of abstract furnished is not equivalent of non-735 (Mo.App.) Where several persons insuit, which does not bar further action.-Id. 564 (1) (Mo.App.) In a suit for purchase money due on a sale of land defended solely on the ground that the abstract did not show clear title, and wherein defendant averred willingness to pay for such a title, a judgment in his favor held not res judicata as to a subsequent suit on petition setting forth substantially the same facts.-Hobson v. Lenox, 201 S. W. 964. (B) Causes of Action and Defenses Merg ed, Barred, or Concluded. 603 (Mo.App.) Where landlord sued in justice court for rent due, and summons was made returnable in nine days instead of ten, as required by Rev. St. 1909, § 7420, and alias summons then issued returnable in due time, the fact that another month's rent fell due before the issuance of the alias summons did not preclude recovery for such month in a second suit. -Plonsky v. Morrison, 201 S. W. 595. 606 (Ky.) Recovery for temporary injury to land by flooding is not a bar to an action for damages for subsequent flooding.-Stahr v. Chicago, M. & G. R. Co., 201 S. W. 451. dorsed a note for accommodation, which a bank accepted as collateral, and in settling the estate of one indorser the original note was allowed as a claim, held, that the judgment allowing the claim was not res judicata as to such estate; the defense of payment having later arisen.-Ollis v. Farmers' & Merchants' Bank, 201 S. W. 947. 735 (Tex. Civ.App.) Judgment is not res adjudicata to prior suit, where matter in issue in subsequent suit was not in issue in prior suit.-International & G. N. Ry. Co. v. Concrete Inv. Co., 201 S. W. 718. 739 (Tex.Civ.App.) Claims against a railroad company under Rev. St. 1911, art. 6625, enacted September 1, 1910 (Acts 31st Leg. [4th Called Sess.] c. 4), could not have been adjudicated in receivership proceedings had prior to the enactment of such statute, and therefore prior to the existence of the purchasing corporations.-International & G. N. Ry. Co. v. Concrete Inv. Co., 201 S. W. 718. 740 (Ky.) That wife in former suit asserted homestead rather than dower rights would in no way affect or defeat dower awarded in such suit.-Johnson v. Boggess, 201 S. W. 42. 619 (Mo.App.) Where contract to erect school building was basis of judgment for bal-743 (2) (Mo.App.) In suit against bank for ance due thereon, its validity could not be attacked in mandamus to enforce it on ground that contractor had entered into contract with knowledge that existence of district had been attacked by quo warranto, as contract was merged in the judgment and defenses should have been made in the contract case.-State ex rel. Hentschel v. Cook. 201 S. W. 361. XIV. CONCLUSIVENESS OF ADJUDI (B) Persons Concluded. fund, wherein bank interpleaded another with See Criminal Law, 304; Evidence, 5- 682 (3) (Mo.) Decree of Supreme Court on 705 (Mo.App.) Where a factor was garnished for proceeds of goods, and a bank interpleaded and claimed it was owner of the goods, if the bank proves its claim, the factor cannot hold out an amount due it from the shipper, where it did not appear in the action except by answer to the garnishor.-Cochrane v. First State Bank of Pickton, Tex., 201 S. W. 572. (C) Matters Concluded. under 713(2) (Tex. Civ.App.) That claim Rev. St. 1911, art. 6625, could have been asserted by amendment of plea of intervention filed prior to enactment of such statute did not make determination of plea res adjudicata as to such claim.-International & G. N. Ry. Co. v. Concrete Inv. Co., 201 S. W. 718. 714(1) (Tex. Civ.App.) In order for judg. ment to be res adjudicata, it must have litigated same claim as that involved in second action. International & G. N. Ry. Co. v. Concrete Inv. Co., 201 S. W. 718. 719 (Tex.Civ.App.) In passing on plea of res adjudicata, issues involved in actions are determined from pleadings therein.