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suit was brought, owned the land marked as and be in possession of the real estate along his on the plat, and owned it in October, 1912, the east side of the road. It may be conat which time he put a gate across the north ceded that the contract, as a contract, would end of the road at the plaintiff's southeast not be binding upon Shoop, but it does not corner and another gate across the road at stipulate that Mackey's successor or any one the midway point between that and the pub- else may close the road after Mackey sells lic road, and thus provoked this action of the the land. Porter did not sign it, and it does plaintiff.

not purport to bind him to any termination When defendant first put up the gate of his long-established right to use the road. across the north end of the road, the plain- He relinquished nothing. The paper is imtiff, it seems, shifted the gate further west, portant as showing the recognition by Mackso that it would open on his land, giving him ey of Porter's right, which Porter saw proper a passageway across the corner of defend- to enforce by a suit. The fact that Mackey ant's land into the road. There is some undertook to bind only himself and not his controversy about this incident. The plain- grantees to respect that right would not tiff claimed that he shifted the gate so that make it any the less enforceable. There is it opened out of his land at the corner, giv- nothing in the evidence anywhere to show ing him access to the road.

that the relative positions of the parties were Higbee & Mills, of Lancaster, for appellant.

changed after that. P. J. Rieger and Cooley & Murrell, all of

Prior to that controversy between Porter Kirksville, for respondent.

and Mackey the evidence is clear as to the continuous use of the road, and when the

circumstances changed so as to put out of use WHITE, C. (after stating the facts as that part of it marked b, b, the use of the above). [1] 1. The defendant claims that road in question was limited to Porter and there was no continuous user so as to estab- his tenants, and possibly to the occupants of lish a prescriptive right on the part of the the 46-acre tract, who had no other outlet. defendant to the road in question. It was Shoop, himself, who owned the 46-acre tract testified by some of the witnesses that the for 10 years prior to the purchase of the tenants of Porter, who lived on the land be- Mackey land on the west side, used this road, fore plaintiff bought it, and the former own- and had no other outlet until he bought the ers of the 46-acre tract, sometimes put wires Mackey land. After the use of the road had across each end of this road, for the purpose been thus restricted to one or two families of pasturing stock on the grass along the for several years, the controversy arose beroad. In mentioning this, however, the wit-tween Porter and Mackey, and this agreenesses speak of the wires as being only two ment settled the status of the parties at that and three, and being put in there "off and time, and left the situation exactly as it had on” during the summer so as to enable the been for a generation, so far as the right of tenants to pasture the road. The evidence

Porter was concerned. does not show that these wires were put up

[3] III. Appellant insists that the use of in any permanent fashion or in such way as the road was permissive only in its incepto obstruct the passage along the road. They tion, and that therefore the prescriptive probably were loosely fastened, so that a ten- right to have it as a road did not inure to ant driving along could take them down, the plaintiff and his grantors. It is true that pass on through, and fasten them up again. a prescriptive right to a private road could Porter's tenants would put them there for be acquired only by grant, or by prescription their own accommodation, and to pasture in which, according to a legal fiction, a grant their own cattle on their own road. It was may be presumed. It also is true that a pernot an interruption of the continuous use of missive use over the lands of one by another the road as a private way by such tenants. for the purpose of passage will not ripen Porter said it never was so closed when he into a prescriptive right as a general rule. was out there. No witness testified that any "Permissive use," as the term is applied to one's passage in or out was interfered with the use of a road, has special significance. at any time by such wires; the user was It is sometimes used interchangeably with continuous and uninterrupted by all who the word "license.” We are unable to find wished to use it.

any decision which defines the expression, [2] II. Appellant makes the further point "permissive use,” but “license” is defined, that, inasmuch as the plaintiff derived his and license in connection with another's land right from Porter, and the defendant derived is a privilege to do some acts or a series of his right from Mackey, they stand in the acts on the land of the licensor without the shoes of Porter and Mackey, respectively, licensee having any permanent interest in it. and, under the agreement between the two, Bouvier, Law Dic., License; Flaherty v. NiePorter's right under the contract of May 27, man, 125 Iowa, 546, 101 N. W. 280. Without 1907, expired when Mackey sold his land to attempting a complete definition of the term, defendant, Shoop, since it only provided that we may say for the purpose of this case that the highway should remain unobstructed as permissive use by one of a passageway over long as the parties of the second part, Peter the land of another is such use as the owner Mackey and William Mackey, should own of the land expressly or tacitly consents to,

