3197, and it is clear to this court that the defendants, believing that by said judgment the said Fidelity Lumber Company was acquiring the interests of all of the heirs of said Marinda Hyde to an undivided one-half interest in said survey, and the moneys paid by the said Carters and the American National Exchange Bank of Dallas, as shown by said judgment, was paid in the belief that the Fidelity Lumber Company was acquiring such title by such judgment, and was paid to protect the title of said Fidelity Lumber Company. The court in its findings uses the following language: "I find that at the time of the rendition of said judgment in cause No. 3197 there were heirs of Marinda Hyde other than those who were parties to said cause and those whose interests were owned by Ewing," "that such fact was at the time of the rendition of said judgment unknown to any of the defendants in cause No. 3197, was unknown to said Ewing, but was known to the said S. M. Johnson and some of the other plaintiffs, and especially to one or more of the plaintiffs whose depositions were taken in said cause." Matthews testified that he was induced to make the settlement because he thought the depositions he had examined and the affidavits furnished him by Johnson, in connection with S. M. Johnson's statement, were such that they should make a compromise. He further says: "I believed those to be all of the heirs, or I would not have made the settlement," and further, "My conversation with Mr. Johnson was in a day or two of the entering of the judgment at that term of court in which the judgment was entered," and further, "Then I prepared the judgment and went to Mr. Thomas' office, and Mr. Thomas read the decree over and O. K.'d it for the Fidelity Lumber Company and E. B. Parker, trustee, and then I signed it as the attorney for the Carters, and S. M. Johnson signed it as attorney for the plaintiffs." "After it was signed up I came into court and notified the court that we had the decree prepared, and he put his O. K. on it, and it was entered. I do not know who was present. Mr. Johnson and Mr. Thomas, I think, were present in court." Therefore the understanding arrived at by Matthews in reliance upon the statements of Johnson and the depositions and affidavits was communicated to Joe W. Thomas, who O. K.'d the judgment in said cause No. 3197 for the Fidelity Lumber Company. Mr. Thomas testified: "I thought from what Judge Matthews said that it was his understanding that the plaintiff's in that suit were all of the heirs of Marinda Hyde; yes, that is all I relied upon." [2] The trial court having, tuerefore, found as a fact as above stated, the conclusion follows as a matter of law that the fraud was supported by the testimony in the case. We have gone somewhat at length over the exhaustive briefs of the several parties, and in our judgment the testimony is amply sufficient to sustain the allegations with reference, not only to the fraud, but as to the mistake upon which the compromise judgment was entered. Therefore the first and second assignments of error are sustained. McMurray v. McMurray, 67 Tex. 665, 4 S. W. 357; Dick v. Collins, 30 Tex. Civ. App. 12, 68 S. W. 1015; Smith v. McDaniels, 170 S. W. 1070; Weir v. Carter, 169 S. W. 1114; Halliday v. Lambright, 29 Tex. Civ. App. 226, 68 S. W. 712; Avocato v. Dell 'Ara, 84 S. W. 443; Heidenhammer v. Loring, 6 Tex. Civ. App. 560, 26 S. W. 99. The third and fourth assignments of error will be considered together, and are as follows: (a) "The trial court erred in that portion of its judgment and decree herein in holding that titled only to the relief of canceling the release the plaintiff Fidelity Lumber Company was enof its warrantor's liability in excess of the sum of $5,000, and in holding that the trial court now could ascertain the present market value of the then market value of land, the title to which was then held by plaintiffs in said cause No. 3197, and charge the said Fidelity Lumber Company in the present suit with such market value as a credit on the liability of said war rantors." (b) "The trial court erred in its findings of fact that there was no definite proof as to what amount was paid the Emporia Lumber Company for the Marinda Hyde survey, because the undisputed proof showed that the consideration was $3 per 1,000 feet for the standing timber upon the various tracts of land conveyed by the Emporia Lumber Company to Thompson Bros. mated number of feet of standing timber upon Lumber Company, and the proof shows the estisaid Marinda Hyde survey from all of which the amount paid for the Marinda Hyde survey was made to appear." The following propositions are presented: (1) "The warrantors, having warranted for 320 acres, on their own initiative sought to avoid their liability to their warrantees by purchasing the title which was being asserted against their warrantees. Instead of buying and delivering to their warrantees 320 acres, which was their duty, they acquired only 131 acres, and thus were entitled to release of their warranty only to that extent; but, owing to the proven fraud and proven mutual mistake, the warrantors