-International & G. N. Ry. Co. v. Concrete Inv. Co., 201 S. W. 718. m 70. JUDICIAL SALES. See Execution, 266-315; Executors and Ad- JUNK DEALERS. See Constitutional Law, 287; Licenses, 7, 16; Searches and Seizures, JURISDICTION. 682; See Appeal and Error, 456, 493, 840; Can- JURY. See Appeal and Error, 994; Criminal Law, 740-764; Grand Jury. II. RIGHT TO TRIAL BY JURY. 19(1) (Ark.) Under Kirby's Dig. §§ 449, 4480, and 4485, relating to summary procedure by client to recover money received by an attorney, where the attorney files a verified answer setting up a good defense, he is entitled to a regular jury trial.-Davies & Davies v. Patterson, 201 S. W. 504. 720 (Tex.Civ.App.) Where decree dividing land between owners contained call for dis- 32 (4) (Ark.) Acts 1917, p. 229, providing tance, and also incorporated therein prior par- that the verdict of any nine of the jurors in a tition deeds and subdivision map, held, distance civil case shall be accepted as the verdict of call could not be selected from among such de- the jury, is void as offending against the conscriptions, so as to render the decree conclu- stitutional guaranty of the right of trial by sive as to adjoining tracts' common boundary jury.-Davis v. H. A. Nelson & Son, 201 S. W. line.-Wilson v. Hutcheson, 201 S. W. 1158. '511. For cases in Dec. Dig. & Am. Dig. Key No. Series & Indexes see same topic and KEY-NUMBER IV. SUMMONING, ATTENDANCE, DIS- SATION. 70(8) (Tex.Cr.App.) Where there were 84 jurors selected for term of court and 60 were discharged without being drawn or serving on a venire, the drawing of the remaining 24 and the adding of 24 names by the sheriff, in a capital case, was not a compliance with Code Cr. Proc. 1911, art. 661, relating to drawing of special venire, and a conviction cannot stand. -Clayton v. State, 201 S. W. 172. IV. PROCEDURE IN CIVIL CASES. 86(6) (Ark.) Under Kirby's Dig. § 385, purchaser at attachment sale in justice court, held to become a party to the proceeding and bound by subsequent order sustaining exceptions and setting aside the sale.-Henry Quellmalz Lumber & Mfg. Co. v. Day, 201 S. W. 125. 90 (Mo.App.) Since a court of the justice of the peace is not a court of record, Rev. St. 1909, § 1834, prescribing the forms of pleading in courts of record, does not apply to actions originating before, the courts of justices of the 72(3) (Ark.) Special venire selected from peace.-City of La Grange ex rel. Palmer v. list of conveniently located persons prepared Carnival City Packet Co., 201 S. W. 631. by judge and sheriff, held chosen from bystand-91(2) (Mo.App.) Statement for material ers within Kirby's Dig. § 4520, authorizing furnished defendant by plaintiff, filed before special venire to be selected from bystanders justice of peace, held fatally defective and inwhen regular panel is disqualified.-Rogers v. sufficient to support judgment for plaintiff.State, 201 S. W. 845. Gillings v. Chapple, 201 S. W. 620. 82(3) (Ark.) Accused cannot complain of 91(2) (Mo.App.) Complaint in justice court manner in which special venire was selected, alleging that the plaintiff was a municipal eerwhere he did not exhaust his peremptory chal-poration, duly organized under the laws of lenges, and did not show that any juror was dis- Missouri and located in Union township, Lewis qualified or biased.-Rogers v. State, 201 S. W. county, Mo., sufficiently identified the city, and 845. was sufficiently specific to bar another action on the claim involved.-City of La Grange ex rel. Palmer v. Carnival City Packet Co., 201 S. W. 631. 82(3) (Tex.Cr.App.) That jury imposed imprisonment. instead of death in capital case, does not affect the right of the defendant to a venire in accordance with law relating to capi-92 (Mo.App.) Though case arises before tal cases.-Clayton v. State, 201 S. W. 172. justice of peace, when defendant does file answer, it should contain all defenses relied on.