POPULARITY CONTEST. See Bills and Notes, 106; Contracts, 138. POSSESSION. unable to complete the contract he might rescind, such clause was admissible in plaintiff's action for the alleged balance due, since the contracts were duplicate originals.-BonnettBrown Sales Service Co. v. Denison Morning Gazette, 201 S. W. 1044. See Adverse Possession; Bills and Notes, 115(2) (Tex.Civ.App.) Jobber who handled 496. POWERS. See Chattel Mortgages, 255-262; Executors and Administrators, 138; Mortgages, PRACTICE. 338. For practice in particular actions and proceedings, see the various specific topics. PREFERRED STOCK. See Corporations, 68. PREMIUMS. See Insurance, 137. PRESCRIPTION. See Adverse Possession; Easements, PRESENTMENT. See Bills and Notes, 396, 537. PRESUMPTIONS. for manufacturer of water-closets order of contractors to erect school building had right to rely on promise of manufacturer's agents that same type of closets would be shipped to contractors that latter had agreed to take.Sanitary Mfg. Co. v. Gamer, 201 S. W. 1068. 116(1) (Ark.) An agent acting within the apparent scope of his authority, though in violation of specific instructions, may bind his principal in dealing with one who has no notice of the restrictions upon the agent's authority.Three States Lumber Co. v. Moore, 201 S. W. 508. (C) Unauthorized and Wrongful Acts. ›147(3) (Ark.) One dealing with an agent whose authority is limited to a single transac tion must ascertain at his peril the extent of such authority.-Three States Lumber Co. v. 7; Moore, 201 S. W. 508. See Appeal and Error, 901-934, 1031; Criminal Law, 1141; Evidence, ~6389. PRINCIPAL AND ACCESSORY. See Homicide, 30, 281; Rape, 19. PRINCIPAL AND AGENT. 148(2) (Tex.Civ.App.) Where purchaser secretly agreed with vendor's agent that agent should become partner in purchase and that contract should be signed by which security of vendor would be greatly impaired, purchaser was estopped to assert misrepresentations of agent being charged with knowledge that agent must not become a partner.-Binder v. Millikin, 201 S. W. 239. 148(3) (Ark.) Where the agent's authority. is confined to a single transaction, there is no presumption as to general authority.-Three States Lumber Co. v. Moore, 201 S. W. 508. One dealing with an admitted agent has the right to presume, in the absence of notice to the contrary, that he is a general agent clothed with authority coextensive with its apparent scope.-Id. See Attorney and Client; Banks and Banking, 54, 55 Brokers; Deeds, 58; Evi-149(2) (Tex.Civ.App.) Recovery cannot be dence, 249, 471. I. THE RELATION. (A) Creation and Existence. (Tex.Civ.App.) Neither architect of school building nor superintendent of schools could be held to be agent of jobber who took order for water-closets of contractors to build school and handled it with manufacturer.-Sanitary Mfg. Co. v. Gamer, 201 S. W. 1068. (B) Termination. 42 (Tex.Civ.App.) Where jobber handled for manufacturer order for water-closets of contractors to erect schoolhouse, contractors were not agents of plumber after they had filed voluntary petition in bankruptcy.-Sanitary Mfg. Co. v. Gamer, 201 S. W. 1068. 45 (Tex. Civ.App.) When agent seeks indiv idual advantage inconsistent with rights of his principal, his authority is automatically destroyed and agency revoked.-Binder v. Millikin, 201 S. W. 239. III. RIGHTS AND LIABILITIES AS TO (A) Powers of Agent. had against one assuming to be an agent, for liquidated damages stipulated in a contract, but can be had for damages, or the value of services rendered.-White v. Roughton, 201 S. W. 679. Where one falsely represents that he is agent for another and enters into a contract, the other party can sue him on his warranty without tendering performance to the supposed principal. -Id. 158 (Mo.) One party to an exchange of properties could not defeat recovery by the other on the ground of fraud by the contention that he had no personal knowledge of the fraud accomplished by false representations of his agents.-Laird v. Keithley, 201 S. W. 1138. PRINCIPAL AND SURETY. See Appeal and Error, 1226, 1234: Bail; Guaranty; Guardian and Ward, 182; Indemnity; Intoxicating Liquors, 301. PRIORITIES. See Chattel Mortgages, 138; Executors and PRIVATE ROADS. See Easements. 