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office of chairman of the county court, and that a completed or executed contract of therefore the decree of the Court of Civil sale of the land in question had been made. Appeals is affirmed.

Defendant insisted that there was only an executory agreement to purchase, with which it had refused to comply on account of com

plainant's defective title. Defendant also CROSS v. BUSKIRK-RUTLEDGE LUM

filed a cross-bill in which it asked for a reBER CO.

scission of the contract made with the com(Supreme Court of Tennessee. Feb. 11, 1918.) plainant, and for a recovery of that part of 1. VENDOR AND PURCHASER 158 Con- the purchase money which had been paid to TRACT FOR WARRANTY DEED-WHEN COn the complainant, and also for damages. TRACT BECOMES EXECUTED - REMEDIES OF

A great mass of proof was taken, and the VENDEE.

Where title is defoctive, delivery of a war- chancellor decreed that the contract between ranty deed to one who has gone into possession the parties had not been executed, and furon representation of good title under contract thermore decreed that complainant's title to of bargain and sale, but providing for “apt and the land was defective, and refused a speproper deed with covenants of general warranty," does not render the contract an execut-cific performance, and dismissed complained one, so as to prevent a rescission of the ant's bill. It appeared that defendant had contract, in the absence of waiver.

already cut certain timber on the lands in 2. WILLS 614(1)-CONSTRUCTION.

question, and the chancellor ordered a refA gift by testator of the use of all his property, real and personal, to his wife for her life, erence to ascertain the value of this timber, created a life estate in all property, real and and also directed the master to report what personal.

damages the defendant had sustained. Be3. Wills On 693(1)-CONSTRUCTION-CONTRA-fore this account was taken, an appeal was DICTION.

Where a testator gave wife a life estate in prayed and granted, and the case has been all his property, a power of sale given to execu- | heard in this court. tors cannot be construed to deprive her of her The complainant, C. Cross, Edward L. life estate, or dispose of property without her Hall, and Edward Shaver were owners of a joining in the deed. 4. VENDOR AND PURCHASER 158 CON

tract of land in Scott county, Tenn., which TRACT FOR WARRANTY DEED WHEN Ex- they acquired by deed from W. H. Buttram, ECUTED,

clerk and master, November 27, 1899. These Under contract for warranty deed, delivery of warranty deed, where title of grantor de parties also had other assurances of title. pends on parol evidence of adverse possession, The tract of land consisted of about 1,800 is not sufficient to render contract executed, in acres. absence of waiver, because title must be good as

U. B. Buskirk was a lumber man residing founded on the records, and not on fact not of in Lexington, Ky. He came to Scott counrecord. 5. ADVERSE Possession Om 106(5)-TITLE.

ty, Tenn., in February, 1913, looking for timAlthough grantor has good title by reason ber lands. While there he met the comof adverse possession, a contract of sale of such plainant, Cross, and the latter showed Busland cannot be specifically enforced unless good kirk this tract of land owned by Cross, Hall, title is shown of record, because a purchaser does not have to take a title which will have to and Shaver. Negotiations followed between be proved by parol evidence.

Cross and Buskirk, and on March 10, 1913,

Cross, for himself and associates, and BusAppeal from Chancery Court, Scott Coun kirk, for the J. W. Johnson Company, the ty; Hugh G. Kyle, Chancellor.

predecessor of the Buskirk-Rutledge LumBill by C. Cross against the Buskirk-Rut- ber Company, entered into the following ledge Lumber Company. Decree for defend

written agreement: ant, and plaintiff appeals. Affirmed.

"This agreement, made and entered into this E. G. Foster, of Huntington, and H. M. the 10th day of March, 1913, by and between C. Carr, of Harriman, for C. Cross. J. F. Baker Cross of Oneida, Tenn., and Edward L. Hall and J. A. Fowler, both of Knoxville, for of Jamestown, N. Y., as parties of the first

part, and J. W. Johnson Co., a corporation of Buskirk-Rutledge Lumber Co.

Lexington, Ky., as party of the second part.

