defects, the lessor, under maxim caveat emptor, need not disclose faults he knows to exist, although he cannot fraudulently conceal such defects.-L. J. Smith Const. Co. v. Mullins, 201 S. W. 602. Where grading machinery was rented "in the present condition thereof," there was no express or implied warranty as to its condition. -Id. 33 (Ark.) In action for rent of machine, court erred in charging that measure of recovery would be difference between value of machine when delivered to defendants and its value when returned.-McDonald v. Hill, 201 S. W. 509. BANKRUPTCY III. ASSIGNMENT, ADMINISTRATION, AND DISTRIBUTION OF BANK- (C) Preferences and Transfers by Bank- 184(2) (Mo.App.) Trustee in bankruptcy is, under Bankruptcy Act July 1, 1898, § 67e, authorized to enforce the rights of creditors of the bankrupt to set aside liens which are void under the state law for want of recording. Stewart v. Asbury, 201 S. W. 949. Under Bankruptcy Act July 1, 1898, § 67e, the effect to be given an unrecorded chattel mortgage, where possession of the article was not given the mortgagee, must be determined under the law of the state in which the case arises.-Id. 184(3) (Mo.App.) Under Rev. St. 1909, §§ 2861, 2887, and 2889, seller of motorcar, who received as payment notes reserving title and giving him chattel mortgage, is not, having withheld same from record, entitled to record same and take possession of car as against creditors whose claims had meantime arisen, so where debtor became a bankrupt few days after seller took possession. his lien is subject to attack by trustee in bankruptcy.-Stewart v. Asbury, 201 S. W. 949. BANKS AND BANKING. See Criminal Law, 369; Indictment and Information, 128. II. BANKING CORPORATIONS AND ASSOCIATIONS. (D) Officers and Agents. 54(3) (Ark.) Acts of officers of bank with capital of only $50,000 in lending $30,000 to a canning company in which they had stock, which had a capital of $10,000, and which continually operated at a loss, though they believed it would ultimately pay a profit, were so reckless as to constitute negligence for which they were liable to shareholders.-Magale v. Fomby, 201 S. W. 278. 55(1) (Ark.) Equity has jurisdiction independent of statute to enforce liability of bank officers to the bank and shareholders for negligent operating causing loss.-Magale v. Fomby, 201 S. W. 278. (E) Insolvency and Dissolution. 76 (Tenn.) In a proceeding to wind up affairs of bank, where receiver petitioned for leave to compromise claims against stockholders and directors, the inquiry was whether it was practicable and advantageous to compromise.-Knaffl v. Knoxville Banking & Trust Co., 201 S. W. 775. In a proceeding to wind up affairs of bank, where the receiver recommended a compromise, and creditors of the bank, the master, the chancellor, and the Court of Civil Appeals were in favor of the compromise, it was not abuse of discretion to order it to be made.-Id. 84 (Mo.) To warrant conviction under Rev. St. 1909, § 4585, making it an offense for owner, agent or manager of a private bank to receive a deposit knowing owner of bank to be insolvent, it is not necessary that accused should have had ultimate authority in managing the bank, if he was in fact intrusted with the duty of receiving deposits, since he was then the agent of the owner.-State v. Munroe, 201 S. W. 100. bank-85(1) (Mo.) The assistant cashier of a private bank cannot be convicted of the offense defined by Rev. St. 1909, § 4585, as to receiving deposits when insolvent in the absence of allegation and proof that he knew not only that the bank was insolvent, but that its owner was also insolvent.-State v. Munroe, 201 S. W. 100. 215 (Tex.Civ.App.) Contractor's ruptcy does not deprive state district court of jurisdiction to distribute funds in owner's hands among mechanic's lien claimants and subcontractors. Gordon-Jones Const. Co. v. Welder, 201 S. W. 681. III. FUNCTIONS AND DEALINGS. (C) Deposits. (D) Administration of Estate. 