entered a decree releasing themselves in full. Having by their own mistake or wrong paid $5,000 for 131 acres, instead of 320 acres, the loss should not be visited upon the warrantees, but upon the warrantors. fore the court erred in holding the innocent warrantees liable for the amount paid in excess of 131/320 of the warranted liability, but appelwarrantors' liability to the extent of 188/320 lants should have been permitted to assert the of the total warranty liability." There (2) "Where the title to a part of the land conveyed under covenants of general warranty has failed, the warrantors' liability under the warranty is this: "The damages will bear the same proportion to the whole purchase money as the value of the part to which title fails bears to the whole premises estimated at the prices paid.'" On the contrary, the counter proposition is urged that the court below correctly held that there was no definite proof as to the amount of the warranty liability, the proof showing such liability to be $3 per thousand feet for the standing timber as estimated by the parties, and there being no evidence as to what the estimated number of feet of standing timber was; therefore the court below, in setting aside the absolute discharge of the Tex.) warranty liability and limiting it to the payment of $5,000, granted to the Fidelity Lumber Company the fullest equity permissible to it under the evidence, for which reason alone the judgment here under complaint can be affirmed. It is shown by the testimony that the land was sold on a timber estimate of $3 per thousand feet of standing timber on the 640 acres. The estimate of timber upon the 640 acres in the Marinda Hyde survey at that time was The total consideration for 4,000,000 feet. said 640 acres, upon the basis of $3 per thousand feet, would be $12,000. In the answer of the defendants S. F. and J. P. Carter in cause No. 3197, they alleged: H. L. McCorkle, 1/7... Presley K. Ewing acquired: 1175 .45.714 9.143 9.143 .39.18 9.143.. 131.626 The above, under the law of descent and distribution, from the depositions of witnesses in the case, who are the heirs of Marinda "That this cause, an action of trespass to try Hyde. After the rendition of the judgment title, was instituted in the district court of in cause No. 3197, certain of the heirs of said Tyler county about the 14th day of June, Marinda Hyde recovered a judgment against 1912, against the said Thompson Bros. Lumber Company for the recovery of said undivided the Fidelity Lumber Company and its warhalf of said 640-acre tract of land, and the rantors in the United States District Court, said Thompson Bros. Lumber Company ask at Beaumont, for an undivided interest of that, in the event of a failure to title to said 145 acres in the Marinda Hyde. Thereafter, undivided half of said 640-acre survey, it have for the certain other heirs of Marinda Hyde recoverjudgment against these defendants amount of purchase money therefor paid to the ed a judgment against the Fidelity Lumber said Emporia Lumber Company, which amount Company in the district court of Tyler counit alleges was $12,000, with legal interest there-ty for an undivided interest of 15.33 acres on from the 2d day of July, 1906, in their respective proportions, that is, against the said J. P. Carter for one-fourth, and against the said S. F. Carter for three-fourths of the amount so paid to said Emporia Lumber Company." S. F. and J. P. Carter made a compromise with the plaintiffs in cause No. 3197, by which, upon the payment of $5,000 in cash to plaintiffs, the plaintiffs permitted a judgment to be rendered against them in favor of the Fidelity Lumber Company upon an undivided one-half interest in the land. The judgment appealed from decrees in effect that the judgment rendered in cause No. 3197 on February 15, 1913, in so far as it discharges defendants S. F. and J. P. Carter, and the American Exchange National Bank of Dallas from their warranty liabilities, absolutely only to the extent of their payment thereby made, to wit, $5,000, be canceled and annulled, and that the plaintiff Fidelity Lumber Company have its action or actions to recover from the defendants Carters and the American Exchange National Bank and the balance of their liabilities on their respective warranties of title as concerns said undivided 320 acres, but only so far as in excess of and after deducting said payment of $5,000, with interest thereon at 6 per cent. per annum from February 15, 1913, which shall be allowed as a credit on said warranty liabilities; $3,336.10 thereof on the warranty liability of S. F. and J. P. Carter, and $1,413.90 thereof on the warranty liability of the American Exchange National Bank. The interests of the plaintiffs in cause No. 3197, who sued as heirs of Marinda Hyde, or standing in the place of such heirs, and whose title was vested in the Fidelity Lumber Company by the decree rendered in that case, amounted to only 131 and a fraction in said survey. [3, 4] The measure of damages in a suit upon general warranty of title to land is the purchase money, with interest at the legal rate from date of payment. Turner