TIRETY.

with the understanding always between himself and the user that such use is terminable OTTO F. STIFEL'S UNION BREWING CO. at his will or on the completion of the spe

V. SAXY et al. (No. 18792.) cific act or acts contemplated in the permis- (Supreme Court of Missouri, Division No. 2. sion. There is no dispute that the owner of Jan, 5, 1918. Motion for Rehearing the land in this instance knew, through all

Denied Feb. 16, 1918.) the years, that the road was used. The rule 1. HUSBAND AND WIFE Om 14(2)-ESTATE BY is, where there has been actual and continu

THE ENTIRETY-COMMON LAW. ous use for the prescribed period with the At common law an estate by the entirety knowledge of the owner, that the law raises partook in many respects of the nature of the a presumption of grant, unless the owner can whom a fee was conveyed took and held it not

marriage relation, and husband and wife to show that the use is merely permissive. An- as separate individuals and by moieties, but as thony v. Building Co., 188 Mo. loc. cit. 720, one person, each holding the whole of it. 87 S. W. 921.

2. HUSBAND AND WIFE Chw14(2)-ESTATE BY [4] Col. Porter, who owned the land and

THE ENTIRETY-SURVIVORSHIP. used the road for many years up to 1909, the right of survivorship was an incident, dif

To an estate by the entirety at common law, said that he used it as a right, and did not fering from the right of survivorship as between ask anybody because it seemed to be a public the joint tenants, in that the survivor succeedroad. He also testified that when the road ed to the whole by virtue of the grant vesting

the entire estate. b, b, along the south of plaintiff's tract was 3. PARTITION Eww12(1)-ESTATE BY THE ENclosed up he was asked about it, and said he did not care about it, indicating that, as to There could be no partition of an estate by that part of the road, his right was recogniz- the entirety at common law. ed and his permission obtained to close it. 4. HUSBAND AND WIFE @w14(10)—ESTATE BY

THE ENTIRETY-DISPOSITION. In fact, from the earliest times the road was

Neither husband nor wife could dispose of always traveled without objection, question, any interest in their estate by the entirety withor permission as a matter of right. Further, out the assent of the other. those who used this road worked it and 5. DIVORCE O322-EFFECT-ESTATE BY THE

ENTIRETY. "kept it in good shape to travel on,” the evi

Upon the divorce of a husband and wife dence shows. The closing up of the old road having an estate by the entirety, the parties b, b, with which it was connected, did not cease to occupy the relation of tenants by the seem to affect their continuous use of a, a,

entirety.

6. HUSBAND AND WIFE 10(1) WIFE's nor did it affect their right to use it. They

PROPERTY-HUSBAND'S INTEREST. had all the more need for it because it was

At common law the wife's money and chatthe only way out. They used it as a right tels in possession passed by the marital right and not as a revocable privilege. It possess to the husband. ed all the characteristics which are mention- 7. HUSBAND AND WIFE Cw9/WIFE'S PROP

ERTY-HUSBAND'S INTEREST. ed by this court as necessary to ripen it into

Where the wife at the time of her marriage a prescriptive right. First, a user for the was seised of an estate of inheritance in land, required period ; second, adverse user; third, the husband, at common law, became seised of user under a claim of right; and, fourth, the freehold jure uxoris, and took the rents and

profits during their joint lives, on the theory user with a knowledge of the owner. An- of the unity of husband and wife. thony V. Building Co., supra ; Sanford v. 18. HUSBAND AND WIFE 14(8) MARRIED Kern, 223 Mo. loc. cit. 628, 630, 122 S. W.

WOMEN'S ACT-ESTATE BY THE ENTIRETY. 1051. It has been said by the Kansas City &$ 8295-8310) is not intended to weaken or de

The Married Women's Act (Rev. $t. 1909, Court of Appeals that the use of a road for stroy the unity of husband and wife which a quarter of a century with the knowledge treats them as equals, but does destroy the and consent of the owners of the servient unity which considers the wife as merged in the land, while it would not of itself vest an es without affecting in any other way the estates

husband, and operates to destroy the jus mariti tablished and prescriptive easement without granted to the wife alone, or to the husband and evidence to explain how it began, would raise wife as tenants by the entireties. a presumption that it was adverse under a 9. HUSBAND AND WIFE 14(11)-ESTATE BY

THE ENTIRETIES — EXECUTION AGAINST THE claim of right, and shift the burden to the

HUSBAND-EFFECT. defendant to show that it was by virtue of A judgment and execution against a husband some license. Gerstner v. Payne, 160 Mo. alone cannot in any way affect property held App. 289, loc. cit. 296, 142 S. W. 794.

by husband and wife by the entireties, or any The chancellor sustained by the supposed separate interest of the husband there

was

in, as he has no separate interest. weight of evidence in the finding of the longcontinued adverse use of this road, and the Appeal from St. Louis Circuit Court; Wiljudgment is affirmed.

liam M. Kinsey, Judge.

