Subrogation 201 SOUTHWESTERN REPORTER 31 (Tex.Civ.App.) Indorsement of vouch- | result.-State v. Louisville & N. R. Co., 201 S. to pay W. 738. ers to bank, which advanced money claims against railroad company of character mentioned in Rev. St. 1911, art. 6625, constituted assignment of vouchers to bank, which in consequence became subrogated to right of original holders.-International & G. N. Ry. Co. v. Concrete Inv. Co., 201 S. W. 718. SUBSTITUTION. SUPERSEDEAS. See Appeal and Error, 7. See Physicians and Surgeons. SUSPENDED SENTENCE. See Criminal Law, 982. TAXATION. 49 (Mo.) The provision of Const. art. 10, a Ins. III. LIABILITY OF PERSONS AND PROPERTY. (A) Private Persons and Property in Gen. eral. 93 (5) (Tex. Civ.App.) A state cannot tax personal property of a nonresident temporarily within its borders.-North American Dredging Co. of Nevada v. State, 201 S. W. 1065. 98 (Tex.Civ.App.) A vessel plying between ports of different states engaged in coastwise trade has its situs for taxation at the domicile of its owner, unless it has acquired an actual situs in another state.-North American Dredging Co. of Nevada v. State, 201 S. W. 1065. 103 (Tenn.) Under Code 1858, § 51, defining land, railroad acquiring property of another corporation is liable for tax imposed by Revenue Act 1915, § 8, on all transfers of realty, although railroad property is merely incident to its use as highway.-State v. Louisville & N. R. Co., 201 S. W. 733. (D) Exemptions. 195 (Tex.Civ.App.) Const. art. 8, § 2, in exempting places of religious worship and institutions of purely public charities, must not be construed so as to exclude necessary grounds for entry into the buildings, and Rev. St. 1911, art. 7507, §§ 1. 6. is therefore constitutional.Trinity Methodist Episcopal Church v. City of San Antonio, 201 S. W. 669. See Adverse Possession, 492, 95; Commerce, 64; Constitutional Law, 208, 229, 283, 290: Levees, 22, 25; Licenses, 1: Limitation of Actions, 34, 58; 204 (2) (Tex.Civ.App.) In considering exStatutes, 245. II. CONSTITUTIONAL REQUIRE- on emptions from taxation, law must be strictly construed.-Trinity Methodist Episcopal Church v. City of San Antonio, 201 S. W. 669. 244 (Tex. Civ.App.) Parsonage or rectory, used as residence for minister, is not exempt from taxation under Const. art. 8. § 2, or Rev. St. 1911, art. 7507, §§ 1, 6.-Trinity Methodist Episcopal Church v. City of San Antonio, 201 S. W. 669. There is clear and logical difference between ity, and that one is used for other does not place of worship and institution of public charand Rev. St. 1911, art. 7507, §§ 1, 6, relating change its character, under Const. art. 8, § 2, to taxation.—Id. 40(1) (Mo.) While Const. art. 10, § 3, stating that taxes shall be uniform upon same class of subjects, prescribes a definite rule for imposing property taxes, it was not intend-245 (Tenn.) Tax statutes will be construed ed to apply to excise or occupation taxes im- most strongly against state.-State v. Louisville posed on a foreign insurance company for do- & N. R. Co., 201 S. W. 738. ing business in state.-Massachusetts Bonding 251 (Tex.Civ.App.) Burden is on one claim& Ins. Co. v. Chorn, 201 S. W. 1122. 40(5) (Mo.) The provisions of Const. art. 10, § 3, that taxes shall be uniform upon the same class of subjects, are not violated by Rev. St. 1909, § 7099, providing tax on premiums received by foreign insurance companies from business done within the state but deducting amount paid for reinsurance by fire companies only, making them a separate class. -Massachusetts Bonding & Ins. Co. v. Chorn, 201 S. W. 1122. 47 (1) (Tenn.) Statutes creating privileges will be construed so as not to impose double taxation, unless such construction is expressly or impliedly required.-State v. Louisville & N. R. Co., 201 S. W. 738. 