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II. COMPUTATION OF PERIOD OF
LIMITATION.

(A) Accrual of Right of Action or De-
fense.

LIMITATION OF LIABILITY.

See Carriers, 218; Telegraphs and Telephones.

LIQUOR SELLING.

See Intoxicating Liquors.

LIVE STOCK SANITARY COMMIS

SION.

58(6) (Ky.) Under inheritance tax law (Ky. St. §§ 4281a-4281t), and especially section 4281d, providing no interest shall be charged if tax be paid within 18 months, which period, under section 4281e, may be extended if estate is involved in litigation, payment of tax cannot be legally enforced and limitation statute does not run against state until such period See Constitutional Law, 62. has expired, unless tax is received by executor, etc., when it must be paid within 30 days, from which time statute runs.-Ritcher Commonwealth, 201 S. W. 456.

V.

(C) Personal Disabilities and Privileges.
72(1) (Ark.) The stockholder's suit to en-
force liability of bank officers for negligently
lending money being derivative, since such suit
is on behalf of the bank, is not excepted from
the bar of the statute of limitations by minor-
ity of the stockholder.-Magale v. Fomby, 201
S. W. 278.

(F) Ignorance, Mistake, Trust, Fraud, and
Concealment of Cause of Action.
100(1) (Tex.Civ.App.) Limitations will not
run against defense of fraud until fraud is
discovered, or by use of reasonable diligence
might have been discovered.-Binder v. Millikin,
201 S. W. 239.

LOGS AND LOGGING.

3 (11) (Tex.Civ.App.) Where landowner conveyed timber, giving grantee 15 years for removal, with provision for extension of time. and heirs of such landowner conveyed land save and except timber included in deed of their ancestor, reversion rights in timber did not pass to grantee, and heirs of original owner alone are entitled to receive consideration for extension of period of removal.-Adams v. Fidelity Lumber Co., 201 S. W. 1034.

Timber deed providing for extension of period for removal held to authorize annual renewals for limited period, and forfeiture of timber rights could not be declared because grantee's successor, when renewal was asked, tendered only the annual payment.-Id.

Where timber deed specified acreage as 2,350 acres, more or less, annual payment for extension of time of removal should be computed on that acreage, though it subsequently developed that land was greater in area. Id.

100(3) (Ky.) Execution in 1914 on judgment obtained in 1908, which was not paid, more than five years after actual and constructive notice of judgment debtor's conveyance to wife 3(14) (Tex.Civ.App.) Where deed conveywithout consideration, and of her possession, was barred by the five-year statute of limitations, Ky. St. §§ 1907, 2515.-Harris v. Harris, 201 S. W. 312.

IV. OPERATION AND EFFECT OF
BAR BY LIMITATION.

ing timber provides a definite time within which timber is to be cut and removed, all timber not so cut within time limited reverts to grantor and those holding under him, notwithstanding deed does not in terms provide for reversion. -Adams v. Fidelity Lumber Co., 201 S. W. 1034. 1895,8(5) (Tex. Civ.App.) In action for breach of contract to pay for logs hauled, where evidence was conflicting as to which party breached the contract, the court erred in peremptorily instructing defendant.-Turner-Cummings Hardwood Co. v. Phillip A. Ryan Lumber Co., 201 S. W. 431.

169 (Mo.) Under Rev. St. 1909, § when cause of action originating in Kansas is barred by statute of limitations of that state, it is barred in Missouri.-Frizell Grain & Supply Co. v. Atchison, T. & S. F. Ry. Co., 201

S. W. 78.

V. PLEADING, EVIDENCE, TRIAL,
AND REVIEW.

for

LUMBER.

177(1) (Mo.App.) In an action on a life See Logs and Logging. policy, the defense of limitation is affirmative, and must be pleaded, or will be considered as waived. Rasch v. Bankers' Life Co. of Des Moines, Iowa, 201 S. W. 919.