103(12) (Tex.Civ.App.) Where plaintiff's agent took defendant's order on blank, which provided that salesmen were not authorized to alter the sales offer by verbal agreement, and wrote on the back of the carbon copy left with defendant that if defendant became financially See Witnesses, PRIVILEGED COMMUNICATIONS. 199, 211. See Courts, 202. PROCESS. ed within meaning of the law, those terms PROVINCE OF COURT AND JURY. 740-764; Trial, 194. PROXIMATE CAUSE. See Carriers, 320; Master and Servant, PUBLIC IMPROVEMENTS. See Appeal and Error, 407; Attachment; I. NATURE, ISSUANCE, REQUISITES, 33 (Tex.Civ.App.) Under Vernon's Sayles' Ann. Civ. St. 1914, art. 1852, requiring citation to state date of filing of plaintiff's petition, citation stating petition was filed on certain day and month, "A. D. 191," is insufficient. Sypert v. Rogers Lumber Co., 201 S. W. 1102. II. SERVICE. (E) Return and Proof of Service. 134 (Mo.App.) Under Rev. St. 1909, § 1763, requiring return to recite place of service, return of writ served on Sunday, reciting, to bring service within section 1785, as to Sunday service, that person served was nonresident, and was about leaving county and state, but not referring to place of service, was insufficient. Taylor v. Helter, 201 S. W. 618. 147 (Mo.App.) Under Rev. St. 1909, § 1763, requiring return to recite place of service, return, not referring to place of service, is not aided by presumption from caption prefixed thereto, "State of Missouri, County of S. S."-Taylor v. Helter, 201 S. W. 618. Recitals of return, prescribed by Rev. St. 1909, § 1763, cannot be aided by extrinsic evidence.-Id. III. DEFECTS, OBJECTIONS, AND AMENDMENT. 164(1) (Mo.App.) Where recitals of return do not comply with requirements of Rev. St. 1909, § 1763, trial court may allow amendment of return.-Taylor v. Helter, 201 S. W. 618. PROHIBITION. See Intoxicating Liquors. PROMISSORY NOTES. See Bills and Notes. PROPERTY. See Fixtures, 15; Good Will. PROSTITUTION. See Disorderly House, 19; Lewdness. (Tex.Cr.App.) Assisting prostitute to ply her vocation in woods held not within pandering statute (Vernon's Ann. Pen. Code 1916, art. 506a), which is directed against offense in connection with house of prostitution, but was within article 498.-Johnson v. State, 201 S. W. 990. PUBLIC LANDS. See Mines and Minerals, 6; Navigable Wa- OF UNITED STATES. more (E) School and University Lands. 54 (3) (Tex.) Under Acts 34th Leg. c. 150, 5420c), providing that school land situated & 3 (Vernon's Ann. Civ. St. Supp. 1918, art. in Jeff Davis county may be sold in quantities not to exceed eight sections of 640 acres each, or less, to one person, and in whole tracts only, and without condition of settlement and residence, the quantum of land which may be purchased by a single individual is determined by the number of sections regardless of Under Rev. St. 1911, art. 5420; Acts 29th acreage.-Ford v. Robison, 201 S. W. 401. Sess.) c. 20, § 6, as to quantities in which Leg. c. 103, § 6; Acts 30th Leg. (1st Called school land may be purchased, purchaser under Acts 34th Leg. c. 150, § 1 (Vernon's Ann. Civ. St. Supp. 1918, art. 5420a), held chargeprior statutes in same county, although such able with land previously purchased under act does not specifically so charge him.—Id. III. DISPOSAL OF LANDS OF THE STATES. between compact 170(3) (Tenn.) Under Kentucky and Tennessee in 1820, held that a Kentucky grant in 1880 was valid, though the land was in Tennessee.-Russell v. American Ass'n, 201 S. W. 151. Since a state in granting lands conveys withapply to a grant from the state so as to pass out covenant, the doctrine of estoppel does not an after-acquired title, and such grant passes only the title the state then had.-Id. of purchasers 172(3) (Tex.) Intending public lands, having made application to purchase as required by Vernon's Sayles' Ann. Civ. St. 1914, art. 5410, held to have perfected rights to lands, though affidavit antedated official declaration that lands were for sale.Stockwell v. Robison, 201 S. W. 1156. 172(8) (Tex.) Purchasers of public lands. against whom forfeiture has been declared for failure to pay interest, may be relieved of the forfeiture only in the absence of intervenother persons.