v. Miller, 42 Tex. 420, 19 Am. Rep. 47; Johns v. Hardin, 81 Tex. 41, 16 S. W. 623; Glenn v. Mathews, 44 Tex. 405; Fleming v. Pringle, 21 Tex. Civ. App. 225, 51 S. W. 553; Lewis v. Ross, 65 S. W. 504. The above measure is applied where there has been an eviction of the warrantee as to the entire tract conveyed; but where the title has not failed as to the whole, but as to only a part, the measure of damages is as stated by Judge Brown, in Hynes v. Packard, 92 Tex. 49, 45 S. W. 563, as follows: "If the title had failed to all the land conveyages would be the purchase money with intered by Hynes to Packard, the measure of dam* the rule by which est from the date of payment. The failure, however, being partial, * warranty is aptly stated thus: "The damages to ascertain the grantor's liability under the will bear the same proportion to the whole purchase money as the value of the part to which the title fails bears to the whole premReichert, 17 Ind. 120 [79 Am. Dec. 463]; ises, estimated at the prices paid.' Phillips v. Raines v. Calloway, 27 Tex. 678; Thomas v. Hammond, 47 Tex. 42; Morris v. Phelps, 5 Johns. [N. Y.] 49 [4 Am. Dec. 323]," etc. [5] The contention of appellant seems to be that the proper measure of damages was not applied by the court in this case, and that by reason thereof the judgment rendered, in effect, allowing S. F. and J. P. Carter a credit of $5,000 upon their warranty, being the amount paid by them to procure for their warrantee the title of the heirs of Marinda Hyde and those in the right of such heirs, does not accord to the warrantee its rights under the law. And the contention is further made that the title of [6] Under the fourth assignment, as above set out, the proposition is that a finding of fact by the court against the undisputed testimony is erroneous, and should be set aside. The court found that: "There was no definite proof as to what amount was paid to the Emporia Lumber Company for the Marinda Hyde survey." The proof of the consideration paid for the Marinda Hyde survey was established by the testimony of W. A. Vinson, who testified: the Fidelity Lumber Company to an undivid- a sum equal to 188/320, or $4,816.56. But, it ed interest of 320 acres in the Hyde 640- is claimed, the judgment allowed as a credit acre survey has not been questioned, and has on the warrantors' liability, not the propornot been claimed by any one, but that Ma- tion that the amount paid by them for onerinda Hyde's heirs appear also to have had half of the 320 acres bore to the whole, but title to an undivided interest of 320 acres of the entire sum of $5,000 paid by them, and the 640-acre survey. In cause No. 3197, a part discharged them from their warranty liabili of said heirs, claiming to be all of the heirs ties to that extent, and restricting their liaof Marinda Hyde, brought suit to recover bilities as to the 188 acres lost to the differan entire undivided interest of 320 acres of ence between $5,000 paid and the purchase the 640-acre survey. Deceived and misled price of the 160 acres lost, claiming that by by S. M. Johnson, the witness Mrs. D. P. thus restricting the warrantors' liability the Foster, who was also a plaintiff, and the warrantee could not recover $4,816.56, which Washington affidavit, and believing that such was the proportionate price with interest heirs were all the heirs, or stood in the right added received by the warrantors for the of such heirs, S. F. and J. P. Carter, recog- 160 acres, but only the difference between the nizing their liability to the Fidelity Lumber $8,200, being the price with interest added Company as warrantors, paid to said heirs, received for 320 acres, and the $5,000 paid or those standing in the right of such heirs, by the warrantors for the 132 acres secured $5,000 to secure for their warrantee the title, for the warrantee, which, it is claimed, is as they believed, to an undivided interest of greatly less than the sum to which the war320 acres. The payment was not made to the rantee is entitled. warrantee to discharge, or to discharge pro tanto, their warranty, and was not, in fact, paid to the warrantee at all, but to those claiming the land adversely to the warrantee, and it is therefore contended that the payment of $5,000 to secure for the warrantee the land did not entitle the warrantors to discharge from their liability for any greater amount or proportion of their liability than the quantity of the land owned by the plaintiffs, and which passed to the warrantee by the judgment in 3197, bore to the entire 320acre undivided interest, and they illustrate this as follows: The amount received by the warrantors for the purchase price of the land, based on three dollars per thousand feet, and upon a timber estimate of four million feet upon the 640 acres, amounted to $12,000, and this, with interest added, would have been the measure of the warranty liability had the warrantee lost the entire 640 acres. On the basis upon which the purchase price was arrived at, the purchase price of an undivided interest of 320 acres would be $6,000, which with interest at 6 per cent. from the date of the guaranty