Suit by the Otto F. Stifel's Union Brewing ROY, C., concurs.

Company against Edward Saxy and wife.

Decree for defendants, and plaintiff appeals. PER CURIAM. The foregoing opinion by

Affirmed. WHITE, C., is adopted as the opinion of the The plaintiff seeks herein to subject an alcourt. All concur.

leged interest of defendant Edward Saxy in

For other cases see same topic and KEY-NUMBER in all Key-Numbered Digests and Indexes

real estate standing in the name of his wife, , son in law, they cannot take the estate by moiethe defendant Mary M. Saxy, to the payment ties, but both are seised of the entirety, per of a judgment debt due to it from the hus- tout, et non per my; the consequence of which

is that neither the husband nor the wife can band. There was a decree for defendants, dispose of any part without the assent of the and plaintiff has appealed.

other, but the whole must remain to the surOn September 3, 1891, certain real estate

vivor." in St. Louis was conveyed to the defendants, Warvelle on Real Property, $ 111, says: they being then as now husband and wife, "It differs from the estate of joint tenancy in and taking said property as tenants by the that joint tenants take by moieties and at the entireties. In 1905, while the property was of the whole. In the estate by entirety neither

same time are each seised of an undivided part so held, the husband became indebted to the tenant is seised of a part, or moiety, but both plaintiff. Thereafter, through an intermedia- of them have the entire estate, and as this inry, the title was placed in the wife alone; volves in itself a physical impossibility in the and, still later, the property was sold, and the lows that effect can only be given to the grant

case of ordinary individuals it necessarily folnet proceeds were used in the purchase of the by regarding both tenants as constituting but real estate now in controversy. The petition one person. But this, in fact, is just what the alleges that the title to both of said tracts was law does, and as this unity of person is never

recognized save in the case of husband and wife, so placed in the wife alone in fraud of plain the estate by entirety is confined exclusively to tiff's rights as such creditor, and prays that persons within the marriage relation." the husband's interest in the last-mentioned

[2] There was incident to this estate the tract be subjected to the payment of plain-right of survivorship. But such survivorship tiff's judgment.

was very different from survivorship in case
Henry E. Haas and John A. Gilliam, both of joint tenancy. 2 Blackstone, p. 184, speak-
of St. Louis, for appellant. Jno. B. Dempsey ing of joint tenancy, says:
and Rozier G. Meigs, both of St. Louis, for "This right of survivorship is called by our
respondents.

ancient authors the jus accrescendi, because the
right upon the death of one joint tenant accu-

mulates and increases to the survivors."
ROY, C. (after stating the facts as above).
I. The question as to whether an execution

Warvelle, supra, speaking of tenancy by against the husband alone can reach any in the entirety, says (section 111): terest of any kind in property held by the

"Both would therefore be seised of the entire husband and wife as tenants by the entireties same without the assent of the other, and upon

estate; neither could dispose of any part of has never been before this court. There are the death of either the whole estate would resome dicta on the subject, which we will con- main in the survivor. In this latter respect sider after a review of the common law and while the right of survivorship gives to the es

tate an apparent resemblance to joint tenancy, the decisions of other jurisdictions. The con- it yet differs materially from joint tenancy, for flicting opinions in the decided cases, and the survivor succeeds to the whole not by the the various reasons given therefor, convince right of survivorship simply, as is the case with us that no safe conclusion can be reached with vested the entire estate in each grantee, or, in

joint tenants, but by virtue of the grant which out a clear perception of what such an estate contemplation of law, in one person with a was at common law, and the effect of the dual body and consciousness." statutes known as the "married women's Stewart says (section 306): acts" on such estates.