47(4) (Tenn.) A railroad which paid tax imposed by Revenue Act 1915, § 10, on corporations acquiring property of another corporation, is also liable for tax imposed by section 8 upon all transfers of realty, since such sections impose different taxes and double taxation does not ing exemptions from taxation to bring himself clearly within statute or Constitution.-Trinity Methodist Episcopal Church v. City of San Antonio, 201 S. W. 669. V. LEVY AND ASSESSMENT. (D) Mode of Assessment of Corporate Stock, Property, or Receipts. § 7099, is to tax premiums of foreign com387 (Mo.) The intention of Rev. St. 1909, on the gross amount of premiums received panies other than fire insurance companies from business done in the state without deor reinsurance.-Massachusetts duction of premiums returned on account of Bonding & Ins. Co. v. Chorn, 201 S. W. 1122. cancellation VI. LIEN AND PRIORITY. 514 (Tex.) Where taxpayer tendered those taxes due and kept his tender good, lien therefor was discharged, and in suit to collect taxes could not be foreclosed.-State v. Hoffman, 201 S. W. 653. VII. PAYMENT AND REFUNDING OR RECOVERY OF TAX PAID. 525 (Tenn.) Where railroad pays transfer real estate tax imposed by Revenue Act 1915, § 8, upon property extending through several counties, tax need be paid only to clerk of county court of county in which deed to land involved is first registered.-State v. Louisville & N. R. Co., 201 S. W. 738. 527 (Tex.) Where taxpayer refused to pay illegal item, but tendered payment of those taxes validly due, it is necessary to keep tender good that money be paid into registry of court. -State v. Hoffman, 201 S. W. 653. 5272 (Tex.) Where taxes are separable, citizen, to escape penalties for nonpayment of valid taxes, need not tender tax which is invalid, but it is sufficient to tender taxes legally due. State v. Hoffman, 201 S. W. 653. VIII. COLLECTION AND ENFORCEMENT AGAINST PERSONS OR PERSONAL PROPERTY. (B) Summary Remedies and Actions. 590 (Mo.) Where tax suit was against the living owners of the land, by name, and other persons "if living, or if they or either of them be dead, then the unknown heirs," etc., "of such deceased person," such joinder was permissible. -Edleman v. Wommack, 201 S. W. 853. 591 (Mo.) In suit to enforce taxes against living owners of land and other persons, and unknown heirs, description of interests of unknown persons is immaterial, and the objection does not affect the service on the named parties. -Edleman v. Wommack, 201 S. W. 853. 592 (Tenn.) Bill to enforce transfer tax on realty imposed by Revenue Act 1915, § 8, which alleged that property was mortgaged for certain sum and was worth considerably more, held not insufficient because not stating property's true value. State v. Louisville & N. R. Co., 201 S. W. 738. tract of land belonging to intestate, without allotment of dower, and the land was sold for taxes as her land, the title acquired was only her life estate. Jackson v. Claypool, 201 S. W. 2. XII. FORFEITURES AND PENALTIES. 840 (Tex.) Where taxpayer tendered portion of taxes validly assessed, he is not liable for penalties on amount of taxes tendered, though he fails to support his claim that part. of taxes not tendered was invalid.-State v. Hoffman, 201 S. W. 653. XIII. LEGACY, INHERITANCE, AND TRANSFER TAXES. 889 (Ky.) Where there is no executor, administrator, or trustee who may be required to pay an inheritance tax, its collection may be directly enforced from persons receiving property subject to tax.-Ritcher v. Commonwealth, 201 S. W. 456. 890 (Ky.) Under Ky. St. § 4281a, making administrators, executors, and trustees liable for inheritance taxes, section 4281f authorizing them to withhold tax from legacies, etc., and section 4281g, authorizing them to sell sufficient property to pay tax, such representatives are liable for tax, irrespective of whether property subject to tax comes into their possession or control.-Ritcher v. Commonwealth, 201 S. W. 456. Under Ky. St. §§ 4281a, 4281f, 4281g, the personal representatives are primarily liable for tax, and action therefor cannot be maintained against a devisee, at least until the remedies against such personal representatives have been exhausted.