180(1) (Ky.) The statute of limitations must be pleaded, and cannot be raised by demurrer.-Davidson v. Kentucky Coal Lands Co., 201 S. W. 982.

LUNATICS.

See Insane Persons.

MACHINERY.

See Master and Servant, 101-125, 233–247.

MALPRACTICE.

182(4) (Tex.Civ.App.) A first amended abandoned petition being no part of a second amended petition, that the second alleges a different cause of action can be raised only by See Physicians and Surgeons. plea and proof.-Corpus Christi Street & Interurban Ry. Co. v. Kjellberg, 201 S. W. 1032.

MANDAMUS.

I. NATURE AND GROUNDS IN GEN

ERAL.

183(2) (Mo.) In action on cause originating in other state, answer, alleging existence of statute of limitations of such other state as to such cause of action, and setting it out in (Mo.App.) Under the statutes mandamus hæc verba, properly pleads the statute.-Frizell Grain & Supply Co. v. Atchison, T. & S. F. Ry. Co., 201 S. W. 78.

199(2) (Mo.) Action for fraud, brought more than five years after exchange of properties was not barred as a matter of law by Rev. St. 1909, § 1889, where plaintiff did not discover the fraud for two years after he took possession.-Laird v. Keithley, 201 S. W. 1138.

LIMITATION OF INDEBTEDNESS. See Municipal Corporations, 863, 865.

is regarded as a special proceeding.-State ex rel. Hentschel v. Cook, 201 S. W. 361.

Mandamus, when used to enforce judgment against a municipal or public corporation, is merely a proceeding ancillary to the main suit and equivalent to an execution upon a judgment against an individual.-Id.

ing in the Code of Civil Procedure, providing 2 (Mo.App.) Rev. St. 1909, § 1864, appearthat article 6 of the Code applies to mandamus, necessarily implies that other parts of the Code do not apply, especially in view of sections 2546-2555, not in the Code, which provide for

mandamus.-State ex rel. Hentschel v. Cook, from herself entered in favor of deceased prior 201 S. W. 361. to alleged marriage to plaintiff.-Kinney v. Tri-State Telephone Co., 201 S. W. 1180.

III. JURISDICTION,

PROCEEDINGS,

AND RELIEF.

142 (Mo.App.) Code of Civil Procedure

MARRIED WOMEN.

(Rev. St. § 1751), as to venue, held not applica- See Husband and Wife; Set-Off and Counterble to mandamus.-State ex rel. Hentschel v. claim, 35. Cook, 201 S. W. 361.

Where a mandamus proceeding against the treasurer of a school district was merely a con

MASTER AND SERVANT.

tinuation of an original suit for balance due See Accord and Satisfaction, 5; Commerce, upon a contract made with district, and simply ancillary thereto, there could be no change of venue.-Id.

Circuit court of county in which a contractor's suit for balance due on contract with the school district was brought, after defendants had obtained a change of venue to another county, would have no right to issue mandamus to enforce payment of the judgment.-Id.

51(1) (Tex. Civ.App.) Owners of three surveys abutting on river bed were necessary parties to mandamus proceeding against county surveyor to compel him to survey river bed, as appropriated to public free school fund, that plaintiff might purchase it.-Siddall v. Hudson, 201 S. W. 1029.

law

con

153 (Mo.App.) The provisions of the authorizing persons having interest in a troversy to be made parties thereto have no application to proceedings in mandamus.-State ex rel. Hentschel v. Cook, 201 S. W. 361.

Directors of invalid school district did not occupy such a relation to the state as to entitle them to represent its interest in money paid to district as against mandamus to compel its application on a contractor's judgment against the district.-Id.

168(4) (Mo.App.) In mandamus against directors of school district to enforce payment of a judgment on its contract, evidence for defendants held not to show that money had been sent to district by state auditor under a misanprehension of facts and a mistake of law, or any misapprehension or mistake of defendants in receiving and retaining it.-State ex rel. Hentschel v. Cook, 201 S. W. 361.