“On the death of either, the other has the [1] We will first endeavor to ascertain whole estate, continuing alone his or her former what an estate by the entirety was at com- holding, and not taking by survivorship in the

sense that a surviving joint tenant does." mon law, leaving out of view the effect on such estate of the power of the husband in

In Garner v. Jones, 52 Mo. 68, it was said: the right of the wife (jure uxoris) to dominate

"At common law a conveyance in fee to husher property. The estate pas peculiar (Hall by the entirety. Being but one person in law,

band and wife, of real estate, created a tenancy V. Stephens, 65 Mo. 670, 27 Am. Rep. 302), ( they took the estate as one person ; each being and partook, in many respects, of the nature the owner of the entire estate, neither of whom of the marriage relation. Husband and wife had any separate or joint interest but a unity took and held it not as separate individuals estate continued in the survivor, as it had exist

or entirety of the whole. So if either died the and by moieties, but as one person, each holded before; an undivided unity or entirety. ing the whole of it. Stewart on Husband There was no survivorship as in joint tenancies, and Wife, $ 303; 4 Kent, 362. The English but a continuance of the estate in the survivor

as it originally stood. The only change by death Court of Chancery, in Jupp v. Buckwell, L. R. was in the person, not in the estate. Before 39 Ch. Div. 148, quotes Coke and Bracton as death they both constituted one person holding saying that in such an estate, “vir et uxor the entire estate, and after the death of either sunt quasi unica persona, quia caro una et the survivor remained as the only holder of the

estate.” sanguis unus." That is a plain statement

In Thornton v. Thornton, 3 Rand. (Va.) that they are one person because “they are

179, it was said: one flesh and one blood.” 2 Blackstone, p.

"But husband and wife have the whole from 182, says:

the moment of the conveyance to them; and the "And, therefore, if an estate in fee be given death of either cannot give the survivor more." to a man and his wife, they are neither properly joint tenants, nor tenants in common, for

See, also, Cole Mfg. Co. v. Collier, 95 Tenn. husband and wife being considered as one per- | 115, 31 S. W. 1000, 30 L. R. A. 315, 49 Am.

[ocr errors]

St. Rep. 921; Kunz v. Kurtz, 8 Del. Ch. loc. by him, or taken for his debts, or charged by cit. 414, 68 Atl. 450.

him with a mechanic's lien." [3] There could be no partition of such es In Hall v. Stephens, 65 Mo. 670, 27 Am. tate. Warvelle on Real Prop. § 111; Ste- Rep. 302, it was said concerning estates by wart on Husband and Wife, $ 306; 4 Kent, the entirety: p. 362; 1 Wash. on Real Prop. $ 913; Rus

"If, as already seen, the husband and wife sell v. Russell, 122 Mo. 235, 26 S. W. 677, 43 became seised in entirety of the undivided oneAm. St. Rep. 581.

seventh of the devised premises, the plaintiff [4] Neither could dispose of any interest of possession, if the husband had at the time

is clearly entitled to a corresponding recovery in the estate without the other. Blackstone's of the sale any interest therein susceptible to language above cited is:

execution. The great current of authority af"Neither the husband nor the wife can dis- firms such susceptibility; going only so far as pose of any part without the assent of the oth- this, however, that if the wife survive her huser, but the whole must remain to the survivor.” band, she, as such survivor, will be entitled to

the whole. This theory, that the husband is Warvelle, as above quoted, says:

possessed of a vendible interest, has for its basis "Neither could dispose of any part of the same

that the husband, jure mariti is entitled to the without the assent of the other.'

possession and usufruct of the wife's real es

tate during marriage, which right suffers no dim4 Kent, 362, says:

inution or abatement by reason of his own in"Neither of them can alien so as to bind the terest in land whereof both his wife and himself other."

are jointly seised. Ames v. Norman, 4 Sneed

[Tenn.) 692 [70 Am. Dec. 269]; French v. Me[5] L'pon being divorced the parties cease han, 56 Pa. 286; Bennett v. Child, 19 Wis. 362 to occupy the relation of tenants by the en- [88 Am. Dec. 692] ; Freeman Cot. and Par. $8 tirety. The dissolution of the marriage re- 73, 74; 1 Wash. R. P. (4th Ed.) 672; Bishop, lation dissolves the tenancy by the entirety. [Pa.] 181."

L. M. W. 622; Stoebler v. Knerr, 5 Watts Russell v. Russell, 122 Mo. 235, 26 S. W. 677, 43 Am. St. Rep. 581. It will be noticed that In that case the estate vested prior to the such an estate was based on the unity of taking effect of the statute which destroyed husband and wife, they being considered in the right of the husband to the exclusive all respects as equals so far as that estate possession and control of the land. was concerned.