and warranty of the title by S. F. and J. P. Carter, to wit, December 13, 1906, to February 15, 1913, the date of the judgment in cause No. 3197, would amount to about $8,200. Therefore, by the judgment rendered in the United States District Court and the subsequent judgment rendered in the district court of Tyler county, the heirs of Marinda Hyde, other than those sued in 3197, recovered an undivided interest of 16033/49, or a fraction of an acre more than half of the 320 acres undivided interest. The title of the warrantee having failed to say 188 acres, the warrantee was entitled, as against the warrantors, to an amount in the proportion that the price paid for the 188 acres bears to 320 acres; and as the purchase price, with interest added, for the 320 acres, as above shown, was $8.200, the proportion of the warrantors' liability for the 188 acres lost would be "In the deed from the Carters to the Thompson Bros. Lumber Company, the lands are mentioned, but the value of each particular tract is not mentioned. It was sold on a timber estimate. and they figured the values of the land at so much per thousand feet. Generally, it was $3, I think.” * Further he testified: I have stated, was based upon a timber estimate "The deal, as I got it from Mr. Carter, as of $3 per thousand feet." And again, he testified: "The rate per thousand feet on that warranty, as I understood from Mr. Carter, was on a basis of $3 per thousand feet." The answer of Thompson Bros. Lumber Company in cause No. 3197 was introduced in evidence, and contained the following alle gation: "Defendant further represents and charges that the land sued for herein by plaintiffs is a part and parcel of said 640 acres of the Marinda Hyde survey so conveyed by said Emporia Lumber Company by the deed above described, and defendant charges that said land has a growth of standing pine timber thereon aggregating 4,000,000 feet log scale, for which the defendants' warrantors paid the said Carters $12,000." In the answer of the defendants S. F. and J. P. Carter in cause No. 3197, it is alleged: "That this cause, an action of trespass to try title, was instituted in the district court of said Tyler county about the 14th day of June, 1912, against the said Thompson Bros. Lumber Company, for the recovery of said undivided half of said 640-acre tract of land, and the said Thompson Bros. Lumber Company ask that, in the event of a failure of title to said undivided half of said 640-acre survey, it have judgment against these defendants for the amount of purchase money therefor paid to the said Emporia Lumber Company, which amount it alleges was $12,000, with legal interest thereon from the 2d day of July, 1906, in their respective proportions, that is, against the said J. P. Carter for one-fourth, and against the said S. F. Carter for three-fourths of the amount so paid to said Emporia Lumber Company." The testimony, as above set out, seems to be undisputed, and in our judgment a finding would necessarily be that the amount received by the warrantors for said land, based upon a timber estimate of four million feet, at $3 per thousand, would be $12,000. Viewed in any light, from this record, it is our opinion that the third and fourth assignments of error must be sustained. [7] Appellants' fifth and sixth assignments of error are as follows: (a) "The trial court erred in its finding of facts, holding that the judgment in cause No. 3197, Ewing v. Thompson Bros. Lumber Company, was one based upon a chance of title between plaintiffs in that suit and the warrantors impleaded therein, because the undisputed facts showed that the said warrantors would not have entered into said agreement of settlement nor have agreed to the entry of said consent decree had it not been represented to them and had they not believed that plaintiffs in cause No 3197 were all of the heirs or stood in the right of all of the heirs of said Marinda Hyde." (b) "The trial court erred in its finding of facts holding that the judgment in cause No. 3197, Ewing v. Thompson Bros. Lumber Company, was one based upon a chance of title between the plaintiffs in that suit, and the warrantors impleaded therein, because the overwhelming and great preponderance of the testimony shows that the said warrantors would not have entered into said agreement of settlement, nor had agreed to the entry of said consent decree, had it not been represented to them, and had they not believed, that the plaintiffs in cause No. 3197 were all of the heirs, or stood in the right of all of the heirs of said Marinda Hyde." Appellants assert the proposition that a finding of fact by the court against the undisputed testimony is erroneous, and should be set aside, and we are of opinion that the testimony in this case was practically undisputed, and in our judgment the assignment is and must be sustained. In the first place, we do not believe that the evidence shows the compromise to have been a chance of title. On January 21, 1913, S. F. Carter wrote Presley K. Ewing, as follows: "I have been delayed in answering your favor of the 13th inst. on account of the pressure of business. "I