263 (Ark.) Agreement between two creditors to bid against each other at bankruptcy sale until certain figure was reached in order to induce other bids, and, if no higher bids were 134(1) (Mo.App.) Where a draft and bill received, to buy property for their joint ac- of lading is given to a bank by a depositor in count and divide any profits, held not invalid.-exchange for credit, and the draft is dishonorSchaap v. Robinson, 201 S. W. 292. Conflicting evidence held to sustain verdicted, the bank can apply the debtor's deposits on that agreement between creditors to bid against but not if the transaction is a sale of the shipthe debt without the consent of the depositor, each other at bankruptcy sale until certain fig- ment.-Cochrane v. First State Bank of Pickure was reached and then buy property for (E) Loans and Discounts. their joint account was made in order to induce ton, Tex., 201 S. W. 572. other bids, and not to eliminate competition or secure confirmation of sale by false appearance183 (Mo.App.) The drawer of a draft. of competition.-Id. Agreement between two creditors to bid at able to a bank for the amount of money he obwhich was returned dishonored, is primarily libankruptcy sale so as to give false appearance tained on it.-Cochrane v. First State Bank of of competition and thus induce confirmation of sale is not void because against public policy, Pickton, Tex., 201 S. W. 572. but constitutes fraud authorizing refusal to confirm sale or enforce contract.-Id. (E) Actions by or Against Trustee. 290 (Mo.) If corporate beneficiary of life policy is estopped to deny that it consented to change of beneficiaries, its trustee in bankruptcy is also estopped.-Coleman v. Northwestern Mut. Life Ins. Co., 201 S. W. 544. See Judgment, BAR. 548-619; Limitation of Ac BATTERY. See Assault and Battery. Bawdy House 201 SOUTHWESTERN REPORTER BAWDY HOUSE. See Disorderly House, 19. BENEFICIARIES. See Insurance, 586, 783, 784. such indorser, such agreement should be strict- (D) Bona Fide Purchasers. 332 (Mo.App.) If indorsee had actual knowledge when he took note that place of payment had been changed, or knowledge of such facts BEST AND SECONDARY EVIDENCE. that his action in taking instrument amounted See Evidence, 157-179. See Jury, 99; Witnesses, 372. BILL OF EXCEPTIONS. See Exceptions, Bill of. BILLS AND NOTES. See Alteration of Instruments, 420, 444; Husband and Judgment, 603; Payment, 146. 6; Evidence, Wife, 85; 9; Pleading, 1. REQUISITES AND VALIDITY. (F) Validity. to bad faith, under Rev. St. 1909, § 10026, he 342 (Mo.App.) Indorsee of note, which plain- V. 342 (Tex.Civ.App.) That note stated that it was part of purchase money for a dredge, title to which was to remain in payee, would not be notice to purchaser that consideration had, or til four months later.-Harty v. Keokuk Sav. would fail, where dredge was not delivered unBank, 201 S. W. 419. 343 (Tex.Civ.App.) If purchaser, who had knowledge that note had been given for machinery, title to which was to remain in payee, also knew or was charged with notice that machinnocent purchaser.-Harty v. Keokuk Sav. Bank, ery had been warranted and might wholly fail to meet warranties, he could not become in 106 (Ky.) In a popularity contest, where company sells dealer the prices and plans, with book of instructions telling that fictiious votes should be given candidates to keep ap interest, notes given are vicious. Commer-201 S. W. 419. cial Sec. Co. v. Archer, 201 S. W. 479. 201 S. W. 310. due are subject to the defense of fraud and 114 (Mo.App.) Where plaintiff's agents in-351 (Ky.) Notes assigned after they become failure of consideration, under Ky. St. § 37206, duced defendant to sign an agency contract and, under representations that other instru- subds. 28, 58, 59.-Sparr v. Fulton Nat. Bank, ments then signed were duplicates of the contract, persuaded him to sign promissory notes, he was not bound, on discovery of the fraud, to rescind the contract, and his continuing under the contract did not waive the fraud.Pioneer Stock Powder Co. v. Goodman, 201 S. W. 576. edge of note's infirmity may secure good title 362 (Mo.App.) Rule that one with knowlby purchasing it from innocent holder is inpayee.