The proposition that the husband's right to [6, 7] We will now consider the estate or control during his life the entire estate held right which the husband acquired jure uxo- by the entirety was by reason of the jus ris in the property of the wife, and its ef- mariti was announced by the English court fect on the estate by the entirety. 1 Bishop in Jupp v. Buckwell, supra, and that case on Laws of Married Women says:

is cited with approval by the Canadian “Thus, as we have seen, the wife's money and court in Re Wilson and Toronto I. E. Light chattels in possession pass by the marital right Co., 20 Ont. Rep. 397. As is said by Stewart, to the husband.”

supra, this interest of the husband jure 2 Kent, 130, says:

uxoris in the wife's property is different "If the wife, at the time of the marriage, be from the curtesy estate. The one is enjoyed seised of an estate of inheritance in land, the during the life of the wife, in her right (or husband, upon the marriage, becomes seised of wrong), and terminates with her death; the the freehold jure uxoris, and he takes the rents other is enjoyed in possession only after and profits during their joint lives." Platt on Property Rights of Married of the marriage, but not in right of the

her death. It, like dower, is held by right Women, § 2, says:

spouse.

We thus see that it was the mar“The husband was entitled to the use during coverture of all the real estate acquired by the ital right, and it alone, which gave the wife before and after marriage."

husband the power to appropriate absoStewart, in his work above cited (section lutely the personal chattels of the wife, and 146), says:

gave him a freehold estate for their joint "At common law a husband holds during cov

lives in her lands, including those held by erture in right of his wife, she being merged in them as tenants by the entireties. Indebim, all her lands in possession, and owns the pendent of that marital right he had no inrents and profits thereof absolutely. This is terest in her property that he could himself called his freehold estate jure uxoris; it is often said to be an estate for the joint 'lives of dispose of, or that was vendible under an exthe husband and wife, but this is a mistake as ecution against him alone, except his curteit terminates with absolute divorce. It differs sy estate concerning which we will say from curtesy initiate in that it is a vested es- nothing further. This freehold estate of the tate in possession, while curtesy initiate is a contingent future estate, it is independent

husband in the lands of the wife and in esbirth of issue, is held in right of the wife, and / tates held by the entireties was based on the is not added to or diminished when curtesy ini- idea of the unity of husband and wife, but tiate arises."

a very different kind of unity from that And in section 306, speaking of estates by unity of equals above described. The esthe entirety, he says:

tate of the husband jure uxoris had for its "During coverture, the husband has at com- very foundation the idea that husband and mon law his estate jure uxoris, with the right to I wife were one because she was merged in the rents and profits; he holds the property subject to his control, use and possession ;' only him, and he held the rights of both, and this estate for their joint lives can be aliened could act for both regardless of her wishes.

[8] We will now consider the effect of the , who was afterwards a Justice of the Sulegislation which is spoken of as the “mar- preme Court of the United States. He there ried women's acts." The verbiage of those says: acts varies in different states, in Canada and "But it is said the act of 1848, by destroying in England. Doubtless the results reached the legal unity of the husband and wife, has in some of the cases are by reason of some

converted such an estate into a tenancy in

common; that is, that such a deed conveys a peculiar provision of the statute under con- different estate from that which the same deed sideration. For the purposes of this case we would have created, if made prior to the passhall treat them all as being the same as sage of the act. To this we cannot assent. It ours, unless some reason to the contrary ap- statute, imputing to it a purpose never intended.

mistakes alike the letter and the spirit of the pears. In some states the estate by the en- The design of the Legislature was single. It tirety has been judicially repudiated. Whitt- was not to destroy the oneness of husband and lesey v. Fuller, 11 Conn. 337; Miles v. Fish- wife, but to protect the wife's property, by reer, 10 Ohio, 1, 36 Am. Dec. 61; Wilson v. band. To effectuate this object, she was enabled

moving it from under the dominion of the husFleming, 13 Ohio, 68; Kerner v. McDonald, to own, use and enjoy her property, if hers be60 Neb. 603, 84 N. W. 92, 83 Am. St. Rep. fore marriage, as fully after marriage as before. 550. In two states there are statutes which crued to her after marriage, it should be owned,

