1917. July 17. Cooper C.J. Shand J. [IN THE FULL COURT.] THE KING v. THE LICENSING JUSTICES OF MOUNT Licensing Court-Jurisdiction as to locality-Sale of liquor by The appellant, who was the holder of a licensed victualler's license for premises situated in the Licensing District of Mount Morgan, was convicted in the Licensing Court at Mount Morgan of an offence of selling liquor away from his licensed premises at a place which was situated outside the Licensing District of Mount Morgan and within the Licensing District of Rockhampton. Held, that the Licensing Court exceeded its jurisdiction. ORDER NISI FOR PROHIBITION. The appellant was the licensee of the Shamrock Hotel, Mount Morgan. On 4th May, 1917, he received a summons to appear before the Licensing Court at Rockhampton to answer to a complaint that he, on 31st March, 1917, being the licensee of the Shamrock Hotel aforesaid, had sold liquor in a place called Ballast Pit, not being the premises in which he was authorised by his license under The Liquor Act of 1912 to sell liquor. When the complaint came on for hearing at Rockhampton, the Police Magistrate intimated that he doubted whether he had jurisdiction, but was prepared to grant an adjournment. The Licensing Inspector, who appeared to prosecute, then applied for and obtained leave to withdraw the complaint. On 22nd May, 1917, the appellant appeared at the Licensing Court at Mount Morgan to answer a complaint, alleging that he had sold liquor in a place called Ballast Pit, not being the premises in which he was authorised by The Liquor Act of 1912 to sell liquor. It was admitted that Ballast Pit was not within the Licensing District of Mount Morgan. When the case for the prosecution was closed, the defendant's counsel again objected to the jurisdiction of the Mount Morgan Licensing Court, but the Police Magistrate convicted and fined the defendant. An order nisi was granted by Lukin J., on the ground that the Police Magistrate had no jurisdiction to make the conviction and order. The Liquor Act of 1912, s. 156, makes it an offence for " any licensee to sell liquor in any place not being the premises in which the licensee is authorised by the Act to sell liquor." Section 11, subsec. 1, provides :-Every offence, act, omission, or neglect, for which by this Act any punishment may be inflicted, shall, if the same is not by this Act directed or permitted to be heard or determined by and before some other Court, be prosecuted and punished before and by the Court of the district in which the offence, act, omission, or neglect was committed or the liability to punishment incurred." Section 11, subsec. 3, provides: "A complaint for any offence against this Act may be laid before any Justice of the Peace. "But, with the exception of the offences of drunkenness and drunkenness with disorderly conduct, and being found creating a disturbance on the premises of a licensee or in a public place, which offences may (subject, however, to The Justices Act Amendment Act of 1909 (9 Edw. VII., No. 11) be heard and determined by and before any Justice or Justices of the Peace sitting in a Court of Petty Sessions, all complaints for and charges of offences under this Act shall be heard and determined by and before a Licensing Court only; and the decision of such Court thereon shall be deemed to be a decision of Justices within the meaning of The Justices Act of 1886 (50 Vic., No. 17).” Larcombe moved the order absolute, and referred to the above sections and to Tooth v. Spiro (1) and Ex parte Davoren (2). There was no appearance on behalf of the respondents. Per Curiam: The rule nisi for prohibition will be made absolute, with costs. Order absolute for prohibition, with costs. Solicitors for the prosecutor: J. F. FitzGerald, Walsh & McLaughlin, Rockhampton. (1) 1876, 4 S.C.R. (Q.) 155. (2) 1906, 6 S. R. (N.S.W.) 270. F. C. THE KING v. THE LICENSING JUSTICES OF MOUNT MORGAN AND QUINLAN, Ex parte BATTLE. 1917. May 1, 2, 3, 4, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11. June 26. Real J. [IN THE FULL COURT.] DUNCAN AND ANOTHER v. THEODORE AND ANOTHER. Construction of Statutes-The Meat Supply for Imperial Uses By a Proclamation of the 30th June, 1915, all raw sugar, the product of the 1915 crop of sugar cane, was vested in His Majesty's Government of the State of Queensland, absolutely freed from any mortgage, charge, lien, or other encumbrance thereon whatsoever, and the right of ownership previously existing in such raw sugar was converted into a right to receive payment of the value thereof, in the manner, and to the extent, to be thereafter determined and declared by a further proclamation or proclamations. The Proclamation also provided that such raw sugar should be held for the purposes and kept for the disposal of His Majesty's Government of the State of Queensland. The Sugar Acquisition Act of 1915, s. 5, validated this Proclamation; and s. 10 of that Act enabled the Governor-in-Council, by proclamation, to extend the operation of the Act so as to authorise the acquisition by His Majesty of raw sugar to be manufactured in any future year, or of any foodstuffs, commodities, goods, chattels, live stock, or things whatsoever (all of which were in the Act referred to as commodities) in such Proclamation mentioned; and provided that thereupon any such commodity might be acquired by a proclamation containing provisions similar to those of the Proclamation of the 30th June, 1915, with such modifications as might be deemed necessary, and that the Act should extend and apply to the commodity mentioned in such proclamation to the same extent and in the same manner