-Casner v. Schwartz, 201 S. W. 592. applicable, where such purchaser is original Where plaintiff's agents persuaded defend-378 (Tex.Civ.App.) Where order for perant to sign promissory notes telling him that they were duplicates of an agency contract, the notes were forgeries and absolutely void, so that defendant could not waive the fraud, at least as between the original parties, or by continuing under the agency contract.-Id. V. RIGHTS AND LIABILITIES ON IN- (A) Indorsement Before Delivery to or 246 (Mo.App.) Indorsers of note warrant- 262 (Mo.App.) Where several persons indorsed note for accommodation, which a bank accepted, requiring another indorser, the note being deposited in the bank as collateral to secure a second note for a smaller amount, the bank could not, as against the accommodation indorsers, enforce its agreement with the last indorser that the note should be a pledge also to secure a loan to him.-Ollis v. Farmers' & Merchants' Bank, 201 S. W. 947. Where several persons indorsed a note for accommodation, which a bank accepted requiring another indorser the note being deposited in the bank as collateral to secure a smaller note, the bank having also agreed with the last indorser that the note should be security for his loan as to the net proceeds after discharging the smaller note, and the smaller note was paid, the bank lost all right to retain the original note as collateral.-Id. Where several persons indorsed a note for accommodation, which a bank accepted, requiring another indorser, the note being deposited in the bank as collateral to secure a smaller note, and the bank and the last indorser agreed that it should also be held as security for a loan to | fume was given, and buyer signed the note attached to order, and the seller detached note before goods were shipped, contrary to his agreement, and sold note for value withof note was not prevented from being innocent out notice of premature detachment, purchaser purchaser even if the order was changed after execution.-Foster v. Iowa City State Bank, 201 S. W. 733. VI. PRESENTMENT, DEMAND, NO- at maturity was necessary to charge indorsers, 414 (Tenn.) One who indorses note before terhouse v. Sterchi Bros. Furniture Co., 201 delivery is entitled to notice of protest.-WaS. W. 150. VIII, ACTIONS. 443 (4) (Ky.) The holder of a note for collection only is entitled to maintain in action thereon.-Harrison v. Union Store Co., 201 S. W. 31. 459 (Ky.) In action by assignee of notes after maturity, payee is not necessary party to entitle maker to counterclaim for cancellation for fraud of payee, even though assignee is only holding notes as collateral, under Ky. St. Bank, 201 S. W. 310. 3720b, subds. 27 and 51.-Sparr v. Fulton Nat. 477 (Mo.App.) In action on notes, the answer relying on fraud of the agents who procured the notes need not set forth the fraud an indictment.-Pioneer Stock Powder Co. v. with all the definiteness and particularity of Goodman, 201 S. W. 576. 489 (5) (Mo.App.) In action on note in court of record, where formal pleadings are required, independent agreement between maker and payee to pay otherwise than in money cannot be shown under general denial or plea of payment, but substantive facts must be pleaded.-Sutton v. Libby, 201 S. W. 615. 489(7) (Tex.Civ.App.) That petition described note as payable to iron works company and note introduced in evidence was payable to iron works did not constitute a variance where parties concerned used names interchangeably.Harty v. Keokuk Sav. Bank, 201 S. W. 419. 492 (Mo.App.) If note on its face appears to be in different handwritings, written at different times, and in different ink, fact destroys presumption of integrity.-Mechanics' American Nat. Bank v. Helmbacher, 201 S. W. 383. 496 (2) (Tenn.) Possession by third party of note payable to payee's order and not indorsed by him raises no presumption of ownership, and no such presumption is created by Negotiable Instrument Law, § 49.-Allen v. Hays, 201 S. W. 135. 