MANSLAUGHTER.

See Homicide.

MARRIAGE.

See Divorce; Husband and Wife.

8, 27; Evidence, 592; Trial, 336.

I. THE RELATION.

(B) Statutory Regulation. 162. Owing to the great increase of matter heretofore classified to this section, we have made a new subdivision, consisting of number sections 346-420, at the end of this topic, where the matter in this and future index digests will be found.

(C) Termination and Discharge. ~41(6) (Tex.Civ.App.) In action for breach of contract of employment, burden of pleading and proving facts showing mitigation of damages by reason of employé's earnings after termination of contract is upon employer.-Mindes Millinery Co. v. Wellborn, 201 S. W. 1059. III. MASTER'S LIABILITY FOR INJURIES TO SERVANT.

(A) Nature and Extent in General.

872. Owing to the great increase of matter heretofore classified to this section, we have made a new subdivision, consisting of number sections 346-420, at the end of this topic, where the matter in this and future index digests will be found.

(B) Tools, Machinery, Appliances, and Places for Work.

101, 102(2) (Mo.App.) A sewer contractor is not an insurer of the safety of his employés working in the trench.-Gracy v. Walsh, 201 S. W. 582.

103(1) (Mo.App.) Where plaintiff's son was injured by explosion of dynamite, which he assisted in using for blowing up stumps, duty resting upon master of furnishing reasonably safe place in which to work was primary one, which could not be delegated.-Gibbs v. Duvall, 201 S. W. 605.

37 (Tex.Civ.App.) Final decree of divorce103 (2) (Tenn.) The master may delegate rendered by California court after the hus- to the servant the duty of constructing his own band's death constituted a valid divorce, and, instrumentalities of labor.-Casey-Hedges Co. together with fact of living together by hus- v. Gates, 201 S. W. 760. band who sought divorce and his second wife, married after the interlocutory decree, validated second marriage contract.-Kinney v. TriState Telephone Co., 201 S. W. 1180.

40(1) (Tex.Civ.App.) Every reasonable sumption will be indulged in favor of validity of marriage when such question is inquired into.-Kinney v. Tri-State Telephone Co., 201

S. W. 1180.

105(1) (Mo.App.) A sewer contractor is liable to an employé for negligence, the test of which is ordinary usage of the business.--Gracy v. Walsh, 201 S. W. 582. 1 pre-107 (5) (Mo.App.) Where contractor's carpenter on building was injured by giving way of wall erected by another contractor, rule relieving master from liability for unsafe place of work, where conditions are constantly shifting, did not apply, where only change in conditions was that caused by progress of carpenter's work.-Bidwell v. Grubb, 201 S. W. 579.

40(4) (Ky.) That man and woman lived together until the man's death, that they were treated as husband and wife, and so considered by their neighbors, and that no one ever disputed their being married, raises presumption of legal marriage.-Jackson v. Claypool, 201 S. W. 2.

40(10) (Tex. Civ.App.) Fact of prior marriage is not sufficient to overcome presumption of legality of second marriage.-Kinney v. TriState Telephone Co., 201 S. W. 1180.

40(11) (Tex.Civ.App.) Woman who intervened in wife's suit against deceased husband's employer for death benefit, claiming a legal marriage, held to have assumed burden of proving there had been no valid decree of divorce

Where contractor's carpenter on building was injured by giving way of brick wall erected by another contractor, rule relieving master from liability for unsafe place of work, where building is in course of erection and conditions are constantly shifting, did not apply, where brickwork in wall had been laid on Friday, and accident happened following Monday.-Id.

Rule relieving master from liability for unsafe place of work, where conditions are constantly shifting, does not apply, where change in conditions is that caused by directions of

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mon law is left intact, and such defense may be set up in action for injuries on railroad turntable as against allegations that the handle was too short, there was insufficient light, the current was on in the electric turner, and that same was out of order.-Ft. Worth & D. C. Ry. Co. v. Miller, 201 S. W. 1049.