"Whereas, the parties of the first part are GREEN, J. This bill was filed by the com joint owners in a certain boundary of land ag

gregating about eighteen hundred acres, situplainant to collect a balance alleged to be ated in Scott county, Tenn., ncar the town of due from the defendant on account of the Oneida, in district No. 8 Said land is further purchase of a tract of land in Scott county. land, whereas C. Cross, one of the parties to

described as being known as the Blankenship The bill averred that the contract had been this agreement, is owner in his own right of executed and a deed for the land delivered. three tracts of land, two of which adjoin the The complainant prayed for alternative re- eighteen hundred acres first above referred to, lief in the event he had mistaken his rem

the other tract lying partly in the town of

Oneida, Tenn., known as the Joshua Smith edy. He asks in this court that he be grant- tract: ed a decree for specific performance if the "Now this agreement witnesseth: That the court should not agree with him that this said C. Cross and Edward L. Hall have this contract had been executed.

day bargained and sold to the party of the second part the eighteen hundred

of land The defendant filed an answer, denying referred to in this contract at the price of eight

For other cases see same topic and KEY-NUMBER in all Key-Numbered Digests and Indexes

dollars ($8) per acre, on the following terms of the purchase price agreed on after the and condition: That is to say, one-third cash, acreage was determined. one-third in six months, one-third in twelve months, deferred payments to draw interest from

Some other agreements and writings were date of deed.

executed and correspondence had between the “The said C. Cross and Edward L. Hall agree parties, which it is not material to set out in to survey the said land as quickly as can rea- this connection. sonably be done, and when acreage is ascertained by survey, then the said C. Cross and Ed

One of the principal controversies between ward L. Hall are to make to the second party the parties, as indicated in the statement an apt and proper deed with covenants of gen-1 above, is whether or not this contract beeral warranty, retaining a vendor's equitable tween them was executed or executory. lien upon the land to secure the unpaid purchase money.

[1] The complainant insists that the trans"The said C. Cross and Edward L. Hall ac-action was closed and title passed as a result knowledge the receipt of five thousand dollars. of the contract of March 10, 1913, heretofore evidenced by the said second party's check on the Phænix 3rd National of Lexington,

Ky.,

copied. We do not assent to this contenpayable to C. Cross.

tion. It is true that the agreement recited "Upon ascertaining the true acreage of the that the vendors had “bargained and sold," said land by survey, should it turn out that the using the past tense, but a further inspecfive thousand dollars so paid is not sufficient to cover one-third of the purchase money, then the tion of the document discloses that other said second party is to immediately pay the said things were to be done. The land was to C. Cross and Edward L, Hall a sum equal to be surveyed, and upon the acreage ascerthe difference of the one-third and the five tained the amount of the cash payment was thousand dollars so paid.

"However, should it turn out that five thou- to be estimated, and turned over, and "an apt sand dollars so paid is in excess of the one and proper deed with covenants of general third of the purchase price, then the said ... warranty" was to be made by the vendors. Cross and Edward Hall are to refund the dif- The deal was not completed, and the contract ference to the said second party.

"C. Cross, in his own right, gives the said was not executed at this stage. Topp v. second party the privilege of taking the other, White, 59 Tenn. (12 Heisk.) 165. three tracts at the same price and upon the

Complainant next insists that the contract same terms and conditions as the eighteen hundred acre tract.

certainly became executed when the deed was “Witness our hand and seal day and date prepared and delivered to Mr. Baker, defendabove written.

ant's attorney.
"C. Cross. [Seal.]
“Edward L. Hall, [Scal,]

Over this latter contention perhaps the “By C. Cross.

greatest fight in the case is made. "J. W. Johnson Company, [Seal,) Mr. Cross insists that it was understood

"By U. B. Buskirk, V. P. between him and Buskirk that the transacWitness: H. R. Anderson."

tion was to be closed by the delivery of this At the time of this purchase, Buskirk's deed to Mr. Baker. Mr. Foster partially corcompany was anxious to procure lumber to roborates this contention. fill certain contracts that it had outstanding.