497(2) (Mo.App.) Under Rev. St. 1909, 10029, providing every holder is deemed prima facie to be holder in due course, burden to show he is such does not devolve upon him until showing is first made that title of person who negotiated note was defective.-Stevens v. Weinberg, 201 S. W. 603. 497(2) (Mo.App.) There being no contention that plaintiff was not the holder of the notes, he will be presumed a bona fide purchaser until defendant shows the notes were procured by fraud, when the burden shifts to plaintiff to prove purchase in good faith for value.--Scheidel Western X-Ray Co. v. Bacon, 201 S. W. 916. 497(2) (Tex. Civ.App.) Although note stated that it was part of purchase money for a dredge, title to which was to remain in payee, burden was on defendant to show some additional fact requiring purchaser to anticipate probable failure of dredge.-Harty v. Keokuk Sav. Bank, 201 S. W. 419. der the maker liable to an innocent holder of such note is a question for the jury.-Harrison v. Union Store Co., 201 S. W. 31. 537(3) (Ky.) In action on note, defendants setting up lack of consideration and claiming they executed original, of which note in suit was renewal, solely for accommodation, case held for jury.-Farmers' Bank of West Louisville v. Birk, 201 S. W. 315. 537(4) (Mo.App.) Whether defendant who signed notes without reading them under representations of plaintiff's agents that they were duplicates of a contract was negligent in so der Co. v. Goodman, 201 S. W. 576. doing held for the jury.-Pioneer Stock Pow 537(6) (Mo.App.) Whether indorsee of note had actual knowledge when he took it that place of payment had been changed, or knowledge of such facts that action in taking instrument amounted to bad faith, are questions for jury, unless evidence is such that no two reasonable could differ.-Mechanics' American Nat.. Bank v. Helmbacher, 201 S. W. 383. men 537 (7) (Ky.) In action on note against maker and indorsers, court properly directed verdict for indorsers, plaintiff having failed to prove presentment for payment, and it not appearing note fell within exceptions to rule requiring presentment Providence Mining Co. v. Glass Bros. Coal Co., to charge indorsers.201 S. W. 308. 537 (8) (Mo.App.) In action on decedent's note, evidence held insufficient to warrant submission to jury of question whether items in kind were paid by decedent on note, and whether note transactions between decedent and payee were intended as payments on note.Sutton v. Libby, 201 S. W. 615. BONA FIDE PURCHASERS. See Bills and Notes, 332-378; Vendor and BONDS. See Appeal and Error, 373, 1226, 1234; Bail; Guardian and Ward, 182; Intoxicating Liquors, 301; Justices of the Peace, 159; Notaries; Street Railroads, 52; United States, ~67. 497(4) (Ky.) Holder of negotiable instrument, transferred before maturity and fair upon its face, is prima facie holder in due course, but, where maker shows vice in the inception of the note, the burden shifts to the holder to show that he is a holder in due course, under Ky. St. § 3720b, subd. 59.--Commercial Sec. See Evidence, 166, 354. Co. v. Archer, 201 S. W. 479. Where maker shows notes were vicious, a holder must prove that the notes were fair BOOKS OF ACCOUNT. BOTTLES. upon their face, that he became holder before See Licenses, 6. 518(2) (Ky.) In action on note claimed by defendants to have been executed without consideration and solely for plaintiff's accommodation, evidence held insufficient to sustain verdict for defendants.-Farmers' Bank of West Louisville v. Birk, 201 S. W. 315. 525 (Ky.) Where note was proven vicious, holder's evidence held insufficient to show want of notice.-Commercial Sec. Co. v. Archer, 201 S. W. 479. 525 (Tex.Civ.App.) Evidence held insufficient to show that plaintiff purchaser of note knew or was charged with notice that dredge, for which note was given, had been warranted and might fail to meet warranties.-Harty v. Keokuk Sav. Bank, 201 S. W. 419. 537(1) (Ky.) Whether one signing a contract made in such form that the holder was able to detach therefrom a part forming a promissory note was such negligence as to ren BOUNDARIES. I. DESCRIPTION. 