-V. COMPETENCY OF JURORS, CHAL- Sutton v. Libby, 201 S. W. 615. LENGES, AND OBJECTIONS. 90 (Ky.) Where a juror was in fact related to deceased, one convicted by the jury of which he was a member was entitled to reversal, unless the juror was in fact ignorant of the relationship.-Leadingham V. Commonwealth, 201 S. W. 500. 99(1) (Ky.) Where a juror had expressed an opinion as to accused's guilt, and falsely stated on his examination that he had not done so, accused, when convicted by jury of which such juror was a member, was entitled to reversal. Leadingham v. Commonwealth, 201 S. W. 500. 130 (Tex. Civ. App.) Justices' courts have special and exclusive jurisdiction under Constitution, and other courts cannot review trials therein except upon appeal, and, where no appeal is allowed, judgments rendered therein are conclusive.--Mann v. Brown, 201 S. W. 438. 135(3) (Tenn.) The levy of an execution from a justice's judgment upon land creates a lien in favor of the judgment_creditor.-Hammock v. Qualls, 201 S. W. 517. V. REVIEW OF PROCEEDINGS. (A) Appeal and Error. (Tex.Civ.App.) County court on appeal from justice has jurisdiction to adjudicate claim for additional damages from deterioration of attached goods since appeal, though this raised amount involved above $200. -Hegman v. Roberts, 201 S. W. 268. 103(3) (Ky.) Unless a juror who had pre-141(4) viously formed or expressed an opinion with regard to accused's guilt qualified by stating on his voir dire examination as provided in Cr. Code Prac. § 207, that he believed he could fairly and impartially render a verdict, one convicted by a jury of which such person was a member was entitled to reversal.-Leadingham v. Commonwealth, 201 S. W. 500. 103(14) (Ark.) A juror who had formed an opinion from newspaper accounts of a rape case, who expressed a fixed willingness and ability to disregard such opinion, was not disqualified.-Crawford v. State, 201 S. W. 784. VI. IMPANELING FOR TRIAL AND ОАТН. 150(4) (Mo.App.) Advantage may be taken of fatally deficient statement filed in justice court at any stage of case, even in Court of Appeals.-Gillings v. Chapple, 201 S. W. 620. 156 (Mo.App.) Where transcript filed by justice in circuit court showed that bond and affidavit required by statute were duly filed, and justice did in point of fact return such appeal to circuit court, circuit court had jurisdiction, though no actual allowance of appeal appeared in record of justice, in view of Rev. St. 1909, § 7574.-Hatfield v. Watson, 201 S. W. 564. 157 (4) (Mo.App.) Under Rev. St. 1909, § 7580, providing that no appeal allowed by justice shall be dismissed for defective affidavit, held, where affidavit lacked jurat, appellants were properly allowed to amend before motion to dismiss was determined.-Hatfield v. Watson, 201 S. W. 564. 159 (3) (Mo.App.) A suit in justice court based on memorandum entitled "W., Debtor to H. in McDonald case, P. Trustee," was against W. alone, so that appeal bond signed by him alone was not defective.-Hatfield v. Watson, 201 S. W. 564. under 164(3) (Tex. Civ.App.) Although, Vernon's Sayles' Ann. Civ. St. 1914, art. 2396, upon granting appeal to county court, justice shall immediately make and transmit transcript, and under article 2395 appeal is perfected upon filing bond, appellant must cause transcript to be filed as required by article 1251 2397.-Houston & T. C. R. Co. v. Aycock, 201, plaintiff's title.-Russell v. McIntosh, 201 S. S. W. 664. failure of 166(2) (Tex.Civ.App.) Upon justice of peace to make and transmit transcript upon appeal to county court, as required by Vernon's Sayles' Ann. Civ. St. 1914, art. 2396, and within time required by article 2397, appellant must compel, same failure to do which for several subsequent terms is negligence justifying dismissal.