Mr. Buskirk, on the contrary, maintains A survey of the land described was begun that it was understood between the parties

that this deed was to be turned over to Mr. promptly. One surveyor was employed by

Baker along with the complainant's other Cross and another by Buskirk. Before any deed to the land was drawn up, the title to the lands, and that the under

title papers, to enable Mr. Baker to pass on Buskirk's people entered and began cutting

standing was that the transaction should not the timber. Cross believed that he had a be considered as closed until title to the perfect title, and so assured Buskirk, and lands had been examined and approved by Buskirk thereupon entered and began cutting,

Mi. Baker. on the faith of this assurance. On March 12, 1913, a deed to the land, de executed, the complainant insists that defend

On the theory that this contract has been scribing it in two tracts, was drawn up and ant may not avoid payment of the purchase executed by Cross and wife to Buskirk's com- price or have a rescission, even though the pany. This deed was left with Mr. Baker, 1 title to the land partially fails. Complaindefendant's attorney. Cross had previously ant insists that under such circumstances detaken deeds to himself from Edward L. Hall, fendant's only remedy is upon the covenants one of his associates, and from the executors in the deed executed by the vendors. of Edward Shaver, his oiher associate in the

Before considering this, it should be pointownership of this land, Shaver having died. ed out that defendant did not enter upon this

This deed did not accurately recite the land under the deed. For reasons stated consideration paid for the land. An addi-above, defendant entered upon the land shorttional memorandum or agreement was drawn ly after the contract of sale was made, upon up and executed by Cross, which fully re-complainant's assurance of good title and becited the consideration paid. This it appears fore the deed was executed. There can be was done by the parties to beguile the tax no controversy as to this on the proof in the assessol.

record. In pursuance of the terms of the contract The general rule undoubtedly is that a venof sale, Buskirk paid to Cross $5,000, and dor's remedy for a defective or incumbered later paid him $468.69, which was one-third title, in the absence of fraud or insolvency of

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the vendor, is not rescission, but an action deed passing a good title, their contract canupon the covenants of his deed, where the not be said to have been completed or execontract is an executed one. McElya v. Hill, cuted, by any delivery to Mr. Baker. He had 105 Tenn. 319, 59 S. W. 1025; Land Co. v. no authority to waive any provision of the Hill, 87 Tenn. 588, 11 S. W. 797; Topp v. original contract so far as the proof shows. White, 59 Tenn. (12 Heisk.) 165; Buchanan

“An executed contract is one in which both parv. Alwell, 27 Tenn. (8 Humph.) 516.

ties have fully performed the terms of the conThis rule, however, is said not to "apply tract by them to be performed. An executory in any jurisdiction where there is a provision contract is one in which the parties have not

yet performed the terms of the contract by to the contrary in the contract.” 39 Cyc. them to be performed.

It consists of mutual 1445.

outstanding promises." Page on Contracts, S “Particular provisions are frequently found 18. in contracts which specifically or by implica "An executory contract is one in which a partion require the vendor's title to be good. Thus ty binds himself to do or not to do a particular it has been held that the conveyance of a good thing, whereas an executed contract is one in title by the vendor is required where a con- which the object of the agreement is performed. tract for the sale of land provides for a 'good

An executory contract, it is said, conand sufficient title,' a 'lawful title,' a 'perfect veys a chose in action while an executed contitle,' a 'general warranty of title, a “good' or tract conveys a chose in possession. ‘good and valid' deed, a 'good and sufficient decd An executed contract consists in the performto vest the title,' or 'to convey the title,' a

ance of everything necessary to be done accord‘good and lawful deed and title,' a deed or con- ing to the terms of the contract between the veyance clear of all incumbrances,' a 'deed with parties contracting so as to fully invest the a covenant against incumbrances,' a deed or party contracted with dominion of the thing conveyance 'free and clear,' a 'deed conveying parted with.” 6 R. C. L. 590. a clear title,' a 'deed in fee,' a 'good and perfect deed,' a 'good and sufficient deed,' or 'good To like effect, see our own cases of Hale v. and sufficient conveyance,' a 'lawful deed of Sharp, 44 Tenn. (4 Cold.) 275; Hardwick v. conveyance,' a 'deed' or 'decd of conveyance,' a ‘proper conveyance for the conveying and as

American Can Co., 113 Tenn. 657, 88 S. W. suring the fee simple of the premises,' a 'good 797; Topp v. White, 59 Tenn. (12 Heisk.) 165. and valid deed,' with the usual covenants of It therefore follows that if Mr. Cross and

seisin and warranty,' a 'good and sufficient war- his associates do not possess good title to this ranty deed, in fee simple, free from all incumbrances,' a 'warranty deed,' a 'general warranty tract of land, their contract with the defenddeed,' or a ‘good and sufficient warranty deed.'" ant cannot be said to have been executed by 39 Cyc, 1445.