205 (5) (Ky.) Where defendant's mine boss assured plaintiffs that room in which they were loading coal was safe, and plaintiffs were injured by fall of slate, recovery cannot be denied on ground that by reason of their failure to examine slate to see whether it was safe they assumed risk.-Carter Coal Co. v. Filipeck, 201 S. W. 468.

meant that servant assumes all of those inci

201 S. W. 357.

law a

(C) Methods of Work, Rules, and Orders. 206 (Mo.App.) By assumption of risk is ~137(2) (Ky.) Coal company held liable to dents and customs which ordinarily exist in boy attending trolley pole of mine motor, in- work in which he is concerned.-Baker v. Lusk, jured when motorman handled motor so as to cause trolley pole to leave wire and break and injure boy.-Borderland Coal Co. v. Miller, 201217(1) (Tex.Civ.App.) At common servant assumes, not only risks ordinarily incident to his employment, but also those arising from the negligence of the master, if he knows or in the proper discharge of his duties necessarily must have known of such negligence and of the dangers incident thereto.-Ft. Worth & D. C. Ry. Co. v. Miller, 201 S. W. 1049.

S. W. 299.

(D) Warning and Instructing Servant.

150(2) (Tex.Civ.App.) One employed by a city to remove rubbish, etc., from street gutters cannot recover from the city for injury received when in such work he sprained his ankle by stepping on a three-cornered brick in the gutter, which turned over the city owing him no duty of warning.-Dawson v. City of Houston, 201 S. W. 1056.

54(1) (Mo.App.) Where plaintiff's son, an inexperienced boy, was injured by explosion of dynamite used in blowing up stumps, fact that boy knew that dynamite was powerful explosive did not excuse failure to warn him, where he did not know that work of attaching caps to fuses and priming dynamite was dangerous.Gibbs v. Duvall, 201 S. W. 605.

(E) Fellow Servants.

To subject servant to defense of assumed risk, it is not necessary that he understand operation of a complicated machine, but only

that he know the dangerous condition thereof, or should know it, in the exercise of reasonable care.-Id.

217 (20) (Tex.Civ.App.) A roundhouse helper who had worked for over two years about engines and a turntable, assumed the risk of injury from conditions which had never changed during such time.-Ft. Worth & D. C. Ry. Co. v. Miller, 201 S. W. 1049.

217(27) (Ky.) A driver of a coal car in a mine who has passed through an entry 66 times 168 (1) (Tex. Civ.App.) It is the duty of a in 11 days will be held to have known that the railroad to furnish an engineer of at least or- entry was too small for him to alight from the dinary skill to operate a crane on a wrecker. car in such entry, so that he assumed such risk. -Texas & N. O. R. Co. v. Glass, 201 S. W.-Mahan Jellico Coal Co. v. Bird, 201 S. W. 730.

306.

185(7) (Mo.App.) In action by employé in 219(1) (Ark.) Servant assumes risks of danrepair department of brick factory for injuries gers which are open and obvious to him.-Arwhile opening a clogged "down spout" carrying kansas Land & Lumber Co. v. Wilson, 201 S. tailings to a crusher, due to negligence of de- W. $18. fendant's servant in starting the crusher, held servant's negligence was that of defendant, so that there could be recovery under safe place rule.-Bright v. St. Louis Vitrified & Fire Brick Co., 201 S. W. 641.

189(3) (Mo.App.) Foreman, engaged in work of blowing up stumps with dynamite, held vice principal, and not fellow servant of employé assisting in work.-Gibbs v. Duvall, 201 S. W. 605.