as if such commodity were expressly mentioned in the Act. By a Proclamation of the 12th November, 1915, the operation of The Sugar Acquisition Act of 1915 was extended so as to authorise the acquisition by His Majesty of "cattle now or hereafter to come within Queensland." By a Proclamation of the 1st June, 1916, in a form somewhat similar to the Proclamation of the 30th June, 1915, it was declared and directed that all the cattle on Moora berrie Station, to the number of about 1700, are and have become and shall remain and be held for the purposes of and shall be kept for . . the disposal of His Majesty's Government of the State of Queensland by a further proclamation Mooraberrie Station and the stock thereon were owned by the plaintiffs. The defendant Theodore, the Treasurer of Queensland, instructed the defendant Balfour, a police constable, to take possession on behalf of the Government of Queensland of all the cattle then on the plaintiff's station; and the defendant Balfour carried out these instructions by going to the station with another police constable, and taking possession of the cattle as the property of the Government of Queensland. Subsequently the defendants withdrew from possession, and restored the cattle on certain terms entered into between the parties. The plaintiffs brought two actions against the Government of Queensland and against Theodore and Balfour, claiming damages for trespass and alternatively for use and occupation of the station; and the actions were consolidated. The Meat Supply for Imperial Uses Act of 1914 declared its pre-eminence over other Acts, rules, regulations, judgments, and instruments; it impressed stock and meat, with certain rights, in favour of the Imperial Government, and provided that the stock and meat should be held and kept for the disposal of the Imperia! Government, and prohibited dealing with the stock and meat except under certain directions and orders, and changed the owner's right of property in the cattle and meat into a right to receive payment of the value thereof which was estimatable in the manner provided by the Act. Held, that as the defendants had not complied with the conditions of The Meat Supply for Imperial Uses Act of 1914, their action was not justified under that Act. Held (Lukin J. dissenting), that The Meat Supply for Imperial Uses Act of 1914 did not preclude The Sugar Acquisition Act of 1915 from being extended to the classes of property dealt with in the former Act; that the Proclamation of the 12th November did not conflict with the provisions and objects of the former Act, and that the Proclamation was a valid and effectual exercise of the powers conferred upon the Governor-in-Council by s. 10 of The Sugar Acquisition Act of 1915, and authorised the acquisition by the Government of cattle now or hereafter to come within Queensland by means of a further proclamation containing provisions similar to those of the proclamation set forth in the Schedule to the Act, with such modifications as might be deemed necessary. Held, that the Proclamation of 1st June, 1916, purporting to acquire rights F.C. DUNCAN AND ANOTHER V. THEODORE AND ANOTHER. DUNCAN AND ANOTHER V. BEAL. F.C. DUNCAN AND ANOTHER V. THEODORE AND ANOTHER. DUNCAN AND ANOTHER V. BEAL. Cooper C.J. in the property of a particular person only, was inconsistent with the provisions of that Act, and could not be regarded as an effectual exercise of the powers conferred by that Act. Held, that the seizure of the plaintiff's stock was a trespass, from which the defendants were jointly liable, unless relieved by some protection of law. But held (Lukin J. dissenting), that the provisions of the Act, ss. 7 and 13, afforded protection to the defendants, and was a bar to the plaintiff's claim. Held, The Meat Supply for Imperial Uses Act of 1914 came into force on the day on which it received the Royal assent. APPEAL. The defendant Balfour, acting under instructions from the defendant Theodore, the Treasurer of Queensland, entered upon the plaintiff's station and seized the cattle thereon. The trespass continued for about two months. The plaintiffs brought two actions, claiming damages for trespass and alternatively for use and occupation of the station, one against the defendants Theodore and Balfour, and the other against a nominal defendant appointed under The Claims against the Government Act. These two actions were consolidated, and tried before Cooper C.J.. with a jury. The facts were practically not in dispute and appear at pp. 255 et seq. The defence raised was that the acts complained of were justified as being a proper exercise of powers granted under The Meat Supply for Imperial Uses Act of 1914 and The Sugar Acquisition Act of 1915, and that the defendants were protected from liability by the provisions of the latter Act. The jury found all questions of fact in favour of the plaintiffs (vide p. 254), for whom judgment was entered. The defendants appealed, asking that the judgment be set aside and judgment entered for the defendants on many grounds, most of which are not material for the purposes of this report, because the main questions decided on the appeal were the interpretation of The Sugar Acquisition Act of 1915 and the validity of the proclamations made thereunder. The judgment of Cooper C.J. was as follows:- The plaintiffs claim damages for a trespass by the defendants in seizing, under a Proclamation dated 1st June, 1916, all the cattle then on or about Mooraberrie Station (the property of the plaintiffs) to the number of 1700, including 800 fat bullocks (therein described), and in entering the plaintiffs' said |