mere delivery of a deed formally correct. We have two instances of this kind in our They contracted to convey good title, and Tennessee cases. Thus the vendor agreed to they have not done so. They have not yet make "good and sufficient deeds of convey

performed the terms of the contract by them ance of and to said two tracts of land." The to be performed. They have not fully investcourt held that these words created an obli- ed the vendee with dominion of the thing gation on the part of the vendor to "execute parted with. They have conveyed a title in deeds of conveyance, not only sufficient in action and not a settled title. point of form, but fully operative, in effect, to

The case then turns on the condition of pass to and vest the complainant with an in the title to these lands which Cross and asdefeasible fee-simple estate.” Cunningham v.

sociates undertook to pass. Sharp, 30 Tenn. (11 Humph.) 116.

As heretofore stated, these lands were conAn agreement of the vendor to make or veyed by Buttram, clerk and master, to cause to be made "a deed in fee for said Cross, Hall, and Shaver. Mr. Cross took a land” was held to mean, “not simply a deed deed from Hall and from Shaver's executors good in form, but one fully operative in ef- to himself and then undertook to pass the tifect to pass to the complainant an indefeasi- tle by his own deed to defendant, in which ble fee-simple estate.” Topp v. White, 59 his wife joined. Tenn. (12 Heisk.) 165, 177.

Edward Shaver, who owned a one-third inBy the contract in this case, Mr. Cross and terest in this property, seems to have died associates agreed to execute "an apt and testate, leaving a widow and children survivproper deed with covenants of general war- ing him. So far as the record shows, the widranty.” The contract also recited that the ow is still alive. Mr. Shaver was a resident owners “are joint owners” of the tract of of Jamestown, N. Y., and his will was there land.

probated in April, 1904. It has been filed for As seen above, an agreement on the part of record in this state, and its material provithe vendor to execute a warranty deed, a gen- sions are in the following words: eral warranty deed, or a good and sufficient

I, Edward Shaver, of the city of Jamestown, warranty deed implies that his title is good, N. Y., being of sound mind and memory, do and binds him to convey a good title. See make and publish and declare this to be my last cases cited under note 11, 39 Cyc. 1446.

will and testament, that is to say:

(1) After all my lawful debts are paid and Such a contract is not satisfied by deed of satisfied, I give and bequeath to my wife, Louise a grantor who has not a good title.

Shaver, the use of all my property, both real Inasmuch, therefore, as Mr. Cross and as- and personal, during her natural life, together sociates contracted to convey a good title to she may deem necessary for her proper main

with so much of the principal of my estate as these lands, unless they have in fact made a tenance and support."

The second, third, fourth, fifth, and part of, Sharer interest in these lands during Mrs. the sixth clauses of the will make bequests Shaver's life is, to say the least of it, exand provisions for the children and certain tremely doubtful. relatives of the testator. The concluding sen- If they have no such right, then the title tences of the sixth clause of the will are intendered by complainants in this case is de. these words;

fective to one-third undivided interest in all "I hereby grant to my executors the power of the lands involved. sale of my real estate and power to execute the The lands lie both north and south of the necessary conveyances thereof. I likewise make, latitude line. As to one tract of 160 acres ly. constitute and appoint Edward L. Hall and George R. Butts executors of this my last will ing north of the latitude line, there is out. and testament, hereby revoking all former wills standing a Kentucky patent which is concedby me made."

edly the oldest and best title, and which cov

ers the 160-acre tract. The complainant Mrs. Shaver is not before the court in this claims to have tolled the title to this tract of case, and, of course, what we say in regard land by possession under younger title papers. to her powers under the will does not deter. There is a question as to the location of this mine or fix those powers, but is only said in possession. But, waiving this, the character consideration of the state of the title here un- of the possession is doubtful. It was a barn dertaken to be passed by the complainant in which Cross built upon the land, and in this case.

which he fed his cattle during feeding time. [2] The gift by the testator of the use of These cattle were out on the range in suitaall his property, real and personal, to his wife ble seasons. There was no lock on this barn. for her life, undoubtedly created in her a life Our court has not so far held a structure of estate in all said property, real and personal. this character to be a sufficient evidence of Gourley v. Thompson, 34 Tenn. (2 Sneed) 387; adverse possession. McKee v. McKee (Ch. App.) 52 S. W. 320; 40