3(3) (Tex. Civ.App.) In determining boundaries, recourse should be had, first, to natural objects; second, to artificial objects; and, third, to courses and distances.-Sullivan v. Masterson, 201 S. W. 194. 3(6) (Mo.) Where parties took deed to adjoining lots from commissioner in partition, each deed locating lot thereby conveyed according to measurement stated in public plat of city addition, their rights were governed by rule under Rev. St. 1909, §§ 10290-10294, inclusive, as to plats of cities, that lines of plat as actually located on ground control over monuments and other surveys.-Macom v. Brewster, 201 S. W. 547. 6 (Tex.Civ.App.) The only reason for reversing calls in field notes is to better follow the surveyor's footsteps, and mere running of lines according to course and distance does not locate the surveyor's footsteps in absence of For cases in Dec. Dig. & Am. Dig. Key No. Series & Indexes see same topic and KEY-NUMBER any marked lines or established corners.-Howell v. Ellis, 201 S. W. 1022. The presumption that a surveyor did not cross a navigable stream in violation of law will not justify reversing courses, where evidence shows that the river by changing its course had crossed the lines, and where by extending the line the original shape of the tract can be practically restored.-Id. V. ACTIONS FOR COMPENSATION. 84 (1) (Mo.App.) In broker's action for compensation, plaintiff has burden of showing that defendant principal used information or services furnished by plaintiff in negotiating loan after terminating plaintiff's agency. Johnson v. Columbia Mortgage & Trust Co., 201 S. W. 365. 86(1) (Mo.App.) In broker's action for (Tex.Civ.App.) Where two contiguous commissions on loan negotiated by defendant tracts are bounded by field notes radically principal after terminating agency, evidence different as to courses and distances, the trial held not to sustain verdict that defendant court has no authority to change field notes availed itself of information or services supof the older survey so as to include the young-plied by plaintiff.-Johnson v. Columbia Morter when no evidence of the footsteps of the gage & Trust Co., 201 S. W. 365. original survey can be found.-Howell v. Ellis, 201 S. W. 1022. AND ESTABLISHMENT. 35(1) (Tex.Civ.App.) Where footsteps of the surveyor are not found, it is the court's duty to ascertain intention by surveyor's field notes and circumstances and conditions surrounding the survey.-Howell v. Ellis, 201 S. W. 1022. BUILDINGS. CANCELLATION OF INSTRUMENTS. See Reformation of Instruments. 37 (1) (Tex. Civ.App.) Evidence held to sustain finding of the jury of the location of I. RIGHT OF ACTION AND DEFENSES. plaintiff's boundaries as contended for by them 4 (Ky.) Cancellation of executed contract in their action of trespass to try title.-Sullivan is exercise of most extraordinary power of v. Masterson, 201 S. W. 194. court of equity, which should not be exercised except in clear case, and never for alleged fraud, unless it is clearly made to appear.Virginia Iron, Coal & Coke Co. v. Crigger, 201 S. W. 298. 40(1) (Ky.) Direction of verdict is properly refused, evidence being conflicting on issue of which of two objects was dividing ridge between named hollows, called for by deed as part of boundary.-Pulaski Stave Co. v. Sale, 201 S. W. 12. 47(1) (Tex. Civ.App.) Where plaintiff's ancestor in title owned two tracts, and conveyed one by deed, if such ancestor had the land surveyed or pointed out the lines, plaintiff would be bound thereby.-Massingill v. Moody, 201 S. W. 265. 52(3) (Ky.) Report of processioners under Ky. St. § 2368, after notice to adjoining owners, is prima facie evidence of the true location of boundary line.-Foster v. Roberts, 201 S. W. 334. 54(6) (Tex.Civ.App.) The presumption that surveyor did not cross a navigable stream in violation of law is one of fact only.-Howell v. Ellis, 201 S. W. 1022. BRIEFS. See Appeal and Error, 759-773. BROKERS. IV. COMPENSATION AND LIEN. I. 426. CONTROL AND REGULATION OF COMMON CARRIERS. 