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Of the Pure INTELLECT.
The first operation of the pure intellect is a simple viety of the ideas of fenfation, just as they lie in the imagination, without affirming or de. nying any thing concerning them. This the logicians term fimple * apprehenfion. N. B. * This term is borrow'd from senfatico, thu ii expresses a pare att
of the intellcat. The second operation of the pure intellect, is the judgment it passes upon the ideas of leníation.
Under judgment we include some of the chief opérations of the intellect upon our ideas.
From fimple apprehension, cr intuitive contemplation of ideas, the inteile&t proceeds not only to make its own observations upon them, as. they appear in the inagination, but to invert their order a pleasure: 10 enlarge', or diminishes; compounds, or divides ; unites, or separates ; improves, or debuies them. It compares ther, to find oui their agreements or aisagreements, their relations, fimilitudes, and oppositions ; and by forting, tran!pofing, and bringing them together, forms an erd. Jess variety of compound ideas, It places À one idea to stand for all others of the same fort, and thus makes it universal in itsssignification. This is called abstraction. It conjoins them with the operations of our minds, known by consciousness, in order to make up cempc: 2.0icns. It substi. tutes the idea or conception of one thing for another, on account of a meer imaginary resemblance, without any real likeness, as in metaphor; or on account of a real and kreeon fimilitude, which is kumar: analogs. Lastly it iubitituies our conceptions of things human, and direly known, for the representation of immaterial objects, whereof we have no direct ider or conception; and this, not on account of any kuctor, but an unknown, tho' real fimilitude, or proportion, or correspondency, which is divine analogy.
The term idea is attributed to the alteracions and combinations of the intelleet leis properly, ihan it is to the original perceptions of sense, when convey'd to the imagination. These are the primary, the other a ficerida ary set of ideas. All beyond these are either riotit, conception, or apprehenfion.
The primary ideas of sensation are independent of the pure intellea; it can't add one to the number already in the imagination.
The inte'lcét first operates either upon some original ideas of sensation, or upon its own compofitions out of them, or upon complex notions of its own forming; which three take in all the objects of the human understanding.
We have no other than complex notions or conceptions of any thing, excep'ing only sensible material objects. Of all immaterial things, and even God hiin:elf and his attributes, we bave no immediate impreilion
I There is no univer!a! exifting, and all our ideas represent particulars. See Me Live on Abstraction. Hp Berkley givis the faint account of Austraction, as our au, ihor does, contrary 10 Mr Locke and the Schoolmen.
or idea from without. And we may observe that all cur complex notions and conceptions are only a curious piece of intellectual workman. Grip; insomuch that our most refind and exalted knowledge, when analytically resolv’d, will end in ideas of sensation, from whence it took is rile.
This opens to the view of the understanding a new and immense field of what goes properly under the name of knowledge and learning in the world: For the intellect is under a necessity of supplying the want of immediate and direct ideas of all things beyond sensible objects, by the belt compofitions it can, which are its notions or conceptions of them.
When the mind pronounces upon any of those ideas, or upon any of thele complex notions or conceptions by express atirr.ation or negation, it becomes a proposition.
The third and highest operation of the foul is reasoning, or finding out and inferring the agreements or differences of two things by the application of a common measure or proof. The great initrument of reaion is syllogifm.
Of Metaphor and ANALOGY. Metapber, in general, is the fubfiution of the idea or conception of one thing, with the term belonging to it, to land for another thing, on account of an appearing similitude oniy, without any real resemblance, and true correspondency between the things compar'd; as when the Psalmilt de cribes the verdure and fruitfulness of vallies by laughing and singing ; which is human metaphor, as being a meer imaginary resemblance between worldly things. When God's power is describ'd by a strong hand, it is divine metaphor, because us'd to express heavenly things.
Both human and divine metaphor are us’d without any absolute necesfity, and to exprels things more exally known before, after another
• Analogs, in general, is the fabrication of the idea or conception of one thing to stand for and represent another, on account of a true refemblanie and correspondent or answerable reality in the nature of the things compared ; as when our conception of human wisdom is substiiuted to represent an inconceivable, but similar and correspondent perfection in the divine nature. This I call divine analogy, to distinguish it from that human analogy, which is usd to conceive things in this world, as when we conceive the various operations of instinct in brutch, by analogy with those of reason in men.
