be taken by the defendants would have been disclosed and, we must assume, frustrated in the juvenile court. The presumption that that court would give a fair hearing in the case and decide justly is equally as strong as the presumption that a court of equity would do so. The chancery court should not be burdened with the consideration and disposition of such cases by a resort to the injunctive process of that court. No grounds for equitable relief in the proper sense are presented. The Sailors v. Woelfile 118 Tenn. 755, 102 S. W. 1109, 12 L. R. A. (N. S.) 881; 22 Cyc. 880.

Should the complainants or their child fail to get justice in the juvenile court, they have a right to have the judgment of that court reviewed in the circuit court by proper procedure to that end; thence an appeal may be prosecuted to the appellate courts.

Writ of certiorari granted; the decree of the Court of Civil Appeals reversed, and that of the chancellor affirmed.

verdict for plaintiff, which was affirmed by the Court of Civil Appeals, and the Railroad Company appeals. Affirmed on condition that remittitur be filed; otherwise reversed and remanded for new trial.

W. H. Washington, of Nashville, and J. C. Voorhies, of Columbia, for Shelton and another. Wright, Miles, Warring & Walker and W. H. Borsje, all of Memphis, for Railroad Co.

WILLIAMS, J. Mrs. Shelton brought this suit to recover damages, alleging that, while she was a passenger on defendant's railway between Memphis, Tenn., and Little Rock, Ark., the defendant failed to provide separate dining cars or a partitioned dining car as required, it was claimed, by an Arkansas statute, which provides for the separate accommodation of the white and negro races. It was further alleged that the plaintiff as passenger was brought into involuntary association with members of the colored race by reason of the negligence of the railway company.

It appears that plaintiff, her husband and

SHELTON et al. v. CHICAGO, R. I. & P. two sisters were passengers from Memphis

R. CO.

to Little Rock, and that a waiter from the (Supreme Court of Tennessee. March 9, 1918.) dining car passed through the sleeper occu1. RAILROADS 226-SEPARATE ACCOMMODA- pied by plaintiff's party announcing a call TIONS FOR RACES-STATUTES-CONSTRUCTION. to luncheon. Mr. Shelton was indisposed The statute of Arkansas (Kirby's Dig. 88 and did not desire food, but the three ladies 6622-6625), requiring separate accommodations in certain cars for the use of white and African immediately proceeded to the diner in repassengers, does not require a dining car to be sponse to the call. It appears that this was partitioned with wood, nor that two separate probably the third and last call, and when dining cars be provided. the ladies entered the dining car only a few white passengers remained at table, and these must have finished their meals at once. Mrs. Shelton, after writing out and handing in the meal order, glanced up and noticed two flashily dressed negro women enter the diner. They were shown seats, and were about to be served at the table in front of and next to the one occupied by plaintiff and her sisters. The white ladies entered into a discussion as to what they should do. About this time negro porters seated themselves and began to eat at the table next to that of the party in their rear, whereupon the ladies started from the car. The two sisters were in front and passed out of the dining car door, but Mrs. Shelton was stopped by the steward, who barred the way by holding the door of exit. He remarked to plaintiff:

2. STATUTES 174, 175-CONSTRUCTION.
A statute, when possible, should be given a
construction making it sensible, without manifest
inconvenience, so serious as to work injustice.
3. RAILROADS 226 SEPARATE ACCOMMO-
DATIONS FOR RACES.
Arkansas statutes (Kirby's Dig. §§ 6622-
6625), as to separate accommodations for white
and African passengers, are not applicable to
and do not prohibit a rule of the carrier by
which white persons are served in its dining car
on a train at one hour of the day and the
negroes at another, without providing separate
dining coaches.

4. RAILROADS 253-SEPARATE ACCOMMODA-
TIONS FOR RACES.

A railroad which maintained a dining car, intending to serve white and negro passengers at different hours, according to a rule promulgated by it, was liable to a white passenger, for its negligence in making a call to the dining car for white persons at the time when negroes were about to be served.

5. RAILROADS 253 - EXCESSIVE DAMAGES.

Where a railroad permitted negroes to be served while white passengers were in the dining car, on perceiving which plaintiff arose and left the car and the steward insisted in the hearing of others that she pay for the meal ordered, a verdict of $750 was excessive and should be reduced to $250.

Appeal from Circuit Court, Davidson County; A. G. Rutherford, Judge.