-Id. TEACHERS' COLLEGE. See Schools and School Districts, 11, 150. TELEGRAPHS AND TELEPHONES. See Commerce, 59. II. REGULATION AND OPERATION. 31 (Ky.) A telephone company may make the furnishing of its service conditional upon an agreement by an applicant that he will observe reasonable rules and regulations.-Bond v. Starkey, 201 S. W. 461. 593(2) (Tex. Civ.App.) Nevada corporation whose dredgeboat and equipment were in Texas and rendered for taxation by it held to have the burden of showing that the property was not taxable, and not to have sustained such burden. -North American Dredging Co. of Nevada v.52 (Ark.) It is duty of one suffering dam State, 201 S. W. 1065. 593(3) (Tenn.) In suit to collect real estate transfer tax imposed by Revenue Act 1915, § 8, value of property stated in deed is only prima facie evidence of its true value.-State v. Louisville & N. R. Co., 201 S. W. 738. 593(3) (Tex.Civ.App.) Agreed statement of facts held to sustain finding that property upon which taxes were due was defendant's property and was duly rendered and assessed, though inventory appeared to be made in wrong name.North American Dredging Co. of Nevada v. State, 201 S. W. 1065. In action for taxes, statement in agreed statement of facts held an admission that the property assessed was defendant's property.-Id. IX. SALE OF LAND FOR NONPAYMENT OF TAX. 620 (Tex. Civ.App.) The refusal of the trial court to foreclose any liens for taxes due prior to judgment for taxes under which the property was sold was correct, since a valid sale under a junior assessment cuts off all prior tax liens. Ivey v. Teichman, 201 S. W. 695. XI. TAX TITLES. (B) Tax Deeds. 783 (Ky.) Where, on death of an intestate leaving children and widow, his widow occupied ages by negligence of telegraph company in misstating offered price for goods, to minimize damage, but he is not required to break the contract.-Des Are Oil Mill v. Western Union Telegraph Co., 201 S. W. 273. 54(1) (Ark.) Printed stipulation on back of telegraph blank held void as attempting to exempt telegraph company from liability for damages resulting from negligence.-Des Arc Oil Mill v. Western Union Telegraph Co., 201 S. W. 273. Act Cong. June 18, 1910, c. 309, giving Interstate Commerce Commission authority to regulate rates and practices of telegraph companies, held not to validate telegraph company's stipulation attempting to exempt itself from liability for negligence.-Id. 54 (6) (Ark.) Telegraph company's stipulation limiting amount of liability for mistakes in transmission of unrepeated message, etc., cannot be sustained as stipulation for value.Des Arc Oil Mill v. Western Union Telegraph Co., 201 S. W. 273. 56(3) (Ark.) Telegraph company is agent of sender, who is bound contractually to sendee by any mistake in transmission, though sendee, under proper circumstances, may maintain action against telegraph company for damages.Des Arc Oil Mill v. Western Union Telegraph Co., 201 S. W. 273. 65(1) (Tex.Civ.App.) In a petition in an ac- TRADE-MARKS AND TRADE-NAMES. tion against a telegraph company for failure to deliver a death message, petition held to state See Libel and Slander, 139. a cause of action as against a general demurrer. -Western Union Telegraph Co. v. Golden, 201 S. W. 1080. TENANCY IN COMMON. See Joint Tenancy. II. MUTUAL RIGHTS, DUTIES, AND LIABILITIES OF COTENANTS. 15(7, 8) (Mo.) Statute of limitations as to adverse possession does not commence to run between tenants in common until there have been such outward acts of exclusive ownership on part of one as to impart notice unequivocally to his cotenant that adverse possession is asserted against him.-Zimmerman v. First Nat. Bank, 201 S. W. 852. 15(10) (Mo.) To establish adverse possession by one tenant in common against another, proof of intention to hold adversely must be so clear and convincing as to satisfy mind.