vania, it was held at one time that an attorney could not recover, without an express promise, anything beyond the trifling and totally inadequate sum provided in the fee-bill. That pure and eminent jurist, Chief Justice Tilghman, thought that the policy of refusing a legal remedy for anything beyond that had not been adopted without great consideration Mooney v. Lloyd, 5 S. & R. 416. He stands not alone in the opinion that it has been neither for the honor nor profit of the Bar to depart from the ancient rule.' It has been departed from in this state, and the early decision overruled, however; and it must be

attorney is in some degree the agent as well as the attorney of the party. Huston, J., in Lynch v. The Commonwealth, 16 S. & R. 368.

1 Hornblower, C. J., in Seeley et al. v. Crane, 3 Green N. J. 35. "I should be sorry to see the honorary character of the fees of barristers and physicians done away with. Though it seems to be a shadowy distinction, yet I believe it to be beneficial in effect. It contributes to preserve the idea of a profession, of a class which belongs to the public, in the employment and remuneration of which no law interferes, but the citizen acts as he likes, in foro conscientia."" Coleridge's Table Talk, vol. 2.

frankly admitted, that the current of decisions in our sister states is in the same way.'

It is supposed that the ancient rule was artificial in its structure, and practically unjust,that it is wholly inconsistent with our ideas of equality to suppose that the business or profession, by which any one earns the daily bread of himself or of his family, is so much more honorable than the business of other members of the community, as to prevent him from receiving a fair compensation for his services on

1 Gray v. Brackenridge, 2 P. & W. 75; Foster v. Jack, 4 Watts 334. In New Jersey, an advocate's fees are not recoverable at law: Shaver v. Norris, Penning. 663; Seeley v. Crane, 3 Green 35; Van Atta v. McKinney's Exrs., 1 Harrison 236. That the general current of decisions is in the opposite direction, will be seen by consulting Stevens v. Adams, 23 Wend. 57; See 26 Wend. 451; Newnan v. Washington, Martin & Yerger 79; Stevens v. Monges, 1 Harrington 127; Bayard v. McLane, 3 Id. 217; Duncan v. Breithaupt, 1 McCord 149; Downing v. Major, 2 Dana 228; Christy v. Douglass, Wright's (Ohio) Rep. 485; Webb v. Browning, 14 Missouri 354; Vilas v. Downer, 21 Vermont 419; Lecatt v. Sallee, 3 Porter 115; Easton v. Smith, 1 E. D. Smith 318.

that account. It has been pronounced ridiculous to attempt to perpetuate a monstrous legal fiction, by which the hard-working lawyers of our day, toiling till midnight in their offices, are to be regarded in the eye of the law in the light of the patrician jurisconsults of ancient Rome, when

-dulce diu fuit et solemne, reclusa

Mane domo vigilare, clienti promere jura,and who at daybreak received the early visits of their humble and dependent clients, and pronounced with mysterious brevities the oracles of the law.

These are arguments which are more plausible than sound: they are imposing, but not solid. The question really is, what is best for the people at large, what will be most likely to secure them a high-minded, honorable Bar? It is all-important that the profession should have and deserve that character. A horde

1 Chancellor Walworth, in Adams v. Stevens, 26 Wend. 451; Foster v. Jack, 4 Watts 337.

2 Senator Verplanck, in Adams v. Stevens, 26 Wend.

of pettifogging, barratrous, custom-seeking, money-making lawyers, is one of the greatest curses with which any state or community can be visited. What more likely to bring about such a result than a decision which strips the Bar of its character as a learned profession, on the principle avowed by one court, that it is now a calling as much as any mechanical art,

or by another, in effect, that the order of things is in the present condition of society reversed, and clients are really the patrons of their attorneys? A more plausible reason is that the client is safer from the oppression of extortionate counsel, by putting both upon the equal footing of legal right and obligation. It would appear, however, better that the parties should make an express agreement before or at the time of retainer, or that the amount should be left to the justice of the counsel, and the honor and liberality of the client subsequently. Every judge, who has ever tried a case between attorney and client, has felt the delicacy and difficulty of saying what is the measure of just compensation. It is to be

graduated, according to a high legal authority, with a proper reference to the nature of the business performed by the counsel for the client, and his standing in his profession for learning and skill; whereby the value of his services is enhanced to his client.' Is then the standing and character of the counsel in his profession for learning and skill to be a question of fact to be determined by the jury in every case in which a lawyer sues his client? How determined, if necessary to the decision of the question? Not surely by the crude opinions of the jurors; but by testimony of members of the same profession on the subject. This never is done; it would be a very diffi

1 Vilas v. Downer, 21 Vermont 419. Responsibility in a confidential employment is a legitimate subject of compensation, and in proportion to the magnitude of the interests committed to the agent: Kentucky Bank v. Combs, 7 Barr 543. When he sues upon a quantum meruit, his professional standing is a proper subject of inquiry as affecting the value of his services, and the amount of his business may be inquired into as tending to show his professional standing: Phelps v. Hunt, 40 Conn. 97.