-Houston & T. C. R. Co. v. Aycock, 201 S. W. 664. Failure to file appeal transcript from justice with county court within time prescribed in Vernon's Sayles' Ann. Civ. St. 1914, art. 2397, will not always be ground for dismissal, since article 2400 provides mode of procedure in district and county courts shall control in justice's courts, unless procedure is otherwise prescribed, where for good cause more than 90 days may be allowed.-Id. W. 33. IV. TERMS FOR YEARS. (C) Extensions, Renewals, and Options to Purchase or Sell. in possession VII. PREMISES AND ENJOYMENT (B) Possession, Enjoyment, and Use. 139(1) (Ark.) The rights of parties where crops on leased land in another state were there converted by a third person are governed by the law of that state.-Security Bank & Trust Co. v. Bond, 201 S. W. 820. 166 (3) (Tex. Civ.App.) Upon appeal from justice of peace to county court, appellee cannot file motion to dismiss until transcript has 139(5) (Ark.) While right of action, which been filed.-Houston & T. C. R. Co. v. Aycock, 201 S. W. 664. 174(22) (Mo.App.) Objection ore tenus in circuit court to statement of cause of action filed before justice of peace, held not entitled to as favorable consideration as if made by written motion to dismiss timely filed.-Gillings v. Chapple, 201 S. W. 620. JUVENILE COURTS. See Infants, 18. JUVENILE DELINQUENTS. See Infants, 16, 18. LACHES. became complete in another state, of landlord against third person who converted the tenant's crop, is enforceable in Arkansas, the remedy depends on the law of Arkansas.-Security Bank & Trust Co. v. Bond, 201 S. W. 820. Remedy of landlord, having lien on tenant's crops, for conversion by third person, is action against tenant for debt, with attachment, or suit in equity against third person.-Id. 139(5) (Tex.Civ.App.) Evidence held sufficient to support finding that lessor agreed to furnish lessee necessary water for irrigating rice crop.-Hudson v. Salley, 201 S. W. 665. (F) Eviction. 180(4) (Ark.) The measure of damages for unlawful eviction is the difference between the agreed rent and the fair rental value, and See Equity, 84; Fraudulent Conveyances, not the profits that would have resulted from 249. LANDLORD AND TENANT. See Eminent Domain, 155; Fixtures, (Mo.App.) Tenant is one who holds or possesses lands or tenements by any kind of title, either in fee, for life, for years, or at will; in popular sense he is one who has temporary use and occupation of lands belonging to another. Young v. Home Telephone Co., 201 S. W. 635. II. LEASES AND AGREEMENTS IN (A) Requisites and Validity. 20 (Mo.App.) It is only in character and status of landlord that owner of premises can contract with reference to compensation for their use and occupation by another.-Young v. Home Telephone Co., 201 S. W. 635. making the lease.-Reeves v. Romines, 201 S. W. 822. Where lessee based his sole right to recover for eviction on profits he would have realized from making a crop, and not the true measure of damages, which is the difference between the rent agreed on and the rental value, he cannot recover nominal damages.-Id. VIII. RENT AND ADVANCES. (A) Rights and Liabilities. 181 (Mo.App.) Fixed charge as compensation for use and occupation of land is "rent." -Young v. Home Telephone Co., 201 S. W. 635. 183 (Mo.App.) Payment of rent is incident to every tenancy, where relation of landlord and tenant subsists, except as to mere tenancy at will or by sufferance, where relation cannot be said to exist.-Young v. Home Telephone Co., 201 S. W. 635. (C) Lien. 246 (5) (Tenn.) A lease clause, retaining lien on future acquired property brought on premises, was good as between lessor and lessee, regardless of whether property became a fixtu-Hart v. Appalachian Washed Coal Co., 201 S. W. 515. (B) Construction and Operation. 