have a letter from Judge Matthews stating that Mr. Johnson had advised him that he would proceed to take depositions showing that the plaintiffs are the only heirs of Marinda Hyde, and when this is done I presume that will cover the point at issue. "All we want to know is that when we have paid you the $5,000.00 on your claim we will not be bothered about this title later on. "Furthermore, as we expect the American Exchange National Bank of Dallas to make good on their warranty, their pro rata, which will be something over $1,400.00, that bank will naturally want to know that there will be no further litigation. isfaction of Judge Matthews, my attorney, I am ready to make payment." On December 12, 1912, Presley K. Ewing wrote J. C. Matthews, of Lampasas, Tex., as follows: "In Ewing et al. v. Thompson Bros. Lumber Company, Marinda Hyde survey, Tyler county, answering yours of 9th inst., I am inclosing to you a letter written to you by Mr. S. M. Johnson, which he forwarded to me for approv al before mailing, and which I do approve, to the effect that he would settle for $20.00 per acre, being practically one-third of the value of the land, although we regard our title as clear as yours." The court found: "This consent judgment was pursuant to an agreement exclusively between the plaintiffs in the former suit and the warrantors of title for what was in effect a chance of sale of their interest by way of compromise with the distinct terms stipulated by the warrantors, as the deal would be consummated only in the event of a verbal report from their attorney, Judge J. C. Matthews, upon independent investigation into the title including heirship." As opposed to this finding, Judge J. C. Matthews testified: of the case for S. F. and J. P. Carter and the American National Bank of Dallas, well, I believed that the case would probably come to trial pretty soon if we didn't settle, and I believe that if we ever went to trial we would lose half of the land, and I thought that the depositions that we had examined and the affidavits furnished me in connection with the Silas M. Johnson statement was such that we should of the heirs or I would not have made a settlemake a compromise. I believe these to be all ment." "As to what induced me to make a settlement Further he says: "I did not understand that Mr. Johnson and myself were looking after the question of heirship. I understood that Mr. Johnson was looking after the question of heirship." He further testified: "I did not understand that there were any lost heirs of Marinda Hyde. I understood that I was getting all the heirs." And also: "My idea was, at the time I filed suit, that time of the settlement I believed that my aswe had all the heirs of Marinda Hyde. At the sociates and myself had before the court all the heirs of Marinda Hyde." In this connection, W. A. Johnson (not S. M. Johnson), the attorney who filed the original petition for the plaintiffs in cause No. 3197, testified: "My idea was, at the time I filed the suit, that we had all of the heirs of Marinda Hyde. * # * At the time of the settlement I believed that my associates and myself had before the court all of the heirs of Marinda Hyde." Joe W. Thomas, attorney who approved the settlement in behalf of the Fidelity Lumber Company in cause No. 3197, testified: "I did not learn that these plaintiffs were not all the heirs of Marinda Hyde until this Beaumont suit was filed." He further testified: "When the case came on for trial or settlement, I was not here and had nothing to do with the negotiations whatever. I understood all the time that Judge Matthews was handling I recollect, however, that when the judgment | court, paying the money. It was perfectly satwas written up that I O. K.'d the judgment. isfactory to chance it. The instances are nuJudge Matthews came to my office one day at merous where the lawyers and parties settle noon and left there some interrogatories and these matters and leave out heirs. I am peraffidavits, and told me, 'Here are two sets of fectly certain of this, that I didn't know or depositions and two or three affidavits,' and he have any reason to believe, until long after the left them on the table by the machine, and settlement was consummated and the money also the draft of the judgment probably. At distributed, that there were outstanding heirs any rate, he told me that if I wanted to look of Marinda Hyde who were not plaintiffs in the over them to do so, but that he was of opin- suit No. 3197. Understand, your honor, I don't ion from the evidence that they had all the say there were any such outstanding heirs that heirs and it was all right. I was in the trial they didn't know of or were not willing to take of another case at the time, and my not receiv- the chance of having left out. I do not, of my ing any fee and not being employed in this case, own knowledge, know about that. I have no as I considered it, I did not look them over. I knowledge of it." did not examine any of the testimony, either the depositions or the affidavits." Again he says: "I was not interested with reference to the question of heirs. No, I did not go