higher points, which can only satisfy the truly conscientious practitioner.

orderly conduct of a suit, and it is his duty to do what the court would order to be done, though his client instruct him otherwise: Anon., 1 Wendell 108; Read v. French, 28 New York 285.

An attorney should advise his client to the best of his judgment, and if the client refuse to follow the advice, it is safer for the counsel to follow the client's instruction, so far as the rules of law will permit: Nave v. Baird, 12 Indiana 318.

An attorney-at-law is responsible for losses caused by his disregard, in bringing a suit for his client, of a rule of law which was well and clearly defined, both in the text-books and the reports, and which had existed and been published long enough to justify the belief, that it was known to the profession: Goodman v. Walker, 30 Alabama 482.

An attorney is bound to exercise reasonable diligence and skill, and is liable for ordinary neglect; and the skill required has reference to the character of the business which he undertakes to do: Cox v. Sullivan, 7 Georgia 144; Holmes v. Peck, 1 Rhode Island 242. See Pennington v. Yell, 6 English 212.

An attorney for a client residing in another state is authorized to use all reasonable and usual means to secure his client's claim; he may indemnify an officer for making a levy directed by him in good faith and upon reasonable grounds, and if he indemnifies the officer by

But what are the limits of his duty when the legal demands or interests of his client conflict with his own sense of what is just and right? This is a problem by no means of easy solution.

That lawyers are as often the ministers of injustice as of justice, is the common accusation in the mouth of gainsayers against the profession. It is said there must be a right and a wrong side to every lawsuit. In the majority of cases it must be apparent to the advocate, on which side is the justice of the cause; yet he will maintain, and often with the appearance of warmth and earnestness, that side which he

his own bond, he may recover from his client what he is obliged to pay thereon: Clark v. Randall, 9 Wisconsin 135.

An attorney, whose office has been broken open and papers stolen therefrom, without negligence on his part, is not liable for the loss: Hill v. Barney, 18 New Hamp. 607.

An action on the case will not lie against an attorneyat-law for acts done bond fide in the prosecution of his client's rights; to sustain such an action, it must be shown that the acts of the attorney were malicious and without foundation: Wigg v. Simonton, 12 Richardson (Law) 583; Burnap v. Marsh, 13 Illinois 535.

must know to be unjust, and the success of which will be a wrong to the opposite party. Is he not then a participator in the injustice? It may be answered in general :

Every case is to be decided, by the tribunal before which it is brought for adjudication, upon the evidence, and upon the principles of law applicable to the facts as they appear upon the evidence. No court or jury are invested with any arbitrary discretion to determine a cause according to their mere notions of justice. Such a discretion vested in any body of men would constitute the most appalling of despotisms. Law, and justice according to law-this is the only secure principle upon which the controversies of men can be decided. It is better on the whole that a few particular cases of hardship and injustice, arising from defect of evidence or the unbending character of some strict rule of law, should be endured, than that general insecurity should pervade the community from the arbitrary discretion of the judge. It is this which has blighted the countries of the East as much as cruel laws or despotic execu

tives. Thus the legislature has seen fit in certain cases to assign a limit to the period within which actions shall be brought, in order to urge men to vigilance, and to prevent stale claims from being suddenly revived against men whose vouchers are destroyed or whose witnesses are dead. It is true, in foro conscientiæ, a defendant who knows that he honestly owes the debt sued for, and that the delay has been caused by indulgence or confidence on the part of his creditor, ought not to plead the statute. But if he does plead it, the judgment of the court must be in his favor.

Now the lawyer is not merely the agent of the party; he is an officer of the court. The party has a right to have his case decided upon the law and the evidence, and to have every view presented to the minds of the judges, which can legitimately bear upon the question. This is the office which the advocate performs. He is not morally responsible for the act of the party in maintaining an unjust cause, nor for the error of the court, if they fall into error, in deciding it in his favor. The court or jury

ought certainly to hear and weigh both sides; and the office of the counsel is to assist them by doing that, which the client in person, from want of learning, experience, and address, is unable to do in a proper manner. The lawyer, who refuses his professional assistance because in his judgment the case is unjust and indefensible, usurps the functions of both judge and jury.

As an answer to any sweeping objection made to the profession in general, the view thus presented may be quite satisfactory. It by no means follows, however, as a principle of private action for the advocate, that all causes are to be taken by him indiscriminately, and conducted with a view to one single end, It is much to be feared, however, that the prevailing tone of professional ethics leads practically to this result. He has an undoubted right to refuse a retainer, and decline to be concerned in any cause, at his discretion. It is a discretion to be wisely and justly exercised. When he has once embarked in a case, he cannot retire from it without the consent

success.