delicacy of his own relation to the negotiation limited the direction to him.

"This government, in rejecting the recent convention, abandons neither its own claims nor those of its citizens, nor the hope of an early, satisfactory, and friendly settlement of the questions depending between the two governments. You will so say to Lord Clarendon, and, in your discretion, you may further proceed to communicate the views given below.

"The terms of the convention, having by accident become known to the public in this country before the action upon it by the Senate, were disproved by the people with an approach to unanimity that foreshadowed possibly even a less favorable vote on the question of its ratification than was actually given.

"This adverse judgment, while unanimous, or nearly so, in its conclusion, was not reached by any single train of argument, nor from any one standpoint of policy, nor with any single standard of estimate of the claims either of the nation or of its citizens, nor with the same degree of importance attached to various points that have been discussed in the correspondence referred to in the convention. Various sources furnished currents running through differing and widely separated channels, but meeting to form one common stream of thought.

"Both with the people and in the Senate, different minds, viewing it from different standpoints, each measuring by its own standard and judging in its own way, arrived at the one conclusion.

"The time and the circumstances under which the convention was negotiated were very unfavorable to its acceptance either by the people or the Senate.

"The nation had just emerged from its periodical choice of a Chief Magistrate, and having changed the depositary of its confidence and its power looked with no favor on an attempt at the settlement of the great and grave questions depending by those on the eve of retiring from power without consulting or considering the views of the ruler recently intrusted with their confidence and without communication with the Senate, to whose approval the treaty would be constitutionally submitted, or with any of its members.

"It is wholly unnecessary to say to statesmen of the intelligence which always marks those of the British Empire that the rejection of a treaty by the Senate of the United States implies no act of discourtesy to the government with which the treaty may have been negotiated. The United States can enter into no treaty without the advice and consent of the Senate, and that advice and consent to be intelligent must be discriminating, and their refusal can be no subject of complaint, and can give no occasion for dissatisfaction or criticism.

"On the 12th of May 1803 a convention between the United States and Great Britain for settling the boundaries of our

northeastern and northwestern frontiers was signed at London by Mr. Rufus King and Lord Hawkesbury, on the part of their respective governments, and submitted to the Senate by President Jefferson, with a message of the 24th of October in that year. The Senate approved of the convention, but upon the condition that the fifth article should be expunged, a condition which was never complied with.

"On the 31st of December 1806 Messrs. Monroe and Pinkney, on our part, signed at London a treaty of amity, commerce, and navigation with Great Britain. This instrument was not acceptable to President Jefferson, as it contained no article providing for the security of United States seamen from impressment. Consequently the treaty was never even laid before the Senate for its consideration.

"A convention for the suppression of the African slave trade was signed at London on the 13th of March, and submitted to the Senate by President Monroe, with a message of the 21st of May 1824. The convention, also, was approved by the Senate with conditions which were not accepted by Great Britain.

"Upon one point the President and the Senate and the overwhelming mass of the people are convinced, namely, that the convention, from its character and terms, or from the time of its negotiation, or from the circumstances attending its negotiation, would not have removed the sense of existing grievance; would not have afforded real substantial satisfaction to the people; would not have proved a hearty, cordial settlement of pending questions, but would have left a feeling of dissatisfaction inconsistent with the relations which the President desires to have firmly established between two great nations of common origin, common language, common literature, common interests and objects in the advancement of the civilization of the age. "The President believes the rejection of the convention to have been in the interest of peace, and in the direction of a more perfect and cordial friendship between the two countries, and in this belief he fully approves the action of the Senate. That action is quite recent and has been the cause of some excitement and popular discussion on both sides of the Atlantic, and possibly of some little disappointment, if not of irritation, in England. The tone of the press and the proclaimed opinions of some public men in each country suggest that the present is not the most hopeful moment to enter upon a renewed discussion, either of the objections to the lately proposed convention, or of the basis of a renewed negotiation. A suspension/ of the discussion on these questions for a short time (but in communicating with Lord Clarendon you will be particular to assure him that the desire on our part is that this suspension be limited to the shortest possible time consistent with its object) will allow the subsidence of any excitement or irritation growing out of the negotiation or of the rejection of the treaty— will enable the two governments to approach the more readily to a solution of their differences.

"The President hopes that Her Majesty's Government will view the propriety of the suspension in the same light in which he proposes it, as wholly in the interest and solely with a view to an early and friendly settlement of the questions between the two governments.

"He hopes that when the question shall again be considered it may comport with the views of Her Majesty's Government to embrace within the scope of the negotiation some agreement by the two governments, defining their respective rights and duties as neutrals in case the other government becomes unfortunately involved in war with a third power.

"The absence of some agreement or definition on this subject was among the causes leading to the rejection of the recent convention, under which, had it been adopted by the two countries, none of the grave questions which have arisen would have been passed upon by a tribunal whose decision either party (much less other nations) would regard as authority, so as to prevent repetition or retaliation. It might, indeed, well have occurred in the event of the selection by lot of the arbitrator or umpire in different cases, involving, however, precisely the same principles, that different awards, resting upon antagonistic principles, might have been made.

