?

mediate idea of the real nature of divine things, as they are in them felves; yet exhibits to us such a semblance or reprefentation of them as ferves all the ends of morality and religion in this life. These images or resemblances we can now directly difcern and affent to; they are the immediate objects of our knowledge, and that faith which is built upon it. The fubftance of what we thus conceive and believe is now the object of our hope in another world, which is no less real, because we fee only fome resemblance of it in a glass, and not directly, or face to face. The idea of a face, we never faw but in a glass, gives fome real and true knowledge of it.

From what has been faid, it appears that without faith it is impofible to pleafe God, in any religion. For in natural, as well as in reveal'd religion, the things of another world are now the immediate objects of knowledge and faith only in their types and reprefentatives, and are but the mediate objects of both, as to their true nature, fubftance and reality. Faith, as the apofile defines it, is the fubftance of things hoped for; which fubftance is in this life reprefented in types and images; fo that we hope for things in another world, whereof we have here no direa perception or idea: The evidence of things not feen, that is, either by the direct eye of the body or mind; but clearly and diftinely conceiv'd and underflood in their types and reprefentatives, in which we have a full proof and evidence of the true fubftance, and real existence of the antitypes, tho', as they are in themselves, they be now utterly inconceivable.

The Angelic Doctor has fet this whole matter in the trueft light. "Words, lays he, can't be apply'd to God and the creatures univerfally in the lite al fenfe, as if they were of the fame kind, nor yet equivocally, in a fenfe fo entirely different as to imply no real fimili"tude or correfpondency of one to the other; but analogically, that is, "when a word is fpoke of a man in its literal propriety, and transferr'd

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to God on account of an inconceivable, but real and anfwerable fimi"litude in the nature of both beings." This analogy he founds in the relation of man, in particular, to God, the firft cause and principle of all things; in whom all the perfections of his creatures (and of man in particular, who was made in the likeness of God, and after his image) are, not eminently, or in a higher degree only, but fupereminently, quite of another kind, and therefore no created perfections can be more than a faint and a diftant fimilitude of his divine, infinite, and uncreated perfections. And tho' nothing can give us a real and true percep tion and apprehenfion of any thing in the nature of God, as he is in himself, yet we have a folid and fubftantial knowledge of him by fimilitude and representation.

Before I conclude, it must be observ'd, that when we apply our own moral virtues, and evangelical graces, by analogy or resemblance, to our maker, we muft except all thofe virtues which relate to the duty we owe ourselves; fuch as temperance, humility, and the like; 2dly, all thofe virtues which come under the head of our duty to God, fuch as faith, fear, hope, and the like, for none of these can be attributed to him confiftent with common fenfe; fo that no other of our virtues or graces can be rationally afcrib'd to him after any manner, but those of a third

• St Thomas Aquinas,

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