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President Wilson could hardly have taken this stand if the Russian revolution had not occurred eighteen days before he made his address; for it would have been difficult to proclaim a crusade for democracy while one of the chief armies on our side was led by the tsar. The moment was opportune. Russia was still in the hands of the conservative republicans and seemed destined to be a bulwark of opposition to Germany on the east. Her espousal of democracy left Germany the great stronghold of autocracy in the world. It was not a mere stroke of fancy to proclaim union of liberal nations to end once for all a system which was truly described as the enemy of democracy wherever it existed.

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When the president ended his address on April 2, 1917, the joint session of congress was terminated, and in each house a joint resolution was introduced declaring that a state of war existed "between the United States and the Imperial German Government" and that the president was authorized to use the power and resources of the nation" "to carry on war against the Imperial German Government. The resolution passed the senate on April 4 with six votes against it and the house on April 6 with fifty adverse votes.1 In a proclamation issued on the sixth the president announced that a state of war existed with "the Imperial German Government," called on the citizens to support the war in every possible way, and announced many regulations by which alien enemies were to be allowed to remain in the United States. Thus came to an end on April 6, 1917, the long period of anxiety for president and people during which they saw the country gradually drawn into the maelstrom of war.

But we went in on the highest ground we could take, to make the world safe for democracy.

Austria-Hungary had not taken part in the ruthless sub

1 Of the six senators 3 were democrats and 3 republicans. Of the 50 representatives 16 were democrats, 32 republicans, 1 a socialist, and 1 an independent.

marine warfare, although she supported the course of her ally. She had recalled Dr. Dumba on request in the autumn of 1915 leaving the embassy in the hands of a chargé d'affaires. A year later she decided to send an ambassador, and Count Tarnowski arrived in Washington in that capacity just as von Bernstorff was being handed his passports. Two days after we declared war on Germany he asked for his passports and departed without having been accorded a formal reception by the American government. It was not until December 7, 1917, that we declared war against his country. At that time a great German army had been thrown against Italy on the Austrian front and the tide of victory was barely turned by the united efforts of Italy and her allies. It was to hearten the Italians that we now formally ranged ourselves among the declared foes of Austria-Hungary.

No declaration of war was made against Turkey and Bulgaria, although they were allies of Germany. Turkey was thought to be drifting away from Germany and it was held that a declaration of war against her would serve to throw her into a stronger dependence on that country. Bulgaria was not in a position to place troops on the western battle-front or submarines in the paths of commerce; and as she had long been especially friendly to the United States it was thought unwise to announce formal hostility. She did not suspend diplomatic intercourse with our government through the course of the war; and it is probable that by maintaining the outward tokens of friendship with her we were able to contribute materially to her impulse to make a separate peace in 1918, a step that had great influence on the general situation.

CHAPTER VI

PREPARATIONS FOR WAR

1. Organizing an Army

HARDLY a man in the United States to-day but has been struck with wonder and admiration by the success with which the nation raised and equipped a vast army. That the most unmilitary people in the world should in less than two years organize an army of nearly four millions was as little expected by ourselves as by our foes. It was equally astonishing that the army should be completely furnished with the various kinds of complicated and skillfully designed materials of war, together with a gigantic system of transportation across the ocean and in France. Nevertheless these things were done with little friction and few mistakes. They were done with sacrifice but also with great joy in the doing. It was a pleasure to see the national spirit of achieving aroused, organizing and carrying forward with the precision of a well adjusted machine.

Much of the success was due to the vivid example Europe gave us at the time. For two and a half years we had been taught in a grim school all the lessons of warfare that the rest of the world had learned in years of training and waiting. We were, therefore, able to begin where other states left off. We only had to ask: "What are the experiences of other warring nations?" and having the answer to profit by it. It was in keeping with the American habit that we also sought to improve upon the methods other states had developed.

Fortunately, we were able to begin the task of mobilization

with the harmonious coöperation of Great Britain and France. Although we did not become their allies formally, we became their partners, and they put freely at our disposal all they had learned in the war. A British mission, headed by Arthur J. Balfour, the British foreign secretary, sailed from a British port on April 11, five days after war was declared, and arrived at Halifax on the 20th, whence they proceeded to Washington. On the 24th a French mission, headed by M. Viviani, former premier of France, and containing General Joffre, the commander of the French armies in the earliest months of the war, arrived at Hampton Roads and proceeded to Washington on the president's yacht, the Mayflower. Together these missions visited the tomb of Washington and laid tributes on it. Their leaders were received on the floors of the houses of congress and Mr. Balfour made a notable speech before the house of representatives. Shortly afterwards an Italian mission arrived, headed by the Prince of Udine, and other missions came still later.

One of the objects was to obtain financial help for a struggle which had already become so severe that the nations of Europe could not carry it alone. To Great Britain we lent $200,000,000 on April 25. Congress had passed a law on the 24th authorizing the issue of $7,000,000,000 in bonds, of which $3,000,000,000 were to go to foreign countries at war with Germany. France and Italy made prompt application for a portion, and were gratified, and Belgian, Russian, and Rumanian loans were also made. By July 1 over $1,000,000,000 had been lent, and this sum was largely increased before the end of the war. The borrowing nations paid us the same interest that the government of the United States paid on its own. bonds, although they were paying a higher rate of interest for money borrowed in Europe. This generous policy was adopted deliberately; for the borrowing nations had long been carrying

the weight of war, England and France lending freely to their allies, and they were nearly at the limit of their financial strength. The proceeds of these loans were for the most part deposited in the banks of this country and used to pay for materials of war that was purchased here.

The second object of the French and British missions was to lay before us the situation abroad and to convince our government of the need of an American army in France at the earliest possible time. The gravity of the situation had not been made apparent on this side of the Atlantic while we were still at peace with Germany. Troops were needed for their own fighting ability, for the assistance they would give to an exhausted nation, and to make the French and Italians realize that our participation in the struggle was to have its full effect on the field of battle as well as in financial and naval matters.

A third object was to bring technical assistance to our army. Both missions contained trained experts on military and naval matters with the knowledge of the newest methods. These experts went into conferences with American experts, showing us all they knew and helping to give our organization the right turn from the first. Without their direct aid we could not have had an army of nearly four million men in a little more than a year, nor could we have constructed it on such excellent models in a greater time.

Meanwhile, active preparations were being made for the mobilization of armies. The act of June 3, 1916, which had authorized an army of 175,000, officers and men, was clearly unequal to the occasion, although it had been considered adequate by most people when passed. As it happened, its most valuable features were the provisions it made for developing the machinery of organization with the result that the regulations of 1917, made to meet the emergency, had but to develop the system already adopted in a general way.

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