44(1) (Ark.) Lessee held obligated by lease only to cultivate 10 acres first year, and to have full term of lease within which to burn248(1) (Tenn.) Rights of conditional selllogs, brush, etc., and otherwise to perform er to whom was due balance for purchase price covenants.-Stanley v. White, 201 S. W. 804. of machinery sold to a lessee, but not permanently affixed, held superior to those of III. LANDLORD'S TITLE AND RElessor under lease giving lien for rent on future acquired property brought on premises. -Hart v. Appalachian Washed Coal Co., 201 S. W. 515. VERSION. (B) Estoppel of Tenant. IX. RE-ENTRY AND RECOVERY OF 61 (Ky.) If defendant's remote ancestor entered on the land as a tenant of the owner agreeing to purchase it from him later and such owner granted it to plaintiff's remote ancestor, defendant's remote ancestor and like-290(2) (Ky.) Ky. St. § 2327, embraces tenwise defendant were estopped to questionancy where tenant agrees to make improve 290(3) (Tenn.) Under Thompson's non's Code, § 5093, landlord may sue to dis LEASE. See Landlord and Tenant; Mines and Minerals, 78; Railroads, 131, 133. LEAVE OF COURT. possess assignee of tenant holding over, though See Pleading, 237. 291(4) (Ky.) Where one rents land in his own name, he can prosecute forcible entry proceedings in his own name, either under Civ. Code Prac. § 21, or because the tenant cannot deny that he is the landlord.-Hickman v. Fordyce, 201 S. W. 307. 291(10) (Ky.) Variance in description between writ of forcible entry and judgment held immaterial where, by further recitals in both, the place was called "Blue Grass Inn," a name by which the premises were generally known.Hickman v. Fordyce, 201 S. W. 307. 308 (3) (Ark.) In action of unlawful detainer by successor of lessor against lessee, plaintiff's testimony held insufficient to take to jury question whether or not defendant had cleared and put into cultivation 10 acres during first year of lease; several witnesses for defendant testifying he did so.-Stanley v. White, 201 S. W. 804. LEGISLATIVE POWER. LEVEES. See Constitutional Law, 70, 328. 132 (Mo.) After officers of levee company refused to serve, and company became defunct, when plaintiff and adjacent owners furnished land and constructed new levees integral with old, they could not, when new levee district was organized, have compensation as owners of old levee, under Rev. St. 1909, § 5707.Voss v. Des Moines & Mississippi Levee Dist. No. 1, 201 S. W. 538. Nor could they have compensation as persons interested under Rev. St. 1909, § 5707. Id. Rev. St. 1909, § 5707, created no liability against the defunct company on ground of acceptance and use of benefits.-Id. 14 (Ark.) Where it was necessary to close a levee gap outside Chicot county in order to prevent overflow, such closure was a part of X. RENTING ON SHARES. the levee system created by Acts 1915, p. 423, 321 (Tex.Civ.App.) Rev. St. 1911, art. 5475, as to levees in Chicot county.-Alcorn v. Blissas amended in 1915 (Acts 34th Leg. c. 38 Cook Oak Co., 201 S. W. 797. [Vernon's Ann. Civ. St. Supp. 1918, art. 54751), 22 (Ark.) Acts 1915, p. 423, § 15, providlimiting share rental of agricultural lands, helding for a maximum levee tax in C. county not inapplicable where landlord furnished house, to exceed 10 cents per acre, is not invalid garden, pasturage, etc., besides furnishing as disproportionate taxation, though various everything needed to raise the crop.-Green v. acreages vary in value.-Alcorn v. Bliss-Cook Prince, 201 S. W. 200. Oak Co., 201 S. W. 797. 25 (Ark.) The Legislature may act directly in determining the amount of benefits to the land in a levee district, or it may empower a board to act for it.-Alcorn v. Bliss-Cook Oak Co.. 201 S. W. 797. The determination of the Legislature, or of the board of levee inspectors, fixing taxes and benefits in a levee district, will not be reviewed, in the absence of an arbitrary abuse of discretion, nor for mere mistakes of judgment.