191(1) (Tenn.) Where cores are selected, inspected, and prepared by employés of anoth er department, without supervision except the general supervision over both departments, a molder cannot recover for injuries from defec tive cores; the negligence being that of fellow servants. Casey-Hedges Co. v. Gates, 201 S. W. 760.

201(1) (Ky.) If injury to a servant is due to concurring negligence of the master and a fellow servant, the master is liable.-Elkhorn Mining Corp. v. Pitts, 201 S. W. 9.

Tong-hooker loading logs on cars was not required to look for danger, but assumed risk only where danger was so apparent that one owing duty to inspect was bound to discover it.-Id.

219(12) (Mo.App.) A railroad section hand, replacing old with new ties, assumed risk of stumbling over fence posts scattered along right of way and concealed by grass and weeds.Baker v. Lusk, 201 S. W. 357.

(G) Contributory Negligence of Servant.

228(1) (Tenn.) Where a servant was guilty of contributory negligence, his recovery is not precluded by the federal Employers' Liability Act.-Cincinnati, N. O. & T. P. Ry. Co. v. Morgan, 201 S. W. 128.

231(2) (Tenn.) Where workman, apprehensive of danger of falling of smokestack being erected by a third person near his place of work, continued at work on being told by his foreman it was safe, his employer was liable for workman's deata by smokestack's falling.(F) Risks Assumed by Servant. Cash v. Casey-Hedges Co., 201 S. W. 347. 203(1) (Tex.Civ.App.) Issue raised by evi-233 (1) (Tenn.) A servant in an iron founddence of employé choosing unsafe way of doing ry injured by defects in cores selected by work, when safe, suitable, and convenient way himself cannot recover.-Casey-Hedges Co. v. is available, is only that of contributory negli-Gates. 201 S. W. 760. gence, and not of assumption of risk.-Southern 234(1) (Mo.App.) Where servant operating Pac. Co. v. De la Cruz, 201 S. W. 428.

204(2) (Tex.Civ.App.) Under federal Employers' Liability Act, when the negligence does not amount to a violation of the Safety Appliance Acts, the defense of assumed risks at com

an equalizing bolt machine in stave factory knew that if he held his hand in a certain place it was apt to get mashed if the belt came off, and he knew the belt was apt to come off, but failed to avoid the danger, he was negligent.

-Bathe v. Morehouse Stave & Mfg. Co., 201278 (18) (Ky.) Evidence held insufficient to S. W. 925.

235 (6) (Ky.) Where defendant's mine boss assured plaintiffs that room in which they were loading coal was safe, plaintiffs, though they failed to test roof for slate, cannot be deemed to have chosen dangerous rather than safe place for work.-Carter Coal Co. v. Filipeck, 201 S. W. 468.

235 (15) (Ky.) Though it was customary in defendant's mine for loaders to remove slate from places where they were loading coal, that custom could be waived by superior officers in charge of mine, and was waived where mine boss assured plaintiffs who were loading coal that place was entirely safe.-Carter Coal Co. v. Filipeck, 201 S. W. 468.

238 (5) (Ky.) In view of custom to let trolley pole of mine motor remain in front when motor was going to be run only few feet, boy attending trolley pole was not guilty of contributory negligence in failing to change it to trailing position.-Borderland Coal Co. v. Miller, 201 S. W. 299.

show negligence of the interstate railway proximately causing the injury to the servant engaged in repairing a car.-Siemer v. Chesapeake & O. Ry. Co., 201 S. W. 469.

279(5) (Mo.) In suit for injuries sustained by plaintiff when an elevator in which he was working fell to bottom of shaft, evidence held to support finding that defendant, general foreman in charge of all elevators, who ordered plaintiff to go upon elevator in question, was representative of defendant master.-Hines v. Hammond Packing Co., 201 S. W. 1127.

279 (5) (Mo.App.) In action for death of plaintiff's son by explosion of dynamite used in blowing up stumps, evidence held to show that the foreman, who caused accident while preparing dynamite for use, was engaged in duties growing out of his position as foreman, and not as fellow servant.-Gibbs v. Duvall, 201 S. W. 605.

