seize them, and the report indicated that those who tried to improve them were many.

Along with the publication of these findings the attorney-general gave out statistics of the production of aircraft up to October 11, showing that at last the days of doubt had passed. In the United States 9,674 airplanes and 24,672 engines hal been delivered to the proper officials. Of the American made planes 3,572 were for elementary training and 1,046 for advanced training, leaving 4,056 for service in the field. At the same time 3,129 planes had been obtained abroad, with engines. It is true we still lacked much in attaining the large number of airplanes that the senate military affairs committee insisted we should have, i.e., from 20,000 to 50,000. But the manufacturing capacity developed was considerable and increasing continually and men who knew felt confident that the army would have all the planes it needed in the spring offensive expected in 1919.

Of all the tasks assumed by the war department in the beginning of our war the aircraft program was most difficult. It meant the development of a large technical personnel from the bottom and the collection and training of an army of expert artisans, all brought together at a time when unemployed expert ability was exceedingly hard to find. So delicate and complex a machine as this might be wholly unfit merely through having some slight deficiency in almost any part. It is doubtful if the many persons who allowed themselves to be plunged into despair over delays had any idea of the obstacles that had to be overcome, not the least of which was the necessity of working all the time to carry the task forward while some of the highest officials of the government and some of the most widely read newspapers poured out scorn.

The services of Mr. John D. Ryan and Brigadier-General Kenly in carrying forward the work on airplanes were highly

valuable. They were so much appreciated that on August 27, 1918, Mr. Ryan was made second assistant secretary of war with oversight over aircraft production. The change was only an elevation in rank, for he had the same power over aircraft before the promotion as after it. Mr. Ryan succeeded Mr. Edward R. Stettinius, who went to France to have charge of war office duties.

In the report of the senate military affairs committee submitted August 22, 1918, was much emphatic language condemning the war department for not having as many airplanes of American make in France as had been promised in the summer of 1917. On the same day was published a letter from Howard E. Coffin, for a year the head of the aircraft production board, saying that the board had nothing to do with technical matters, which were left entirely to the army officers, along with the making of contracts. Mr. Coffin also said that the aircraft programs of army and navy stood in similar relations to the board. He implied that since the navy program went forward smoothly, the blame for the delay was not the board's but the army's. This may be literally true, but we shall fail to do justice if we do not remember that it was an easier task to build airplanes, or flying boats, for the navy than to build the very fast and light types of airplanes for the army. The seaplane was comparatively slow and was not expected to have combats in the air, being designed in the main to spy out lurking submarines. The army planes were continually being improved as to speed and carrying capacity. The scout plane that was merely as fast as it opponent had to be discarded. Under these circumstances there is much reason for Americans to feel that the builders of their aircraft showed no lack of American spirit and skill in what they did to establish their great industry in a little more than seventeen months.

CHAPTER IX

THE AMERICAN EXPEDITIONARY FORCE

1. Crossing the Atlantic

THE problems connected with the mobilization of industry and administration of the war department have too long turned our attention from the actual course of events in France where the soldiers under General Pershing, the American Expeditionary Force in France, were already passing through the preliminary stages of a career of service that added greatly to the glory of American arms. It is necessary to remember that whatever we think about the progress of events in the United States, nothing occurred to mar the steady and normal development of this force. Secretary Baker, in his report for 1917, calls attention to the fact that the determination to supply clothing and other necessary articles to the force in France was in some degree responsible for the temporary shortage of such supplies in the training camps in the United States. To place the army of two millions in France was a great achievement, but equally great was the system of transportation and distribution of materials of every kind that enabled the army to perform the service demanded. When we entered the war it was generally assumed that we should not be able to send a large army to France and that our aid to our friends abroad would consist chiefly in loans, the freest opportunity to procure munitions and supplies, and the support of the American navy in restraint of the submarines. Interviews with members of the French and British missions that arrived in Washington in April convinced

the president that we ought to send troops for the effect they would have on the spirits of the allied people, and the first division under Pershing was dispatched. At the same time steps were taken to raise a great army. The act of May 18, 1917, authorized the president to receive volunteers for the regular army until it reached the number of 488,218 officers and men, to call into service the national guard which when fully recruited would contain 470,177 officers and men, and to draft into a national army by a selective process two installments of 500,000 men each. If all these means were used the result would be an army of nearly 2,000,000 men.

At the time the law was passed few persons thought it would be used to the extent of its meaning. In fact, the situation in Europe was so favorable to the allies that it was easy to believe that no large army from our side of the Atlantic would be needed to finish the German resistance. March 12 Russia broke into a revolution, three days later the czar abdicated, and the republican government that succeeded to power was anti-Teutonic. It was believed that the Russian armies would now pass into the hands of officers untainted with treason, and, supplied and encouraged by an honest government, become a force strong in proportion to its size. At the same time the German army on the Somme River executed an extensive retreat to safer lines farther east and seemed disposed to assume the defensive for the rest of the war.

Six months later these hopes had declined. The Russians had failed to rally to the call of their military leaders, a campaign inaugurated in Galicia as a desperate means of arousing national spirit had ended in failure, the lines had been beaten in by the Teutons, who advanced along the coast and took Riga, and at last, November 7, Lenine and Trotsky had firmly seated themselves in power and had begun to negotiate for peace with the Teutonic allies. December 6 they signed an armistice and

March 3, 1918, accepted the treaty of Brest-Litovsk. The conviction was thus slowly borne in upon us that the United States would have to take the place of Russia in the war and that all their efforts would be demanded to prevent a German victory.

This changing opinion seems to be indicated by the figures for the transportation of troops to Europe. By the statement of the secretary of war given out July 1, 1918, the movement of American soldiers across the ocean was as follows: in 1917— May, 1,718; June, 12,261; July, 12,988; August, 18,323; September, 32,523; October, 38,259; November, 23,016; December, 48,840; 1918-January, 46,776; February, 48,027; March, 83,811; April, 117,212; May, 244,345; June, 276,372; July, 297,000; August, 283,000; September, 258,000; and October, 159,000. The conviction that Russia would be completely lost to the Entente must have been formed about October. About that time the seized German ships began to be placed in a condition for use, about that time the national guard units began to be ready for transportation to Europe; and about that time American engineers in France began to make extensive plans for landing large bodies of American troops. It seems probable that all these considerations entered into the decision of the government late in 1917 to hurry up transportation of troops.

At the end of the year 187,916 soldiers and 7,579 marines had been embarked for France, an average of nearly 28,000 a month. The number was so inadequate for the emergency that arrangements were made to get three of the fast British liners and four smaller troop-ships for the service. At the same time an additional number of repaired German ships and some new ships were available. The result is shown in the figures just given. The number of troops transported during

1 July 1, 1918, marines to the number of 14,644 had been embarked. The figures here given up to July 1, were given out by the secretary of war in New York Nation, July 13, 1918. For later dates I have followed the secretary's report, 1918, p. 9.-J. S. B.