Action by Mrs. Mattie Shelton and another against the Chicago, Rock Island & Pacific Railroad Company. Judgment on

"Those ladies (referring to the colored women) were in here when you came in." Mrs. Shelton, pushing his hand from the doorknob got past the steward who, however, followed her into an intervening sleeping car next to the diner, and in a manner described as insulting demanded that the food ordered be paid for, in the presence and hearing of other passengers in that Pullman. Plaintiff passed on to the sleeper where her husband and sisters were. The steward still followed her, and offered to serve the order there, but

Plaintiff was awarded judgment upon a verdict for $750, which has been sustained by the Court of Civil Appeals. The railway company has appealed, and insists that there is no liability; that if there be liability, nominal damages only should be allowed, and that in any event the verdict was ex-ute did not undertake to prescribe that dincessive.

[3] It appears, however, that the defendEvidently the Arkansas statute, like our ant railway company had established a rule own, was passed before dining cars were for the purpose of providing equal, but sepabrought into use. The statute to be constru- | rate and sufficient accommodation in its dined does specifically mention in section ing cars for the two races. The partition it 6625 sleeping cars and chair cars, which made of the car for use was by hours during

And in the Chiles Case, on writ of error, the Supreme Court of the United States held that this was true even as to interstate passengers, where there is congressional inaction in that regard. 218 U. S. 71, 30 Sup. Ot. 667, 54 L. Ed. 936, 20 Ann. Cas. 980 and note.

which members of the respective races might | see Chesapeake, etc., R. Co. v. Wells, 85 resort to the dining car for food. It seems to Tenn. 613, 4 S. W. 5. us that this rule was not only reasonable, but that it was a wise and fair one, and perhaps the best that in the circumstances could be adopted to serve the same ends the Legislatures had in mind when they enacted laws in relation to separation of the races in passenger coaches. The rule of the railway company in operation was that white passengers were served first; three separate meal calls were made in the day coaches and sleepers for the white passengers. If there were any negro passengers desiring the meal, they were not served until the lapse of a reasonable time following the making of the last call when there was no probability of other white passengers coming into the car for service. In our opinion we should not read into the statute anything that would preventing car immediately after a call to luncheon such a just regulation by the carrier, unless compelled to do so. The rule admits of railway trains maintaining schedules that are not slowed down by stops for roadside meals, and it does not lead to denial of meals to members of either race, or to unreasonable inconveniences.

A state Legislature may very wisely deem regulation of dining cars by rules of the carrier, rather than by statute, advisable.

The right of a carrier, at common law, to make reasonable rules for the separation of passengers belonging to different races, observing the condition of equality of accommodations, has often been sustained by the state courts. Chiles v. Chesapeake, etc., R. Co., 125 Ky. 299, 101 S. W. 386, 11 L. R. A. (N. S.) 268, and cases collected in note; and

[4] We hold that a recovery by the plaintiff in the pending case must be unheld on the ground that the evidence shows liability on the part of the railway company, under the above rule, in that there was negligence in the making of the call for whitę passengers to go into the dining car for luncheon at a time when negro passengers and train employés were about to be or were being served. Plaintiff's proof is that she went to the din

had been cried in her car. The dining car steward was negligent in not stopping her and explaining the error if the call had in fact been made by mistake, in permitting the situation to grow more involved in the circumstances shown and in his later treatment of Mrs. Shelton when he barred her passage and followed her into the sleeping car, as set out above.

[5] But the court is of opinion that the verdict was excessive, and that $250 is a proper allowance under the conditions appearing. A remittitur of $500 is suggested; and in event it is accepted, an affirmance of the judgment below is ordered. On refusal, a reversal and remand for a new trial results. Costs of the appeal will abide the event.

CITY OF ST. LOUIS v. VAUGHN.

(No. 19077.)

(Supreme Court of Missouri, Division No. 1. March 4, 1918.)

APPEAL AND ERROR

ABSTRACT.

592(1)-NECESSITY OF

Where a city sued to recover a fine for violation of an ordinance, and the defendant appealed to the Supreme Court without printing an abstract of record, as required by rules 12, 13, and 14 (186 S. W. vii, viii), applicable to civil actions, the appeal must be dismissed.

Appeal from St. Louis Court of Criminal Correction.

Action by the City of St. Louis against Daniel R. Vaughn for violation of a city ordinance. Judgment for the City, and ant appeals. Appeal dismissed.

DAVIS et al. v. DAWSON et al. (No. 16781.)
En Banc. Feb.
2, 1918. Rehearing Denied
March 5, 1918.)

(Supreme Court of Missouri.

1. APPEAL AND ERROR 173(2) — ISSUES IN
COURT BELOW.

did not rely on presumption of execution to
In action to quiet title, where defendants
them of deed from the record owner, such claim
could not be considered on appeal.
2. APPEAL AND ERROR 846(2)—REVIEW.