284 (1) (Mo.App.) Evidence held to present jury question whether a sewer digger could recover for injuries when the trench caved in 247(4) (Ky.) Though boy on mine motor upon him.-Gracy v. Walsh, 201 S. W. 582. attending trolley pole knew car was being back-284(1) (Tex.Civ.App.) Peremptory instruced with pole in front of it, and knew pole would be more likely to come in contact with roof, company was liable for injuries to boy when pole hit roof and broke, if accident was caused by rapid and negligent manner in which motorman operated motor.-Borderland Coal Co. v. Miller, 201 S. W. 299.

(H) Actions.

tion held properly refused if there was any evidence that plaintiff was defendant's employé, was performing the duties of his employment, and that defendant's negligence proximately caused his injuries.-San Antonio, U. & G. R. Co. v. Dawson, 201 S. W. 247.

285 (1) (Ark.) In action by railroad's employé for injuries when weight of car door supported by him with pinch bar strained him, weight of door, and what weight came down on plaintiff, were questions for jury.-Dickinson v. Brummett, 201 S. W. 812.

25034. Owing to the great increase of matter heretofore classified to this section, we have made a new subdivision, consisting of number sections 346-420, at the end of this topic, 286(1) (Ark.) In tong-hooker's action for where the matter in this and future index digests will be found.

injuries while loading logs on cars, evidence held to present question for the jury whether the master was negligent.-Arkansas Land & Lumber Co. v. Wilson, 201 S. W. 818.

263 (Tex.Civ.App.) Where defendant denied that plaintiff was in defendant's employ, and alleged that he was working for F., an in-286 (19) (Mo.App.) In action for injuries to dependent construction contractor, an allegation of supplemental petition that F. was defendant's president held relevant.-San Antonio, U. & G. R. Co. v. Dawson, 201 S. W. 247.

sewer digger when trench walls caved in upon him, under evidence that only joint clay was customarily braced, and conflicting evidence whether the soil which caved in was joint clay, 265(1) (Tex.Civ.App.) Where railroad em- instructions should have submitted the facts as ployé who received injuries while engaged in to usage, and it was error to permit recovery switching gave notice to company to furnish for failure to brace, regardless of the character record showing nature of service in which the of the soil.-Gracy v. Walsh, 201 S. W. 582. cars being switched at time of accident were 286(25) (Ky.) In action for injuries received engaged, company has burden, employé having made out a prima facie case of injuries occurring while he was engaged in interstate commerce service, of showing that injuries did not so occur.-Southern Pac. Co. v. Stephens, 201 S. W. 1076.

by railroad brakeman, who was caught by telephone cable, which had sagged from its fastening, question whether railroad company was negligent in failing to discover and remedy defect held, under evidence, for jury.-Louisville & N. R. Co. v. Mink, 201 S. W. 16.

276(2) (Ark.) In action against railroad by 286(32) (Tenn.) Where an engine hostler employé for injuries when weight of car door supported by plaintiff with pinch bar strained him, evidence held to warrant finding plaintiff was injured in manner claimed.-Dickinson v. Brummett, 201 S. W. 812.

276(3) (Tex. Civ.App.) Evidence in servant's action for injury from fall of trip hammer while not being operated, held sufficient to raise issue of it being broken or worn.-Southern Pac. Co. v. De la Cruz, 201 S. W. 428.

277 (Tex. Civ.App.) Evidence held sufficient to support finding that railway conductor was defendant's employé and was engaged in the performance of the duties required of him by defendant when injured.-San Antonio, U. & G. R. Co. v. Dawson, 201 S. W. 247.