"If, however, the two leading maritime commercial nations of the world establish a rule to govern themselves, each with respect to the other, they may reasonably hope that their conclusion will be accepted by the other powers, and will become for the future recognized as a part of the public law of the civilized world.”

While rejecting the claims convention, the Senate adopted a resolution advising and consenting to the conclusion of a treaty of naturalization on the basis of the protocol signed by Mr. Johnson and Lord Stanley. Mr. Motley was furnished with full powers to conclude such a treaty. On the convention for the arbitration of the San Juan water boundary, the Senate did not come to a vote. Mr. Motley was instructed to communicate this fact to the British Government.

with Lord Clarendon.

Mr. Motley had his first interview with Lord Motley's Interview Clarendon on the 10th of June, and, although it did not affect the international result of the negotiations, it illustrates the complications to which they were exposed and forms an integral part of their history. Mr. Motley, after communicating the purport of his instructions in regard to the naturalization question and the San Juan boundary, proceeded to the subject of the rejected claims convention. In so doing he declared that he was fully sensible of the "gravity of the occasion" and of the "contingencies" that

would depend upon the negotiations concerning such "burning questions as those comprehended under the simple title of a convention for the settlement of all outstanding claims." The rejected convention would, he said, have "covered up a griev ance which most certainly would have continued to rankle and to fester beneath the surface," and those wounds "must be probed before they could be healed." Mr. Motley also expressed the conviction that the "aleatory process" provided for the selection of an umpire was an unworthy method for disposing of questions hinging on great principles of law and "involving the welfare of nations and the contingencies of war and peace."

In regard to the recognition of belligerency, Mr. Motley said that the President recognized the right of a sovereign power "to issue proclamations of neutrality" under proper conditions, but that "such measures must always be taken with a full view of the grave responsibilities assumed;" that "the famous proclamation of neutrality of May 13, 1861," was not considered by the United States as justifiable, but that the President desired it to be used only as showing animus and "as being the fountain head of the disasters which had been caused to the American people, both individually and collectively, by the hands. of Englishmen;" that other nations had issued proclamations contemporaneously, or nearly so, with that of Great Britain, but that from Great Britain alone had come "a long series of deeds, injurious to the United States, as the fruits of the proclamation."

In conclusion, Mr. Motley said that he meant to do his best to bring about better relations, but that he did not disguise from himself that "the path was surrounded by perils." It was, he observed, sometimes thought puerile or unbecoming in political or international affairs to deal with the emotions, the passions, or sentiments; but enlightened statesmen, like those of England, would never forget that "grave and disastrous misunderstandings and cruel wars resulted as often in history from passionately excited emotions and injured feelings as from cabinet deliberations or political combinations." There was, he declared, "much excitement of feeling and intensity of opinion" in the United States in regard to the questions at issue, and be deemed it his duty calmly but earnestly to call attention "to this grave aspect of affairs." He confessed to a despondent | feeling sometimes as to the possibility of the two nations ever

understanding each other," or of "their looking into each other's hearts."

At the beginning of this interview Lord Clarendon referred to Mr. Sumner's speech on the rejected claims convention, and it is not improbable that his lordship assumed, as the conference progressed, that the views expressed in that speech had been adopted as the basis of Mr. Motley's instructions. The tone of these instructions was, however, wholly conciliatory. In preparing them Mr. Fish had kept three objects in view— first, to show that the rejection of the claims convention was not an act of unfriendliness; second, to suggest a suspension of discussion till the prevailing irritation should subside; and third, to make it clear that the government of the United States did not base its claims against Great Britain on the latter's concession of belligerent rights to the Confederate States. Of these three points the last was the most important, as well as the most troublesome. It was the most im portant not only because it vitally affected the course of future negotiations, but also because it involved a sovereign right which it was the interest of all nations to preserve, and for the exercise of which the Government of the United States now fore. saw a possible occasion in the insurrection prevailing in Cuba. It was the most troublesome, because it brought the administration into conflict with those who considered the concession of belligerency as a ground of claim.

It is not to be supposed that Mr. Motley willfully departed from his instructions. He has declared-and his declaration should be decisive-that he sincerely endeavored to carry them out. But it is evident that Mr. Motley treated the questions at issue as an historian, rather than as a diplomatist. Instead of refraining from discussion, he precipitated it, suggesting "the contingencies of war and peace," and confessing to a "despondent feeling" as to the "possibility of the two nations ever understanding each other." In describing the Queen's proclamation of May 13, 1861, as the "fountain head of the disasters which had been caused to the American people, both individually and collectively," he stated the position of Mr. Sumner instead of that of Mr. Fish on the recognition of belligerency; nor does he appear to have been conscious of the radical difference between the views expressed by these statesmen on that subject.

1S. Ex. Doc. 11, 41 Cong. 3 sess. 5-10.