When a prima facie case is made by plain-
tiffs, and no instructions are asked or given, the
appellate court will not review the evidence for
the purpose of determining its sufficiency to
overthrow plaintiffs' case.
3. ADVERSE POSSESSION 492, New, vol. 6
Key-No. Series-BURDEN OF PROOF.
defend-tablish a prima facie case by showing record ti-
In action to quiet title, where plaintiffs es-
tle, defendants, to prevail under the 30-year
must prove that for 30 consecutive years plain-
statute of limitations (Rev. St. 1909, § 1884),
tiff, or some one under whom he might claim,
had no possession, had paid no taxes on the
land, had failed to bring suit within one year
thereafter, and that defendants are in posses-
sion.

Chas. P. Johnson and C. Orrick Bishop, both of St. Louis, for appellant. Charles H. Daues and H. A. Hamilton, both of St. Louis, for respondent.

GRAVES, J. In this case the city of St. Louis complained against the defendant, Daniel R. Vaughn, for a violation of Ordinance No. 27113 of said city, approved July 14, 1913. The city sought to recover of defendant the sum of $500 as a fine. Judgment for the city, and defendant has appealed. It is suggested in the brief of the respondent (city of St. Louis) that appellant has neither filed nor served a printed abstract of the record in this case, notwithstanding our rules 12, 13, and 14 (186 S. W. vii, viii), requiring the same. This suggestion is well taken. We find no printed abstract of the record on file in the case. For the appellant we find "Appellant's Statement, Brief, and Argument," and no other printed document in his behalf. In the early case of City of Kansas City v. Clark, 68 Mo. loc. cit. 590, it was held that a proceeding of the kind involved here was a civil suit. To like effect was the ruling in St. Louis v. Weitzel, 130 Mo. loc. cit. 612, 31 S. W. 1048, whereas Sherwood, J., said: "And first as to the sufficiency of the complaint; in regard to which it may be observed that we have always held that a prosecution under a city ordinance is but a civil action, and hence the sufficiency of the complaint therein is to be determined by the same rules as are dominant in other civil cases. Kansas City v. Clark, 68 Mo. 588; Ex parte Hollowedell, 74 Mo. 395."

If this were a criminal case, this division of the court would have no jurisdiction. Our jurisdiction is dependent upon the fact that the suit is a civil action. Being a civil action our rules 12, 13, and 14, with reference to printed abstract of record, apply.

The appeal should be dismissed for failure to comply with the rules. It is so ordered. All concur, except BOND, P. J., absent.

POSSESSION

4. ADVERSE POSSESSION 97
WITHOUT COLOR OF TITLE.
Possession without color of title is confined
to the part actually occupied.
5. ADVERSE POSSESSION 95-EVIDENCE-

CIRCUMSTANTIAL EVIDENCE.

Where, in action to quiet title, defendants claimed under the 30-year statute of limitations (Rev. St. 1909, § 1884), they could prove nonevidence, and were not limited to direct evipayment of taxes by plaintiffs by circumstantial dence.

6. EVIDENCE 332(8)-COURT RECORDS.
The minute or docket entry of the county
filed renunciation of the provisions of the will of
court, reciting that on a certain date a widow
her deceased husband, was admissible, in suit by
children of her and her husband to quiet title to
land owned by her husband, to show that a
paper purporting to be her renunciation was
filed on such date; the county court being the
proper court in which to file renunciation.
7. EVIDENCE 207(1), 265(7) COURT REC-
ADMISSION ADMISSIBILITY—

ORDS AS
WEIGHT.

An entry of record in the proper court, reciting that a widow filed renunciation of the provisions of the will of her deceased husband, was, as her admission, admissible against her children, as plaintiffs in suit to quiet title to land owned by her deceased husband, and sufficient to show prima facie she renounced the will.

8. EVIDENCE

82-PRESUMPTIONS.

Where court entry, reciting widow's filing of renunciation of provisions of her husband's will, was made 48 years before suit was brought, in which plaintiffs disputed the regularity and validity of such renunciation, and plaintiff's position was inconsistent with their claim of invalidity of such renunciation, it would be presumed that in filing the renunciation the regular and natural order of business was observed.

Appeal from Circuit Court, Butler County; J. C. Sheppard, Judge.

Action by Carrie D. Davis and others against William Dawson and others. From the judgment, both parties appeal. Affirmed. See, also, 201 S. W. 528.