278 (16) (Mo.App.) In action against employer by carpenter injured by giving way of brick wall, erected by another contractor on building on which plaintiff was working, evidence held sufficient to show that ordinarily careful inspection by plaintiff's employer would have revealed defective condition of wall.Bidwell v. Grubb, 201 S. W. 579.

was struck by the dropping of a hood on a smokestack by an inspector of equipment, negligence was for the jury on the inference that the inspector or his helpers, if exercising due care. would have seen the hostler and avoided the injury.-Cincinnati, N. O. & T. P. Ry. Co. v. Morgan, 201 S. W. 128.

286 (32) (Tex.Civ.App.) Where injured servant's petition charged negligence in ordering him to operate locomotive turntable by hand while the electric current was turned on in the machine turner, without the servant's knowledge, there was an issue of negligence for the jury.-Ft. Worth & D. C. Ry. Co. v. Miller, 201 S. W. 1049.

286(41) (Ark.) Evidence that plaintiff, an inexperienced servant, was injured while working near unguarded cut-off saw in stavemill without previous instruction or warning, held to make defendant employer's negligence a jury question.-Saling v. Chess & Wymond Co. of Arkansas, 201 S. W. 119.

287 (5) (Mo.App.) In action by mine helper for personal injury in operation of drill driven

by compressed air, in view of Rev. St. 1909, 5440, abrogating fellow-servant doctrine, held, on the evidence, that whether alleged negligence of fellow servant was proximate cause of injury was for the jury.-Loveless v. Cunard Mining Co., 201 S. W. 375.

287(11) (Ky.) Whether master's negligence in providing improper insulator or failing to cut the current was a concurring cause of the servant's injury held for the jury.-Elkhorn Mining Corp. v. Pitts, 201 S. W. 9.

288(1) (Ark.) In tong-hooker's action for injuries in loading logs, whether he assumed risk held under evidence for jury.-Arkansas Land & Lumber Co. v. Wilson, 201 S. W. 818. 288(12) (Ark.) Ordinarily question whether danger is so obvious that one owing no duty to inspect must have discovered it is for jury. Arkansas Land & Lumber Co. v. Wilson, 201 S. W. 818.

pendent contractor.-Postal Telegraph-Cable Co. v. Murrell, 201 S. W. 462.

323 (Ark.) Contractor, digging a ditch, is not liable for tort of independent contractor, clearing right of way, who threw logs and brush on adjoining lands.-Northern Construction Co. v. Johnson, 201 S. W. 510.

(C) Actions.

329 (Mo.App.) Complaint in action for injuries in collision held sufficient to allege ownership and agency of driver.-Edwards v. Yarbrough, 201 S. W. 972.

Where plaintiff alleged that defendant permitted an automobile to be driven by his agent so as to strike plaintiff, proof of the ownership of the automobile was admissible as tending to show that defendant did permit such driving, though it was not specifically alleged that defendant owned the automobile.-Id.

289(10) (Ark.) Evidence that an inexperi-332(1) (Mo.) In an action for injuries to enced servant was injured while working near an unguarded cut-off saw in stavemill, held to make his contributory negligence a jury question.-Saling v. Chess & Wymond Co. of Arkansas, 201 S. W. 119.

289 (11) (Mo.App.) In action for personal injuries to inexperienced boy due to explosion of dynamite used in blowing up stumps, it was question for jury whether it was possible for him to see manner in which foreman performed work of priming dynamite from position where he was working.-Gibbs v. Duvall, 201 S. W.

605.

employé of electric company repairing machin-
ery of defendant, due to plaintiff's arm being
drawn into a clamp used for winding an arma-
ture with electric wire, evidence as to defend-
ant's negligence held to require submission to
the jury. Scherer v. Bryant, 201 S. W. 900.
der the evidence, for the jury.—Id.
Question of contributory negligence held un-

332(3) (Mo.) In an action for injuries due to defendant's engineers negligently operating an engine used in turning an armature whereon plaintiff was engaged in winding electric wire, whether such engineers were loaned to plaintiff's employers held for the jury.-Scherer v. Bryant, 201 S. W. 900.