Nictaphor is altogether arbitrary, and the result mcerly of imagina. tion; it is a figure of speech and allusion only, and not a real fimilitude or comparison of things; and therefore is properly of consideration in shetoric and poetry. There is, for instance, no seal similitude or cor. respondency in the nature of ihings between a faculty of our soul, in ditlinguishing beauties and defects in writing, painting, music, ard architecture, and the tasle of the palate. But anaiogy is built on a real fimilitude and correspondency in the very rature of things; which lays a foundat on for a parity of renfor, even betreen things diferent in na. [ure and kind: As when God is faid to have knowledge, power, and
grodnels + So...e logicians define anilogy's A likeness with feme diversi :.
goodness. This is a necessary and useful method of conception and rea* loning; and therefore of confideration in pbysics and metapbysics.
Now tho' this divine analogy is certainly founded on a real fimilitude and correspondency between worldly and divine objects, yet the things of this life can bear no such exact resemblance or correspondency to heavenly things, as they do to each other. It is impossible for us to conceive, what particular degree or proportion of similitude and correspondency the properties of a finite creature bear to the perfections of an infinite creator. But there is a true and real, tho' an incomprehensible fimilitude and corre pondency between them, and such as sufficiently serves all the noble ends of morality and religion in this life. This knowledge by analogy is imperfect, but not delusive; it is real, true and clear as far as it goes. We are sure there must be a real ground for this divine analogy ; yet that part of the ground of it which exiits in the divine things themielves, is utterly imperceptible to us, we can't tell particularly what it is, nor comprehend wherein exactly it consists. We prove that such analogical conceptions are just and true; not only from our being created afier the image of God, and in his likeness, but also from the absolute necessity of this analogy to our thinking and speaking at all of the divine being, and the objects of another life; as well as from the example of God himself in his revelation to mankind.*
Concerning Divine ANALOGY. 'Tis a truth which holds universally, that we have not the least idea, perception, or consciousness of pureiy spiritual beings, or of God in particular, as they are in their own nature. In respect of the real nature of immaterial beings, the mind of man is as a scene or chamber of thick darkness, where the least spark or glimpse of celeltial light, or the glory of God does not directly dart itself.
We have three ways of thinking and speaking concerning God and his attributes, as well as all beings purely spiritual.
1. By the parts and members of a human body, or other things meerly materia).
2. By the passions and affections of a human soul. 3. By the operations of she mind or intellcét.
As 10 the first of these, there can be no real resemblance between macter and 1pirit, nör between their properties; and therefore here we transfer the words only, and not the ideas ; which shows these words are purely figurative and metapboriral, apply'd voluntarily, and without necesli:y to things whereof we had before obiain'd the most exact knowledge we are capable of, by the help of analogy.
2. The second way we have of expresing God's attributes is, by the commendable + passions and affections of a human soul: After we have remov'd all the natural and moral irregularities of them as carefully as we can, we attribute them to God, not so fully and exactly as we do the perfections and operations of the pure intellect, but with lome degree of
• Bp Burk'y in the Minute Philes pher, combates our author's notion of analogy: but he suppvies trae constiruent parts in man, as well as ous quihor.
+ 24. is not this notion somewhat particular?
fcruple and reluctance, as more faint, imperfect, and diftant resemblances of divine perfections, some way similar and antiverable, but infinite, ineffable, and utterly inconceivable, as they are in themselves in the divine nature.
Tho'there are in God no passions, nor any perfections literally the fame even with our most commendable pallions when duly regulared, nor the fame in kind, yet there are perfections which move and incline him to act in all his diipensations towards mankind, and other intelligent beings, as our passions properly regulated dispose us to behave cowarus other men ; which divine perfections are no less real, because they are infinite, and consequently are, literally, and in kind, infinitely different from what they are in us.
'Tis certain that in God these perfections are not attended with any the least natural disturbance, or moral irregularity, as the passions are in us. Nay, bope and fear, which imply fomething future for their objects, can have nothing answerable to them in the divine nature, 10 which every thing is prelent. But it can't be a thought unworthy of being transferr'd to him, that he really loves a virtuous, and bates a vicious agent, that he is angry at finners, pities their moral infirmities, is pleas'd with their innocence or repentance, and displeas'd with their transgressions : Tho' all these perfections are in him accompany'd with the utmost se. renity, and never failing tranquillity. Our church afferts God to be without body, parts, or passions. The two first can't be apply'd to him even in any the lealt degree of analogy, or resemblance ; nor the last literally, or as the fame in kind, but as a very weak and partial resemblance of what literally and in kind differs infinitely from them.