For other cases see same topic and KEY-NUMBER in all Key-Numbered Digests and Indexes

John A. Hope, of St. Louis, Leslie C. Green, town of New Madrid. The mother died in of Poplar Bluff, and Ernest A. Green and James A. Seddon, both of St. Louis, for plaintiffs. James R. Brewer, of New Madrid, and Wilson Cramer, of Jackson, for defendants.

MAYER, Special Judge. Plaintiffs are the three daughters and the son of George W. Dawson. On August 26, 1909, they brought this suit in the circuit court of New Madrid county, making the four sons and the daughter of Thomas H. Dawson defendants, for the purpose of determining and quieting the title to 579 acres of land lying in said county. On change of venue the cause was transferred to Butler county, where on May 3, 1911, judgment was rendered.

August, 1856, and soon thereafter Thomas H. Dawson moved from the old homestead to the land in question, and his brother George W. moved into the old homestead and continued to reside there until his death in 1862. Although George W. Dawson obtained title to the Netherton tract in 1857 under the sheriff's deed heretofore referred to, so that he then held title to all of the land, he never took possession of any of it, and for more than two years Thomas H. Dawson continued to reside in the house which he had built on the Miller tract, continued his clearing and the operation of a sawmill and woodyard on the Netherton tract, from which woodyard he sold cordwood to the steamboats plying the Mississippi river. In 1859, being driven away by the overflow of the river, he moved to New Madrid where he remained until his death.

All of the land was and is subject to overflow, the water covering it to a depth of from 5 to 15 feet, frequently standing thereon for several weeks. There were few successive years from 1856 until the trial that the land did not overflow. While he resided on the land in controversy, Thomas H. Dawson stated to friends that he had gone there to make his permanent home. After moving back to New Madrid, he continued to speak of the land as his, and there is no testimony that any other person laid any claim to it until within a few years before this suit was brought. Soon after Thomas H. Dawson moved to New Madrid, the house which had been built on the Miller tract was torn down and moved away, but at some time later a house was built on the Netherton tract by him, or by some of his sons for him, and that house was on the Netherton tract at the time of the trial.

George W. Dawson and Thomas H. Dawson were brothers. Prior to 1857 and until their death, they resided in New Madrid county, where all of the plaintiffs and all of the defendants were born, and where all of them continue to reside. The land in controversy is located on the Mississippi river and is near the town of New Madrid, in which town, or in the vicinity of which, all of the parties to this suit have spent their lives. The land lies together, but is referred to in the record as the Netherton tract, containing 419 acres, and the Miller tract of 160 acres. Title to all of the land emanated from the United States government more than 30 years before the filing of this suit. In 1847 Thomas H. Dawson became the record owner of the Netherton tract. On April 20, 1857, the Netherton tract was sold under execution and conveyed by sheriff's deed to George W. Dawson, who on August 7, 1856, had obtained title to the Miller tract by conveyance from one Miller, the then record owner. On November 5, 1856, George W. Dawson conveyed the Miller tract to Hen- From 1857 until the trial, Thomas H. ry Clay Watson, who on April 7, 1857, re- Dawson or some of his sons, on occasions, conveyed that tract to George W. Dawson. sold timber off the land; at intervals they Thus the record title to all of the land came had tenants there who cultivated a small to George W. Dawson, and in him it remain-portion of the Miller tract on shares; piling, ed until his death in 1862, when it vested in these plaintiffs, his children, who still retain it.

The defendants, laying no claim to paper title, pleaded, by amended answer (1) the 10-year statute of limitations, and (2) such facts as to give them title acquired by virtue of the 30-year statute of limitations.

From the evidence we adduce that Thomas H. Dawson, who died in 1906, moved onto the land in controversy in the early fall of 1856, and, although the record title to the Miller tract was then in his brother, George W. Dawson, or for a short time in Henry Clay Watson, Thomas H. Dawson set about clearing a part of that tract, built a house thereon, and erected a sawmill on the Netherton tract. Prior to moving onto this land, Thomas H. Dawson had lived with his mother on

staves, and sawlogs were sold from time to time off of the Netherton tract. Because of the frequency with which the land overflowed, it was impossible to cultivate any of it continuously, but various tenants were put on the place to clear it, to cut cordwood and sawlogs, and to raise stock. Thomas H. Dawson had all of the land surveyed in the '80's in order that he might determine whether or not those cutting timber about the land were encroaching upon it.

It is certain that at least some of the plaintiffs did not know that plaintiffs ever had any interest upon which to base a claim to the land until Mr. Lee Hunter tried to buy the interest of Clay Dawson, one of the plaintiffs, which was very shortly before this suit was brought. If the mother of plaintiffs, who had remarried in 1867, had any knowledge of their