SHARPE V. WREN. defendant the defendant's taxed costs of the action, and that no further action in respect of the same causes of action be brought by the plaintiff against the defendant until the defendant's costs of this action have been paid by the plaintiff to the defendant. and until security for costs in respect of such further action in respect of the same causes of action in the sum of £200 be given by the plaintiff to the defendant. Solicitors for plaintiff Atthow & McGregor. Solicitors for defendant: O'Shea & O'Shea. [IN THE FULL COURT.] In re RENNICK. Barrister-Motion for admission. R. was a bachelor of laws of the University of Melbourne. Under the rules in force in Victoria, a person holding that degree is entitled to admission as a barrister and solicitor after he has served under articles with a practising barrister and solicitor for one year. R. had not so served; but he had acted as Associate to a Justice of the Supreme Court of Queensland for more than two years. Held, that he was not thereby entitled to admission as a barrister in Queensland, or to exemption from passing the final examination. MOTION. J. G. Rennick obtained a diploma for the degree of Bachelor of Laws in the University of Melbourne on 8th April, 1916. For a period of two years, from 1st January, 1913, to 31st December, 1914, he served as Associate to Lukin J.; and he occupied that position at the time of this application, having been re-appointed thereto on 1st February, 1916. He had not presented himself for examination under the rules relating to the admission of barristers to the Supreme Court of Queensland (vide Rules of Court as of 27th November, 1896, as amended by Rules of Court as of 13th December, 1912). He had not been admitted as a barrister and solicitor by the Supreme Court of Victoria, vide The Legal Profession Act of 1915 (Victorian statutes) and r. 6 of the Rules of the Victorian Council of Legal Education, which provides : "That in order to qualify for admission as a barrister and solicitor of the Supreme Court of Victoria a candidate who has obtained the degree of Bachelor of Laws in the University of Melbourne must thereafter have served in accordance with the provisions hereinafter contained for one year as a pupil under Articles to a barrister and solicitor practising in Victoria." He applied to the Barristers' Board for a certificate of compliance with the rules (vide Rules of Court relating to the Admission of Barristers of the Supreme Court of Queensland as of 27th November, 1896, as amended by Rules of Court as of 13th December, 1912, rr. 16, 17, 47, Schedule Form I.); and in the alternative he applied to be exempted from passing the final examination prescribed by these rules. The Board considered that they were not authorised either to grant a certificate or to make an exemption in his case. 1917. June 16. Cooper C J. FC. In re RENNICK. Fahey moved that the applicant be admitted as a barrister of the Supreme Court, notwithstanding the non-compliance with the rules, in that the Board had not granted a certificate-r. 59. He referred to rr. 16, 17, 45, 47, and to the Rule of Court of 1st August, 1893; The Legal Profession Practice Act of 1915 (Victorian Statutes), ss. 5, 9, 15, 16-18. The applicant's academic and scholastic attainments are of a standard sufficient to support his admission; his practical experience as Associate is of a nature sufficient (cf. Solicitors' Rules of 12th October, 1898). That practical experience is equivalent to the requirement under The Legal Profession Practice Act, 1915, and rules thereunder. Rule 6, which requires a year's pupilage, is sufficiently observed by two years as an Associate to a Supreme Court Judge, and therefore all the requisite scholastic attainments and practical experience are possessed by the applicant. : [REAL J. The admission of persons as barristers-at-law of this Court (other than by examination in compliance with our rules) is based on the fact of their admission by certain other recognised Courts-rr. 16 (4) and 16 (5).] [CHUBB J. Is there any authority or rule which establishes that service as associate is equivalent to the service required in Victoria under r. 6 with a practising barrister and solicitor ?] No, but it is recognised as a sufficient experience by the rules relating to solicitors (r. 16). He referred to Re Morse (1), Ex parte Ryan, No. 2 (2), In re Salkeld (3), In re Henchman (4). Alternatively he moved that the applicant be exempted under r. 59 from passing the final examination, on the ground hat the qualification of LL.B. (Melb.) was an academic qualification equal in standard to that examination. [COOPER C.J.: Somewhat similar applications have been refused by this Court in the cases you have cited. Do you know of any case where the Court has made the dispensation ?] No, but the reason for the refusal in the past had its basis in the want of reciprocity between Victoria and Queensland, which no longer exists. (1) 1893, 5 Q.L.J. 69. (2) 1900, 10 Q.L.J. 45, (3) 1904, Q.W.N. 80. Macgregor, for the Barristers' Board: Although the applicant's qualifications and educational attainments may be of as high a standard as that required by the rules of this Court, his case does not fall within those rules, and the Board has no authority to grant a certificate-rr. 16, 17, 45, 47-or to exempt the applicant from passing his final examination under the present circumstances. The only power to grant exemption vested in the Board relates to the intermediate examination—r. 26—and the only power to exempt in other cases is vested in the Court-r. 59. The Board hold the opinion that nothing other than an alteration of the existing rules will empower them to accede to either of the applications. Per Curiam: The Court is unable to grant the application. F.C. In re RENNICK. Privy Council. Lord Hobhouse Sir Richard Couch CLARK & FAUSET v. MUNICIPALITY OF BRISBANE AND Contract-Sale of goods-Delivery-Rescission of contract-Loca! On appeal to the Privy Council, the judgment of the Full Court of Queensland in this case (2) was affirmed. The judgment of the Judicial Committee was read by LORD HOBHOUSE: The respondents, who were plaintiffs below, are engineers in Brisbane; and the appellant Municipalities, who were defendants below, were in the year 1890 constituted a joint Local Authority for the purpose (among others) of establishing and maintaining ferries across the Brisbane River. In the early part of 1893 a bridge over the river was closed for repairs after a flood, and a ferry was wanted. On the 2nd March the plaintiffs wrote to Mr. Stephens, President of the defendants' Board, submitting a plan for a ferry punt. After describing the mode of working the punt, its capacity, and its speed, the letter concluded thus: 'The cost to the Board of the whole under steam will be (£2,000/0/0) two thousand pounds, and we agree to guarantee same for two months, the Board allowing us during that period to appoint our own engineer. Time for completion will be (10) ten to (12) twelve days." 66 Immediately afterwards the plaintiffs made an addition to their offer which, as written, is dated 3rd March, and is as follows: “In reference to the accompanying offer we further agree to run the steam punt, provide engineer and fireman, coal, etc., continuously for an average of 12 hours per day, for 7 days per week, for the sum of £25 per week; and in the event of any delay arising through fault of machinery gear or punt we bind ourselves under a penalty of £20 per day." (1) The judgment of the Privy Council, on appeal from the Supreme Court of Queensland in this case, affirmed the decision of the Supreme Court; and as the judgment on appeal was not reported in the English Law Reports, it is considered that it should be included in these reports. even at this late time. The Judicial Committee consisted of Lord Hobhouse, Lord Macnaghten, Lord Morris, and Sir Richard Couch; and the judgment was delivered on 22nd February, 1896. (2) 1895, 6 Q.L.J. 131. |