-Stockwell v. ing rights of Robison, 201 S. W. 1156. The commissioner of public lands may, under Vernon's Sayles' Ann. Civ. St. 1914, art. 5407, when a second forfeiture has been deat which it was once appraised, under Acts 33d clared, reappraise land at less than the amount 1914, arts. 5423a-5423f), permitting repurchase Leg. c. 160 (Vernon's Sayles' Ann. Civ. St. by former purchasers whose purchase was de 4 (Tex.Cr.App.) Evidence held insufficient to sustain conviction of pandering under Ver-clared forfeited.—Id. non's Ann. Pen. Code 1916, art. 506a.-John-175(7) (Tex.Civ.App.) In trespass to try tison v. State, 201 S. W. 990. tle, where evidence suggests a conflict between 5 (Tex.Cr.App.) In prosecution for pan- surveys, the burden is upon the party claiming dering in violation of Vernon's Ann. Pen. Code under a junior patent to show that his land 1916, art. 506a, where it was doubtful wheth- does not conflict with that held under a senior er houses involved were houses of prostitution grant; but it is not incumbent upon one holdor where prostitution was encouraged or allowing under a junior grant well defined and lo 1271 INDEX-DIGEST cated on the ground to locate surrounding grants or uncertain description.-Howell v. Ellis, 201 S. W. 1022. PUBLIC NUISANCE. See Nuisance. PUBLIC SCHOOLS. See Schools and School Districts. PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSIONS. 5 (Mo.) Public Service Commission Act, PUBLIC SERVICE CORPORATIONS. PUBLIC USE. See Dedication; Eminent Domain. See Public Service Commissions. See Penalties. PUNISHMENT. RAILROADS. See Carriers; Commerce, 27; Eminent Do- II. RAILROAD COMPANIES. by 30 (Tex.Civ.App.) Debts notes were not "subsisting liabilities and claims" within Rev. St. 1911, art. 6625, where debts and claims within such statute had been paid with money procured by giving the notes without any assignment of the claims or agreement that the lender should be subrogated to the rights of the creditors whose claims were paid with the borrowed money.-International & G. Evidence, in a suit to enforce against railroad N. Ry. Co. v. Concrete Inv. Co., 201 S. W. 718. property purchased from receiver a claim under Rev. St. 1911, art. 6625, held to show that stockholders of old company received stock in or control over new company in consideration of their holdings in the old company.-Id. IV. LOCATION OF ROAD, TERMINI, AND STATIONS. 46 (Tex.Civ.App.) Contract made by receiver of railroad and complied with by receiver and company for over 20 years to establish headquarters for division at particular town held company perpetual contract which railroad could not terminate without showing that it could not by reasonable effort discharge duties while complying with contract.-Houston & T. C. R. Co. v. City of Ennis, 201 S. W. 256. In view of Rev. St. 1911, art. 6423, a contract of receiver of railroad to establish division headquarters with necessary roundhouses and machine shops at particular town based on valuable consideration and which was adopted by com See Schools and School Districts, 150, 158. pany is valid and enforceable.-Id. QUIETING TITLE. 139 I. RIGHT OF ACTION AND DEFENSES. 12(10) (Ky.) Plaintiff's possession by a tenant is sufficient for action to quiet title.-Sasseen v. Farmer, 201 S. W. 39. II. PROCEEDINGS AND RELIEF. 37(1) (Ky.) Under Civ. Code Prac. § 125, answer in action to quiet title which described certain land was sufficient to warrant judgment for defendant for land forming only part thereof.-Foster v. Roberts, 201 S. W. 334. ~50 (Ark.) Although suit was brought to quiet title, where the answer alleged that the deed under which plaintiff claimed was a mortgage, and the evidence proved such claim, a judgment of foreclosure was authorized, under the rule that, where equity acquires jurisdiction for one purpose, it acquires it for all purposes. -Estes v. Lucky, 201 S. W. 815. QUO WARRANTO. I. NATURE AND GROUNDS. 8 (Mo.) A quo warranto proceeding is the appropriate direct attack upon the validity of the county court's order incorporating a road district.-State, on Inf. of Killam, v. Colbert, 201 S. W. Contract of railroad company to maintain its division headquarters at particular town entered into by receiver for valuable consideration and complied with for many years may be enforced by injunction.-Id. 57 (Tex.Civ.App.) Decree enjoining a railroad company from removing division headquarters from a particular town held not erroneous as prescribing company's train schedules, etc.Houston & T. C. R. Čo. v. City of Ennis, 201 S. W. 256. Decree enjoining railroad company from removing division headquarters from town held not erroneous as uncertain or indefinite.