-Zimmerman v. First Nat. Bank, 201 S. W. 852. TRANSFER OF CAUSES. See Appeal and Error, 359-407; Justices of the Peace, 156-159. TREES. See Logs and Logging. TRESPASS. See Assault and Battery; Equity, 24; Judgment, 606. II. ACTIONS. (A) Right of Action and Defenses. 30 (Ark.) One who purchases an invalid tax title and conveys the right to cut trees standing on the land to another is liable for the trespass committed by his purchaser in cutting and removing the trees.-Hendrix v. Black, 201 S. W. 283. (B) Jurisdiction, Parties. Preliminary Proceedings, and Pleading. 40(5) (Mo.App.) Petition for trespass, without allegations setting forth character and amount of damages, does not state cause of action.-Young v. Home Telephone Co., 201 S. W. 635. (D) Damages. 47 (Mo.App.) For trespasses other than those enumerated in Rev. St. 1909, §§ 5448, 5449, recovery is either value of thing appropriated, removed, or destroyed, or sum equal to damage done.-Young v. Home Telephone Co., 201 S. W. 635. TRESPASS TO TRY TITLE. See Ejectment; Public Lands, 175. II. PROCEEDINGS. 41(1) (Tex.Civ.App.) Evidence in trespass to try title held sufficient to establish title in defendant and his successors in interest by deed, duly executed and delivered, which was lost before recording.-Boedefeld v. Johnson, 201 S. W. 1027. Evidence in trespass to try title examined, and defendants held to have met all requirements of both the five and ten year statute of limitations, and by proof of knowledge of and recognition by plaintiff's vendor of adverse possession of defendants for more than such periods of limitation.-Id. 45(1) (Tex. Civ.App.) In trespass to try title by one who took by inheritance from his mother and gift from his father, instruction that he See Master and Servant, 101-125, 233-247. could not recover unless his father could was not erroneous as instructing to find for defendant because the father was making no claim.-Massingill v. Moody, 201 S. W. 265. III. DAMAGES, USE AND OCCUPATION, IMPROVEMENTS, AND TAXES. 59 (Tex.Civ.App.) In trespass to try title, there was no error in admitting defendants' testimony as to what they were told as to title, on the issue of their good faith in making improvements. Massingill v. Moody, 201 S. W. 265. TRIAL. See Continuance; Costs; Jury; New Trial; Stipulations; Venue. For trial of particular actions or proceedings, see also the various specific topics. For review of rulings at trial, see Appeal and Error. IV. RECEPTION OF EVIDENCE. (A) Introduction, Offer, and Admission of Evidence in General. 47(1) (Mo.App.) Where an offer of certain testimony to show contributory negligence was excluded, but defendant made no showing what such would be, sustaining the objection was not error.-Edwards v. Yarbrough, 201 S. W. 972. (C) Objections, Motions to Strike Out, and Exceptions. 143 (Mo.) On contradictory evidence, demurrer is properly refused.-Hill v. Harvey, 201 S. W. 535. 143 (Tex.Civ.App.) The evidence raising an issue, failure to submit it is error, notwithstanding any preponderance of the evidence.Kirlicks v. Texas Co., 201 S. W. 687. VII. INSTRUCTIONS TO JURY. (A) Province of Court and Jury in General. 194(7) (Tex.Civ.App.) Objection to charge as on weight of evidence is not tenable where there is no dispute as to fact.-Hegman v. Roberts, 201 S. W. 268. 76 (Tex. Civ.App.) Specific objection to introduction of ordinance that it had not been published must be made at time, that it may thereafter be available.-San Antonio & A. P. 194(9) (Tex. Civ.App.) Instruction that apRy. Co. v. Boyed, 201 S. W. 219. 82 (Mo.App.) Objections to a hypothetical question put to a physician concerning plaintiff's injuries that such question did not embrace all the facts shown by the evidence, but which failed to point out what facts were omitted, was unavailing.-Shafer v. Kansas City Rys. Co., 201 S. W. 611. 