Here comes to a pause the long series of protests by which the United States sought to induce Germany to respect law and humanity in the use of the submarine. Here ends, also, the series of evasive replies in which the imperial government resisted our demands as much as it dared, and tried to get us to make its enemies relax their measures of restraint. It wished us to force Great Britain to modify her blockade, to relinquish her broad interpretation of the doctrine of continuous voyage, to give up her peculiar kind of blockade, to abandon her plan for starving the people of Germany into submission, and to deprive her merchantmen of the right to arm in self-defense. It also sought to force us to cut off the current of supplies of warlike materials that ran from our factories to the battlefields of France and Russia. Some of these measures we should have gladly carried into effect of our own motion; for they were in keeping with older interpretations of international law; but we would do none of them on the basis of a bargain with Germany. As Secretary Lansing said in his note of May 8, 1916, our rights were "absolute, not relative," and throughout the course of the tedious negotiation no word had been spoken by which they were diminished.

Germany's methods of warfare, however, did much to weaken her influence in this country. British trade restrictions were not popular in the United States, and a large majority of the people had a genuine hope that their government would not be brought into the war. They did not like many things Germany had done in Belgium and in other areas of her land warfare, but they would never have fought on that ground. By her submarine attacks without warning she overtopped this dissatisfaction with British orders-in-council and built up a solid mass of real hatred for a nation that continued to take American lives.

CHAPTER IV

AMERICAN IDEALS AS AFFECTED BY THE WAR IN

EUROPE, 1914-1917

1. The General Results

WHEN the war began few Americans thought that the United States were to be drawn into it. It was not our war. It arose out of long-established rivalries, inextricably related with a series of international congresses with which we had nothing to do. We looked at the broad Atlantic Ocean and were thankful that it was a safe barrier against the madness that raged beyond it. We were to learn that the ocean was no longer a barrier and that the last great international congress had been held in whose deliberations we could have no part.

The spectacle which the contending nations presented to our eyes could not fail to impress on us certain defects in our own national life. First of all, it showed how unprepared we were to meet a serious attack from a strong nation, and the desire to remedy the deficiency was slowly but steadily formed in the popular mind. It also showed how loosely adjusted was our governmental machinery. When we saw the French, Germans, and British bringing every national force into its proper relation to the task that was laid upon the state, we could but ask what would happen if our loosely united government were forced to conduct a similar struggle. Yet the day came, and speedily, in which, in time of trial, the nation rose to the emergency before it quite as well as the nations of Europe. Finally, many men felt that party strife was so great in the United States that we could not make the united efforts that

a great war demands. But under the shadow of the struggle in Europe party strife took a lower pitch and disappeared altogether for the time we were actually at war.

To understand the development of such ideals as these it is well to remember what kind of man was at the head of the government. By education and experience President Wilson is a scholar. His particular knowledge is in the field of history and government, and it gives him that habit of viewing politics in the long sweeps of human experience which we are apt to deem idealism. We have had few presidents who were as able as he to bring to bear on present day problems the philosophy of the past. Conscious that he runs ahead of the judgment of contemporaries he seems to distrust the practical statesman. is his nature to make his own standards and to proceed by his own judgment.

It

Nevertheless, he has not shown himself a mere theorist. While still a college professor he expressed his ideal of politics in these words: "Speculative politics treats men and situations as they are supposed to be; practical politics treats them (upon no general plan, but in detail) as they are found to be at the moment of actual contact." 1 In the conduct of affairs he shows a willingness to follow the high expediency which Edmund Burke praised. He has not, like some other presidents, thrown away the support of his party through being superior to it. The democrats had proved themselves hard to lead before his day: he gave them party cohesion for the first time since the days of James Buchanan. When the war in Europe began he was popular with his own party and not unpopular with his opponents.. As it progressed he grew in popularity, despite the criticisms made by the more ardent champions of the allies. During our own participation in the war he became very popular with a large majority of the people. In both

1 Wilson, Woodrow, Mere Literature and Other Essays (1896), p. 158.

of these periods he was the maker of ideals for the American people.

A good illustration of his political ability is the way in which he dealt with Mr. Bryan, whose long established supremacy in the party might have brought trouble to a less tactful president. The most prying eye has not discovered any friction between these two men, not even when they were so far apart in their views that Mr. Bryan felt that he could not remain in the cabinet. We know little about the president's method in dealing with his first secretary of state, but the results seem to show that he sincerely liked and trusted him. Something must be said, also, for Mr. Bryan, who has usually inspired his friends with great loyalty. He gave to the administration his candid support, and when he withdrew from it he did not try to lessen its prestige. Perhaps if Mr. Bryan's political philosophy had been as good as his personal relations with his party he would have long since reached the presidency. His strong influence in his party and his sincere support of the administration were among the president's best assets.

2. The Alluring Rôle of Peace-Maker

When the United States won their short war against Spain in 1898, editors, clergymen, and other representative men said freely that we had become a "world power." In fact a stride had been taken away from isolation; but it is doubtful if it proved as great as had been foretold. We acquired some distant possessions which to-day many persons do not esteem valuable to us. We were soon building the Panama Canal to facilitate the defense of the Pacific Coast. It was a period of material expansion. During the past four years there has been an equally large amount of expansion, but of a spiritual nature.

Its first manifestation was in the opinion, often heard in the beginning of the war, that eventually the United States through

mediation would become the peace-maker in Europe. It was merely an assumption, but it raised the national spirit. It was supported by the fact that our diplomatic representatives in the capitals on each side of the contest freely took over the affairs of belligerent states. For thirty-two weeks the United States had a right to consider themselves the common friend of nations. When the people realized this fact, they were perceptibly lifted out of their old sense of isolation. To go farther and see themselves peace-makers was not a wide stretch of the imagination.

August 5, 1914, four days after fighting began, the president, acting under Article III of the Hague Convention, informed the rulers of France, Great Britain, Russia, Germany, and AustriaHungary that he would be glad "to act in the interest of peace" whenever any of these powers should see fit to accept his services. The offer was received with formal thanks.

Just after the battle of the Marne Mr. Oscar Straus, a member of the International Tribunal of the Hague, went to Washington from New York, visited Secretary Bryan, who hurriedly interviewed the representatives of the warring nations, among them Count von Bernstorff—who had made a hasty journey from New York to attend the secretary. After some hours Mr. Straus and the German ambassador returned to New York on the same train. At the same time the air became full of rumors of attempted peace negotiations at the instigation of Germany. Sifted down it seems that von Bernstorff indirectly caused Mr.

1 Ambassador W. H. Page, in London, took over the German, Austrian, and Turkish interests; Ambassador Herrick, in Paris, took the same interests and the Serbian also; Ambassador Marye, in Petrograd, represented Germany and Austria; Ambassador Gerard, in Berlin, Great Britain, Japan, and Serbia; Ambassador Penfield, in Vienna, Great Britain, France, and Japan; Ambassador Morgenthau, in Constantinople, Great Britain, France, Belgium, Serbia, and Switzerland; and Minister Volpicka, in Bucharest, Rumania, took under his charge the interests of Germany and Austria in Serbia. Minister Brand Whitlock took over the interests of Great Britain, Germany, Austria, Japan, Serbia, and Denmark, in Belgium, while Ambassador Guthrie, in Tokio, represented Germany and Austria.