-Id. Decree enjoining removal by railroad company of division headquarters from town held not erroneous though it enjoined removal of superintendent and train dispatchers, etc., from such town.-Id. VI. CONSTRUCTION, MAINTENANCE, 99(11) (Mo.) Railway held not entitled, on to assess damages in proceedings by Kansas its attempted appeal, to review of proceedings City, under its charter (articles 6, 7) to abate grade crossing where railway crossed street.-Kansas City v. Kansas City Terminal Ry. Co., 201 S. W. 541. VII. SALES, LEASES, TRAFFIC CON- 131 (Ark.) Railroad company may temporarily lease portions of right of way where such lease does not interfere with its functions.Clark v. St. Louis. I. M. & S. Ry. Co., 201 S. W. 111. 133(5) (Ark.) Where lease of portion of railroad right of way for lumber mill provided for termination on 30 days' notice by either party, it will be presumed to continue in existence though mill had ceased and was no longer developing freight for railroad.-Clark v. St. Louis. I. M. & S. Ry. Co., 201 S. W. 111. cases Railroads 201 SOUTHWESTERN REPORTER X. OPERATION. (A) Duty to Operate. 218 (Mo.) Facts held to show other train service at county seat reasonable and adequate, so as to make improper commission's order for interstate mail train to stop on flag.-State ex rel. Missouri Pac. Ry. Co. v. Public Service Commission of Missouri, 201 S. W. 1143. Fact, standing alone, that interstate mail train did not stop at county seat but stopped at smaller places on flag. is of slight weight in determining county seat's claim of discrimination in train service.-Id. (B) Statutory, Municipal, and Official start until the boy had been removed.-Louis- to 276(4) (Ky.) Habitual practice of boys ride on moving trains without invitation or permission, held not to render company liable, unless danger was discovered; but if they rode with conductor's permission, the company bound to exercise ordinary care to protect them from injury.-Louisville & N. R. Co. v. Steele, 201 S. W. 43. was 278(4) (Ky.) Ky. St. § 805, prohibiting persons getting on moving trains, held not to prevent recovery by eight year old boy who got on standing train and was injured in attempting to alight after it started.-Louisville & N. R. Co. v. Steele, 201 S. W. 43. re 281(2) (Ky.) A railroad company was sponsible for the acts of its conductor in inviting, permitting, or encouraging boys to get on or ride on his train, though in violation of the company's rules.-Louisville & N. R. Co. v. Steele, 201 S. W. 43. 226 (Tenn.) The statute of Arkansas (Kirby's Dig. §§ 6622-6625), requiring separate accommodations in certain cars for the use of white and African passengers, does not require a dining car to be partitioned with wood, nor that two separate dining cars be provided.-282(4) (Ky.) In action for injuries to boy Shelton v. Chicago, R. I. & P. R. Co., 201 S. in alighting from train, evidence as to custom of boys to ride on and jump on and off of the train and of the conductor's practice in permitting them to do so, held competent.-Louisville & N. R. Co. v. Steele, 201 S. W. 43. W. 521. Arkansas Statutes (Kirby's Dig. §§ 66226625), as to separate accommodations for white and Agrican passengers, do not prohibit a railroad from adopting a rule by which it serves white persons at one hour and negroes at another, without providing separate dining coaches.-Id. 229 (Tex.Civ.App.) Const. N. M. art. 20, § 16, and article 22, § 2, providing it shall be unlawful for railroad to use defective car or locomotive, and that railroad shall be liable to employé injured through defect, relate exclusively to employés of railroads, and have no application in case of other persons injured or killed.-Clay v. Atchison, T. & S. F. Ry. Co., 201 S. W. 1072. 253 (Tenn.) A railroad which maintained a dining car, intending to serve white and negro passengers at different hours, was liable to a white passenger for its negligence in making a call to the dining car for white persons at the time when negroes were about to be served.Shelton v. Chicago, R. I. & P. R. Co., 201 S. W. 521. Where a railroad permitted negroes to be served while white passengers were in the dining car, on perceiving which plaintiff arose and left the car, and the steward insisted in the hearing of others that she pay for the meal ordered, a verdict of $750 was excessive, and should be reduced to $250.