83(1) (Mo.App.) Objection to the admission of evidence on the ground that it did not tend to prove any of the issues is general and unavailing if the evidence is competent for any purpose in the case.-Edwards v. Yarbrough, 201 S. W. 972. 89 (Tex. Civ.App.) Where a witness by his own admissions on the stand shows that he is not informed as to a matter concerning which he gave opinion testimony, such testimony should be stricken.-Southern Pac. Co. v. Stephens, 201 S. W. 1076. V. ARGUMENTS AND CONDUCT OF 133 (6) (Tex.Civ.App.) Conceding plaintiff's argument to have been beyond proper bounds, the error was cured by prompt instruction not to consider such remarks and by the withdrawal of such remarks.-Sullivan v. Masterson, 201 S. W. 194. plication for employment and agreement as to plaintiff's seniority on list of conductors was not an employment, held properly refused as an instruction on the weight of the evidence, prohibited by Vernon's Sayles' Ann. Civ. St. 1914, art. 1971.-San Antonio, U. & G. R. Co. v. Dawson, 201 S. W. 247. (B) Necessity and Subject-Matter. 203 (1) (Tex.Civ.App.) While the court is not required ordinarily to state the issues made by the pleadings in the preliminary part of the charge, if he attempts to do so, the issues should be correctly stated.-Bonnett-Brown Sales Service Co. v. Denison Morning Gazette, 201 S. W. 1044. 218 (Ark.) Argument that "defendants' possession was not peaceable possession within the meaning of the instructions, because L. J. went down there and they had a row about it," was reversible error, where court refused to admonish jury that counsel had not correctly interpreted instructions on this subject, being tantamount to giving erroneous instruction.Briggs v. Jones, 201 S. W. 118. 219 (Ky.) In action on note, defendants setting up lack of "consideration," term, under facts, held not of such technical significance as to require definition.-Farmers' Bank of West Louisville v. Birk, 201 S. W. 315. 133 (6) (Tex. Civ.App.) Argument by rail-219 (Mo. App.) Instructions submitting road employé's counsel in which he adverted to fact that employé had wife and children, though evidence of that fact had not been allowed to go to jury, having been withdrawn and jury instructed to disregard it, held not to warrant reversal. Schaff v. Riha, 201 S. W. 210. VI. TAKING CASE OR QUESTION (A) Questions of Law or of Fact in Gen- 134 (Tex. Civ.App.) If issue of fact is raised as to any material question in case, it must be submitted to jury.-Reeves v. Avina, 201 S. W. 729. 139(1) (Ky.) Under scintilla rule prevailing in Kentucky, it is duty of trial court to refuse peremptory instruction, and to submit issue to jury, though verdict for one side might be flagrantly against evidence so as to justify setting it aside.-Farmers' Bank of West Louisville v. Birk, 201 S. W. 315. 140(1) (Ark.) Issue as to credibility of witnesses was peculiarly for jury.-Dickinson v. Brummett, 201 S. W. 812. 140(1) (Mo.) Credibility of witnesses is for jury.-Hill v. Harvey, 201 S. W. 535. 140(1) (Tex.Civ.App.) The jury are the exclusive judges of the credibility and weight of the testimony.-Sullivan v. Masterson, 201 S. W. 194. legal conclusions to the jury and without giving definitions are improper. Scheidel Western X-Ray Co. v. Bacon, 201 S. W. 916. (C) Form, Requisites, and Sufficiency. ~232(5) (Mo.App.) In attachment suit, modification of instruction, by inserting as a definition of the word "domicile" the words "that is, his permanent home," was improper, as not specific enough and misleading.-Ware v. Flory, 201 S. W. 593. 235 (4) (Mo.) In action on policy insuring against death by accidental means, evidence being circumstantial, defendant's requested instruction that jury could not resort to guess, conjecture, or speculation was misleading, and properly refused.-Reynolds v. Maryland Casualty Co., 201 S. W. 1128. 