Even in cases where a dwelling house had Cyc. 1615. Moreover, the gift to Mrs. Shaver been constructed, the court has held that if in this connection of said property for life, “to- the doors be left open, such a possession will gether with so much of the principal of my es- not be sufficient. Allen v. Suseng, 41 Tenn. tate as she may deem necessary for her prop-(1 Cold.) 204; Davidson v. Phillips, 17 Tenn. er maintenance and support,” may perhaps (9 Yerg.) 93, 30 Am. Dec. 393; Greer y. Wroe, confer on her, by implication, a power of sale 33 Tenn. (1 Sneed) 246. as to all the property, if in her judginent any The court has also held that pens for feedpart of it should be required for the purposes ing hogg or cattle occasionally did not conindicated. If such a power is conferred, the stitute sufficient evidences of adverse possesnecessity of a sale would be a matter to be sion. Hubbard v. Godfrey, 100 Tenn. 150, 47 controlled by her discretion. Matthews v. S. W. 81; Pullen v. Hopkins, 69 Tenn. (1 Lea). Capshaw, 109 Tenn. 480, 72 S. W. 964, 97 Am. 741; Hicks v. Tredericks, 77 Tenn. (9 Lea) St. Rep. 854.

491. The dominant intention of the testator There are other detached parcels of land in seems to have been to provide for his wife's this tract, to which the chancellor was of support and comfort.

opinion that complainant did not have good [3] Having undoubtedly conferred on her a title. These titles depend largely upon poslife estate in all his property, real and per- sessions. The possessions as to their characsonal, and his intention having been to secure ter, location, and continuity are subjects her support, this power of sale given to the of parol controversy. executors apparently cannot be so construed So that we have a case in which the title as to deprive her of her life estate; that is to tendered by the complainant as to a one-third say, they cannot, during the widow's life- undivided interest in all the land is doubtful time, dispose of her property without any con- upon the record. The necessary parties are sultation with her or without her joining in not before the court to enable this title to be the deed. Moreover, if a power of sale be fixed and declared herein. given to her, such a power conflicts with the Again we have a possession of dubious power of sale given to the executors, if that character relied on to establish ownership to latter power be construed as conferring upon the whole of 160 acres and the title to other them authority to sell during the life of the parts of the land is dependent upon the teswidow.

timony of witnesses as to possessions. As suggested by counsel for defendant, the

[4] Under the circumstances, it cannot be probable construction of the will may be that said, in our opinion, that the complainant the testator intended the executors to exer- has complied with the agreement to furnish cise the power of sale conferred on them aft

a good title. He has not completed and exeer the death of the wife in order to carry out

cuted his contract. other provisions of the will.

[5] On the other hand, if we regard his What is the proper construction of the will bill as one for specific performance, he is not we are not called on to determine. The nec-entitled to the relief sought. essary parties are not before us. Enough has

"In a suit by the vendor to enforce performbeen said, however, to show that the right of ance of a contract for the sale of land, the venthese executors to make a conveyance of the dee will not be compelled to accept the title

unless it is a marketable one; that is, one , property is found, regardless of the fact that which will not expose him to litigation. To its directors and officers reside in another counforce upon the vendee a title which he may bety; this being particularly true where it did not compelled to defend in the courts is to impose appear that the corporation was at that time upon him a hard bargain, and this a court of doing business in the state so as to render servequity, in the exercise of its discretion, will ice of process on resident directors and officers refuse to do, irrespective of the question whether valid. the title is actually good or bad." 36 Cyc. 632. 2. APPEAL AND ERROR Om895(2) EQUITY "Where the title depends upon the existence

CASES-TRIAL DE Novo. of a fact, which is not a matter of record, and

While the general rule is that on appeals in the fact depends for its proof entirely upon chancery the trial is de novo, that relates, not to oral evidence, the case must be very clear by technicalities of procedure, but to the chancelthe vendor to warrant the court in ordering spe- lor's decision on the facts, which does not havn cific performance. The opinion of the chan-| the same force as a verdict or finding of fact ty cellor or of the appellate court can have little, a court of law sitting without a jury. if any, curative effect upon a doubtful title, where the doubt relates to a matter of fact, 3. APPEAL AND ERROR Eww188—PRESENTATION

OF GROUNDS OF REVIEW IN COURT BELOWsince a disputed fact may be proved in one liti

SERVICE OF ATTACHMENT. gation to-day, and disproved in another between different parties to-morrow." 36 Cyc. 635.