-Id. LEVY. Pen. See Execution, 145; Levees, 25. (A) Indictment and Information. under 37 (Tex.Cr.App.) Indictment Code 1911, art. 1351, for theft from person, must allege that property was taken from person of another, and it is not sufficient to allege that it was taken "from the possession of the person" of another.-White v. State, 201 S. W. 186. (C) Trial and Review. 68(1) (Mo.) In prosecution for larceny of cow, question of guilt held for jury.-State v. Nave, 201 S. W. 88. In prosecution for larceny of cow, question of the identity of cow which plaintiff drove away with one charged to have been stolen held for jury.-Id. LAST CLEAR CHANCE DOCTRINE. See Street Railroads, 103. LAW OF THE CASE. See Appeal and Error, 853, 1097, 1195. LAW OF THE ROAD. See Highways, 184. LEADING QUESTIONS. See Witnesses, 240. See Prostitution. LEWDNESS. 9 (Tex.Cr.App.) On trial under indictment for living together and having carnal intercourse, where state's witnesses had testified to seeing accused with the woman in very secreted place near certain mail box, evidence that the woman frequently went to mail box and remained there from 20 minutes to 2 hours was admissible.-Green v. State, 201 S. W. 182. LIBEL AND SLANDER. V. SLANDER OF PROPERTY OR 136 (Mo.App.) Const. art. 2, § 14, guaranteeing privilege of saying, writing, and publishing whatever citizen desires, subject to liability for any abuse, and providing that in all suits and prosecutions truth may be given in evidence, applies to actions for slander of title. Nat. L. McGuire Oil & Supply Co. v. Marvin, 201 S. W. 628. If statements alleged to have been slanderous of plaintiff's title were true, defendant was permitted to publish them where, when, and as often as he desired.-Id. 139 (Mo.App.) Petition held grounded on slander of title, and not on unfair competition and interference with plaintiff's business.-Nat. L. McGuire Oil & Supply Co. v. Marvin, 201 S. W. 628. The remedy for slander of title is by action at law, and not by suit for injunction.-Id. LICENSES. See Constitutional Law, 48, 287; Food: I. FOR OCCUPATIONS AND PRIVI LEGES. (Tenn.) Revenue Act 1915, §§ 8 and 10, Producing Co. v. Davidson County, 201 S. 16(11) (Mo.) One dealing in bottles, chief. ly new, but handling large quantities of used bottles, is a "junk merchant" within St. Louis City Ordinance No. 24751.-City of St. Louis v. Baskowitz, 201 S. W. 870. LIENS. See Chattel Mortgages, 138; Execution, 108-146; Justices of the Peace, 135; Landlord and Tenant, 246, 248; Mechanics' Liens; Mortgages, 149; Municipal Corporations, 975; Pledges; States, 131. 15 (Tenn.) Secret liens are not favorites taxing transfers of realty and corporations of the law.-Hammock v. Qualls, 201 S. W. 517. acquiring property of another corporation, impose privilege taxes.-State v. Louisville & N. R. Co.. 201 S. W. 738. 6(13) (Mo.) Under Charter of St. Louis, art. 3. § 26, cl. 5, giving power to license, regulate, or tax certain named occupations "and all other business trades, avocations or professions whatever." applies to one dealing in used bottles, whether his occupation be specifically named or not.-City of St. Louis v. Baskowitz, 201 S. W. 870. 7(1) (Mo.) The business of junk and secondhand dealers being of such character as to warrant police regulation. St. Louis City Ordinance No. 24751, § 1605, providing for such regulation, is a valid exercise of such police power, as conferred by Charter, article 3. § 26. -City of St. Louis v. Baskowitz, 201 S. W. 870. LIFE ESTATES. See Dower; Wills, 614. 24 (Tenn.) Where life tenant mortgaged land assigned to him under a void partition decree, the mortgage was valid as against his interest, although void as against remaindermen. -Chickamauga Trust Co. v. Lonas, 201 S. W. 777. 27(2) (Ky.) In action by life tenant under Civ. Code Prac. § 491, to sell land and reinvest, remaindermen are necessary parties. but conare not.