237(1) (Tex. Civ.App.) In physician's action for hospital services rendered boy injured by defendant, court's special charge held clearly to have instructed jury that only in event they should find from preponderance of evidence that plaintiff had proven his cause of action could they render verdict for him.-Banfield v. Davidson, 201 S. W. 442. 239 (Tex.Civ.App.) In action for balance under contract where defendant made unconditional tender of a smaller sum, instructions precluding recovery of anything except the amount sued for was error.-Bonnett-Brown Sales Service Co. v. Denison Morning Gazette, 201 S. W. 1044. 143 (Ky.) Where evidence was sharply conflicting, peremptory instruction was properly 240 (Tex.Civ.App.) Instruction as to belief denied; question being for jury.-Carter Coal in truth of grounds set out in affidavit for atCo. v. Filipeck, 201 S. W. 468. tachment not affecting right to recovery for Trial 201 SOUTHWESTERN REPORTER wrongful attachment, held argumentative.-Heg- 252 (11) (Tex.Civ.App.) In action for death of locomotive engineer, where the evidence man v. Roberts, 201 S. W. 268. 242 (Mo.) Where the evidence was volum- raised no issue of contributory negligence, failinous, and the issues were many and complicat-ure to instruct thereon was not error.-Gulf, C. ed, the mere fact that an instruction was very & S. F. Ry. Co. v. Carpenter, 201 S. W. 270. long, and might therefore tend to mislead, did 252 (11) (Tex. Civ. App.) Where not constitute error.-Laird v. Keithley, 201 S. W. 1138. (D) Applicability to Pleadings and Evidence. injured servant's testimony disclosed that he was legally chargeable with knowledge of some of the dangerous conditions, requested instruction that he did not assume the risk if he acted under orders without time to appreciate the danger was improper.-Ft. Worth & D. C. Ky. Co. v. Miller, 201 S. W. 1049. 251(3) (Ky.) In the absence of pleading of equitable estoppel in an action to enjoin and recover damages for trespass upon land, request-253(4) (Mo.App.) Where plaintiff passenger ed instruction on equitable estoppel was properly refused.-Fort v. Wiser, 201 S. W. 7. 251(3) (Ky.) Issue for submission to jury being which of two objects was dividing ridge called for by deed, requested instructions submitting construction of deed were properly refused.-Pulaski Stave Co. v. Sale, 201 S. W. 12. alleged defendant street railway, after stopping its car pursuant to signal, negligently started it while plaintiff was alighting, and evidence conflicted as to whether stop was regular one, an instruction not submitting issue whether car stopped pursuant to signal nor defining a regular stop, held erroneous.-Hays v. Metropolitan St. Ry. Co., 201 S. W. 566. 251 (3) (Tex.Civ.App.) In suit against rail-253(4) (Tex.Civ.App.) In action for injuroad to recover for horse killed by its motorcar ries in collision, where plaintiff alleged defendwithin city limits, an instruction submitting ant was violating Pen. Code 1911, art. 815, by question whether city was incorporated as re- driving in excess of 18 miles per hour, and arquired by law, an issue not raised, was mis-ticle 816, prohibiting, excessive or dangerous leading. Texas City Terminal Co. v. McGee, speed and dangerous driving, held error to submit only recovery under article 815.-Figueroa 201 S. W. 673. v. Madero, 201 S. W. 271. 251(5) (Tex.Civ.App.) In action for balance alleged to be due under contract, instruction that, if defendants defauited in payment before cancellation of the contract, to find for plaintiff was error in the absence of a pleading to support it.-Bonnett-Brown Sales Seryice Co. v. Denison Morning Gazette, 201 S. W. 1044. 251(6) (Mo.) Where, in action on policy insuring against accidental death, an instruction given for plaintiff was in accordance with theory on which pleadings were framed and case tried, defendant cannot complain that it ignored the issue of "suicide sane sane," insanity not being in issue.