In an action begun by attachment where all

of the defendants, including the foreign corporaOur own authorities are fully in accord: tion, appeared, and the parties treated the atMullins v. Aiken, 49 Tenn. (2 Heisk.) 535 ; | tachment writ as lawfully levied, contesting only Cunningham v. Sharp, 30 Tenn. (11 Humph.) the rights conferred by the levy, objections that 116; Topp v. White, 59 Tenn. (12 Heisk.) garnishment in writing was left with the de.

there was no proper writ because no notice o 165; Buchanan V. Alwell, 27 Tenn. (8 fendant garnished, and that there was no publiHumph.) 516; Collins v. Smith, 38 Tenn. (1 cation for the defendants, where made for the Head) 255.

first time on appeal, will not be considered notMany other questions are raised on this withstanding the suit was one in equity.

4. STIPULATIONS 18(1)-APPEARANCE-DErecord, and the case has been fully argued

MURRER. and has required much investigation upon Where defendants moved to dismiss a bill the part of the court. We think what has and in the alternative demurred, it being stipubeen said, however, is sufficient to dispose of lated that if the motion should be sustained

the demurrer would not be considered an entry the controversy, and further elaboration is of appearance, the motion being disallowed, denot required.

fendants must be treated as having appeared. It results that the decree of the chancellor 5. FRAUDS, STATUTE OF Ow118(4) SUFFI, will be affirmed, and the case remanded for

CIENCY OF WRITING-SIGNED LETTERS. further proceedings in accordance with that plainant employment for two years at a fixed

Where defendant, by letter, offered comdecree. The complainant will pay the costs compensation, and complainant wrote letters inof this court, and the costs below will be ad- dicating an acceptance, there was a sufficient judged by the chancellor.

compliance with the statute of frauds (Thompson's Shannon's Code, § 3142, subsec. 5), even though it be deemed that the written memorandum should be signed by both parties; both de

fendant and complainant having signed their BREWER v. DE CAMP GLASS CASKET respective letters. CO. et al.

Appeal from Chancery Court, Sullivan (Supreme Court of Tennessee. Feb. 19, 1918.) County; Hal H. Haynes, Chancellor. 1. CORPORATIONS Om 666 FOREIGN AT

Bill by R. F. Brewer against the De Camp TACHMENT-SERVICE.

Thompson's Shannon's Code, ş 4515, declares Glass Casket Company and others. Defendthat in actions commenced by "attachment of ants moved to dismiss and in the alternative property without personal service of process the demurred. From a decree disallowing the attachment may be sued out or suit brought in motion and overruling the demurrer, defendany county where the real property lies or any part of the personal property may be found, ants appeal. Affirmed and remanded for furwhile section 5211 authorizes an attachment ther proceedings. against the property of a nonresident debtor or defendant. Sections 4539-4541, inclusive, pro

Susong & Biddle, of Greeneville, and Cox vide for institution of actions against corpora- & Taylor and H. G. Morison, all of Johnson tions either resident or nonresident by service City, for R. F. Brewer. J. Read Voigt, of of process on certain designated officers or agents. Chattanooga, and W. M. Simonton, of CovActs 1859–60, c. 89, embodied in Thompson's Shannon's Code, $ 4542, declares that where a ington, for De Camp Glass Casket Co. Heacorporation, company, or individual has an office zel & Camblos, of Kingsport, for First Nat. or agency or resident director in any county Bank of Kingsport. other than that in which the chief officer or principal resides, service of process may be made upon any agent or clerk employed therein. NEIL, C. J. The bill was filed to attach a Sections 2549 and 4543–4546, respectively, relate fund belonging to the defendant company in to service on foreign corporations having no office the First National Bank of Kingsport. or agency in the state and to substitutionary There was a motion to dismiss the bill and service on foreign corporation not domesticated and having neither property nor localized busi- in the alternative a demurrer in case the ness. Held, that as section 4516, which ap- motion should fail. It was agreed between parently restricted the scope of service on the parties that if the motion should be susagents, was enlarged by Acts 1859–60, c. 89. a foreign corporation may be served by'attach: tained the demurrer should not be considered ment of its property in any county where such í an entry of appearance. The chancellor dis

For other cases see same topic and KEY-NUMBER in all Key-Numbered Digests and Indexes
201 S.W.-10

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