-Id. (C) Companies and Persons Liable for In- 260 (Tex.Civ.App.) A railroad is liable for 261 (Ark.) Under provision in a contract for joint use with plaintiff of defendant's tracks that in the event of collision caused by negligence of a joint employé, each shall bear its own property loss, the plaintiff cannot recover for destruction of a motorcar caused by negligence of a joint operator.-Kansas City Southern Ry. Co. v. Wade, 201 S. W. 787. (D) Injuries to Licensees or Trespassers in General. Evidence that father of boy injured in jumping from moving train had requested conductor or go about it, held competent.-Id. not to permit him to go on or ride on the train 282(10) (Ky.) Conflicting evidence held to make question for jury as to whether conductor when he signaled train to start saw a boy who was stealing a ride.-Louisville & N. R. Co. v. Steele, 201 S. W. 43. Whether boy was negligent in jumping from train, held a question for the jury, though he been warned not to do it, and whipped for dotestified he knew it was dangerous, and had ing it.—Id. 282(15) (Ky.) Instructions as to duties of trainmen towards boy stealing a ride and as to contributory negligence, held not erroneous.Louisville & N. R. Co. v. Steele, 201 S. W. 43. (F) Accidents at Crossings. 325(1) (Tex.Civ.App.) If boy of 10 years, injured at railroad crossing, acted with prudence that child of his age, intelligence, and experiwas not guilty of contributory negligence.-ence would use under same circumstances, he Houston & T. C. Ry. Co. v. Roberts, 201 S. W. 674. 337(1) (Tex.Civ.App.) Negligence of railroad in failing to keep flagman at crossing was proximate cause of injuries to boy when he backed into passing freight train, in endeavor, as he claimed, to avoid another engine approaching on another track.-Houston & T. C. Ry. Co. v. Roberts, 201 S. W. 674. action against 348(2) (Tex. Civ.App.) In railroad for injuries to boy, evidence held to show boy must have known freight train was passing behind him when he stepped backward into it, as he claimed, to avoid another engine, so that railroad's failure to keep bell at crossing could not have been proximate cause of injury.-Houston & T. C. Ry. Co. v. Roberts, 201 S. W. 674. In action for injuries to boy at railroad crossing, evidence held to show boy stopped and stood between two tracks to let switch engine go by, and, in attempting to get out of its way, backed into freight train behind. Id. 2732 (Ky.) Railroad company held no more bound to keep tracks, crossings, and premises safe for infants than for adults, unless by course of conduct it establishes a status for 348(7) (Tex.Civ.App.) In action for injuries children imposing greater care.-Louisville & N. R. Co. v. Steele, 201 S. W. 43. 276(3) (Ky.) If boy was trespasser, conductor held to owe him no duty except to exercise ordinary care to prevent injury after discovery of his peril; but if conductor saw him on step before starting train, it was his duty not to to 10 year old boy at railroad crossing when he stepped back into passing freight train, as he claimed, to avoid switch engine on other track, in view of age of boy, evidence held sufficient to support finding acquitting him of contributory negligence.-Houston & T. C. Ry. Co. v. Roberts, 201 S. W. 674. (G) Injuries to Persons on or near Tracks. were equal was proper.-Clark v. St. Louis, I M. & S. Ry. Co., 201 S. W. 111. 390 (Mo.) That intoxication of trespasser on suburban railroad's trestle contributed to 485(8) (Ark.) In action against railroad his injury did not relieve railroad company company for injuries to property from fire, in from liability under humanitarian doctrine.struction on contributory negligence of plainOwens v. Kansas City, C. C. & St. J. Ry. Co., tiff's agent held proper.-Clark v. St. Louis, I. 201 S. W. 548. M. & S. Ry. Co., 201 S. W. 111. RAPE. 396 (1) (Tex.Civ.App.) One into whose eye hot cinder is thrown by railroad engine 174 feet distant has burden of proving negligence.-Mis- See Criminal Law, 419, 420, 678, 864. souri, K. & T. Ry. Co. of Texas v. Langford, 201 S. W. 1087. 