-Reynolds v. Maryland Casualty Co., 201 S. W. 1128. or in 251(6) (Mo.App.) In action on fire policy, where there was ample evidence goods were in L. building when insured and when burnt, and that such building was located on lot 3, block 17, etc., it was not reversible to use the term "L building" in instructions, where the petition only referred to the lot number.Young v. Queen Ins. Co. of America, 201 S. W. 940. In action for injuries in collision, where plaintiff alleged defendant violated Pen. Code 1911, art. 815, by driving over 18 miles per hour, and article 816, prohibiting dangerous driving, error to submit only recovery under fendant was driving on the wrong side of the article 815 held, in view of evidence that deroad.-Id. 253 (8) (Mo.App.) Requested declarations of law precluding recovery if the cause of action arising by grading one street arose befused where a different street was later gradyond the time of limitations were properly rev. City of Joplin, 201 S. W. 1147. ed within the period of limitations.-Frederick 253(9) (Tex. Civ. App.) Where servant's testimony disclosed that he was legally chargeable with knowledge of some of the dangerous conditions, it was error to charge that he could recover if the master was negligent.-Ft. Worth & D. C. Ry. Co. v. Miller, 201 S. W. 1049. (E) Requests or Prayers. injured the 251 (8) (Tex.Civ.App.) Instruction defining 256(1) (Tex. Civ.App.) Omissions in "employer" and "employé" held properly refus- charge cannot be complained of in the absence ed where the special issues did not use these of request for amplification.-Crawford v. El Paso Land Improvement Co., 201 S. W. 233. words, though they asked whether plaintiff was in defendant's employ.-San Antonio, U. & G. R. Co. v. Dawson, 201 S. W. 247. Under Vernon's Sayles' Ann. Civ. St. 1914, art. 1984a, instruction that a person was an independent contractor, and that defendant was not liable for his negligence, held properly refused where it did not explain or define anything in the special issues.-Id. 252 (1) (Mo.App.) Refusal of an instruction is not error, where the evidence affords no basis for it.-Hartman v. Hoernle, 201 S. W. 911. 252(5) (Ark.) Where landlord's evidence tended to show that he rented land to another in January, while tenant's evidence tended to show that it was rented to him, instructions that landlord could not recover possession where he stood by and allowed tenant to hold over and plant his crops were properly refused. -Moore v. Ellis, 201 S. W. 791. 252(11) (Ark.) In an action for injuries to a servant while placing a spring hanger on locomotive, evidence held sufficient to authorize instruction on master's liability due to servant obeying orders of foreman, and on assumption of risk.-Wisconsin & Arkansas Lumber Co. v. Standridge, 201 S. W. 295. 260(1) (Mo.App.) Requested instruction, covering matter already fully covered by another instruction given by court, was properly refused.-Estes v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co., 201 S. W. 563. 260(1) (Tex. Civ.App.) There was no error in refusing to submit requested issues to jury, substance of them being submitted by main charge.-Hudson v. Salley, 201 S. W. 665. the court gave a requested instruction, it was not error to refuse another instruction whose substance was the same.-Corpus Christi Street & Interurban Ry. Co. v. Kjellberg, 201 S. W. 1032. 260(1) (Tex.Civ.App.) Where 260 (2) (Tex. Civ.App.) Trial court is not required to give general charge, independent of special charges given, where such special charg es fairly cover all issues called for by pleadings and evidence.-Banfield v. Davidson, 201 S. W. 442. for in 260 (8) (Ky.) Plaintiff's request struction, directing jury to find for plaintiff if they believed original note, of which note in suit was renewal, was executed for purchase price of two bonds of coal company, held properly refused as fully covered.-Farmers' Bank of West Louisville v. Birk, 201 s. W. 315. |