3. The last way we have of conceiving and expressing the divine na. ture and attributes is, by the perfections and operations of our intellect and will; which being more refin'u and farthest remov'd from matter, and but accidentally liable to moral corruption (that is, by voluntarily yielding to vitious appetites, and irregular passions) are the best and most sively representations we have of the divinity, such as wisdom, knowledge, thinking, and will, and the various modifications of them; and accordingly in these we familiarly and without scruple transfer both the word and the conception annez'd to it, to express the divine perfe. tions.
No finite and created being can have any dired and immediate views of that effence and those perfe&ions which are infinite. Besides a dire& knowledge of them wou'd leave no room for belief or faith, which is the evidence of things not feen, immediately and dire&ly, but, as it were, in a glass, by an obscure, yet true sign, or resemblance of them. An assent to things in this manner requires the concurrence of the will. This is seeing of them thro' a glass darkly, or, as it shou'd be translated, in a glass is an obscure representation. As by the help of a looking-glass we see only the resemblance of a man, but nothing of the Subhance or seality of human nature; so God in his revelations gives us a view of himself, not directly thro'a Perspective or Telescope, but in the mirrour of this world ; which cho' it affords us no direct or imнь
Βλέπομεν γάρ άρτι δι' εσόθροι εν αινίγματι, τότε δε πρόσωπον προς πρόσωπον. ? Cor. xu. 12. gr. lan wnat our author herc tays be reconcil'd watin Di Scaric's demonftration of the being of God • priori from the necellary modes of inn.en.icy and eternity ?
mediate idea of the real nature of divine things, as they are in them. felves; yet exhibits to us such a semblance or representation of them as serves all the ends of morality and religion in this life. These images or resemblances we can now directly discern and affent to; they are the immediate obje&is of our knowledge, and that faith which is built upon it. The tubstance of what we thus conceive and believe is now the object of our hope in another world, which is no less real, because we fee only some resemblance of it in a glass, and not direally, or face to face. The idea of a face, we never law but in a glass, gives some real and true knowledge of it.
From what has been said, it appears that without faith it is imposible to please God, in any religion. For in natural, as well as in reveal'd religion, the things of another world are now the immediate objects of knowledge and faith only in their types and representatives, and are but the mediate objects of both, as to their true nature, substance and reality. Faith, as the apoflle defines it, is the fubfiance of tbings hoped for; which fubitance is in this life represented in types and images; so that we hope for things in another world, whereof we have here no dire& perception or idea : The evidence of things not feen, that is, either by the direct eye of the body or mind i but clearly and difinetly conceiv'd and under food in their types and representatives, in which we have a full proof and evidence of the true íubitance, and real existence of the antisypes, tho', as they are in themselves, they be now uiterly inconceivable.
The Angelic Doctor * has set this whole matter in the trueft light. " Words, tays he, can't be apply'd to God and the creatures universal
ly in the lite, al sense, as if they were of the same kind, nor yet
equivocally, in a sense so entirely different as to imply no real simili-, “cude or correspondency of one to the other ; but analogically, that is, “ when a word is spoke of a man in its literal propriety, and transferr'd “ to God on account of an ioconceivable, but real and answerable limi“ litude in the nature of both beings." This analogy he founds in the relation of man, in particular, to God, the firft cauie and principle of all things ; in whom all the perfections of his creatures (and of man in particular, who was made in the likeness of God, and after his image) are, not eminently, or in a higher degree only, but fupereminently, quite of another kind, and therefore no created perfections can be more than a faint and a distant fimilitude of his divine, infipite, and uncreate ed perfections. And tho' nothing can give us a real and true percef: tion and apprehension of any thing in the nature of God, as he is in himself, yet we have a lolid and substantial knowledge of him by limilicude and representation.
Before I conclude, it must be observ'd, that when we apply our own moral virtues, and evangelical graces, by analogy or resemblance, to our maker, we must except all those virtues which relate to the duty we owe ourselves; such as temperance, humility, and the like; 2dly, all those virtues which cone under the head of our duty to God, such as faith, fcar, hope, and the like, for none of these can be attributed to him confiftene with common sense ; so that no other of our virtues or graces can be rationally alcribid to him after any manner, but those of a third