289 (15) (Mo.App.) In action for injuries sustained by an employé in repair department of defendant's brick factory while opening a332(4) (Mo.App.) Where a driver casually clogged pipe carrying tailing to crusher, ques-employed by an automobile liveryman had damtion of contributory negligence held for the aged the machine and repaired it, and was tryjury.-Bright v. St. Louis Vitrified & Fire ing it out when he struck plaintiff's motorcycle, instruction that if he was using it about Brick Co., 201 S. W. 641. his own business plaintiff could not recover was properly refused.-Edwards v. Yarbrough, 201 S. W. 972.

289 (27) (Ky.) Evidence that defendant employer's foreman brought lighted lantern near plaintiff servant who was repairing acetylene light, causing explosion, etc., held to make plaintiff's contributory negligence a jury question.-Bates & Rogers Const. Co. v. Fluharity's Guardian, 201 S. W. 10.

VI. WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION

ACTS.

(A) Nature and Grounds of Master's Liability.

293 (2) (Ark.) Instruction that it was the defendant master's duty to use reasonable care 372 (Tex.Civ.App.) Under to provide reasonably safe appliances, etc., held not erroneous because using word "reasonable" instead of "ordinary," or because absolutely requiring reasonably safe appliances to be furnished. Wisconsin & Arkansas Lumber Co. v. Standridge, 201 S. W. 295.

Workmen's Compensation Act, compensation may be awarded, although employer's negligence did not proximately cause injury.-General Accident, Fire & Life Assur. Corp. v. Evans, 201 S. W. 705.

293(14) (Ky.) Whether master used due care to provide safe appliances to a servant putting up electric trolley wires in the mine held question for jury.-Elkhorn Mining Corp. v. Pitts, 201 S. W. 9.

293 (14) (Mo.App.) In action for injuries to sewer digger when trench walls caved in upon him, refusal of requested instruction on necessity of removing loose earth before bracing held error.-Gracy v. Walsh, 201 S. W. 582.

296(7) (Ark.) In tong-hooker's action for injuries by log rolling from pile, instruction that, if he was injured due to his negligent failure to remove himself to place of safety, jury should find for defendant, was proper, since omission therefrom of the word "negligent" would have amounted to a peremptory instruction.-Arkansas Land & Lumber Co. v. Wilson, 201 S. W. 818.

IV. LIABILITIES FOR INJURIES TO
THIRD PERSONS.

373 (Tex.Civ.App.) Where employé loses his life in rescuing fellow employé while both are working in course of their employment, relatives may recover workmen's compensation, at least where deceased was not positively prohibited by his employer from undertaking rescue.-General Accident, Fire & Life Assur. Corp. v. Evans, 201 S. W. 705.

(B) Compensation,

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385(1) (Tex.Civ.App.) Workmen's pensation judgment for certain sum and over 200 future weekly installment items, for which execution should issue, if not paid when due, held not improper.-General Accident, Fire & Life Assur. Corp. v. Evans, 201 S. W. 705.

389 (Tex.Civ.App.) Any one who pays for medical services for a servant may recover from the insurer, under Vernon's Sayles' Ann. Civ. St. 1914, art. 5246k.-American Indemnity Co. v. Nelson, 201 S. W. 686.

(C) Proceedings.

398 (Tex. Civ.App.) Under Vernon's Sayles' (B) Work of Independent Contractor. Ann. Civ. St. 1914, art. 5246k, a servant can316(1) (Ky.) Messenger for telegraph com- not recover for medical aid where the insurer pany who furnished his own bicycle and uni- was not notified of the injury.-American Inform, and took his own routes at his own demnity Co. v. Nelson, 201 S. W. 686. speed, and was paid two cents for each mes-405 (1) (Tex.Civ.App.) Evidence regarding sage delivered, was servant, and not an inde- I warnings and protests by employer's super

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