-Walden tingent remaindermen Smith, 201 S. W. 302. reinvestment in land in another county.-Id. V. Under Civ. Code Prac. § 491, circuit court of county in which land held by life tenant is loThe conduct of the business of a junk mer-cated has jurisdiction to decree sale of land and chant is not an inalienable right, and may be forbidden, and a junk merchant cannot complain that an ordinance, requiring him to keep a registry, etc., is oppressive, particularly when made burdensome by the size of his business.-Id. Where life tenant, with her children as remaindermen, were living at distance from land not containing farm buildings, and could not conveniently farm it, court properly ordered sale of the land and reinvestment near their place of abode.-Id. 7(1) (Tex.Civ.App.) Acts 35th Leg. c. 190, and chapter 207, as amended by First Called Sess. 35th Leg. c. 31, creating state highway department and providing for licensing of motor vehicles, held not a revenue measure.-Atkins See Adverse Possession; Municipal Corpora v. State Highway Department, 201 S. W. 226. That amounts realized from license fees provided for by Acts 35th Leg. c. 190, and chapter 207, as amended by First Called Sess. 35th Leg. c. 31, greatly exceed expense of administer ing law, held not to show that Legislature provided for tax.-Id. 7(2) (Tex.Civ.App.) License fees for operation of motor may be fixed according to horse power, though Const. art. 8, §§ 1, 2, requires uniformity of taxation and forbids assessment of property for taxes elsewhere than in county where it is situated.-Atkins v. State Highway Department, 201 S. W. 226. LIMITATION OF ACTIONS. tions, 564. 1. STATUTES OF LIMITATION. (B) Limitations Applicable to Particular Actions. 21(5) (Ark.) Negligent lending of money by bank officers to a local factory created no liability enforceable at the suit of a stockholder who knew of the loans, but did not bring suit for more than three years, in view of Kirby's Dig. § 5064, requiring actions on any unwritten contract to be brought within three years.— Magale v. Fomby, 201 S. W. 278. 32(3) (Mo.App.) An action for damages for overflow caused by the construction of city and railroad improvements is barred under the five-year statute.-Frederick v. City of Joplin, 201 S. W. 1147. 7(3) (Mo.) The provisions of St. Louis City Ordinance No. 24751, § 1605, relating to licensing of junk dealers, is not in conflict with Const. art. 10, § 3, providing taxes shall be uniform upon the same class of subjects, because it divides an occupation into different 34(7) (Ky.) Action to recover inheritance classes, if uniform as to each class.-City of St. Louis v. Baskowitz, 201 S. W. 870. mer 7(8) (Mo.) Where one has paid a chant's tax, both state and city, the exaction of a junk merchant's occupation tax also is not violative of the provisions against double taxation. City of St. Louis v. Baskowitz, 201 S. W. 870. 16(9) (Tenn.) Revenue Law, imposing tax on persons having oil tanks, etc., for purpose of selling, delivering, or distributing oil, is inapplicable to petroleum manufacturer and refiner maintaining storage tanks merely as part of its manufacturing establishment and making only manufacturer's profit.-General Refining & tax is barred in five years under Ky. St. § 2515, providing such limitation period for statutory liabilities where no other time is fixed, and section 2523, making such limitation period applicable to actions by commonwealth.Ritcher v. Commonwealth, 201 S. W. 456. 35(1) (Mo.) Kansas Reciprocal Demurrage Act (Gen. St. Kan. 1909, §§ 7201-7203), subjecting railroad to exemplary damages to shipper for delay in furnishing cars, held penal statute within section 5610, Gen. St. Kan. 1909, providing that action for penalty must be brought within one year.-Frizell Grain & Supply Co. v. Atchison, T. & S. F. Ry. Co., 201 S. W. 78. |