44 (Mo.App.) Where real estate agent places his principal in touch with purchaser and thereafter principal terminates agency and (B) Interstate and International Transcompletes sale to such purchaser, agent may recover his commission.-Johnson v. Columbia Mortgage & Trust Co., 201 S. W. 365. Where agent in good health expends time and labor but has not had reasonable opportunity to avail himself of results, principal cannot terminate agency and use such services without compensating agent.-Id. 54 (Ark.) Under contract of broker to produce a purchaser "ready, willing, and able to buy" on the principal's terms, he is entitled to commission if he produces one with whom the principal contracts.-Warmack Perkins, 201 S. W. 120. V. portation. 32 (1) (Tenn.) A connecting carrier is not estopped to rely on a provision in a bill of lading, limiting liability to loss occurring on its own lines to defeat recovery on an unlawful contract made by its agent to pay such loss on interstate shipment, since estoppel cannot be invoked to obtain for shipper an illegal preference. Southern Ry. Co. v. Lewis & Adcock Co., 201 S. W. 131. 32(2) (Ark.) That a station agent after telegraphing told a shipper that a train arriving during the night would carry his cattle did not constitute a contract for special service and a discrimination in violation of the Elkins Act.-Chicago, R. I. & P. Ry. Co. v. Stallings, 201 S. W. 294. 32 (2) (Mo.App.) In action under Carmack Amendment against initial carrier of certain interstate shipments, there could be no covery on theory that carrier had waived provision in contract as to notice, in view of pur re pose of Interstate Commerce Act to prevent | forced.-Carolina Spruce Co. v. Black Moundiscrimination.-Cudahy Packing Co. v. Chi- tain R. Co., 201 S. W. 154. cago & N. W. Ry. Co., 201 S. W. 596. 32(2) (Tenn.) An agreement by a carrier to pay damages, not occurring on its lines, to goods shipped in interstate commerce under a bill of lading providing that no carrier shall be liable for loss other than on its own lines, is a discrimination and unenforceable.-Southern Ry. Co. v. Lewis & Adcock Co., 201 S. W. 131. II. CARRIAGE OF GOODS. (F) Loss of or Injury to Goods. 131 (Mo.App.) In an action against common carrier for damage to a shipment of a meat, a defense that the meat was spoiled, because being packed in defective refrigerator cars, was not covered by general denial.Cudahy Packing Co. v. Atchison, T. & S. F. Ry. Co., 201 S. W. 623. ed as III. CARRIAGE OF LIVE STOCK. 213 (Ark.) Where a shipper left his cattle in loading pen and car where they could not be fed or watered, relying on statement of railroad agent that train would take them during that night and they were not taken until 5 o'clock next day, the carrier was negligent, and shipper could recover loss sustained.-Chicago, R. I. & P. Ry. Co. v. Stallings, 201 S. W. 294. 218(5) (Mo.App.) A provision in a contract of shipment of cattle, that the carrier does not assume any liability for live stock while remaining in pens awaiting shipment, is void as far as intended to relieve the carrier of negligence.-Akeman v. Wabash Ry. Co., 201 S. W. 590. W. 590. 228(5) (Mo.App.) Evidence held sufficient to support a finding that a steer shipped over 134 (Mo.App.) In an action against a common carrier for damages to a shipment of defendant's road died through negligence of fresh meat, evidence that the meat was pack- defendant.-Akeman v. Wabash Ry. Co., 201 S. was eustomary held sufficient to show that it was properly packed and in good condi-229 (5) (Ark.) Where a carrier delayed a tion at the time of delivery to the carrier.- shipment of 47 head of cattle for about a day, Cudahy Packing Co. v. Atchison, T. & S. F. causing them to be without feed or water, a Ry. Co., 201 S. W. 623. verdict for $150 damages, based on testimony of cattleman as to their shrinkage in weight, is not excessive.-Chicago, R. I. & P. Ry. Co. v. Stallings, 201 S. W. 294. In an action against a common carrier for damages to a shipment of meat in transit, evidence held not to show notice to the carrier of intent to claim damages, as required by the bill of lading.