And the act declared that if her property acdestroy the rule that a conveyance of land used and enjoyed by her, as her own separate to husband and wife, of itself and without property, exempt from liability for the debts and further provision, creates an estate by the engagements of her husband. All this had in

view the enjoyment of that which is hers, not entireties. Bassler v. Rewodlinski, 130 Wis. the force and effect of the instrument by which 26, 109 N. W. 1032, 7 L. R. A. (N. S.) 701; an estate may be granted to her. It has nothWilson v. Wilson, 43 Minn. 398, 45 N. W. 710. ing to do with the nature of the estate. The In the following states it is held that the act does not operate upon rights accruing to her

until after they have accrued. It takes such married women's acts have in effect abolish- rights of property as it finds them, and regulates ed such estates: Donegan v. Donegan, 103 the enjoyment; that is, the enjoyment of the Ala. 488, 15 South. 823, 49 Am. St. Rep. 53; estate after it has vested in the wife. And the Robinson's Appeal, 88 Me. 17, 33 Atl. 652, 30 It is to be as her separate property is enjoyed,

mode of authorized enjoyment is significant. L. R. A. 331, 51 Am. St. Rep. 367; Green v.

as property settled to her separate use. The Cannady, 77 S. C. 193, 57 S. E. 832; also in act therefore no more destroys her union with England, Jupp v. Buckwell, supra; and in her husband than does a settlement of property

for her separate use. To a certain extent she Canada, Griffin v. Patterson, 45 U. C. Q. B. is enabled, but no more than is necessary, to 536 (loc. cit. 554). In others it is held that protect her property after it has been acquired. those acts have made husband and wife ten- We have held that she can convey her lands ants in common with right of survivorship. Pettit v. Fretz, 9 Casey [33 Pa.] 118. This is

only by joining in a deed with her husband. Schulz v. Ziegler, 80 N. J. Eq. 199, 83 Atl. a clear recognition of the existing unity of the 968, 42 L. R. A. (N. S.) 98; Hiles v. Fisher, two. It need not be repeated that no greater 144 N. Y. 306, 39 N. E. 337, 30 L. R. A. 305, effect is to be given to the act of 1848 than its

language and spirit demand. It is a remedial 43 Am. St. Rep. 762. Some states hold that statute, and we construe it so as to suppress such acts have had no effect on the hus- the mischief against which it was aimed, but band's right in lands held by the entireties. not as altering the common law any further Pray v. Stebbins, 141 Mass. 219, 4 N. E. 824, hold it as operating upon the deed conveying

than is necessary to remove that mischief. To 55 Am. Rep. 462; Morrill v. Morrill, 138 land to a wife, making such deed assure a differMich. 112, 101 N. W. 209, 110 Am. St. Rep. ent estate from what it would have assured 306, 4 Ann. Cas. 1100. In two states it is without the act, is to lose sight of the legisla

tive purpose. Were we to do so, it would beheld that those acts have resulted in depriv- come in many cases a means of divesting her of ing the husband's creditors of the right to her property, instead of an instrument of proaffect the interest of the wife during the tection. In the present case, if it has converted existence of the marriage relation; but they tenancy in common, it has taken from her her

the estate granted to Diver and his wife into a intimate that the right of the survivorship of ownership and enjoyment of the entirety during the husband can be sold for his debts. Cole her husband's life and her right of survivorMfg. Co. v. Collier, 95 Tenn. 115, 31 S. w. ship to the whole. On this subject the remarks

of Chief Justice Lewis in Stuckey v. Keefe's 1000, 30 L. R. A. 315, 49 Am. St. Rep. 921; Executors, 2 Casey [26 Pa.] 401, are worthy of Simpson v. Biffle, 63 Ark. 289, 38 S. W. 345. attention.” All those cases which hold that such legisla

That language is a clear and irrefutable tion has destroyed or changed estates by the statement of the conclusion that the marentireties proceed on the theory that it has ried women's acts are not intended to weakdestroyed the unity of husband and wife. en or destroy that unity of husband and They overlook the plain fact that such acts wife which treats them as equals, but that are meant to destroy the unity of unequals, they do destroy that unity of the two which the foundation of the jus mariti, and to considers the wife as merged in the husband. thereby restore to its full vigor the unity In other words, the purpose of such acts is made up of equals, the foundation of the to destroy the jus mariti, without affecting, estate by entireties.

in any other way, the estates granted to the The doctrine most numerously supported wife alone, or to the husband and wife as by the decided cases is best expressed in tenants by the entireties. That doctrine has Diver v. Diver, 56 Pa. 106, by Strong, J., ) been indorsed in Kunz v. Kurtz, 8 Del. Ch.

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