into the question of heirship. Judge Matthews told me that he had them all there, and that was the reason for the release of the warranty." Wm. A. Vinson, the attorney who filed the answer of Thompson Bros. Lumber Company in cause No. 3197, testified: The original petition in cause No. 3197, as well as the amended petition, sued for an undivided interest of 320 acres of land. On September 13, 1912, J. C. Matthews wrote Mr. Ewing a letter, which is the beginning, so far as this record shows, of the negotiations looking toward a settlement: "The plaintiffs in that case (Ewing v. Fidelity Lumber Company, No. 3197), as I understand, claim an undivided half of said survey. I would be pleased to know the amount of your "I understood that all of the heirs were rep- interest in the survey, whether the heirship of resented when I approved the disposition of those from whom you purchased can be clearly that case at the time that Judge Matthews re-established, and what is the least amount you ported to me on his return from Woodville that will take for your interest in the land." he had settled the case." C. L. Carter, who, as attorney for the Fidelity Lumber Company in cause No. 3197, had active charge of the case, testified: "I had no knowledge that there was any question as to the Fidelity Lumber Company having acquired title to the entire undivided onehalf interest in the Marinda Hyde survey until this suit was filed in the federal court in Beaumont." The only evidence as to "chance of title," and upon which the court must have based its findings, if upon any evidence at all, is found in the testimony of Judge J. C. Matthews and Judge Ewing. Judge Matthews, in his cross-examination by Mr. Ewing, tes tified: "I have been practicing law in Texas a long time, in land and other litigation. Yes, I have in my experience come across cases in which heirs were seeking to recover on an ancient claim of title. I cannot recollect any specific instance, but I think it is a common thing for there to be heirs that you can find no trace of, that have been lost sight of. Yes, it is a common occurrence upon adjustment to be made of the chance that they will never turn up. I don't know how common or frequent such occurrences happen, but it is done. I don't know how many instances I have known. I cannot recollect any, but I have known instances. don't know how frequently it is, but it happens." Mr. Ewing testified: I "I will say that I do know that it is a common thing in this country that unknown heirs are dropped out, and a settlement made, and money paid, with the understanding that there may be some heirs that they don't know where to find them, and a chance settlement is made upon the idea that they will never turn up. I know of one case in Jefferson county, involving a league of land, where three or four times successively other heirs turned up; and I know another case involving a league where some heirs were dropped out and never turned up; and I know another in Angelina county, in which the firm of Terry, Cavin & Mills were engaged as attorneys, and made a settlement where unknown parties were not before the On December 9, 1912, Matthews writes S. M. Johnson: "If any compromise is effected, I will want to know that Mr. Ewing is the purchaser from some of the heirs of Marinda Hyde, and that all the other heirs are parties to the suit." In response to this last letter, Johnson writes on December 11, 1912, to Judge Matthews, the letter which first went to Mr. Ewing for his approval, and which Mr. Ewing did approve, in which he makes the following declaration: "If he (Mr. Ewing) thinks proper to send you this letter, as far as me and Judge Johnson and our clients are concerned, we think that we would consider a proposition of $20 per acre, provided we will not have to go to the expense of taking further depositions to prove heirship, of course, in event of settlement we would furnish you affidavits of heirship. There is no shadow of a doubt that our clients are entitled to one-half of this survey, 320 acres. If there is a prospect of your recommending this proposition for settlement, write me at once, because I was on the eve of preparing several lots of depositions to prove their heirship, and this is the only thing we have to do in this case to be ready for trial." On December 12th Mr. Ewing writes to Judge Matthews inclosing the letter from Mr. Johnson, and stating his approval of the settlement at $20 per acre, and stating: "We regard our title as clear as yours." On the 24th of December, Matthews writes Johnson: "I note what you say in regard to taking the depositions of witnesses to prove the intermediate heirship, and I think it is important that you take them, because we want to be sure that the heirs with whom we are settling are in fact the heirs. And because we have a warrantor to deal with, and he, as well as we, wants to know that there are no other heirs with whom we will have to litigate in the future. "I am sorry to have put you to this trouble, which may seem to you to be unnecessary, but I feel that it is important to my client that you prove up your case thoroughly." |