398(2) (Tenn.) The statement of a witness that the whistle was not sounded "until it blew inside the corporation here," and of another that he lives 11⁄2 miles from Rogersville and 1 mile from the spring, without giving relative location of each and the depot, is insufficient to establish city limit or defendant's noncompliance with Thomp. Shan. Code, & 1574, subsec. 3.-Alexander v. Virginia & S. W. Ry. Co., 201 S. W. 134. I. OFFENSES AND RESPONSIBILITY 6 (Ark.) Guilt of rape of a girl slightly life or safety or failure to make an outery, but over 12 does not depend on fear of danger to on force.-Crawford v. State, 201 S. W. 784. 13 (Ark.) Physical development of a child of 12 years must be considered as well as mental development on the question of consent in a rape case.-Crawford v. State, 201 S. W. 784. 19 (Tex.Cr.App.) Where accused held the victim while another raped her, accused was guilty of rape, under the law of principals, unless insane, in view of Pen. Code 1911, arts. 74, 75, defining principals.-Dodd v. State, 201 S. W. 1014. II. PROSECUTION AND PUNISHMENT. (A) Indictment and Information. 407 (Tenn.) Since the statutes do not cov-20 (Tex.Cr.App.) To convict one of rape er injuries to animals by railroads other than under law of principals, the indictment need by collision, an action for injuries to mules not allege the acts making accused a princifrightened by a train and injured in a trestle pal, but may directly charge the crime of rape. is a common-law action.-Nashville, C. & St. L.-Dodd v. State, 201 S. W. 1014. Ry. v. Ford, 201 S. W. 755. After those in charge of the train observe frightened animals on the track or near by, it is incumbent on them to use ordinary care in operating the train, and if they approach negligently and further frighten the animals and cause injury, the railroad is liable.--Id. 411(15) (Tex.Civ.App.) Where plaintiff's horse was running at large within limits of town, contrary to ordinance, defendant, not being required to fence its tracks, would not be liable, unless horse was killed because of negligence of its servants operating motorcar. Texas City Terminal Co. v. McGee, 201 S. W. 673. 417 (Tex. Civ.App.) Where plaintiff's cattle while in city were run down by defendant's train, which was proceeding in excess of speed allowed by ordinance, and there was testimony that had train not been proceeding so fast cattle could have been driven from tracks, recovery cannot be denied on theory railroad company's violation of municipal ordinance was not proximate cause.-Galveston, H. & S. A. Ry. Co. v. Liuzza. 201 S. W. 1043. (B) Evidence. ~36 (Ark.) The burden is on the state in a rape case to prove that a child of 12 had no capacity to give consent, but it was proper to instruct to consider the physical and mental development of the child.-Crawford v. State, 201 S. W. 784. 53(2) (Ark.) Evidence held to sustain a conviction of assault with intent to rape, although the evidence would have warranted a conviction of rape.-Crawford v. State, 201 S. W. 784. (C) Trial and Review. 59 (24) (Tex.Cr.App.) Where evidence showed that accused raped the victim and held her while another raped her, accused's instruction that conviction could be had only for actual rape by personal intercourse, on theory that indictment would not support a conviction on the law of principals, was properly refused.Dodd v. State, 201 S. W. 1014. RATIFICATION. 443(1) (Tenn.) Evidence held insufficient See Marriage, 37. to show negligence in operation of a train by which mules on the track were frightened and caused to be injured on a trestle.-Nashville, C. & St. L. Ry. v. Ford, 201 S. W. 755. (I) Fires. REAL ACTIONS. See Ejectment; Forcible Entry and Detainer; 453 (Ark.) Under Acts 1907, p. 336, § 1, REBUTTAL. See Criminal Law, 683; Evidence, 89. RECEIVERS. IV. MANAGEMENT AND DISPOSI- Redelivery 481(1) (Ark.) In action against railroad company for destruction of plaintiff's property, evidence of forest fire in vicinity which might have caused destruction is admissible.-Clark v. St. Louis, I. M. & S. Ry. Co., 201 S. W. 111. C485(4) (Ark.) Where there was evidence that (D) Sale and Conveyance or fire might have resulted from some cause other than that of railroad company, instruction that 142 (Tex.Civ.App.) Purchaser of railroad verdict should be for company if probabilities property and corporation organized to operate of Property. |