-Id. 137 (Mo.App.) In action against a common carrier for damages to a shipment of meat, an instruction for defendant, if the damage was caused by the insufficiency of the cars to properly refrigerate the meat, held properly refused as being outside the issue.-Cudahy Packing Co. v. Atchison, T. & S. F. Ry. Co., 201 S. W. 623. (H) Limitation of Liability. 159(2) (Mo.App.) A bill of lading, covering a shipment of meat, providing that claims for loss, damage, or delay must be made in writing to the carrier at the point of delivery within four months, is binding upon the shipper.-Cudahy Packing Co. v. Atchison, T. & S. F. Ry. Co., 201 S. W. 623. IV. CARRIAGE OF PASSENGERS. (D) Personal Injuries. 282 (Mo.) Mere fact that, when prospective passenger on freight train trespassed on part of right of way not intended for his use, he was not ejected, did not make him invitee to go into same place second time, especially where dangerous condition Was obvious.Hamilton v. Pryor, 201 S. W. 550. 295 (1) (Mo.) It was not negligence for conductor and motorman to leave street car on slight incline, provided they first properly secured car.-Delfosse v. United Rys. Co. of St. Louis, 201 S. W. 860. Street railway was not responsible for injuries to girl passenger who jumped from car which began to move unattended down slight incline on which it had been stopped where railway was not responsible for car so moving. -Id. (I) Connecting Carriers. 180 (1) (Tenn.) Carmack Amendment, creating initial carrier's unity of responsibili-306 (1) (Ark.) A contract provision that ty for transportation to destination, does not union depot company should be liable to the preclude limiting the responsibility to shipper railroad company for negligence of servants by a connecting carrier to damages on its own held limited to the depot company's own yard line, and such limitation is good at common limits, and not applicable to negligence of an law. Southern Ry. Co. v. Lewis & Adcock operator failing to transmit to conductor mesCo., 201 S. W. 131. sages covering train movements wholly beyond such yard limits.-Kansas City Southern Ry. Co. v. Wade, 201 S. W. 787. (J) Charges and Liens. 193 (Tenn.) Under contract to transport A provision, in an agreement for use of lumber, etc., at four cents per hundred pounds joint tracks, that if plaintiff carried passengers in excess of current rates from a junction, between certain stations it should assume recharge of that rate and receipt of three cents sponsibility for injuries to such, as though it from connecting carrier for originating traf-owned and exclusively operated the road, confic was authorized.-Carolina Spruce Co. v. Black Mountain R. Co., 201 S. W. 154. strued with other clauses, held to mean injuries caused by negligence of plaintiff's servants, the parties being each liable for one-half of injuries caused by negligence of joint servants under another clause.-Id. Established and well-known practice among railroads to allow to carrier originating business an advantage in distribution or division of rate has been recognized and by fair infer-306 (4) (Ark.) Under a contract with ence upheld by Interstate Commerce Commission and United States Supreme Court.-Id. (K) Discrimination and Overcharge. 199 (Tenn.) Railroad's contract for construction of logging road to main line junetion, and to transport goods at certain rate, if construed as giving logging company right to part of through rate allowed railroad for originating business would give it an undue and forbidden preference, and should not be en plaintiff for joint use of defendant's track, providing that each railway company shall be liable for one-half of the injury to persons caused by negligence of a joint employé, and who shall be considered such, held that a telegraph operator of a union depot company, receiving and transmitting train orders, for both, is such joint employé.-Kansas City Southern Ry. Co. v. Wade, 201 S. W. 787. 317(8) (Mo.App.) In action against receivers of street railway for injuries to pas |